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SUMMARY
This thesis examines one of the most controversial issues in the modem governance of 
marine living resources, namely the regulation o f cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises). 
Cetaceans face a wide range of conservation pressures, from targeted catches to incidental 
mortality in fisheries and the pernicious effects o f habitat destruction and disturbance. The 
voluminous literature on cetacean issues to date has focussed predominantly on the 
complicated regulatory position o f the International Whaling Commission, created under the 
International Convention for the Regulation o f Whaling 1946, although supervisory 
institutions pertinent to cetaceans have steadily proliferated since the mid-1970s.
This thesis reviews the leading regulatory actors and institutions, with particular reference to 
the cohesion o f the overall framework and its ability to develop effective synergies and to 
advance meaningful conservation measures for cetaceans. In so doing, the role of the IWC is 
analysed to provide a basis to identify the degree o f regulatory supplementation required by 
alternative fora. To this end, this thesis further analyses the role of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Flora and Fauna 1973, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 1992 and the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea 1982, before 
conducting a sustained appraisal o f obligations under the Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species o f Wild Animals 1979 in respect of small cetaceans. This thesis also 
advances a first substantive examination o f pertinent policies of the European Union, and 
evaluates the role o f EU law in the conservation o f cetaceans on the international, regional 
and national levels.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The international regulation of cetaceans: An introduction to the debate
On 2 December 1946, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling1 
was concluded in Washington DC, USA, establishing the legal foundations for the 
inauguration of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) as the global regulatory 
body responsible for the husbandry o f whale stocks. The IWC, which entered into 
practical effect in May 1949, was duly charged with implementing the twin objectives 
of the ICRW, stated as being “to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks 
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”. It remains 
a matter of some considerable debate as to whether, following almost sixty years of 
the operation of the IWC, whale stocks may be realistically considered to have been 
properly conserved, or the whaling industry characterised as being remotely close to 
orderly.
The whaling debate, and associated concerns over the long-term survival of depleted 
stocks of great whales, continues to occupy a central position in the contemporary 
international law of marine living resources. Arguably more so than any other marine 
resource contested by states, the regulation o f whaling remains one of the most 
controversial questions in modem oceans governance. This position has altered little 
since the earliest meetings o f the IWC. Indeed, the IWC has long been characterised 
more by its internal divisions than clear management successes, with its often 
fractious and conflict-ridden meetings earning it a dubious reputation as one of the 
more dysfunctional multilateral organisations o f the United Nations era. A series of 
fault-lines has been evident between the various elements of the membership of the 
IWC since its very first meetings, with whaling negotiations often conducted in a 
climate of ill-feeling and petulant threats to repudiate the Convention. Subsequently, 
relations have steadily deteriorated to the extent that the present-day Annual Meetings 
of the IWC, now convened in the full glare o f the global media, are considered by one 
leading commentator and long-standing delegate to be less a series of debates on the
1 161 UNTS 72 [hereinafter “ICRW”].
2 Preamble to the ICRW.
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regulation of whale stocks, than perpetual “altercations” between two mutually 
antagonistic blocs, advancing diametrically opposing viewpoints as to the future of 
commercial whaling.
The polarisation of views regarding directed hunting has been thrown into sharper 
focus by the establishment o f a global moratorium on commercial whaling, instituted 
in 1982 and brought into effect in 1986. This unprecedented move was designed to 
provide a window of sustained opportunity for whale stocks to regenerate to the point 
at which commercial hunting would be ecologically and economically viable. In the 
interim, the IWC would simultaneously elaborate a sophisticated and workable 
alternative to the unsatisfactory management initiatives thus far advanced to establish 
whaling quotas. The finalisation of this much vaunted new management system -  
known as the Revised Management Procedure (RMP) -  encompassing a complex 
modelling exercise in conjunction with more holistic considerations of animal 
welfare, has to date proved elusive and, consequently, the moratorium on commercial 
hunting remains in effect.
The continued operation of the moratorium, together with the current failure to 
ultimately progress the RMP, has led to further controversy. A number of key whaling 
states argue that certain stocks of whales have recovered to the point at which a 
resumption in commercial harvesting is now feasible, while a slender majority of 
IWC members remains ideologically opposed to a resumption of commercial whaling 
and has consistently blocked initiatives to overturn the moratorium. This in turn has 
led a number o f pro-whaling states to explore alternative options, such as a series of 
loopholes within the ICRW and the development o f rival institutions to effectively by­
pass these restrictions, causing a further souring of relations to the extent that the 
continued viability o f the IWC itself has been called into question.
Despite the highly divisive nature of IWC negotiations, a series of general principles 
may be advanced to summarise the regulation of cetaceans. Firstly, the issue of 
directed hunting has, over the course o f the past four decades, become politicised on 
an unprecedented scale, with the gradual evolution of the IWC from a perceived
3 A. Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2005), at xv.
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“whalers’ club” to a more overtly conservation-orientated organisation.4 As global 
public opinion has shifted markedly in this time, so a considerable number of 
governments have fundamentally altered their national position on the lethal 
exploitation of whales, which has accordingly influenced the regulatory direction of 
the IWC. For reasons of space and focus, this thesis seeks not to comprehensively 
evaluate assertions that whales are inherently “special” and ought therefore to be 
protected per se from lethal exploitation.5 It is instead merely observed that such 
views exist in some quarters, and are soundly rejected by other constituents.
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that public perceptions of whaling in many 
countries have shifted from relative nonchalance to strong opposition,6 a process that 
has accelerated since the UN Conference on the Human Environment 1972, which 
was subsequently reflected in the official policies of an increasing number of parties 
to the ICRW.7 As a distinct quota-setting body, it is doubtful whether the IWC itself 
was designed to facilitate this debate as the central aspect o f its operations that this 
now forms. Indeed, as one former IWC Chairman has lamented, “the public furore 
about whales and whaling” has jeopardised efforts “to achieve the rational 
management o f world whaling and restoration o f whale resources to full biological 
productivity for utilisation by man”.8 Nevertheless, it is clear to both sides of the 
debate that, for many of the current parties to the ICRW, the objective articulated by 
McHugh as constituting the key function o f the Convention has become politically 
unacceptable, while the essential terms o f reference for the IWC have remained 
largely unchanged.
4 See S. Suhre, “Misguided Morality: The Repercussions o f the International Whaling Commission’s 
Shift from a Policy o f Regulation to One o f Preservation” (1999) 12 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 305; see also H. Sigvaldsson, “The International Whaling Commission: 
The Transition from a “Whaling Club” to a “Preservation Club” (1996) 31 Cooperation and Conflict 
311.
5 On the legal case for such a position see A. D ’Amato and S. K. Chopra, “Whales: Their Emerging 
Right to Life” (1991) 85 American Journal o f  International Law 21. For concise appraisal o f the 
scientific and ethical case for a prohibition on all forms o f exploitation o f cetaceans see M. P. 
Simmonds, “Into the Brains o f Whales” (2006) 100 Applied Animal Behaviour Science 103.
6 C. Epstein, The Power o f Words in International Relations: Birth o f an Anti-Whaling Discourse 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008).
7 P. W. Bimie, The International Regulation o f  Whaling: From Conservation o f  Whaling to the 
Conservation o f Whales and the Regulation o f  Whale-Watching (New York: Oceana Publications, 
1985), at 1.
8 J. L. McHugh, “The Role and History of the International Whaling Commission” in W. E. Schevill 
(ed.), The Whale Problem: A Status Report (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1974), at 311-313.
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Secondly, while the ICRW remains the longest-standing international regime 
currently in operation to address the regulation o f whaling, it is also clear that within 
the IWC there has been an increasing focus on cetaceans as opposed merely to 
whales. As will be noted in Chapter II o f this thesis, the movement towards examining 
the needs of “small cetaceans”, including dolphins and porpoises, commenced in the 
early 1970s within the Scientific Committee o f the IWC, before assuming an 
increasingly prominent role upon the agenda of the Commission itself. This remains a 
controversial development; as will be observed in the following Chapter, a number of 
pro-whaling states adopt an extremely narrow view of the parameters of regulatory 
competence exercised by the IWC, to the exclusion of small cetaceans, while other 
parties have argued strongly in favour o f such a remit. Despite the lack of consensus 
on this issue, the IWC has nonetheless adopted a substantial number of Resolutions 
addressing a wider class of cetaceans.
Thirdly, and allied to this development, there has been a further movement within the 
IWC towards addressing threats to cetaceans beyond the general need to mitigate and 
deter over-consumption of whale stocks. In recent years, a more holistic view of 
cetacean husbandry has emerged, with the IWC now seeking to address a number of 
wider anthropogenic factors that may have an adverse impact upon the conservation 
status of these species. Particular concerns have been raised in respect of fisheries 
interactions and, moreover, a broad range o f threats to habitats, ranging from the 
pernicious effects of pollution, an increased degree o f anthropogenic activities in 
areas of key significance for cetaceans, poorly regulated ecotourism, significant 
ocean noise and, on a longer-term basis, the uncertain effects of global climate 
change. Again, the explicit recognition by the IWC of the need to exercise regulatory 
functions beyond the narrow confines o f quota setting has proved controversial. 
Nevertheless, such issues have steadily occupied a significant position on the agenda 
of the Commission in recent years.
Fourthly, the sustained failure to advance the RMP and to develop a series of 
pragmatic compromises to the political -  as opposed to scientific -  difficulties 
experienced within the IWC, has led to a stagnation of the Commission’s activities. 
The continuing lack of a clear solution to this problem has in turn stymied progress on
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other central aspects of cetacean management, which has in recent resulted in the 
virtual paralysis of the IWC as an effective regulatory body.
As a direct result of these evolving pressures upon the IWC, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for the international management of stocks of cetaceans to be 
realistically and effectively discharged under the sole auspices of the ICRW as it 
currently stands. One ostensibly straightforward solution would be to seek to reform 
an ageing and unsatisfactory treaty. However, a flexible amendment procedure in the 
form of the ICRW Schedule has proved ineffectual to date, while the extreme division 
between states concerned with cetacean issues, evidenced on an annual basis at IWC 
Meetings, strongly suggests that such an approach would be fraught with practical 
difficulties and endowed with limited prospects for success.9 Accordingly, since the 
1972 UNCED Conference, a supplementary regulatory framework has emerged 
alongside the ICRW, to which certain key issues in the global debate on cetaceans 
have been displaced. An eclectic supervisory mosaic o f international and regional 
bodies exercising a degree o f legal competence over aspects o f cetacean management 
may now be identified. It is this alternative framework, developed on a largely ad hoc 
basis outside the auspices of the ICRW, which constitutes the primary focus of this 
thesis.
1.2 Point of departure and key research themes
The international regulation of cetaceans remains a subject of substantial academic 
fascination and frustration. To date a formidable volume of commentary has been 
produced on this question, especially in relation to the controversial progress of the 
IWC, from Bimie’s seminal study o f the international regulation of whaling10 and 
Tonnessen and Johnsen’s classic historical review of the industry,11 to more current 
works on the present and future of the beleaguered organisation. The IWC has been
9 On these difficulties generally see M. C. Maffei, “The International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling” (1997) 12 International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law 287 and P. Bimie “Are 
Twentieth-Century Marine Conservation Conventions Adaptable to Twenty-First Century Goals and 
Principles? Part II” (1997) 12 International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law 488.
10 Bimie, “International Regulation”.
11 J. N. Tonnessen and A. O. Johnsen, The History o f  Modern Whaling (London: C. Hurst & Co., 
1982).
12 See, for instance, W. C. G. Bums and A. Gillespie (eds.), The Future o f Cetaceans in a Changing 
World (New York; Transnational Publishers, 2003) and Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”.
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examined as a distinct ecopolitical13 and international relations14 conundrum, while 
the rich and informative experience o f its Scientific Committee has been drawn upon 
to illustrate its contribution to management in the face of considerable scientific 
uncertainty.15 The assortment of literature on cetacean conservation issues within 
scholarly periodicals devoted to various disciplines and sub-disciplines of science, 
law, public policy, ethics, environmental management, political science and 
international relations is also exceptionally voluminous.
Given that a substantial body of inter-disciplinary literature currently exists, it may be 
questioned to what extent a further legal analysis is necessary or, indeed, helpful. In 
response, the central contention of this thesis is that the current commentary remains 
essentially focussed on the vexed questions of whale harvesting and the future 
viability of the IWC. While these controversies remain of significant importance to 
the debate -  and issues of directed hunting are considered primarily in Chapter II of 
this work -  this thesis seeks to depart from the present literature by examining 
regulatory issues and actors that have, to date, been afforded rather more peripheral 
attention. Essentially, this thesis seeks to break new ground by evaluating the broader 
regulatory framework pertinent to cetaceans, and the capacity o f these regional and 
global actors to effectively address the more pervasive and insidious threats to the 
survival of species of cetaceans in addition to the polemic confines of the directed 
hunting debate.
In so doing, this thesis seeks to answer three primary research questions:
• To what extent is the current transnational regulatory framework capable of 
addressing the primary anthropogenic threats to cetaceans?
• To what extent has a more regionally-based framework begun to emerge to 
regulate cetaceans, with particular reference to small cetaceans given the 
supervisory difficulties historically experienced by the IWC in this regard?
13 Epstein, “The Power o f Words”.
14 P. J. Stoett, The International Politics o f Whaling (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1997).
15 M. Heazle, Scientific Uncertainty and the Politics o f  Whaling (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2006).
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• Within this regional framework, what are the implications of the recent 
emergence o f the European Union as a distinct cetacean regulator?
The key points of originality developed by such an approach may be considered to be 
as follows.
Firstly, issues concerning the inherent legality, or otherwise, of the resumption of 
commercial whaling and the various means utilised by states to avoid the IWC 
moratorium, continue to dominate the attention o f legal writers. This thesis takes as its 
point o f departure the sentiments o f the Cetacean Specialist Group of the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN), which is primarily responsible for conducting 
independent and objective analysis o f the global conservation status of cetaceans, that 
direct exploitation has increasingly posed a lesser threat to stocks than the cumulative 
range o f current anthropogenic pressures upon the cetacean environment.16 
Nevertheless, despite this truism, a comparatively modest and ad hoc collection of 
legal literature has thus far been devoted to such issues. Therefore, in addition to 
considering the position in respect of the ongoing controversy surrounding 
commercial hunting, this thesis accordingly seeks to posit an original contribution to 
the current corpus of research by considering the management responses to these 
wider, non-consumptive, anthropogenic threats to cetaceans, with particular reference 
to by-catches.
Secondly, and allied to the previous point, to date the legal literature has been 
dominated not only by the directed hunting issue, but also by the IWC itself. In recent 
years legal writers have demonstrated a growing interest in alternative bodies,
1 7primarily as a result of the ambiguous wording o f the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982,18 the inauguration o f pro-consumptive regulatory rivals such as the
16 R. R. Reeves, B. D. Smith, E. A. Crespo and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and 
Porpoises: 2002-2010 Conservation Action Plan fo r  the World’s Cetaceans (Gland: IUCN, 2003), at 2.
17 T. L. McDorman, “Canada and Whaling: An Analysis o f Article 65 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention” (1998) 29 Ocean Development and International Law 179; see also P. W. Bimie, “Marine 
Mammals: Exploiting the Ambiguities o f Article 65 o f the Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
Related Provisions: Practice under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling” in D. 
Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds.), The Law o f  the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).
18 1883 UNTS 396 [hereinafter “LOSC”].
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North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO)19 and the tentative
9 nemergence of regulatory initiatives within other fora. However, while the 
development of regulatory alternatives to the IWC has been on-going since the 1970s, 
a unified analysis of the current system has been somewhat conspicuous by its
91absence. This thesis therefore seeks to redress this lacuna in the literature by 
providing a detailed assessment of the broader supervisory system in operation.
Thirdly, in addition to the modest levels o f coverage historically afforded to these 
supervisory alternatives, since 2002 one particular regional body has emerged as a 
key component of the transnational regulatory framework, namely the European 
Union. Given that, as is argued in this thesis, conservation efforts under the current 
broad framework are routinely undermined by a lack of resources, legal powers, 
national implementation and political will, in many respects the EU seemingly 
operates as a microcosm of an optimal cetacean regulator. Indeed, the EU institutions 
can call upon substantial financial resources to underwrite conservation and research 
activities which, under EU law, must be effectively implemented by the Member 
States on pain o f facing infringement proceedings, and are underpinned by a virtually 
unanimous political stance on the issue. The progress and prospects of the EC as a 
distinct cetacean regulator have not, as yet, been substantively explored in the current 
legal literature, nor indeed have the implications of such policies on the activities of 
other components of the global regulatory framework. This thesis will therefore 
advance the first comprehensive appraisal of the relevant EC policies and evaluate 
their prospects for success in relation to cetaceans in European waters and beyond.
19 D. D. Caron, “The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures” (1995) 89 American 
Journal o f International Law 154.
20 See, for instance, H. Nijkamp and A. Nollkaemper, “The Protection of Small Cetaceans in the Face 
of Uncertainty: An Analysis o f the Ascobans Agreement” (1997) 9 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 281; W. C. G. Bums, “The Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of 
the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS): A Regional Response 
to the Threats Facing Cetaceans” (1998) 1 Journal o f  International Wildlife Law and Policy 113; R. R. 
Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans: A Preliminary Evaluation o f the Ascobans and Accobams 
Agreements” in A. E. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: 
Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and R. R. 
Churchill, “The Agreement on the Conservation o f Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas” in 
Bums and Gillespie, “Future o f Cetaceans”, at.
21 Indeed, Bimie noted the regulatory potential posed by a series o f recently inaugurated biodiversity 
conventions, but lamented that spatial constraints within her key treatise on the whaling regime 
precluded substantive analysis of these alternative regimes: “International Regulation”, at xxx.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis comprises nine substantive chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
this thesis commences by outlining the primary components of the international legal 
framework addressing the conservation needs and status of cetaceans. To this end, 
consideration is first accorded to the ICRW as the distinct management system of the 
greatest longevity. Chapter II highlights the development of the “whaling regime” 
with particular attention to the conclusion o f the ICRW and the innovative structures 
of the IWC. Accordingly, Chapter II will provide a concise outline of the key issues in 
the international regulation o f whaling as currently experienced within the IWC. In so 
doing, it is argued that two key issues arising within the IWC require supplementary 
regulation from further external bodies.
Firstly, it will be observed that the controversy generated over attempts within the 
IWC to regulate small cetaceans has necessarily displaced conservation efforts for 
these species to separate fora. As will be demonstrated in this Chapter, operational -  if 
not necessarily legal -  constraints upon the parameters of the IWC’s regulatory remit 
has left, in practice, a supervisory vacuum regarding small cetaceans and a 
corresponding need to regulate such species on a multilateral level outside the 
auspices of the ICRW. Secondly, given the traditional emphasis on quota-setting, the 
precise remit of the IWC to address broader environmental concerns remains 
somewhat uncertain. Accordingly, until a definitive agreement is reached between the 
parties on this issue, it is clear that a degree o f regulatory supplementation will be 
required from alternative bodies.
Following this, Chapter III proceeds to examine the major multilateral treaties with a 
practical application to cetaceans and charts the impact of these regimes upon the 
IWC. To this end, this Chapter will consider the LOSC, the primary international 
instrument establishing overarching commitments in relation to the husbandry of 
marine resources and the protection of the marine environment. Moreover, cetaceans 
are specifically addressed within Articles 65 and 120 LOSC, establishing obligations 
on states to work through “appropriate organisations” for the conservation and 
management of these species. The ambiguous wording of these provisions, as will be
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observed in this thesis, has raised the spectre that the IWC may be avoided as a 
regulatory regime for the exploitation o f whale stocks.
Chapter III will also examine two key international biodiversity treaties. Firstly, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
emerged in the early 1970s and quickly became a forum through which certain 
aspects of the whaling debate were displaced, which has led to a somewhat strained 
relationship with the IWC on occasion. This Chapter will note the attempts within 
CITES to influence the regulation o f whaling by certain parties and analyse the 
prospects for a harmonious working relationship with the IWC. Furthermore, Chapter 
III will also briefly examine the role o f the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
1992,23 a framework treaty adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development to promote the conservation of biodiversity and a source of global 
commitments and aspirational targets in this regard. While to date the CBD has 
exercised a highly limited role in relation to cetaceans, in recent years an 
unprecedented degree o f attention has been focussed on marine biodiversity in this 
forum, with corresponding implications for the regulation of cetaceans on a global 
level.
Chapter IV examines a particular international convention that not only straddles the 
international/regional divide, but has also exercised a strong supervisory remit in 
relation to small cetaceans in particular, namely the Convention on the Conservation 
of Migratory Species o f Wild Animals.24 In this respect it is argued that the CMS 
currently represents the most viable regulatory alternative for addressing the 
conservation needs of small cetaceans, notwithstanding the various deficiencies 
inherent within this regime. Chapter IV therefore presents a critical overview of the 
application of the Bonn Convention to these species, with particular reference to its 
application as a framework treaty that facilitates the elaboration of region- and even 
species-specific subsidiary instruments to address the conservation needs of migratory 
species, of which four have been concluded to date that are pertinent to cetaceans.
22 993 UNTS 243 [Hereinafter “CITES”].
23 1790 UNTS 79 [hereinafter “CBD”].
24 1651 UNTS 333 [hereinafter the “CMS” or “Bonn Convention”].
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Chapter IV argues that the CMS regime presents a number of advantages in this 
regard, not least given that issues of cetacean management have yet to be heavily 
politicised within this forum, in addition to the clear enthusiasm within the CMS to 
regulate such species and development o f a mutually-cooperative relationship 
between the Bonn Convention and the IWC. However, this Chapter also observes that 
there are a number of significant impediments to the overall effectiveness of the CMS 
as a cetacean regulator, not least a chronic lack o f resources, substantial commitments 
to the regulation of a disparate range o f terrestrial, marine and avian species in 
addition to cetaceans, an application only to migratory cetaceans, vague treaty 
commitments and an alarming recent trend for subsidiary instruments to be adopted 
on a non-binding basis.
Chapters IV, V and VI provide a critical analysis of the progress and prospects for the 
various subsidiary instruments pertinent to cetaceans adopted to date under the CMS 
umbrella. Chapter IV examines the Agreement on the Conservation of Small 
Cetaceans of the Baltic Sea, North-East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas 1992,25 the 
first and most long-standing CMS subsidiary Agreement specifically adopted to 
address the conservation needs of cetaceans. This Chapter details in full the 
development of the Agreement and the practical and legal difficulties faced by it, with 
particular reference to its often uncomfortable relationship with the EU and internal 
tensions over its regulatory remit, as well as resource limitations and a dearth of 
binding obligations. Chapter IV argues that ASCOBANS has made a positive 
contribution to cetacean conservation in these waters and remains a strong focal point 
for much-needed research activities and the elaboration of action plans, but it has been 
largely overshadowed by the emergence o f the EU as a cetacean actor. Indeed, as this 
Chapter will demonstrate, given that its constituent parties are subject to a series of 
overriding -  and sometimes conflicting -  commitments under EC law, ASCOBANS 
has been largely relegated to the status o f an adjunct advisory organisation, which has 
increasingly led to difficult questions as to its future viability as a stand-alone forum.
25 1772 UNTS 217 [hereinafter “ASCOBANS”].
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Chapter V examines the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black
9 ASea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area 1996, the sister Agreement of 
ASCOBANS. ACCOBAMS has been praised by commentators as potentially the 
more effective o f the two Europe-based CMS cetacean subsidiaries, given that it is 
more ostensibly conservationist in tone and operates a more sophisticated institutional 
structure. Chapter V will therefore trace the development of ACCOBAMS and 
analyse its prospects for future success, arguing that while the Agreement appears to 
be in a stronger position than ASCOBANS to deliver meaningful conservation 
measures for cetaceans within the waters under its regulatory purview, it too has been 
undermined by resource limitations and a generally poor level of implementation of 
the measures adopted by the Agreement by its constituent parties.
Following this, Chapter VI analyses developments under the CMS in relation to 
cetaceans, with particular reference to two Memoranda o f Understanding concluded 
in recent years, namely the MOU for the Conservation of Cetaceans and their Habitats 
in the Pacific Islands Region, concluded in 2006, and the MOU Concerning the 
Conservation of the West African Manatee and Small Cetaceans o f Western Africa 
and Macaronesia, concluded in 2008. The adoption o f the MOUs marks a departure to 
previous cetacean policies advanced under the auspices of the CMS, with both these 
instruments being essentially non-binding in legal character. To this end, this Chapter 
offers an appraisal of this approach, arguing that notwithstanding the absence of a 
firm commitment to the elaboration of binding obligations for cetaceans, there is 
merit in this policy with the Pacific Islands MOU making use of existing regional 
structures in an area in which there is a considerable disparity of views over cetacean 
conservation policy, while the West Africa MOU marks the first regional initiative to 
address the conservation needs of cetaceans within these waters.
Following the analysis of the regional CMS instruments, Chapter VIII considers the 
emergence of the European Union as a distinct regulatory forum for cetaceans. The 
EU retains a unique position within the global framework for the regulation of 
cetaceans, operating as an overarching fisheries management body as well as a source
26 2183 UNTS 303 [hereinafter “ACCOBAMS”].
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77of binding environmental law in the form of the Habitats Directive. Moreover, in 
recent years the EU has exercised substantial influence over the whaling debate 
through the application both of its external relations policies and internal trade rules. 
The emerging role and legislative impact of the EC will be fully analysed, tracing the 
development of a distinct policy towards cetaceans from its origins in a series of ad 
hoc Regulations. This thesis will argue that, from these early initiatives, the Habitats 
Directive has subsequently played a key role in cetacean conservation in the region,
7Rbefore the impact of the Sixth Environmental Action Programme has brought an 
unprecedented degree of focus upon marine mammals, through the development of 
the EC Biodiversity Strategy, the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy and the 
adoption of the first clear cetacean laws, in conjunction with a greater focus on the 
marine application of the Habitats Directive and the elaboration of the Marine
7QStrategy Framework Directive. These developments have collectively fostered a 
distinct policy framework towards cetaceans, both within EC waters and also 
manifested in external policies as regards various other regional and international 
fora, culminating in the emerging possibility o f a common whaling policy. This 
Chapter argues that while this is a highly positive development from the perspective 
o f cetacean conservation, this has to an extent been counterbalanced by a tendency of 
the EC institutions to undermine existing fora, while certain key policies have been 
adopted with little reference to scientific advice, to the ultimate detriment of the 
measures in question.
Chapter IX of this thesis then presents a series of conclusions concerning the 
operation of the current international framework for the conservation, management 
and study of cetaceans.
In advancing this analysis, this thesis endeavours to state the pertinent legal position 
addressing cetaceans as it stood on 31 August 2009.
27 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats o f wild fauna 
and flora [19927 Official Journal L206/7.
28 Decision No. 1600/2002/EC [2002] Official Journal L242/1.
29 Directive No. 2008/56/EC of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the 
field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) [2008] Official Journal 
L164/19.
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CHAPTER II
THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION AND THE 
REGULATION OF CETACEANS
2.1 Introduction
This first substantive Chapter considers the international regulation of whaling and the 
application of key institutions to the wider conservation needs of cetaceans. It is the central 
contention of this thesis that a definitive regime for the regulation of cetaceans has largely 
failed to emerge under the auspices of the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling1 and its constituent management organ, the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC). Accordingly, this Chapter seeks to establish how and why certain key conservation 
and management questions in respect of cetaceans have been left unanswered by the whaling 
convention. Thereafter, the remainder of this thesis considers the extent to which such issues 
may be addressed within alternative and complementary regulatory fora. The most 
appropriate starting point for a thesis concerned with the wider conservation of cetaceans is to 
accordingly review the current leading treaty regime governing (many) such species, in order 
to identify the areas within which it has struggled to advance regulatory initiatives and the 
reasons for these travails.
It is not the intention of this Chapter, nor indeed this thesis, to undertake an extensive review 
of the permutations of the various IWC Meetings. Definitive accounts of the IWC’s long 
history currently exist, encompassing Tonnessen and Johnsen’s exhaustive review of the 
history of modem whaling,2 Bimie’s seminal study o f the Commission’s practice up to the 
formulation of the moratorium on commercial hunting and, more recently, Gillespie’s 
informed appraisal o f current developments.4 This Chapter instead presents the whaling 
debate within the wider context of the international regulation of cetaceans, noting the key 
challenges posed by attempts to foster a wider supervisory regime for species and threats 
beyond those traditionally considered subject to the purview of the IWC.
1 161 UNTS 72 [hereinafter “ICRW”].
2 J. N. Tonnessen and A. O. Johnsen, The History o f  Modern Whaling (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982).
3 P. W. Bimie, The International Regulation o f Whaling: From Conservation o f Whaling to the Conservation o f  
Whales and the Regulation o f Whale-Watching (New York: Oceana Publications, 1985).
4 A. Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2005).
14
To this end, this Chapter will first place the ICRW in its historical context, detailing the 
processes and pressures that led to its formation. There will then follow an examination of the 
practical difficulties experienced by the IWC regulating whaling, not least in establishing a 
clear management system and the implications of its current moratorium on commercial 
hunting. This Chapter will then evaluate the key inhibiting factors to the development of a 
more holistic conservatory regime for cetaceans, primarily the ongoing political controversies 
arguing that although a legal case may be made for a formal recognition of broader 
conservation activity, the long-standing political impasse within the IWC has undermined 
efforts to effectively advance the regulatory -  if  not necessarily the scientific -  remit of the 
ICRW. These on-going difficulties have therefore largely displaced further consideration of 
wider anthropogenic threats beyond commercial hunting, as well as the management of 
“small” cetaceans, to other multilateral fora, for which an appraisal of the strengths and 
limitations of these alternative regimes is advanced in subsequent Chapters of this thesis.
2.2 A brief history of whaling
It is impossible to state definitively the point at which the first primitive coastal whaling 
activities commenced, although recent archaeological evidence suggests that the earliest 
known whaling communities were established on the Korean peninsula up to 6000 years BC.5 
Further evidence exists of whaling activities along the western coast of Canada over 3000
f\ 7years ago, and Greenlandic harvesting may be traced back to 2400 BC, while some degree
Q
of whaling trade was conducted by Norwegian hunters before 900 AD. Nevertheless, the 
establishment of a first discernible whaling “industry” is widely credited to coastal Basque 
communities in the Eleventh Century, with the northern right whale believed to be “probably 
the first large whale to be hunted on a systematic, commercial basis”.9 Local stocks of the 
right whale, which was considered easier to harvest due to its slow movement and tendency 
to float when killed, accordingly became heavily depleted in the Bay of Biscay by the
5 S-M. Lee and D. Robineau, “Les Cetaces des Gravures Rupestres Neolithiques de Bangu-dae (Coree du Sud) 
et les Debuts de la Chasse a Baleine dans le Pacifique Nord-Ouest” (2004) 108 L ’anthropologie 137.
6 G. G. Monks, “Quit Blubbering: An Examination o f Nuu’chah’nulth (Nootkan) Whale Butchery” (2001) 11 
International Journal o f Osteoarchaeology 136.
7 R. A. Caulfield, Greenlanders, Whales and Whaling: Sustainability and Self-Determination in the Arctic 
(Hanover, New Hampshire, University Press o f New England, 1997), at 81.
8 M. Castellini, “History o f Polar Whaling: Insights into the Physiology o f the Great Whales” (2000) 126 
Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology Part A 153, at 154.
9 P. J. Clapham, S. B. Young and R. L. Brownell, Jr., “Baleen Whales: Conservation Issues and the Status of the 
Most Endangered Populations” (1999) 29 Mammal Review 35, at 41.
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Thirteenth Century.10 By the Fifteenth Century, technological advances had enabled Basque 
whalers to harvest whales further out to sea, eventually establishing a substantial industry 
expanding up to the shores o f Newfoundland.11
As a distinct industry, commercial whaling has been traditionally hamstrung by poor long­
term management strategies, leading to periodic cycles of over-exploitation and stock 
collapse. As right whales become increasingly scarce by the Seventeenth Century, Dutch
whalers, which by this point dominated the industry, targeted bowhead whales, with north
1 0Atlantic stocks of this species also hunted to the point of commercial collapse. By the mid- 
Seventeenth Century a small coastal whaling industry had been founded in New England, 
before the discovery of sperm whale hunting grounds in 1712 led to the establishment of the 
famous Nantucket whaling industry, which dominated world whaling throughout the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries until the outbreak of the American Civil War.13 
Following the Civil War, a thriving whaling industry developed along the West Coast of the 
US which decimated stocks o f grey whales to the point of near extinction,14 until the 
discovery of oil in Pennsylvania essentially ended the sustained economic viability and 
attraction of the American whaling industry.15
The advent of “modem” whaling is considered to be the 1860s, with the development of the 
exploding harpoon, permitting for the first time the industrial pursuit of rorquals, which 
yielded the largest harvest of both products and profits.16 This led to the development of a 
major pelagic whaling industry in Antarctica in the early Twentieth Century, with the
17establishment of the first Antarctic whaling stations in 1904. In the years prior to the First 
World War the industry was dominated by the UK and Norway, with large numbers of 
humpback whales caught on an annual basis, in addition to a burgeoning catch of blue
10 J. E. Scarff, “The International Management o f Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary 
Assessment” (1976) 6 Ecology Law Quarterly 323, at 344.
11 S. L. Cumbaa, “Archaeological Evidence o f the Sixteenth Century Basque Right Whale Fishery in Labrador” 
in R. L. Brownell, Jr., P. B. Best and J. H. Prescott, Right Whales: Past and Present Status -  Reports o f the 
International Whaling Commission; Special Issue 10 (Cambridge: International Whaling Commission, 1986), at 
187.
12 Clapham, Young and Brownell, Jr., “Baleen Whales”, at 44.
13 On the Nantucket whaling industry see E. J. Dolin, Leviathan: The History o f Whaling in America (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), especially 63-305; see also N. Philbrick, In the Heart o f  the Sea 
(London: Harper-Collins, 2001).
14 Scarff, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 345-46.
15 Dolin, “Leviathan”, at 335-41.
16 On this issue generally see Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 16-54.
17 Scarff, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 347.
16
whales. By the 1920s, following a considerable reduction in output during the First World 
War,18 the hunting o f blue whales began in earnest.19 At this point, the first calls for 
conservatory activity were made within the newly inaugurated League o f Nations, as an 
unprecedented degree of attention began to be paid towards the aggregation of legal norms 
governing marine resources.
2.3 The early regulation of whaling
The economic and ecological problems associated with unsustainable whaling practices were 
first observed in the context of the codification of the law of the sea during the League of 
Nations era. Prior to this, whaling activities were regulated under national law or through 
bilateral agreements between major whaling nations, which provided limited conservation 
measures.20 Moreover, there was little tradition of developing multilateral conservation 
agreements for marine resources at this time. The Behring Sea Fur Seals Fisheries 
Arbitration21 in 1893 had primarily viewed high seas stocks of marine mammals as res 
nullius. Whales therefore remained subject to the freedom of high seas fishing and thereby 
open to largely unrestricted exploitation in these waters, beyond individualised arrangements 
between interested states.
In 1924, the League o f Nations established a Committee o f Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law,22 with the “exploitation of the products of the sea” 
identified as a potential area for further activity. In 1925, Rapporteur Jose Leon Suarez 
submitted a series of proposals to the Committee of Experts noting particular concern for 
whale stocks.23 Suarez advocated a “new jurisprudence” for the exploitation of marine living 
resources, which were considered res communis or “the patrimony of the whole human 
race”.24 A series of whale conservation measures were proposed, including the establishment
18 See Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History of Modern Whaling”, at 292-305.
19 Scarff observes that “[b]y 1922 the annual catch o f humpbacks had fallen to nine and the blue whale catch 
had increased to 5,700”: “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 347.
20 Nevertheless, a series of local whaling bans had been instituted between 1863 and 1904 in Norwegian waters: 
Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 61-67.
21 1 M oore’s International Arbitration Awards 755.
22 Assembly Resolution o f September 22 1924. On the contemporary difficulties o f this process see H. G. 
Crocker, “The Codification o f International Law: Some Preliminary Queries” (1924) 18 American Journal o f  
International Law 38 and W. L. Rodgers, “What Parts o f International Law May Be Codified?” (1926) 20 
American Journal o f  International Law 44.
23 Reproduced at (1926) 20 American Journal o f International Law: Special Supplement 230, at 237; see also P.
C. Jessup, “L’Exploitation des Richesses de la Mer” (1929) 4 Recueil des Cours 403.
24 “Special Supplement”, at 236.
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of reserved zones to protect habitats and migratory routes, restrictions on hunting activities
9  ^and the need for a specialist international conference to further elaborate such policies. In 
1929, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) proposed that whaling 
should be regulated “as a matter of urgency” and submitted a draft convention to the
97League, based on Norwegian legislation. The Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
was opened for signature on 24 September 1931 and entered into force on 16 January 1935.28
90The 1931 Convention, which applied solely to baleen whales, ultimately offered a rather 
negligible degree of protection to these species. The primary difficulty was a marked lack of 
participation by key whaling states, while a high proportion o f signatories further declined 
to ratify the Convention,31 seemingly denoting a preference for specific bilateral
39arrangements over an open multilateral agreement. Nevertheless, as noted by Bimie, the
331931 Convention was “for all its limitations, largely innovatory”. Indeed, the Convention 
established for the first time a prohibition on the taking of individual species,34 as well as
3 ^juveniles, calves and accompanying females. Reporting requirements were also 
established36 and the ICES proposals for the full use of carcasses37 and financial payments38 
were also reflected within the final text, while perhaps the most novel aspect of the 
Convention established an exemption for the activities o f “aborigines dwelling on the coasts
25 To this end, Suarez envisaged that such a conference could examine “[gjeneral and local principles for the 
organisation of a more rational and uniform control o f the exploitation of the aquatic fauna in all its aspects; 
creation o f reserved zones, organisation of their exploitation in rotation, close periods and fixed ages at which 
killing is permitted; determination of the most effective method of supervising the execution of the measures 
adopted and maintaining the control”: “Special Supplement”, at 240.
26 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 108-09.
27 155 LNTS 349.
28 The delay was primarily due to the stipulations o f Article 17 o f the Convention, which required eight 
ratifications, including those specifically o f Norway and the UK, with legislative congestion at Westminster 
blamed for the UK’s tardiness in this regard: W. R. Vallance, “The International Convention for Regulation of 
Whaling and the Act o f Congress Giving Effect to its Provisions” (1937) 31 American Journal o f International 
Law 112, at 114.
29 Article 2.
30 Chiefly Argentina, Chile, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union.
31 Indeed, of the twenty-six states that signed the Convention, eight failed to ultimately ratify it.
32 P. C. Jessup, “The International Protection o f Whales” (1930) 24 American Journal o f  International Law 751, 
at 752.
33 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 118.
34 Under Article 4, “[t]he taking or killing of right whales, which shall be deemed to include North-Cape whales, 
Greenland whales, southern right whales, Pacific right whales and southern pigmy right whales, is prohibited”.
35 Article 5.
36 Article 12 required the parties to “communicate statistical information regarding all whaling operations under 
their jurisdiction” to the newly established International Bureau for Whaling Statistics in Oslo.
37 Article 6. Indeed, the failure to secure “the full industrial utilisation of all the parts o f the captured whale” had 
been considered by Suarez as constituting a particularly pertinent example o f the “crying need” for further 
international regulation: “Special Supplement”, at 235.
38 Article 7.
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of the territories of the High Contracting Parties”.39 However, despite these innovative 
features, the Convention failed to incorporate the most important ICES stipulations on 
whaling restrictions. Likewise, key terms remained undefined, such as the concept of an 
“immature whale”, which did little to discourage the harvest of juvenile individuals and 
thereby had a marked adverse effect upon stock regeneration.40
Given the general lack of participation in the 1931 Convention, a degree of “in-house” 
regulation was instead advanced through inter-company agreements between the major 
whaling enterprises. A production agreement, signed on 9 June 1932, provided further 
innovation by assigning for the first time specific quotas for whales. Such quotas were based 
on a new, and largely artificial, unit o f management called the Blue Whale Unit (BWU). The 
BWU, which subsequently “bedevilled the effectiveness of the conservatory regulation 
during the next 40 years”,41 provided a numerical reference point for whaling quotas, 
although based on a rather arbitrary comparison with blue whales. Accordingly, one BWU 
was considered equivalent to the oil content of one blue whale, or two fin whales, 2.5 
humpback whales, or six sei whales. Nevertheless the system was in hindsight deeply flawed 
and, given that a BWU did not discriminate between the size o f a whale caught, merely 
encouraged whaling crews to seek the largest individuals -  which tended to be female blue 
whales42 -  thereby facilitating the continued decline of the species. When blue whales 
became less abundant, a similar fate awaited progressively smaller species.
The industry arrangements remained operational until the entry into force of the 1931 
Convention. Nevertheless, by 1936 the Convention had become virtually unworkable. 
Relations on whaling matters between the UK and Norway had deteriorated dramatically, 
while Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union, which had since emerged as major whaling 
nations, refused to participate in the Convention. In May 1937 an international conference 
was convened in London to foster a new accord to regulate Antarctic whaling. Despite
39 Article 3. The exemption was conditional upon native hunting techniques being used, while to ensure that this 
provision did not merely become a convenient avenue for commercial enterprises to procure products from 
protected species, the hunters were neither permitted to be employed by a non-aborigine nor to be under contract 
to deliver such products to third parties.
40 Scarff, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 349.
41 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 120.
42 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 403-04. Contemporary catch statistics reveal that 
the ratio of female blue whales harvested outnumbered males by over 4:1: ibid.
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considerable negotiating tensions over disputed territory and whaling practices,43 the 
International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling,44 was opened for signature on 8 June 
1937.
The 1937 Agreement consolidated a number o f the key provisions of the 1931 Convention 
and aimed essentially “to secure the prosperity of the whaling industry and, for that purpose, 
to maintain the stock of whales” 45 The key innovation of the Agreement encompassed the 
mandatory presence of nationally-appointed and funded observers on all factory ships in 
order to detect and deter infractions.46 Minimum catch lengths were prescribed for particular 
species,47 alongside a series of closed areas48 and a prohibition on harvesting grey whales.49 
A further development allowed parties to issue permits for lethal scientific research, subject 
solely to restrictions and conditions “as the contracting Government sees fit”.50
The Agreement was intended to expire in June 1938,51 but global overharvesting prompted a 
series of additional conferences in 1938 and 1939 to address concerns over the long-term 
sustainability o f the whaling industry. An additional Protocol to the 1937 Agreement was 
adopted at the 1938 Meeting.53 This instrument was heavily diluted from the original 
proposals, from which only a protected area for humpback whales54 and the establishment of 
a two-year sanctuary for baleen whales survived in the final text.55 Nevertheless, even this 
latter sanctuary was largely symbolic as a conservation measure, given that no hunting 
activities physically occurred within this area.56 A further conference in 1939 gave rise to a
43 L. L. Leonard, “Recent Negotiations Toward the International Regulation of Whaling” (1941) 35 American 
Journal o f  International Law 90, at 102.
44 190 LNTS 79.
45 Preamble.
46 Article 1.
47 Article 3.
48 Article 9.
49 Article 4.
50 Article 10.
51 Article 21. However, due to the vagaries o f the ratification process, the Agreement did not formally enter into 
force until May 1938.
52 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History of Modem Whaling”, at 453.
53 1938 Protocol Amending the Agreement; reproduced on-line at www.intfish.net (last visited 31 August 2009).
54 Under Article I, the taking o f humpback whales was prohibited in waters south o f 40 degrees between 1 
October 1938 and 30 September 1939.
55 Article II.
56 G. Rose and S. Crane, “The Evolution o f International Whaling Law” in P. Sands (ed.), Greening 
International Law (London: Earthscan, 1993), at 163.
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Resolution recommending further modifications to the 1938 Agreement, including improved
cn
catch records and regular conferences on whaling issues.
Ultimately, the initiatives developed throughout the 1930s had a very limited impact towards 
the protection of whale stocks and the stated aim o f preserving the economic viability of the 
global whaling industry. These instruments were undermined primarily by a failure to secure 
the adherence of all the major whaling nations, in a manner that had been previously achieved 
by bilateral agreements. Moreover, and o f equal significance, a number of promising 
conservationist initiatives were effectively neutered at the negotiation stage, with parties 
unwilling to translate concerns over excessive catches into meaningful regulatory measures.
Nevertheless, the initiatives of the 1930s may be considered highly significant, if  not for the 
elaboration of clear and successful management policies, then for developing a rudimentary 
template for the modem regulation of whaling. Indeed, in addition to fostering a tradition of 
standardised statistical reporting, the practical mechanics o f whaling negotiations established 
the basis for a cooperative approach, encompassing semi-regular meetings of concerned 
states in which consideration was afforded both to scientific and management issues, as well 
as debate over potential conservation measures. Such an arrangement was eventually refined 
within the terms of the ICRW, to which this thesis now turns.
2.4 The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946
The Second World War largely interrupted the development of further regulatory activities, 
although despite the hostilities a reduced degree of commercial harvesting did occur during
r o
these years. A further Conference was convened in 1944, at which point a new Protocol was 
adopted but did not ultimately enter into force due to Irish opposition.59 The 1944 Conference 
established a global quota of 16,000 BWUs for the first post-war pelagic whaling season and, 
most significantly, the US declared its intention to sponsor a global conference to develop a 
further regulatory regime for whaling in the immediate post-war years.60 An additional
57 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 127-28.
58 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History of Modem Whaling”, at 472-98.
59 Protocol on the International Regulation of Whaling (With a Final Act o f Conference); British Cmnd., 6510, 
Miscellaneous No. 1 (1944).
60 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 493.
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conference to prepare for the US-sponsored initiative was then convened in November 1945, 
producing a further Protocol to formalise whaling quotas in the interim.
The post-war era presented particular advantages for further whaling regulation, especially 
since the most recalcitrant participants in the pre-war whaling regime, Japan and Germany, 
had little realistic option but to accept prescriptive multilateral regulation. In November 1945, 
a further International Whaling Conference was convened in Washington DC to consider and 
refine a new draft treaty prepared by the US, following which the ICRW was opened for 
signature on 2 December 1946 and formally entered into force on 10 November 1948.
The ICRW is a concise document, augmented by a lengthier Schedule, and is essentially 
focussed on facilitating the establishment of the IWC. In this respect, the ICRW was highly 
innovative and ambitious at the material time, given that previous regimes governing the 
exploitation of marine mammals had been limited both in terms o f species coverage and 
geographical scope.61 Moreover, the establishment of a specific global management body for 
whaling activities was also revolutionary, and represents an evolution of cooperative 
practices explored in the 1930s by providing a regular and more formalised forum for debate, 
as well as a flexible means of policy development and treaty amendment. Indeed, Suarez had 
previously identified such a process as “the most effective method of supervising the 
execution of the measures adopted and maintaining the control”. Suarez did not offer any 
explicit recommendation towards the establishment of permanent or ad hoc management 
bodies, leaving the precise regulatory arrangements of the “new jurisprudence” to be 
determined by a later conference of experts. Nevertheless, as Franck observes, “[t]he notion 
of res communis does not of itself determine distributional outcomes, the allocation of 
goods”,63 which would seemingly render the establishment of a specialist quota-setting body 
a practical necessity for the international regulation of common resources like whale stocks.
The ICRW also broke new ground in recognising the “interest of the nations of the world in 
safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by whale
61 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 158; see also J. A. R. Nafziger, “Global Conservation and Management 
of Marine Mammals” (1980) 17 San Diego Law Review 591 and J. W. Kindt and C. J. Wintheiser, “The 
Conservation and Protection of Marine Mammals” (1985) 7 University o f Hawaii Law Review 301.
62 “Special Supplement”, at 240.
63 T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 395.
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stocks”.64 While similar statements are generally ubiquitous in modem natural resources 
treaties, the ICRW preamble represented one o f the first such pronouncements in the context 
of marine living resources. Although likened to the modem principle of inter-generational 
equity,65 it nonetheless appears rather more rooted in economic as opposed to inherently 
ecological concerns. Indeed, although the negotiating parties had viewed whales as “wards of 
the entire world”, such approaches were seemingly motivated more to deter claims for the 
national appropriation of such stocks rather than a clarion call for far-reaching global 
conservation.66 Moreover, the Convention was explicitly stated to operate “on the basis of the 
principles embodied in the provisions” of the 1937 Agreement and its constituent Protocols67 
which had, as noted above, clearly established conservation activity as a means for largely 
economic ends.
The key function of the ICRW is “to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and 
thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”.68 Such a position 
appears loosely based on the preambular intentions of the 1937 Agreement, which further 
suggests a degree of continuity from previous regimes, although it has been argued that the 
underlying intentions of the US drafting team were to facilitate a less industrial interpretation 
of whale stocks.69 Nonetheless, as noted below, early IWC practice strongly suggests that 
most parties viewed conservation concerns as very much the junior partner in this 
arrangement. In more recent years, the marriage o f conservation and exploitation principles 
has become increasingly uneasy within the Commission and has led to increasing polarisation 
and conflict between the parties since the late 1960s.
2.4.1 Institutional arrangements
As noted above, a key objective of the ICRW is to facilitate the creation of a specialist 
management body, which is established under Article III of the Convention. Membership of
64 Preamble; second recital.
65 D. French, International Law and Policy o f  Sustainable Development (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2005), at 60.
66 P. W. Bimie, “International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale: A Review of Four 
Decades of Experience” (1989) 29 Natural Resources Journal 903, at 908.
67 Preamble; seventh recital.
68 Preamble; eighth recital.
69 M. Bowman, “‘Normalizing’ the International Convention for the Regulation o f Whaling” (2008) 29 
Michigan Journal o f International Law 293, at 397.
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HC\the IWC is open to “contracting governments”, irrespective of the degree o f national 
interest in whaling or, even, the ultimate possession of a coastline. At the negotiating stage, 
the US convenors were keen that non-whaling states should be afforded an opportunity to 
participate in the treaty, although none were actually represented among the nineteen 
participants at the 1946 Conference.71 This position, which had proved somewhat 
controversial in the negotiations towards the earlier initiatives, was not unprecedented: 
indeed, the instruments of the 1930s at no stage imposed conditions upon membership and
nothe 1931 Convention had been ratified by Switzerland. The IWC, however, has remained 
closed to formal membership by international organisations, regional economic integration 
organisations such as the European Union, and other territories and entities, which may
n 'y
instead be granted observer status.
The IWC presently comprises 86 parties,74 which often have disparate motives for 
participation. Each individual party, irrespective o f size, political power or whaling heritage, 
is entitled to one vote within the IWC and may be accompanied by as many experts and 
advisors as it deems appropriate. Meetings o f the IWC are “convened as the Commission 
may determine”,75 although in practice have been consistently held on an annual basis and 
augmented occasionally by Special Meetings where matters of particular importance have 
arisen. In addition to the parties, Annual Meetings may be attended by observers although, 
unlike a number of multilateral agreements subsequently reviewed in this thesis, there are few 
conditions imposed upon eligibility for attendance, raising criticisms that a number of 
observers have attended Meetings with little obvious expertise in cetacean issues.76
70 Article 111(1). A number of landlocked states are accordingly parties to the IWC, including Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovakia.
71 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 166.
72 According to Vallance, “[i]t is understood that the Swiss Government desired to show its interest in the 
protection of wild life wherever possible and to show the interest of a small state in a convention which does not 
directly concern it”: “Act of Congress”, at 113.
73 The position of the EU in relation to the IWC is explored in detail in Chapter VIII of this thesis.
74 As of 31 August 2009.
75 Article 111(8).
76 On this issue generally see A. Gillespie, “Transparency in International Environmental Law: A Case Study o f 
the International Whaling Commission” (2001) 14 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 333, 
especially 338-42; see also K. Mulvaney, “The International Whaling Commission and the Role o f Non- 
Governmental Organisations” (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 347.
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The IWC comprises a Chair and Vice-Chair and is supported by a Secretariat, which has 
been provided by the UK since the inception of the Convention. The IWC may establish
70
“such committees as it considers desirable to perform such functions as it may authorize”.
7Q
A number of operational committees have been established to date, of which the Scientific 
Committee is by some distance the most important. The Scientific Committee is essentially 
responsible for discharging the obligations under Article IV(1) of the Convention to 
undertake substantive research into whaling practices and the status of whale stocks. 
Although such obligations relate specifically to “whales”, the Scientific Committee has 
undertaken concerted research activities upon other species of cetaceans since the 1970s and 
is widely considered to be a leading global forum for debate and discourse on all aspects of 
cetacean science.80 In 2003 a Conservation Committee was controversially established by the 
IWC,81 which has sought to bolster the work o f the Scientific Committee and to explore 
further synergies with allied institutions.
Two key aspects of the work of the IWC are established under the Convention. In the first 
instance, Article VI enables the Commission to “make recommendations to any or all 
Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or whaling and to the 
objectives and purposes o f this Convention”. The wording of this provision makes clear that 
the IWC is not endowed with powers to adopt binding and enforceable measures and, instead, 
adopts Resolutions82 at its annual and ad hoc meetings. Decisions made by the IWC require a
83simple majority of the parties present and voting.
77 Article 111(3). The Secretariat is based in Cambridge, and has always been provided by the UK government, 
although it was not established as a full-time institution until 1976. Prior to this, rudimentary administrative 
support was provided by the UK Ministry o f Agriculture and Fisheries: S. Andresen, “The Whaling Regime: 
‘Good’ Institutions but ‘Bad’ Politics?” in R. L. Freidheim (ed.) Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2001), at 242.
78 Article 111(4).
79 For a discussion of the main IWC committee structure see M. C. Maffei, “The International Convention for 
the Regulation o f Whaling” (1997) 12 International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law 287, at 292.
80 For a detailed discussion o f the history and operation o f the Scientific Committee see M. Heazle, Scientific 
Uncertainty and the Politics o f Whaling (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006).
81 Resolution 2003-1: The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International 
Whaling Commission.
82 In a departure from traditional practice, the two IWC Resolutions adopted at the Sixty-First Annual Meeting 
in June 2009 were termed “Consensus Resolutions”. This is not to suggest that all Resolutions advanced at 
previous IWC meetings were adopted by a unanimous vote; in fact the majority o f Resolutions have been, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the product of broad consensus. Instead, at the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC in 
2008, Chapeau E of the Rules o f Procedure of the IWC was amended to ensure that “[t]he Commission shall 
make every effort to reach its decisions by consensus”, with this position now seemingly reflected formally in 
the titles of subsequent IWC Resolutions.
83 Article 111(2).
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Rather more significantly, and in conjunction with these responsibilities, under Article V the 
IWC is also charged with the amendment o f the ICRW Schedule, which forms “an integral 
part” of the Convention. In many respects, the Schedule is the key component of the ICRW, 
and elaborates the operational requirements for present and future whaling activities. The 
amendment mechanism provided under Article V is a highly significant aspect of IWC 
practice. Whereas the 1937 Agreement required the adoption of periodic Protocols to address 
issues of conservation and management concern, the IWC, by virtue of the Schedule 
amendment process, allows in principle for the parties to adjust the operational parameters of 
the ICRW in a relatively swift and flexible manner without the need for the formal 
negotiation of adjunct treaty instruments. To this end, the IWC may amend the Schedule in 
respect of a variety of issues, especially catch and size limits, protected species, open and
• • o cclosed seasons, sanctuary designations and authorised whaling equipment and methods of 
inspection.86 Nevertheless, the amendment o f the Schedule has become a problematic and 
controversial process in recent years. Amendments require a three-quarters majority of all 
parties present and voting,87 a requirement that has become increasingly difficult to meet as 
the membership of the Commission has expanded significantly over the past twenty years. 
Where an amendment to the Schedule is adopted, parties have a ninety-day period to lodge an 
objection.88 Reservation practices have proved controversial in the context of the current 
global moratorium on commercial whaling, as discussed below.
Despite the elaboration of what was in 1946 a largely pioneering framework for the 
international management and conservation of marine resources, the IWC is now widely 
perceived as a rather beleaguered organisation. While the Scientific Committee retains 
considerable global prestige, the IWC as a political and management body has been
on ,
frequently described as “dysfunctional” by commentators. It is argued that such criticism is 
not entirely misplaced and stems from significant stock management failures, as well as 
internal political problems raised largely by the evolving perception of whales, to which this 
thesis now turns.
84 Article 1(1).
85 Article VI(l)(a)-(h).
86 Added by Protocol in 1956.
87 Article 111(2).
88 Article V(3).
89 Y. lino and D. Goodman, “Japan’s Position in the International Whaling Commission” in W. C. G. Burns and 
A. Gillespie (eds.), The Future o f  Cetaceans in a Changing World (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2003), 
at 3.
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2.5 The regulation of whaling and the IWC moratorium on commercial hunting
The seeds of the current conflict within the IWC were largely sown during its first thirty 
years of operation. In explaining the present state o f affairs within the IWC, a number of 
commentators have sought to identify broad stages in the operation of the whaling regime.90 
Although the precise demarcation and nomenclature of these periods may be considered 
somewhat subjective, and sometimes debatable,91 it is nonetheless clear that the aims and 
objectives of many of the parties have evolved, while minimal structural adjustment has 
occurred within the auspices of the Convention.
Since its inception the IWC has elaborated three distinct management mechanisms, which 
constitute useful boundaries in tracing the development of the Convention. The first period, 
1949-72, involved the use of the BWU which was later considered to be wholly inappropriate 
for the regulation of whaling. Between 1972 and 1982 a New Management Procedure was 
instituted to provide a more sophisticated numerical analysis of quotas. Finally, in 1982 a 
global moratorium was introduced to preserve whale stocks, while a more statistical quota- 
setting model could be developed. These adjustments have been accompanied by a change in 
prevailing ideology, as the whaling question has become increasingly and acrimoniously 
politicised since approximately the mid-1960s, into a totem of the environmental 
movement.92 It is impossible to understate the importance that such political considerations 
have played in the development o f the IWC, with many parties having fundamentally 
adjusted their position from a pro-hunting outlook, or even ambivalent non-participation, to a
• cnprotectionist ideology or “ethical” viewpoint of the whaling debate.
90 A particularly noteworthy example is A. D ’Amato and S. K. Chopra, “Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life”
(1991) 85 American Journal o f International Law 21.
91 For instance, one highly influential chronological discussion, that of D ’Amato and Chopra, identifies what the 
present author would consider to be aspects of the darkest chapter of IWC mismanagement -  the first twenty 
years o f its operation -  as “conservation becomes protection”: ibid., at 32. Insofar as a discernible 
conservation/protection period is concerned within the IWC, it might be more appropriately identified as the 
moratorium era.
92 For an account o f this process see P. Stoett, The International Politics o f Whaling (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1997), especially 61-102.
93 On this issue see A. Gillespie, “The Ethical Question in the Whaling Debate” (1997) 8 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 355 and J. Baird-Callicott, “Whaling in Sand Country: A Dialectical 
Hunt for Land Ethical Answers to Questions about the Morality of Norwegian Minke Whale Catching” (1997) 8 
Colorado Journal o f  International Environmental Law and Policy 1.
27
2.5.1 The Blue Whale Unit, 1946-74
The BWU, first introduced under the 1932 production agreements, was retained by the IWC 
as its operative unit of measurement for whaling quotas, a decision subsequently condemned 
as “[o]ne of the greatest weaknesses o f the 1946 Convention”.94 As outlined above, there 
were grave pre-existing flaws in the BWU concept, which were subsequently exacerbated by 
IWC practices in the immediate post-war years. In the first instance, BWU limits were issued 
by the IWC en bloc as a global quota, with the IWC exercising little control over the ultimate 
allocation of this allowance between the individual fleets.95 This unsatisfactory position in 
fact pre-dated the IWC regime, with individualised quotas considered unpopular due largely 
due to the prevailing cartel mentality at the material time.96 The IWC also failed to assign 
species-specific quotas, which again facilitated the unsustainable harvest of blue and fin 
whales. Moreover, and of equal concern, the parties seemingly regarded warnings from the 
Scientific Committee with impunity.97 Where the IWC did effect modest reductions to the 
global quota -  as occurred for the first time in 1953 -  most of the parties promptly invoked
98the Article V(3) reservation process against these restrictions.
The first management crisis faced by the IWC occurred in the late 1950s, where chronic 
overcapacity threatened the economic future o f the Antarctic fleet. The IWC was, in effect, 
precluded from addressing this problem under Article V(2)(c), which forbids Schedule 
amendments concerning numerical restrictions on whaling vessels. Proposals by individual 
states, notably Norway, to downscale national whaling activities in exchange for financial 
contributions from other fleets were rejected, essentially forcing states to continue 
unsustainable hunting operations to maintain their position in future Antarctic quota 
negotiations.99 The response of the IWC was simply to increase the global quota.100
94 J. L. McHugh, “The Role and History o f the International Whaling Commission” in W. E. Schevill (ed.), The 
Whale Problem: A Status Report (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), at 308.
95 Indeed, McHugh observes that that was “a private matter between the nations concerned”: McHugh, “Role 
and History”, at 323.
96 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History of Modem Whaling”at 585.
97 Heazle, Scientific Uncertainty”, at 54.
98 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 5.
99 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History of Modem Whaling”, at 587-88.
100 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 5.
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By 1959, however, it was clear that the management of Antarctic stocks of whales in
particular had descended into farce. These difficulties were compounded in 1960, as the IWC
effectively abdicated responsibility for stock management and suspended the Antarctic quota
for two years, with the parties largely formulating their own arrangements.101 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, it subsequently proved difficult to induce parties accustomed to elaborating
their own rules to accept sweeping multilateral reductions.102 By 1964, it was noted that while
the BWU concept “may have had some administrative convenience and given some apparent
1
flexibility to the operation of the quota system in the past”, it should be replaced with a 
more sophisticated model. Subsequently, it was agreed that from 1972 onwards, species- 
specific quotas should be introduced.104 Concurrent with these developments, as noted below, 
the first official calls for moratoria on commercial whaling were made in 1972 at the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE). While such calls were rejected at this 
juncture, the IWC did nonetheless endorse an Australian proposal for New Management 
Procedures (NMP) to replace the BWU approach, based on a more explicit acceptance of 
scientific advice and providing for species-specific management measures.
2.5.2 The New Management Procedures, 1974 -  present
The emergence of the NMP as the chosen management mechanism of the IWC is attributable 
both to grave concern over the BWU approach, as well as the evolution of legal principles 
within the wider codification of the law o f the sea and the nascent body of international 
environmental law at the material time. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the prevailing 
management approaches towards fisheries resources105 operated in terms of “Maximum 
Sustainable Yield” (MSY). An early and influential use of this term was made at the first UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, which resulted in the adoption of four substantive treaties 
codifying the contemporary law of the sea. Article 2 of the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958106 defined its conservationist 
aims as “rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to 
ensure a maximum supply of food and other marine products”. Accordingly, the IWC
101 Heazle, “Scientific Uncertainty”, at 78.
102 Ibid., at 89-90.
103 Fourteenth Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1964), at 37.
104 Twenty-Third Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1973), at 6.
105 Indeed the ICRW, remains fundamentally a fisheries-based treaty, with numerous references throughout to 
“whale fisheries”: for instance, preambular recitals 3 and 7, as well as Article 111(6).
106 559 UNTS 225.
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embraced the MSY concept as a key management policy, although by 1971 the FAO
107considered this approach “too simple for the increasingly complex situation of whales”. 
Moreover, as noted by Rose and Crane, “[t]he concept of ecosystem management, instead of 
single species management, gained support in the 1970s and the NMP were intended to 
reflect this trend”.108
Despite concerns outside the IWC over the value o f an MSY basis for whale quotas, this 
principle nonetheless constituted a fundamental basis for the NMP. The NMP remains 
nominally the current system of management for whale stocks under the ICRW, subject to the 
application of the present moratorium on commercial harvesting. Section 10 of the ICRW 
Schedule has adopted a species-specific approach to whaling quotas and allocates stocks into 
one of three categories, based on the advice of the Scientific Committee. The first category, 
Initial Management Stocks,109 comprises the most abundant species and the stocks upon 
which the greatest degree of hunting could be supported. For these stocks, the Scientific 
Committee was charged with calculating a baseline MSY, for which quotas could be set at a 
maximum of ninety percent of this figure, leaving a ten percent shortfall to accommodate 
natural wastage. The second category, Sustained Management Stocks,110 encompasses whales 
with a population at approximately the same level as the MSY, with quotas tailored to ensure 
that stock numbers remain at a consistent level. The final category, Protection Stocks,111 
constitutes the least abundant species, for which no commercial hunting would be permitted.
Initial appraisals of the NMP accorded the new arrangements a high degree of praise,112 
although hindsight has exposed a number o f flaws within this system, not least that “MSY 
does not take into account long-term adverse effects, limitations of knowledge and 
imperfections of management”.113 Limitations on exploitation of MSY levels were often 
rather arbitrary,114 while the mechanism itself required highly specific data concerning 
population structures that were not feasible to attain at the time. Moreover, such calculations
107 Bimie, “Four Decades”, at 923.
108 Rose and Crane, “Evolution o f International Whaling Law”, at 171.
109 Article 10(b) of the ICRW Schedule.
110 Article 10(a) of the ICRW Schedule.
111 Article 10(c) of the ICRW Schedule.
112 Indeed, Scarff observes that the NMP “marked the strongest and most specific commitment to conservation 
that the IWC had ever undertaken”, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 370, while Tonnessen and Johnsen 
consider this to have been a “significant step forward in the protection and conservation of the world’s whale 
stocks”: “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 684.
113 D’Amato and Chopra, “Emerging Right”, at 41.
114 Heazle, “Scientific Uncertainty”, at 147.
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presupposed that data provided to the IWC was accurate and legitimate; instead troubling 
evidence of wholesale fraud has been uncovered in recent years within certain parties.115 
Consequently, the NMP experienced a relatively brief operational tenure, with the subsequent 
introduction of a global moratorium on commercial whaling, during which considerable 
efforts have been made to elaborate a new quota-setting instrument, the Revised Management 
Procedures.
2.5.3 The moratorium on commercial whaling, 1985/86 — present
The first calls for the imposition of moratoria upon the commercial harvesting of whale 
stocks pre-dated the adoption of the NMP and largely reflected the internationalisation of the 
whaling question beyond the narrow confines o f the IWC during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Although the origins and development o f the IWC moratorium are multi-faceted, the 
emergence of a discemable anti-whaling movement exerted a substantial influence on many 
of the parties to the ICRW and, ultimately, the direction of the IWC itself.116 These 
developments fundamentally and irrevocably altered the dynamic of the Commission, 
resulting in the oft-cited truism that the IWC metamorphosed during the late 1970s and 1980s 
from a “whalers’ club” into a largely protectionist institution.117
By the 1960s, the number o f states actively pursuing whaling activities had declined rapidly, 
with the economic viability of Antarctic operations having virtually collapsed. New Zealand 
had abandoned whaling in 1964,118 followed by the UK and the Netherlands in 1965, while 
the Norwegian fleet had formally ceased Antarctic operations by 1968.119 Subsequently,
115 A. V. Yablokov, “Validity of Whaling Data” (1994) 367 Nature 108; see also D. D. Tormosov et al., “Soviet 
Catches of Southern Right Whales Eubalaena Australis 1951-1971. Biological Data and Conservation 
Implications” (1998) 86 Biological Conservation 185 and P. Clapham et al., “Catches of Humpback Whales, 
Magaptera Novaeangliae, by the Soviet Union and Other Nations in the Southern Ocean 1947-1973” (2009) 71 
Marine Fisheries Review 39. On the Soviet whaling fleet and falsification practices generally see A. R. Berzin, 
“The Truth About Soviet Whaling” (2008) 70 Marine Fisheries Review 4; see also P. Clapham and Y. 
Ivashenko, “A Whale of a Deception” (2009) 71 Marine Fisheries Review 44. In 1994 the IWC formally noted 
its concerns over historical Soviet data and the implications for future stock management at its Forty-Sixth 
Annual Meeting -  Resolution 1994-6: Resolution on the Unreliability o f Past Whaling Data.
116 On this issue generally see C. Epstein, The Power o f  Words in International Relations: Birth o f an Anti- 
Whaling Discourse (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008).
117 See S. Suhre, “Misguided Morality: The Repercussions o f the International Whaling Commission’s Shift 
from a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation” (1999) 12 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 305; see also H. Sigvaldsson, “The International Whaling Commission: The Transition from a ‘Whaling 
Club’ to a ‘Preservation Club’” (1996) 31 Cooperation and Conflict 311.
118 S. Holt, “Whaling Mining, Whale Saving” (1985) 9 Marine Policy 192, at 199.
119 M. J. Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management o f Whaling”
(1992) 46 International Organization 147, at 162.
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whaling activities in the key Antarctic grounds effectively became the sole preserve of the 
USSR and Japan, which continued commercial operations “because, unlike their competitors
190they had strong economic incentives to do so”.
Beyond these practical concerns, the abandonment of commercial hunting was more 
ostensibly linked to opposition from an environmental movement of considerable emerging 
prominence. Although there was little tradition of active opposition to whaling at the time of 
the conclusion of the ICRW, public opinion in many jurisdictions began to shift dramatically 
from a consumptive model of regulation towards a more preservationist remit for the IWC,121 
which began to manifest itself in national legislation. Perhaps most influentially, in December 
1970 the US listed the eight largest species o f whales on the Endangered Species 
Conservation Act 1969,122 thereby prohibiting their exploitation and extinguishing the last 
remnants of the American whaling industry. Moreover, the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
1972, enacted in response to widespread concerns over the incidental mortality of dolphins in 
national tuna fisheries, further enhanced the degree of legal protection afforded to cetaceans, 
both in US waters and indirectly in allied jurisdictions through its extra-territorial application 
to foreign fishing vessels. Furthermore, in Australia, a national review of national whaling 
policies in November 1977 in the wake of sustained public protests, recommended inter alia
123the prohibition of commercial hunting in national waters.
Concurrent with these national processes, there was a profound sense of alarm and 
dissatisfaction over the stewardship by the IWC of global stocks of whales, which were 
becoming increasingly viewed as a common concern of humankind. In 1972, the UNCHE 
considered the plight of global whale stocks as part o f its extensive agenda and addressed a 
three-pronged recommendation both to the international community and the IWC, calling for 
action “to strengthen the International Whaling Commission, to increase international 
research efforts, and as a matter of urgency to call for an international agreement under the
120 Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists”, at 162.
121 Epstein, “The Power of Words”, at 89-115; see also A. Kalland, “Whose Whale is That? Diverting the 
Commodity Path” in M. M. R. Freeman and U. P. Kreuter (eds.), Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? 
(Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1994), at 159.
122 Scarff, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 387.
123 S. Frost, The Whaling Question: The Inquiry by Sir Sydney Frost o f  Australia (San Francisco: Friends of the 
Earth, 1979), at 209-211. Whaling was subsequently prohibited within Australian jurisdictional waters by virtue 
of the Whale Protection Act 1980. On this process generally see K. D. Suter, “Australia’s New Whaling Policy: 
Formulation and Implementation” (1982) 6 Marine Policy 287.
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auspices of the International Whaling Commission and involving governments concerned, for 
a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling”.124
Shortly after the Stockholm Conference, the IWC convened its Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Meeting, which was dominated by the question of a global moratorium on commercial 
hunting.125 Recommendation 33 was formally presented to the Commission in person by the 
Secretary-General of the UNCHE, with the IWC accordingly considered to have been
1 9“directly rebuked by the world community”. A proposal for a ten-year moratorium was 
tabled by the US delegation. This was ultimately rejected due to the lack of a scientific
197foundation and the prospect of wholesale unregulated whaling. Moreover, it was 
considered that a blanket ban would encounter similar deficiencies to the unlamented BWU, 
in that it would fail to take into account the status and condition of individual stocks, while 
the flow of scientific information would be interrupted and the moratorium might contravene 
the preambular objectives of the ICRW.128
In 1973, a near identical proposal was again tabled by the US which attracted the support of 
the majority of the parties, but ultimately failed to secure the requisite three-quarters of the 
vote.129 Proposals for moratoria were subsequently tabled by the US at successive IWC
• • i m _Meetings, which began to attract the co-sponsorship of additional parties. Throughout the 
1970s a noticeable trend began to emerge for states to ratify the ICRW with the express 
intention of advancing further conservation initiatives within the IWC. In 1976, New Zealand 
rejoined the IWC, having repudiated the Convention in exasperation in 1969, citing
124 Recommendation 33 of the Stockholm Action Plan; reproduced at (1972) 11 International Legal Materials 
1416.
125 The question o f a potential moratorium on commercial hunting had in fact been considered by the IWC 
Scientific Committee at the previous Annual Meeting in 1971, but was rejected in favour o f the institution o f a 
decade of cetacean research: Twenty-First Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 
1973), at 38.
126 Scarff, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 367.
127 R. Gambell, “Whale Conservation: The Role o f the International Whaling Commission” (1979) 1 Marine 
Policy 301, at 307.
128 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 10-11.
129 Twenty-Third Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1975), at 26.
130 For instance, Mexico seconded the US proposal at the 1974 Annual Meeting and announced at this juncture 
its support for pro-conservation policies, pledging to protect key breeding grounds for grey whales under 
national law: Twenty-Fourth Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1976), at 35. 
On Mexican initiatives to protect this species generally see J. Vargas, “The California Gray Whale: Its Legal 
Regime under Mexican Law” (2006) 12 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 213; see also S. Dedina, Saving the 
Gray Whale: People, Politics and Conservation in Baja California (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000), 
especially 40-77.
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consideration for public opinion of whaling as the primary motivation for re-accession.
Likewise, in 1977 the Netherlands rejoined the IWC, partly due to the interests of national
conservation groups.132 Moreover, a number o f existing parties explicitly clarified their stated
position within the IWC; for instance in 1979, Australia announced a change in national
policy towards promoting the cessation o f commercial hunting and to protecting whale 
1populations.
This coincided with an influx of new parties of the ICRW among developing countries, 
whose participation was actively encouraged -  and allegedly underwritten -  by prominent 
environmental NGOs.134 Perhaps the most significant of these was the Seychelles, which 
joined in 1979 and is credited by Bimie as having had an immediate impact upon the policy 
direction of the IWC.135 The Seychelles successfully advocated a whale sanctuary in the
1 7A 1 ^ 7  • • •Indian Ocean and a moratorium on sperm whaling. Most significantly, it took a lead role 
in advancing general moratoria proposals at a point at which the moral authority of the 
traditional sponsor of such motions, the US, was heavily compromised given its controversial 
pursuit of a bowhead whale quota for the Alaskan Inuit in the face of concerted opposition
I I O
from the Scientific Committee.
In 1982, at the historic Thirty-Fourth Meeting o f the IWC, a Seychelles proposal for the 
graduated introduction of a moratorium on commercial whaling ultimately secured the
139requisite approval of three-quarters of the parties. The Schedule was accordingly amended 
to freeze quotas at zero, subject to a later review, in a revised paragraph 10(e) which stated:
131 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 675.
132 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 474.
133 D ’Amato and Chopra, “Emerging Right”, at 42.
134 S. Andresen, “The Making and Implementation o f Whaling Policies: Does Participation Make a Difference?” 
in D. G. Victor, K. Raustiala and E. B. Skolnikoff (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness o f International 
Environmental Agreements: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), at 439-440.
135 P. Bimie, “The Role of Developing Countries in Nudging the International Whaling Commission from 
Regulating Whaling to Encouraging Nonconsumptive Uses o f Whales” (1985) 12 Ecology Law Quarterly 937, 
at 959-60.
136 Resolution 1979-3: Resolution in Relation to the Establishment o f a Whale Sanctuary in the Indian Ocean.117Bimie, “Developing Countries”, at 962.
138 On this issue generally see S. M. Hankins, “The United States’ Abuse of the Aboriginal Whaling Exception: 
A Contradiction o f United States Policy and a Dangerous Precedent for the Whale” (1990) 24 U. C. Davis Law 
Review 489. The US pursuit o f a quota for endangered bowhead whales left it highly vulnerable to claims o f 
double-standards in seeking to impose restrictions on commercial harvesting by other parties from stocks that 
were of significantly greater abundance.
139 The proposal was approved by twenty-five states in favour, seven against and with five abstentions. On the 
events of the Meeting generally see P. Bimie, “Countdown to Zero” (1983) 7 Marine Policy 68.
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“Notwithstanding the other provisions o f paragraph 10, catch limits for the killing for 
commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 
pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. The provision will be kept under review, 
based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will 
undertake a comprehensive assessment o f the effects of this decision on whale stocks 
and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch 
limits”.
The moratorium serves a dual purpose in providing a window of opportunity both to allow 
stocks of particularly imperilled species to regenerate, and for the IWC to develop an 
improved management mechanism to allocate whale quotas for when a resumption of 
commercial activity is ultimately sanctioned. Accordingly, as noted below, since the 
inception of the moratorium, work has been ongoing on the development a two-pronged 
mechanism for the future management o f whale stocks. This emerging system comprises the 
Revised Management Procedure (RMP), which constitutes the mathematical processes by 
which future quotas are to be calculated by the Scientific Committee, in tandem with a 
Revised Management Scheme (RMS), which encompasses operational aspects incumbent in 
any future whaling activities. While the RMP has been formally adopted by the IWC, aspects 
of the RMS remain a source of contention between the parties and have yet to be finalised, 
hence the moratorium remains in place. In the interim, a number of parties have exploited 
loopholes within the Convention in order to pursue a degree of directed hunting, which has 
created further political pressures within and beyond the IWC.
2.6 Directed hunting activities under the moratorium on commercial whaling
Despite the current operation of the moratorium, considerable scope for the harvesting of 
whales remains through the ICRW under four broad conditions. Firstly, a party to the ICRW 
may enter a reservation, consistent with pertinent rules of international treaty law, to the 
operation of the moratorium. Secondly, and perhaps most controversially, lethal catches of 
whales may be sanctioned under Article VIII o f the ICRW for the purposes of scientific 
research. Thirdly, directed hunting for aboriginal subsistence purposes is recognised by the 
IWC as distinct from commercial whaling, and is therefore subject to a separate and specific 
series of annual quotas. Finally, reflective of the essentially consensual nature of international 
law, non-parties are not bound by the moratorium.
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2.6.1 Reservations to the moratorium
As noted above, Article V(3) of the ICRW permits the parties to enter reservations to 
amendments to the Schedule within ninety days of the conclusion of that amendment. The 
reservation process was advocated by the US at the negotiation stage in order to attract the 
maximum number of participants to the nascent whaling regime140 and was unprecedented in 
previous whaling instruments. The reservation process has been invoked by parties to the 
ICRW since the earliest meetings of the IWC, although it has assumed a wider political 
significance since the inception of the moratorium.
Initial attempts to enter reservations to the IWC restrictions proved highly controversial 
within an organisation in which a pro-conservation lobby held a clear majority. These 
difficulties were exacerbated by the absence of a specific dispute resolution mechanism,141 a 
traditional limitation of the ICRW. Accordingly, when the moratorium was introduced there 
was, in effect, little meaningful process that the IWC could initiate to deter or postpone the 
application of reservations. Instead, reservations to the moratorium have been subject to 
considerable external unilateral activity, where appeals for restraint have failed within the 
IWC.
The US has traditionally been the most active exponent of unilateral fisheries sanctions, 
acting primarily under the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fishermans’ Protective Act 1967142 
and the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act 1976.143 The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments constitute a 
powerful dual mechanism to promote compliance with international norms. The Pelly 
Amendment permits the closure of US markets to imports of fish from states whose activities
140 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 194. Indeed, it is widely considered unlikely that the ICRW would have 
ultimately entered into effect without the incorporation o f such a clause.
141 No dispute resolution machinery was envisaged at the initial negotiation stage of the ICRW, with the regular 
fomm for debate, the IWC, seemingly viewed as the key mechanism through which differences of opinion and 
approach could be collectively addressed. Indeed, as noted by Bimie, “[t]he IWC has in practice either settled its 
disputes internally, usually by achieving compromises, or by negotiation outside the Convention”: “International 
Regulation”, at 201.
142 Public Law No. 92-219; codified at 22 USC § 1978.
143 Public Law No. 96-61; codified at 22 USC § 1821(e)(2).
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diminish the effectiveness of inter alia the IWC.144 Likewise, the Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment further mandates the denial of access to US fisheries for actions that likewise 
diminish inter alia the effectiveness of the IWC.145
The Pelly Amendment was first invoked in a whaling context in 1974, where the USSR and 
Japan were certified for breaching IWC minke whale quotas.146 Subsequently, it seemingly 
exerted a strong impact upon state practices. In 1978 Chile, South Korea and Peru were all 
certified under this procedure and swiftly joined the IWC at its next Meeting, while in 1979 
the threat of certification induced Spanish compliance with a fin whale quota to which it had 
previously objected.147 Moreover, China instituted a complete ban on national whaling 
activities following certification due to a failure to observe IWC restrictions in 1980 and 
1981.148 In 1985 the USSR was certified, but it is somewhat debatable whether certification 
or domestic economic disarray led to the Soviet cessation of commercial whaling in 1987.149 
In 1986 Norway was certified over catches of minke whales, but sanctions were not 
ultimately imposed as the Norwegian government undertook to cease commercial whaling in
1987 150
Since these incidences, it appears that US enthusiasm for unilateral certification has waned 
and diplomatic considerations -  as well as GATT/WTO concerns -  have facilitated a more 
cautious line .151 For instance, the US and Japan controversially negotiated a four-year quota 
of 1200 sperm whales outside the auspices o f the IWC under the Baldridge-Murazumi
144 Whaling concerns were a key issue raised by Congressman Pelly in the development of this legislation: D. 
M. Wilkinson, “The Use o f Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling Agreements: A Critical 
Perspective” (1987) 17 Denver Journal o f International Law and Policy 271, at 280.
145 See T. L. McDorman, “The GATT Consistency o f US Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and 
Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles” (1991) 24 George Washington Journal o f International Law and 
Economics 477; see also G. S. Martin, Jr. and J. W. Brennan, “Enforcing the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments” (1987) 17 Denver Journal o f  
International Law and Policy 293.
146 D. D. Caron, “International Sanctions, Ocean Management, and the Law of the Sea: A Study of Denial of 
Access to Fisheries” (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly 311, at 318.
147 Caron, “Denial o f Access”, at 318.
148 D. D. Caron, “The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: 
The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures” (1995) 89 American Journal o f International Law 
154, at 158.
149 Caron, “Denial o f Access”, at 319.
150 Caron, “Denial o f Access”, ibid.
151 Indeed, on a political level there has been a marked reluctance by officials to resort to the Pelly and 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, “but whenever a U.S. administration has tried to avoid or delay 
certification of a state, environmentalists have sued in the courts to ensure enforcement”: R. L. Freidheim, 
“Moderation in the Pursuit o f Justice: Explaining Japan’s Failure in the International Whaling Negotiations”
(1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 349, at 362.
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152Agreement, contingent upon an undertaking to cease commercial whaling in 1988. A 
substantial body of litigation was brought at various tiers in the US, before the Supreme 
Court narrowly reversed an order to compel the use of the Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment.153 In 1993 Norway announced its intention to resume the commercial hunt of 
minke whales, pursuant to a reservation to the moratorium,154 following which the US 
reluctantly commenced the certification process. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration 
limited the US response to stem anti-whaling rhetoric and an ambiguous undertaking towards 
on-going good faith negotiations with the Norwegian government,155 and no sanction has thus 
far been imposed upon Norway under national law. Likewise, Icelandic reservations -  
considered to “almost certainly” incur certification156 -  have also received a muted response, 
comprising general calls for cessation and sundry anti-whaling statements.
The IWC has not encouraged reservations to the moratorium and has adopted a host of 
Resolutions in which it “calls upon” and “requests” Norway to cease further whaling 
activities,157 albeit to little discernible effect upon national policies. The most intriguing 
incident to have arisen in the context of reservations involved an attempt by Iceland in June 
2001 to rejoin the IWC subject to a reservation to moratorium, a condition that was rejected
152 On this issue generally see A. J. Siegel, “The US-Japanese Whaling Accord: A Result of the Discretionary 
Loophole in the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment” (1985) 19 George Washington Journal o f International 
Law and Economics 577.
153 The Supreme Court ruled by 5:4 to overturn the verdict: Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean 
Society (1986) 106 S. Ct. 2860. For (largely critical) commentary on this decision see V. A. Curry, “Japan 
Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society. The Great Whales become Casualties of the Trade Wars” 
(1986) 4 Pace Environmental Law Review 277; see also M. K. Blatt, “Woe for the Whales: Japan Whaling 
Association v. American Cetacean Society” (1987) 55 University o f  Cincinnati Law Review 1285, C. S. Gibson, 
“Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court’s Review of an Agency’s Statutory 
Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society” (1987) 14 Ecology Law Quarterly 
485 and Haskell, Jr., note 175 supra.
154 Caron, “Risks o f Coercion”, at 162.
155 See T. Bjomdal, J. M. Conrad and A. Toft, “On the Resumption o f the Norwegian Minke Whale Hunt” in G. 
Petursdottir (ed.), Whaling in the North Atlantic (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 1997), at 38.
156 T. L. McDorman, “Iceland, Whaling and the U.S. Pelly Amendment: The International Trade Law Context”
(1997) 66 Nordic Journal o f  International Law 453, at 454.
157 Specifically Resolution 1995-5: Resolution on Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales (calling on Norway to 
reconsider its objection and halt all whaling activities under its jurisdiction); Resolution 1996-5: Resolution on 
Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales (regretting the unilateral establishment of quotas for commercial whaling 
in the absence of a valid abundance estimate and calling on Norway to reconsider its objection and halt all 
whaling activities under its jurisdiction); Resolution 1997-3: Resolution on Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales 
(reiterating practically verbatim the sentiments of Resolution 1996-5); Resolution 1998-1: Resolution on 
Norwegian Whaling (reiterating the commitment o f the IWC to the moratorium on commercial whaling and 
calling on Norway to reconsider its objection and to immediately halt all whaling activities under its 
jurisdiction); Resolution 2001-5: Resolution on Commercial Whaling (calling on Norway to refrain from issuing 
export permits for whale products, to reconsider its less conservative “tuning level” for the establishment of 
quotas, to reconsider its objection and to immediately halt all whaling activities under its jurisdiction).
38
1by the majority of the voting parties at the Annual Meeting. Iceland had repudiated the 
Convention in 1991 in protest at IWC policies.159 A further Icelandic application for 
membership on the same terms was again rejected at the 2002 Annual Meeting,160 although at 
a Special Meeting convened in October 2002 Iceland was formally accepted as a party to the 
ICRW, a decision that perhaps owed more to practical considerations in admitting a key 
whaling nation to participate in the Convention than to a popular endorsement of the 
legitimacy of the reservation.161
The reservation issue again highlights the inherent ambiguity of the central purpose of the 
ICRW, i.e. “to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible 
the orderly development of the whaling industry”. This has essentially served to defeat the 
traditional test for the legality of reservations prescribed under Article 19(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.162 To this end, notwithstanding the clear distaste for the 
Icelandic reservation demonstrated by a significant number of parties, it is difficult to 
definitively and objectively state that such a move defeats the object and purpose of the 
ICRW. Anti-whalers would base an argument on the inherent circularity of the preambular 
intentions of the Convention, in that the moratorium on commercial hunting is necessary to 
safeguard the integrity of pertinent stocks and thus facilitate future industrial activity. 
Likewise, pro-whalers would contend that a reservation to the moratorium remains a feasible 
means of securing the “orderly development o f the whaling industry” when applied to 
abundant stocks that are currently precluded from exploitation. Ultimately, however, the 
decision to admit Iceland appears based more in the realms of realpolitik than the confines of 
legal argument, with Icelandic participation within the IWC serving to mitigate the prospect 
of further hunting activities outside ICRW auspices.
2.6.2 Scientific whaling
158 Nonetheless, this was a highly contentious issue, and some sixteen parties refused to vote on the motion: S.
D. Murphy, “Blocking of Iceland’s Effort to Join Whaling Convention” (2002) 96 American Journal o f  
International Law 712, at 713.
159 J. V. Ivarsson, Science, Sanctions and Cetaceans: Iceland and the Whaling Issue (Reykjavik: Centre for 
International Studies -  University o f Iceland, 1994), at 135-160.
160 A. Gillespie, “Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling Commission” (2003) 14 European Journal 
of International Law 977.
161 Indeed, some nineteen parties to the ICRW subsequently entered formal objections to the Icelandic 
reservation.
162 1155 UNTS 331 [Hereinafter the “VCLT”]. Article 19(c) provides that a reservation may be entered 
provided that it is not “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”.
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The second possibility for continued whaling activities lies in the form of the scientific 
whaling exception, provided under Article VIII of the Convention. Scientific whaling quotas 
have long proved controversial. Although scientific considerations were ultimately absent 
from the 1931 Convention, some parties nonetheless unilaterally advanced a research
1 63exemption within their enabling legislation, notably the USA. An exemption for lethal 
research was first instituted under Article 10 of the 1937 Agreement, which was largely 
reproduced within Article VIII(l) o f the ICRW.164 Despite the stated advisory role of the 
Scientific Committee, the regulation of whaling under scientific auspices largely remains the 
exclusive preserve of the party in question. Scientific whaling is subject to a lone obligation 
to report on such activities to the IWC, with the national authorities ultimately responsible for 
setting the conditions, scope and duration of permits, thereby constrained solely by reference 
to the present international law governing marine scientific research.165
The scientific whaling exception has provoked controversy since the early years of the IWC: 
in 1957 Norway accused the USSR of manipulating scientific activities under Article VIII to 
gain an enhanced harvest, prompting demand that such permits be allocated on “a limited and 
cogent basis”.166 Thereafter, scientific research appears to have occurred on a comparatively 
modest scale,167 and occupied a peripheral and sporadically contentious position on the IWC 
agenda. Nevertheless, since the inception o f the moratorium, scientific whaling has expanded 
on an unprecedented scale.168 Consequently, lethal scientific research is generally viewed 
with considerable cynicism as less a vital research policy and more a convenient avenue to 
circumvent the current commercial restrictions.169
163 Vallance, “Act of Congress”, at 118-19.
164 Article VIII(l) states “[notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Government 
may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for 
purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as 
the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating o f whales in accordance with the 
provisions o f this Article shall be exempt from the operation o f this Convention. Each Contracting Government 
shall report at once to the Commission all such authorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting 
Government may at any time revoke any such special permit which it has granted”.
165 On this issue generally see R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law o f the Sea (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), at 400-16.
166 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 579. In 1962 the IWC established that proposed 
permits should be subject to consultation with the Scientific Committee, although a limited degree of scientific 
hunting occurred in the mid-1960s: Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 120.
167 For instance, Japan issued permits for an annual scientific catch of three right whales between 1961 and 
1963: Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History of Modem Whaling”, at 666.
168 Gillespie observes that the rate of scientific catches in the years between 1986 and 2002 alone was almost 
three times higher than the entire period between 1949 and 1987: “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 120.
169 See, for instance, C. S. Baker et al., “Scientific Whaling: Source of Illegal Products for Market?” (2000) 290 
Science 1695; A. Gillespie, “Whaling Under a Scientific Auspice: The Ethics of Scientific Research Whaling 
Operations” (2000) 3 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 1; J. Iversen, “An Angry Rift in the Year
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Whaling under scientific auspices has been primarily undertaken by Japan, coinciding with 
the withdrawal in 1988 of the national reservation to the moratorium. A limited degree of 
lethal research is also undertaken by both Norway and Iceland. In response to the rapid rise in 
scientific whaling in the years immediately after the introduction of the moratorium, the IWC 
sought to establish further conditions upon the licensing processes undertaken by the 
parties.170 Nevertheless, it appears that these measures had little persuasive influence, with 
the Commission merely instructed to “inform” pertinent governments that proposed permits 
had failed to adhere to the criteria established by the Scientific Committee.171 Subsequently, a 
series of Resolutions were adopted in which parties were “invited to reconsider” scientific 
catches172 and encouraged to undertake non-lethal research,173 again with little discernible 
deterrent effect.
To date, the most extensive lethal scientific activities have been operated by Japan, in the 
form of the JARPA174 and JARPN175 programmes. The JARPA programme is considered 
especially controversial, since it largely occurs within a designated IWC whale sanctuary.
2000: Japan’s Scientific Whaling” (2000) 11 Colorado Journal o f  International Environmental Law and Policy 
121; R. B. Ackerman, “Japanese Whaling in the Pacific Ocean: Defiance o f International Whaling Norms in the 
Name of ‘Scientific Research’, Culture, and Tradition” (2002) 25 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 323; E. V. C. Greenberg,, P. S. Hoff and M. I. Goulding, “Japan’s Whale Research 
Programme and International Law” (2002) 32 California Western International Law Journal 151; and T. 
Wansbrough, “On the Issue of Scientific Whaling: Does the Majority Rule?” (2004) 13 Review o f European 
Community and International Environmental Law 333.
170 Resolution 1986-2: Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research; Resolution 1987-1: Resolution on 
Scientific Research Programmes.
171 At the 1987 Meeting a series of Resolutions was adopted stating that proposed special permits has failed to 
meet the 1986 scientific criteria: Resolution 1987-2: Resolution on Republic o f South Korea’s Proposal for 
Scientific Permits; Resolution 1987-3: Resolution on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches; Resolution 
1987-4: Resolution on the Japanese Proposal for Scientific Permits. Many such calls were reiterated at the 1988 
meeting: Resolution 1988-1: Resolution on the Norwegian Proposal for Special Permits; Resolution 1988-2: 
Resolution on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches.
172 Resolution 1989-1: Resolution on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches; Resolution 1989-2: 
Resolution on the Norwegian Proposal for Special Permits; Resolution 1989-3: Resolution on the Proposed 
Take by Japan of Whales in the Southern Hemisphere under Special Permit; Resolution 1990-1: Resolution on 
the Norwegian Proposal for Special Permits; Resolution 1990-2: Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan 
in the Southern Hemisphere; Resolution 1991-2: Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern 
Hemisphere; Resolution 1991-3: Resolution on USSR Proposal for Special Permit Catches in the North Pacific; 
Resolution 1993-7: Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere; Resolution 
1993-8: Resolution on the Norwegian Proposal for Special Permits; Resolution 1994-9: Resolution on Special 
Permit Catches by Japan in the North Pacific; Resolution 1994-10: Resolution on Special Permit Catches by 
Japan in the Southern Hemisphere.
173 Resolution 1990-5: Resolution on Redirecting Research towards Non-Lethal Means.
174 The JARPA programme commenced in 1987 in the Southern Ocean and was replaced in 2005 with a second 
phase, JARPA II.
175 The JARPN programme commenced in the western North Pacific in 1994 and was replaced in 2000 with a 
second phase, JARPN II.
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The Japanese authorities contend that lethal research is both a valuable and necessary 
component of ongoing investigations into whale biology,176 especially in ascertaining the 
level of fisheries competition between whales and humans.177 The Scientific Committee, 
however, has consistently stated that the JARPA and JARPN programmes offer limited value 
to the current state of scientific knowledge178 and, moreover, largely fail to provide data that 
could not be attained through non-lethal means.179 In 2003, the IWC condemned scientific 
permits as “contrary to the spirit o f the moratorium on commercial whaling and to the will of 
the Commission”, declaring that Article VIII is “not to be exploited in order to provide whale 
meat for commercial purposes”,180 although the anti-permit rhetoric has since softened 
considerably. Indeed, a more effective strategy pursued by the Scientific Committee has been
101
to consistently demonstrate the lack of scientific merit in continued lethal research.
Beyond these viewpoints, attempts to restrict scientific whaling have been restricted by 
difficulties in the exercise of unilateral fisheries powers. The US initially threatened to certify
1 Q'J
Iceland over scientific whaling in 1987, which initially deterred such initiatives. Iceland 
has subsequently issued further permits, but no further official action has been taken by
176 W. Aron, W. T. Burke and M. M. R. Freeman, “Science and Advocacy: A Cautionary Tale from the Whaling 
Debate” in Bums and Gillespie, “Future of Cetaceans”, at 87.
177 On this issue generally see J. W. Young, “Do Large Whales Have an Impact on Commercial Fishing in the 
Southern Pacific Ocean?” (1998) 1 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 254; see also M. 
Donoghue, “Whales -  The New Scapegoat for Overfishing” in Bums and Gillespie, “Future of Cetaceans”, at 
383.
178 Notably Resolution 1997-5: Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan (noting that JARPA “does not 
address critically important research needs for the management o f whaling in the Southern Ocean”); Resolution 
1998-4: Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit (reiterating a failure by JARPA and JARPN to meet 
critically important research needs); Resolution 2000-5: Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit in the 
North Pacific Ocean (noting that the JARPN II programme did not justify the killing of whales); and Resolution 
2007-1: Resolution on JARPA (noting that the JARPA II programme did not address critically important 
research needs).
179 Notably Resolution 1995-9: Resolution in Whaling under Scientific Permit in Sanctuaries (noting that “with 
the development o f modem [research] techniques it is not necessary to kill whales to obtain the information that 
is needed for initial implementation of the Revised Management Procedure for a particular whale stock”); 
Resolution 1997-6: Resolution on Special Permit Catches in the North Pacific by Japan (noting that the JARPN 
programme makes no advances in knowledge that could not be attained by non-lethal means); Resolution 2003- 
2: Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit (noting that non-lethal research “will usually provide better data 
at less cost to both animals and budget”); and Resolution 2007-3: Resolution on the Non-Lethal Use of 
Cetaceans (recognising the “valuable benefits” o f non-lethal research, which constitutes “a legitimate 
management strategy”).
180 Resolution 2003-2: Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit. Concerns had previously been raised over 
the potential international trade in whale meat taken for scientific purposes: Resolution 1994-7: Resolution on 
International Trade in Whale Meat and Products (noting that whale products acquired through lethal research 
activities should be sold only within domestic markets).
181 Indeed, the scientists in question have consistently struggled to publish their data in peer-reviewed journals: 
Y. Fukui, “Difficulties in Publishing Research Results from Scientific Whaling” (2005) 21 Marine Mammal 
Science 781.
182 Ivarsson, “Science, Sanctions and Cetaceans”, at 30.
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successive US administrations in response. Likewise, the JARPA programme provoked swift 
certification by the Regan administration,183 although this was largely symbolic as low fish 
stocks meant that Japan would not, in any event, have been allocated a quota in US waters for 
that particular season.184 Japan was recertified in September 2000, but was again essentially
1 or
banned from fishing in waters in which no such activities were scheduled.
Japanese scientific whaling in Antarctic waters has instead become something of a cause 
celebre in Japan-Australia relations in recent years.186 The JARPA programme is considered 
in some quarters to constitute an abuse of right,187 especially when conducted in Antarctic 
waters. In 1994 Australia somewhat contentiously established an EEZ within its claimed
1 R RAntarctic territory, to which Japan has consistently objected. In response, Australia has 
pledged to enforce a full ban on Japanese whaling in all nationally-claimed waters, supported 
if necessary by military assistance.
On a domestic level, environmental litigation in Australia has further strengthened the Rudd 
administration’s resolve against scientific whaling. In 2004 a leading environmental NGO 
commenced litigation against a major Japanese whaling company under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, which allows “any interested person” to 
enforce its constituent provisions.189 Although the Federal Court initially rejected the 
application on account of its potentially prejudicial effect upon international relations,190 this 
was later overturned on appeal,191 holding that diplomatic considerations were irrelevant to 
the application. Given that service of the orders was in practice unfeasible, the applicants
183 On this issue generally see K. Sumi, “The ‘Whale War’ between Japan and the United States: Problems and 
Prospects” (1987) 17 Denver Journal o f  International Law and Policy 317.
184 S. D. Murphy, “U.S. Sanctions against Japan for Whaling” (2001) 95 American Journal o f International Law 
149, at 151.
185 Murphy, “U.S. Sanctions”, at 152.
186 J. Mossop, “When is a Whale Sanctuary Not a Whale Sanctuary? Japanese Whaling in Australian Antarctic 
Maritime Zones” (2005) 36 Victoria University o f Wellington Law Review 757.
187 See especially G. Triggs, “Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse of Right or Optimum Utilisation?” (2000) 
5 Asia-Pacific Journal o f Environmental Law 33.
188 S. Kaye and D. R. Rothwell, “Australia’s Antarctic Maritime Claims and Boundaries” (1995) 26 Ocean 
Development and International Law 195.
189 Section 475. On this issue generally see T. Stephens and D. R. Rothwell, “Japanese Whaling in Antarctica: 
Humane Society International Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd” (2007) 16 Review o f  European Community 
and International Environmental Law 243 and R. Davies, “Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The HSI 
Litigation” (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal o f  International Law 6.
190 Humane Society International Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2005] FCA 664. This first action 
concerned an application for leave to serve the requisite processes upon the defendants in Japan. For 
commentary see R. Davies, “Taking on the Whalers: The Humane Society International Litigation” (2005) 24 
University o f Tasmania Law Review 78.
191 Humane Society International Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116.
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sought and secured a further order for substituted service,192 thereby permitting the Australian 
authorities to sanction whaling vessels operated by the defendant within these waters on the 
ultimately rather prosaic basis of contempt of court. Nevertheless, the judgment itself appears 
largely symbolic given that “[rjegardless of how the laws are drafted, it has been the 
Australian Government’s practice not to enforce Australian laws in Antarctica against non­
nationals”.193 Indeed, subsequent practice of the Australian navy has been to merely observe 
scientific whaling and, in line with IWC commitments, to ensure shipping safety against 
protests from militant environmental activists.194
Given that the decision in Humane Society International is highly unlikely to be enforced, 
efforts to deter scientific whaling in Antarctic waters may be more appropriately addressed 
elsewhere. This position raises the intriguing prospect of legal action between Australia and 
Japan before an international court. However, while parallels exist with the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna cases,195 considerable practical difficulties have nonetheless emerged in identifying a 
specific forum to resolve the dispute over scientific whaling.196 Furthermore, few pertinent 
international organisations beyond the IWC appear to offer realistic adjudicatory alternatives. 
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980197 provides 
a limited mandate to address the conservation o f cetaceans beyond the regulation of activities 
affecting krill.198 Likewise, it has been argued that a collective trade embargo under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora199 may
192 Humane Society International Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCA 3. On this process in a 
Japanese context generally, see A. J. MacDonald, “Service o f Australian Originating Process in Japan” (1992) 
66 Australian Law Journal 810.
193 Davies, “Enforcing Australian Law”, at 19.
194 At recent IWC Meetings concerns have been raised at the increasing numbers of violent clashes between 
protestors and whaling crews. To this end the IWC has adopted two key Resolutions in which it “does not 
condone” violent protests (Resolution 2006-2: Resolution on the Safety of Vessels Engaged in Whaling and 
Whale Research-Related Activities) and condemns the actions o f protestors to jeopardise safety at sea 
(Resolution 2007-2: Resolution on Safety at Sea and Protection of the Environment).
195 (2000) 39 International Legal Materials 1359.
196 See A. Hutchinson, “Baleen Out the IWC: Is International Litigation an Effective Strategy for Halting the 
Japanese Scientific Whaling Programme?” (2006) 3 Macquarie Journal o f International and Comparative 
Environmental Law 1.
197 1329 UNTS 47.
198 Indeed, Article VI of the Convention provides “[njothing in this Convention shall derogate from the rights 
and obligations of Contracting Parties under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the 
Convention for the Conservation o f Antarctic Seals”.
199 993 UNTS 243 [Hereinafter “CITES”].
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prove effective.200 However, whaling in a scientific context has been virtually unexplored 
within CITES, which has focussed solely on the international trade in whale products.
It may be argued that the scientific whaling controversy is more likely to be resolved through 
the on-going negotiations towards a new direction for the IWC, than by judicial intervention 
or the operation of external treaty processes. Given the considerable evidence that current 
scientific whaling operates effectively as a substitute to industrial quotas, a resumption of 
commercial whaling should render scientific catches largely redundant. Any meaningful data 
from lethal research -  insofar as it exists at all -  can instead be garnered by scientific 
observers aboard whaling vessels. Moreover, it is likely that a universal cessation of scientific 
catches would be considered a fundamental pre-requisite by the anti-whaling lobby for 
approval of the RMS and the resumption o f future commercial activities under the ICRW.
2.6.3 Aboriginal subsistence whaling
A third potential basis for limited hunting activities is provided under Section 13 of the 
ICRW Schedule, under which specific catch limits are established “to satisfy aboriginal 
subsistence need”. Modem aboriginal whaling is primarily confined to the waters of the 
Northern Hemisphere, conducted by the Alaskan Inuit for beluga and bowhead whales, 
Russian Chukotkan peoples for beluga, bowhead and grey whales, Greenlanders for 
narwhales, beluga, humpback, fin and minke whales, the Faeroese for pilot whales and the 
Canadian Inuit for bowhead, beluga and narwhals. A smaller degree of indigenous
907humpback whaling also occurs in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Equatorial Guinea,
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alongside sperm whaling in isolated parts of Indonesia.
The aboriginal subsistence exception has been a long-standing feature of multilateral whaling 
arrangements and, as noted above, was first incorporated in the 1931 Convention. While 
absent from the 1938 Agreement, it was subsequently reinstated within the ICRW Schedule
200 P. H. Sand, “Japan’s ‘Research Whaling’ in the Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean in the 
Face of the Endangered Species Convention (CITES)” (2008) 17 Review o f European Community and 
International Environmental Law 56.
201 For a summary of these hunts see M. M. R. Freeman et al., Inuit, Whaling and Sustainability (Walnut Creek, 
CA: AltaMira Press, 1999), at 59-96. On Greenlandic activities in particular see Caulfield, “Greenlanders, 
Whales and Whaling”.
202 N. R. R. Ward, “The Whalers of Bequia” (1988) 30 Oceanus 89.
203 R. R. Reeves, “The Origins and Character of ‘Aboriginal Subsistence’ Whaling: A Global Review” (2002) 
32 Mammal Review 71, at 86-88. Furthermore, a miniscule Filipino catch of Bryde’s whales was effectively 
ended by domestic legislation in 1996: ibid.
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following a proposal by the USSR in respect of indigenous Siberian peoples.204 Since 1950, 
the aboriginal subsistence provisions of the ICRW Schedule have been successively 
expanded and amended to establish particular tribal requirements and restrictions on certain 
stocks.205
The vast majority of aboriginal hunts are conducted by ICRW parties, although a small 
volume of tribal hunting also occurs outside the auspices of the Commission. Ultimately, 
aboriginal whaling is largely regulated on a national level by the parties in question, acting in 
conjunction with hunting standards and quotas prescribed by the IWC, with the “parent” 
government required to apply for a share of the aboriginal allocation on particular stocks. No 
guidance is provided for “aboriginal” credentials, leaving parties to champion the claims of 
particular communities as an aspect of national whaling policies.
It is generally accepted that aboriginal hunting is fundamentally distinct to commercial 
whaling. Broad endorsement is therefore accorded in principle for hunts that do not endanger 
the populations in question and to which precautionary monitoring and management 
measures are applicable.206 The initial exemption in the 1931 Convention appears to be based 
on pre-existing marine mammal treaties that enshrined consideration for aboriginal seal- 
hunters.207 The continuing basis for the recognition of aboriginal subsistence claims has been
<^ AO
subsequently attributed to modem human rights norms, such as the prohibition on 
deprivation of subsistence under Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966,209 although advocates of more ecocentric and preservationist 
approaches to whaling have expressed a degree of scepticism towards such claims.210
204 Resolution 10 of the 1946 International Whaling Conference.
205 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 195.
206 Reeves, “Origins and Character”, at 73. Moreover, the IWC has declared that “the highest priority shall be 
accorded to the objective of ensuring that the risk o f extinction to individual stocks is not seriously increased by 
aboriginal subsistence whaling”: Resolution 1994-4: Resolution on a Review of Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling.
207 In this respect, Article IV of the now-defunct Convention between the United States, Great Britain, Russia 
and Japan for the Preservation and Protection o f Fur Seals 1911 provided an exemption for aboriginal 
communities using traditional hunting methods, phrased in a similar manner to Article 3 o f the 1931 
Convention, which seems to have used the 1911 instrument as an indicative drafting guide.
208 See in particular N. Doubleday, “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: The Right o f Inuit to Hunt Whales and 
Implications for International Environmental Law” (1989) 17 Denver Journal o f International Law and Policy 
373.
209 993 UNTS 3.
210 See especially D ’Amato and Chopra, “Emerging Right”, at 58-66.
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The aboriginal exemption first received sustained scrutiny in the mid-1970s due to concerns
911over the potential impact of bowhead whaling by indigenous communities. This resulted in 
the controversial decision by the IWC in 1977 to temporarily ban aboriginal hunts for grey 
and bowhead whales. The bowhead controversy demonstrated that the IWC possessed “a 
strong scientific committee but essentially no expertise within its ranks for addressing the
919socio-economic, cultural and nutritional dimensions of aboriginal whaling”. Consequently, 
an Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Sub-Committee (ASWSC) was established in 1983 to 
review quota applications and provide advice on technical management measures. The IWC
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has primarily focussed on reducing the numbers of whales struck but not landed, ensuring 
the sustainability of specific aboriginal hunts214 and improving humane killing methods.215
Two particular challenges have arisen in recent years concerning the aboriginal exemption. 
First, the application process for aboriginal quotas has proved susceptible to political 
manipulation, as demonstrated in the recent Makah controversy. Aboriginal permits are 
allocated to particular stocks -  as opposed to named parties, communities or individuals -  
and distributed by consensus between pertinent IWC members. In this instance, a Native 
American community which held historic whaling rights under a treaty with the US 
government,216 sought to resume whaling. The US applied to the IWC for a quota in 1996, 
which was subsequently rejected due to concerns that the application might subsequently
211 J. Walsh, “Moratorium for the Bowhead: Eskimo Whaling on Ice?” (1977) 197 Science 847.
212 Reeves, “Origins and Character”, at 72.
213 For instance, Resolution 1981-4: Resolution to the Government o f the United States on the Behring Sea 
Bowhead Whale (calling on the US to ensure that aboriginal hunters acted to reduce the levels of bowhead 
whales struck but not landed to zero “as quickly as possible”).
214 Resolution 1998-9: Resolution on Directed Takes of White Whales (noting “doubts about the sustainability 
of the current harvest” o f beluga and narwhals by Greenlanders); Resolution 1994-4, op. cit.
215 In this respect, particular concerns have been raised over the Faroese drive hunt -  Resolution 1993-2: 
Resolution on Pilot Whales (noting the IWC’s “continuing concern” over the humaneness of the hunt and 
expressing concern over the adequacy of Faeroese legislation); Resolution 1995-1: Resolution on Killing 
Methods in the Pilot Whale Drive Hunt (noting improvements and encouraging the further development of 
alternative killing methods); see K. Sanderson, “Grind -  Ambiguity and Pressure to Conform: Faroese Whaling 
and the Anti-Whaling Protest” in Freeman and Kreuter, “Elephants and Whales”, at 187. More generally the 
IWC has sought to improve the humane killing element of all aboriginal hunts -  see Resolution 1985-3: 
Resolution on Humane Killing in Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (urging the prompt adoption of more efficient 
killing methods); Resolution 1997-1: Resolution on Improving the Humaneness of Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling (urging those engaged in aboriginal hunting “to do everything possible to reduce still any unavoidable 
suffering to whales”).
216 The Treaty of Neah Bay 1885, considered to be the only such instrument that confers whaling rights on 
Native Americans, provides “[t]he right of taking fish and of whaling or sealing at usual and accustomed 
grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens o f the United States”: Article 
4. On the Makah whaling saga see R. Sullivan, A Whale Hunt (London: Headline Publishing, 2000).
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inspire other dormant or novel claims.217 In 1997, a five-year package of aboriginal quotas 
was controversially negotiated based on a joint US-Russian submission, whereby Russia 
agreed to assign a small number of grey whales to the Makah hunt in exchange for a similar 
allowance from the traditional Alaskan bowhead quota.218 In response, the IWC introduced a 
rider to the grey whale quota restricting such takings “exclusively for local consumption by 
the aborigines whose traditional subsistence needs and cultural needs have been 
recognised”.219 Although a small number of whales were subsequently taken by the Makah, it 
is nonetheless doubtful whether the requirements of Section 13(2) were met on a strict
construction, notwithstanding arguments that the “re-discovery” of a whaling tradition may
99n
constitute an exercise of wider rights to self-determination by traditional communities. 
Although Makah whaling was later suspended and ultimately blocked by domestic 
litigation, the initial quota nonetheless set an uncomfortable precedent and raises difficult 
questions regarding IWC controls over the re-establishment by indigenous groups of a lapsed 
whaling heritage.
Secondly, certain parties have called on the IWC to establish a whaling quota as an interim 
relief allocation to alleviate short-term economic disruption to coastal regions most affected 
by the commercial moratorium. The cause o f so-called “small-type coastal whaling” has been 
consistently advocated by Japan223 -  and, on a rather more transient basis, by Norway224 and
217 J. Firestone and J. Lilley, “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling and the Right to Practice and Revitalize Cultural 
Traditions and Customs” (2005) 8 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 111, at 198.
218 On this process generally see W. Walters and C. Dugger, “The Hunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of 
Native American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling” (1997) 22 Columbia Journal o f  
Environmental Law 319; L. Jenkins and C. Romanzo, “Makah Whaling: Aboriginal Subsistence or a Stepping 
Stone to Undermining the Commercial Whaling Moratorium?” (1998) 9 Colorado Journal o f International 
Environmental Law and Policy 71; R. K. Eichstaedt, “Save the Whales v. Save the Makah: The Makah and the 
Struggle for Native Whaling” (1998) 4 Animal Law 145 and W. Bradford, “Save the Whales v. Save the Makah: 
Finding Negotiated Solutions to Ethnodevelopmental Disputes in the New International Economic World 
Order” (2000) 13 St. Thomas Law Review 155.
219 Section 13(2) of the ICRW Schedule (emphasis added). This provision has since been amended.
220 See R. J. Miller, “Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe Goes Whaling” (2000) 25 
American Indian Law Review 165; see also Firestone and Lilley, “Right to Practice and Revitalize”.
221 Metcalf v. Daley (2000) 214 F.3d 1135; see R. Fowles, “Metcalf v. Daley: Consideration of the Significant 
Impact on the Gray Whale Population in an Environmental Assessment” (2001) 6 Ocean and Coastal Law 
Journal 397.
222 Anderson v. Evans (2002) 314 F.3d 1006; see Z. Tomlinson, “Abrogation or Regulation? How Anderson v. 
Evans Discards the Makah’s Treaty Whaling Right in the Name of Conservation Necessity” (2003) 78 
Washington Law Review 1101; see also Firestone and Lilley, “Right to Practice and Revitalize”, at 202-07.
223 For a review of Japanese small-type whaling claims see M. M. R. Freeman, “Culture-Based Conflict in the 
International Whaling Commission: The Case o f Japanese Small-Type Whaling” in Bums and Gillespie, 
“Future of Cetaceans”, at 33. For a critical rebuttal of such claims see H. Watanabe, Japan’s Whaling: The 
Politics o f Culture in Historical Perspective (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2009), especially 151-170.
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99Smost recently South Korea -  as a distinct, yet analogous, form of subsistence whaling. 
Thus far, such requests have been consistently rejected, while the response of the IWC has 
been essentially platitudinous in nature, confined to bland statements of solidarity with the 
communities affected and vague recommendations to “work expeditiously to alleviate 
distress”.226 Indeed, a rather limited degree of sympathy has been exhibited towards claims 
for relief quotas to mitigate the socio-economic impacts of the commercial moratorium upon 
wealthy, industrialised and economically versatile nations, which remain infinitely better
997placed than isolated and itinerant indigenous communities to adapt to whaling restrictions.
2.6.4 “Pirate” and “non-affiliated” whaling
Finally, reflective of the position that “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for 
a third State without its consent”,228 IWC initiatives have no legal effect upon non-members. 
Third parties may therefore undertake whaling operations subject to national or regional 
constraints and the pertinent rules of the law of the sea, as outlined in Chapter III. Whaling 
outside IWC auspices falls into one of two broad categories. So-called “pirate whaling” 
involves circumventing the Convention through the reflagging of vessels and transfer of 
whaling equipment to third parties. On the other hand, a degree of what may be termed “non­
affiliated whaling” occurs, where hunting operations are sanctioned through national law or 
membership of an alternative pro-consumption organisation.
Although considerable attention and alarm has been focussed on external whaling, the scale 
of such activities should be viewed in context. In the 1970s, generally considered the pinnacle 
of non-IWC whaling, approximately ninety percent of hunting operations were nonetheless
224 See B. T. Hodges, “The Cracking Fasade of the International Whaling Commission as an Institution of 
International Law: Norwegian Small-Type Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption” (2000) 15 
Journal o f Environmental Law and Litigation 295.
225 Background Paper for Japan’s Small-Type Coastal Whaling; Document IWC/60/9, submitted by Japan at the 
Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC in 2008. Likewise, such claims have a basis in the preambular recognition 
by the ICRW that “it is in the common interest to achieve the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as 
possible without causing widespread economic and nutritional distress”: Preamble to the ICRW, Fifth Recital.
226 See Resolution 1993-3: Resolution on Japanese Community-Based Minke Whaling; Resolution 1995-4: 
Resolution on Japanese Community-Based Whaling; Resolution 1996-1: Resolution to Resolve the Distress of 
the Japanese Small-Type Coastal Whaling as Community-Based Whaling; Resolution 2000-1: Resolution on 
Community-Based Whaling in Japan; Resolution 2001-6: Resolution in Japanese Community-Based Whaling; 
and Resolution 2004-2: Resolution on Japanese Community-Based Whaling.
227 H. N. Scheiber, “Historical Memory, Cultural Claims and Environmental Ethics: The Jurisprudence of 
Whaling Regulation” in H. N. Scheiber (ed.), Law o f  the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), at 165.
228 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34.
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regulated under the ICRW.229 The first modem case of pirate whaling is considered the 
Olympic Challenger incident in 1954, in which Peru arrested a Honduran-registered vessel of
230Panamanian origin that had been reflagged to specifically avoid certain IWC restrictions. 
Uncertainties over the limits of Peruvian maritime jurisdiction raised questions over the 
ultimate legitimacy of the arrest, although a series of local fines were later imposed for 
whaling infractions.
Until the 1970s, consideration of the issue o f non-IWC whaling was “superficial”.232 
Sustained attention was accorded to these concerns between 1976 and 1981, culminating in a 
series of Special Meetings in 1977 and 1978 and the establishment in 1980 of a Working 
Group on Non-IWC Whaling. The IWC has traditionally adopted a “carrot-and-stick” 
approach to external hunting activities, seeking to restrict the flow of equipment and expertise 
to non-members and to refrain from purchasing whale products in order to stunt the 
development of national industries,233 while simultaneously encouraging such states to ratify 
the Convention.234 Beyond cooperative actions with CITES to address the international trade
229 Gambell, “Whale Conservation”, at 308.
230 The Olympic Victor and Other Vessels (1958) 22 International Law Reports 278.
231 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 231-33. Pem had claimed a 200-mile mar presencial within which the 
vessel had been arrested which, as noted in Chapter III, was highly contentious at the material time.
232 Thirty-First Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1981), at 23.
233 See Resolution 1976-5: Resolution on Transfer o f Vessels, Equipment and Assistance (calling on parties to 
prohibit the sale o f vessels and equipment and to take all practicable steps to discourage the dissemination of 
expertise and assistance to non-parties); 1977-8: Resolution on Prevention of Transfer o f Whaling Vessels, etc 
(calling on parties to “take all practical steps” to avoid transfer); Resolution on Importation of Whale Products 
from Non-IWC Member Countries and Resolution on Transfer o f Whaling Equipment and Expertise, etc, both 
adopted at the IWC Special Meeting in December 1978; Resolution 1979-9: Resolution on Importation of 
Whale Products from, Export o f Equipment to, and Prohibition of Whaling by Non-Member Countries (calling 
on parties to “cease immediately” the import o f whale products and export o f vessels and equipment to non- 
parties and to consider prohibiting whaling by non-parties within national fishery conservation zones); 
Resolution 1980-6: Resolution aimed at Discouraging Whaling Operations Outside IWC Regulations (calling on 
parties to “take all practical steps” to avoid offering services or expertise directly relevant to whaling to non- 
parties).
234 See Resolution 1976-4: Resolution on Adherence to the Convention (urging Spain and Portugal to join the 
IWC); Resolution 1977-2: Resolution 1977-2: Resolution on Sea of Japan Minke Whale Stock (urging China 
and North and South Korea to join the IWC); Resolution 1977-3: Resolution on Spain-Portugal-British Isles Fin 
Whale Stock (urging Spain to join the IWC); Resolution 1977-4: Resolution on North Atlantic Sperm Whales 
(urging Spain and Portugal to join the IWC); Resolution 1977-5: Resolution on Right Whales at Madeira 
(urging Portugal to join the IWC); Resolution 1977-7: Resolution on Prevention of Importation of Whale 
Products (renewing a general invitation for non-members to join the IWC and further requesting that current 
members “should seek to encourage membership by all non-member whaling nations”); Resolution on Bryde’s 
Whales in the South Pacific Ocean (urging Peru to join the IWC), Resolution on Sperm Whales in the South 
Pacific Ocean (urging Chile and Peru to join the IWC) and Resolution on Sei Whales in the South Pacific Ocean 
(urging Chile to join the IWC), adopted at the Special Meeting in December 1977; Resolution 1978-7: 
Resolution on Non-Member Whaling Countries (encouraging non parties to join the IWC); Resolution on 
Adherence of Peru to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling 1946 (welcoming Peruvian 
membership and observing that “this adherence will materially assist the Commission in its regulation of 
whaling activities”). Nevertheless, concerns have also been raised by the lack of data on the extent of non-IWC
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in whale products, as detailed in Chapter III, concerns over pirate whaling have been 
relatively peripheral within the IWC since the early 1980s. Most recently, efforts have been 
centred on encouraging Canada, which oversees a miniscule bowhead hunt by its Inuit 
peoples, to rejoin the Commission.235
2.7 Revised Management Procedures and the future regulation of commercial whaling
Efforts have been on-going since the introduction of the moratorium to establish a universally 
acceptable model for quota-setting that would overcome the scientific deficiencies and 
practical shortcomings experienced by previous systems. The post-moratorium mechanism 
envisaged by the IWC, the Revised Management Procedures, therefore consists of two 
fundamental and mutually-supportive components. In the first instance, the Revised 
Management Procedure (RMP) establishes the computational modelling and data-gathering 
mechanisms necessary to establish a conservative numerical quota for commercial whaling, 
based on available data from individual stocks. The Revised Management Scheme (RMS), 
which has proved rather more contentious within the IWC, encompasses the requisite 
enforcement, inspection and welfare conditions framing any future hunting activities. 
Although the scientific components of the new system were adopted by the IWC with little 
active controversy, progress on the more holistic issues of the RMS has failed to keep pace 
with these developments, generating further political discord within the Commission. The 
RMS has dominated recent IWC Meetings, with the parties having identified a clear risk of 
institutional implosion unless tangible progress is forthcoming in the short-term future.
The development of a more sophisticated regulatory mechanism to the NMP was first 
mandated by the IWC in 1981,236 and was a priority activity for the Scientific Committee 
throughout the 1980s. Indeed, the IWC condemned the previous arrangements as “deficient in 
several important respects”, not least their limitations in the face o f considerable uncertainty, 
which “often left the Commission without adequate advice on classifications and catch
whaling: Resolution 1981-6: Resolution to Implement Recommendations o f the Technical Committee Group on 
Non-IWC Whaling.
235 See Resolution 1996-9: Resolution on Canadian Whaling; Resolution 1998-13: Resolution on Canadian 
Membership to the IWC; Resolution 1999-7: Resolution on Small Populations o f Highly Endangered Whales; 
and Resolution 2000-2: Resolution on Whaling of Highly Endangered Bowhead Whales in the Eastern Canadian 
Arctic. Canada left the IWC in 1981 and has thus far resisted invitations by the IWC to bring its bowhead 
whaling policies under the auspices of the Commission’s aboriginal subsistence programme. On the Canadian 
position generally see T. L. McDorman, “Canada and Whaling: An Analysis of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention” (1998) 29 Ocean Development and International Law 179.
236 Resolution 1981-2: Resolution on Developing Revised Management Procedures.
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limits”.237 The priorities for the RMP were considered to be ensuring the stability of catch 
limits, outlining acceptable risks and facilitating the highest possible continuing yield from 
stocks.
In 1992, the parties endorsed a sophisticated mathematical model, the Catch Limit Algorithm 
(CLA), as the statistical basis for the future calculation of whaling quotas, declaring that the 
CLA should not be applied “until there is agreement on all aspects of the Revised 
Management Scheme”.238 To date, despite the exemplary progress on the development of the 
RMP, the conclusion of the RMS has nonetheless proved elusive and divisive. At the Forty- 
Fifth Meeting in 1993, a proposed Resolution on the RMS was defeated, prompting the 
resignation of the Chair of the Scientific Committee in protest. The subsequent observation 
that the remaining scientific aspects o f the RMP had been “adequately addressed”239 rather 
emphasised the ongoing difficulties in reconciling the technical and the political aspects of 
the process.
This position has created an impasse within the Commission which has both dominated and 
polarised IWC Meetings in recent years and, arguably, impeded progress on other equally 
pressing issues of importance to the conservation and management of whale stocks. Since 
2000, progress -  or the lack thereof -  towards the conclusion of the RMS has been 
increasingly linked to the future stability and viability o f the IWC itself. Indeed, at the Fifty- 
Second Meeting in 2000, it was considered “important for the future of the Commission” that 
the process to conclude the RMS proceeds expeditiously.240 Despite regular meetings of a 
designated Working Group, a universally acceptable version of the RMS remains elusive. 
This has clear political implications for the Commission, with subsequent Resolutions 
warning that a lack of progress on this issue “may seriously jeopardise the ability of the IWC 
to fulfil its responsibilities”241 or even provoke a “collapse”. 242
237 Resolution 1991-4: Resolution on the Revised Management Procedure.
238 Resolution 1992-3: Resolution on the Revised Management System (recognising that this “completes the 
main scientific component o f the development of a Revised Management Scheme for commercial baleen 
whaling”).
239 Resolution 1994-5: Resolution on the Revised Management Scheme.
240 Resolution 2000-3: Resolution on the Revised Management Scheme. In this respect, the Resolution echoed 
an earlier call “towards completing work expeditiously” on the RMS -  Resolution 1996-6: Resolution on 
Provisions for Completing the Revised Management Scheme.
241 Resolution 2004-6: Resolution on Completion of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS). To this end, 
based on the Chair’s Proposal for A Way Forward discussed at the Meeting, the Resolution re-established a 
distinct Working Group on the RMS and established a full intersessional programme of work.
242 Resolution 2006-1: St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration.
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OA'XIn 1996 the IWC officially identified three remaining issues to be finalised on the RMS : 
namely, inspection and observation matters; ensuring that total catches over time remain 
within designated limits; and the drafting of an appropriate Schedule amendment.244 O f these, 
inspection and compliance issues have received particular attention,245 although consensus on 
the precise components of such a scheme has proved elusive. Key points of divergence 
include whether observer programmes should be mandatory or voluntary, the nationality of 
observers and their precise remit. While the 1937 Agreement pioneered the use of national 
inspectors on whaling vessels, the ICRW was essentially silent on this issue due to procedural 
difficulties in instituting an international inspection scheme,246 while a proposal to this effect 
in 1955 was rejected by the parties.247 Few model programmes existed at the time beyond the 
specialist confines of arms control treaties, 248 hence the voluntary adoption in 1968 of an 
International Observer Scheme for Factory Ships Engaged in Pelagic Whaling in the 
Antarctic249 was considered groundbreaking. However, the observer scheme only received 
universal approval and participation in the mid-1970s and lapsed following the 
commencement of the commercial moratorium, hence current commercial hunts under 
reservations to the Convention deploy nationally-appointed inspectors.
Additional complications have been raised, however, over the position of animal welfare 
standards within the IWC’s proposed management system. A number of parties have voiced 
concerns over the absence of such considerations within the on-going RMS negotiations 251
243 Resolution 1996-6: Resolution on Provisions for Completing the Revised Management Scheme.
244 Although in many respects this issue is likely to prove least problematic o f the three given that, in addition to 
the Working Group on the RMS, Resolution 2004-6 further established an Expert Drafting Group (EDG) to seek 
to marshal broad areas of consensus into a consolidated draft text for a future amendment o f the Schedule.
245 On this issue generally see A. Gillespie, “The Search for a New Compliance Mechanism within the 
International Whaling Commission” (2003) 34 Ocean Development and International Law 349.
246 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 358.
247 Seventh Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1957), at 5.
248 E. C. Surrency, “International Inspection in Pelagic Whaling” (1964) 18 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 666, at 670.
249 (1968) Cmnd 2209.
250 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 358-59. Nevertheless, this is not without potential pitfalls, as Norwegian 
fisheries officials discovered to their cost in the context o f seal hunting, when in 1988 they were duped into 
appointing a rogue environmental campaigner as an observer. The resulting report by the “inspector”, a 
fabricated tirade alleging gruesome violations o f animal welfare standards, gave rise to a series of substantial 
libel actions that ultimately had to be resolved by the European Court of Human Rights: Bladet Tromse and 
Stensaas v. Norway (1999) 29 EHRR 125.
251 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 367-68. The leading advocates o f this policy have been the UK and New 
Zealand.
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While the IWC has adopted a series of Resolutions addressing humane killing, such 
measures remain essentially non-binding. Certain parties therefore wish to elevate the 
operational status of these principals to a central aspect of any future regulatory regime 
governing commercial hunting.253 In response, elements of the pro-whaling lobby view these 
concerns as a stalling tactic, designed to obstruct progress on the RMS.254 Despite lying 
outside the traditional concerns elucidated by the IWC in the context of the RMS, it appears 
that some form of agreement will also have to be reached on this issue, in order to avoid 
further political postponement of progress towards the completion of this mechanism.
Finally, it was agreed in 1998 that “catch limits for commercial purposes for any species of 
whale in any region shall be calculated by deducting all human-induced mortalities that are 
known or can be reasonably estimated, other than commercial catches, from the total 
allowable removal”.255 This position echoes the sentiments of a previous Resolution that had 
observed the need to consider wider environmental factors in quota calculations, but saw 
“little advantage in modifying the Catch Limit Algorithm further to account for
252 See Resolution 1978-4: Reporting Data Relative to Humane Killing (noting the dearth of available data on 
humane killing); Resolution 1980-11: Resolution to Ban the Use o f the Cold Grenade Harpoon for Killing 
Minke Whales from the 1981/92 and 1982 Whaling Season (banning the use o f the cold grenade harpoon); 
Resolution 1982-4: Resolution on the Use o f the Cold Grenade Harpoon (condemning the cold grenade harpoon 
as a technique that is “cruel and attracts adverse criticism o f the whaling industry” and requesting reservations 
ban to be withdrawn); Resolution 1992-1: Resolution on Humane Killing (establishing an action plan on 
humane killing); Resolution 1993-1: Resolution on Humane Killing (encouraging the parties to continue to 
progress the action plan on humane killing); Resolution 1994-1: Resolution on the Use of the Electric Lance as a 
Secondary Method of Killing Whales (calling on parties to “develop more satisfactory methods of killing 
whales”); Resolution 1995-1: Resolution on Killing Methods in the Pilot Whale Drive Hunt (calling on parties 
to improve the humaneness of the Faroese drive hunt); Resolution 1995-2: Resolution on Methods of Killing 
Whales (calling on parties to suspend the use o f the electric lance pending activity towards a full ban); 
Resolution 1997-1: Resolution on Improving the Humaneness o f Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (calling on 
parties to “reduce unavoidable suffering” of whales subject to aboriginal hunts); Resolution 1999-1: Resolution 
arising from the Workshop on Whale Killing Methods (encouraging the development of more accurate 
indicators of death and to provide appropriate assistance to aboriginal hunts); Resolution 2001-1: Resolution on 
Whale Killing Methods (encouraging dissemination o f information on technical developments); Resolution 
2004-3: Resolution on Whale Killing Issues (expressing concern “in the light of its current mandate and long­
standing commitment to address welfare issues, that current whaling methods do not guarantee death without 
pain, stress or distress” and that data is incomplete and the criteria currently used to ascertain death is 
inadequate). On the current limitations of the IWC regime governing humane killing generally see S. K. 
Knudsen, “A Review of the Criteria Used to Assess Insensibility and Death in Hunted Whales Compared to 
Other Species” (2005) 169 The Veterinary Journal 42; see also N. Gales, R. Leaper and V. Papastavrou, “Is 
Japan’s Whaling Humane?” (2008) 32 Marine Policy 408.
253 Indeed, some commentators have argued that humane killing is an essential pre-requisite of any regime 
purporting to regulate the lethal harvest of any animal: see A. Gillespie, “Humane Killing: A Recognition of 
Universal Common Sense in International Law” (2003) 6 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 1 
and S. R. Harrop, “From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and the International 
Whaling Commission” (2003) 6 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 79.
254 Friedheim, “Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice”, at 359 (describing humane killing considerations as “a 
perfect diversionary issue”).
255 Resolution 1998-2: Resolution on Total Catches over Time.
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environmental change”, with alternative aspects of the RMS considered a more appropriate
CfL
avenue by which to reflect such concerns. This approach therefore considers the adverse 
impact of wider anthropogenic factors on whale stocks in a manner largely unprecedented 
within previous IWC management schemes. However, this approach in isolation merely 
observes that stocks have become depleted through external environmental factors and 
adjusts the mathematical parameters of the RMP accordingly. Therefore, if  the IWC is to 
truly advance “the proper conservation of whale stocks” as mandated by the Convention, it is 
contended that the RMS will require a supplementary programme of regulatory activity to 
address, as opposed to merely identifying, the impact of such threats on commercial catch 
quotas. Nevertheless, in recent years the IWC has consistently struggled to establish effective 
conservation policies, due primarily to a lack of consensus on the precise competencies of the 
Commission and compounded by wider institutional difficulties, to which this thesis now 
turns.
2.8 The “proper conservation of whale stocks” and future directions for the IWC
Thus far, this Chapter has examined the deficiencies of the IWC as a distinct quota-setting 
body and the negative impact that such mismanagement had both on whale stocks and the 
global perception of the Commission as a credible institution. The remainder of this Chapter 
considers the extent to which the IWC is equipped to address the wider conservation needs of 
whales and other cetaceans in the mid- to long-term future.
In addressing future regulatory issues within the IWC, three central observations should be 
made at this juncture. First, as explicitly acknowledged by the IWC in 2007, “whales in the 
21st Century face a wider range of threats than those envisaged when the IWC was concluded 
in 1946”.257 The IWC will need therefore to demonstrate adaptability if  it is to exercise global 
leadership in this regard. Second, the IWC itself may be considered to be at an operational 
disadvantage in respect of many of these new management challenges. Some of these 
limitations are essentially self-inflicted, given the lack o f universal internal endorsement of 
the IWC’s purported remit. Conversely, certain issues may be considered broader global and 
environmental problems to which the ICRW may lack the mandate and practical prowess to 
address effectively. Third, such limitations have been compounded in recent years by
256 Resolution 1994-5.
257 Resolution 2007-3: Resolution on the Non-Lethal Use o f Cetaceans.
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controversy and confusion over the future direction of the IWC in respect of whales and other 
cetaceans, as two conflicting “constitutional” Resolutions adopted since 2003 have largely 
failed to establish a clear, defining ethos for the Commission in the mid- to long-term future.
2.8.1 The evolving environmental threats to cetaceans
Although Suarez noted habitat degradation and the variable abundance of plankton and 
essential prey as particularly pressing threats to whales and other marine mammals, 
broader conservation considerations beyond regulating numerical catch quotas were largely 
absent from the 1930s instruments. This trend also characterised the early years of operation 
of the IWC. Nevertheless, since the early 1970s increasing concerns have been raised over 
the impact of alternative anthropogenic pressures upon whale stocks, the scale of which 
perhaps became more pronounced given that commercial whaling had been abandoned by the 
majority of ICRW parties by this stage. Accordingly, “[w]hile overkill from hunting was the 
most obvious and immediate threat to some species and populations during much of the 
twentieth century, the relative importance o f other threats, particularly bycatch in fisheries,
259has increased dramatically during the last few decades”.
Strong concerns have been raised regarding the continued unsustainable removals of 
individuals from stocks. Beyond the historical impact o f over-hunting, recent removals have 
occurred through the culling of certain species, especially minke whales, due to perceived 
competition with fisheries.260 More insidiously, and of greater alarm, interactions with 
fisheries pose arguably the gravest current threat to cetaceans. Fisheries interactions -  
especially incidental mortality and injury in fishing gear -  is considered a “looming crisis” 
for marine mammals,261 credited with the dubious distinction of being a primary cause in the 
recent likely extinction of one species of cetacean.262 Further anthropogenic removals from 
stocks -  with potentially significant adverse implications for diminished populations -  occur 
through the live capture industry, discussed fully in Chapter III of this work. Beyond the 
substantial impact of direct and indirect removals o f individuals from stocks, an increasingly
258 “Special Supplement”, at 232-37.
259 R. R. Reeves, B. D. Smith, E. A. Crespo and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises: 
2002-2010 Conservation Action Plan for the World’s Cetaceans (Gland: IUCN, 2003).
260 Donoghue, “Whales -  The New Scapegoat”, at 385.
261 A. J. Reid, “The Looming Crisis: Interactions between Marine Mammals and Fisheries” (2008) 89 Journal o f  
Mammalogy 541.
262 S. T. Turvey et al., “First Human-Caused Extinction of a Cetacean Species?” (2007) 3 Biology Letters 537.
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9 fi'Xtroubling picture of habitat-related challenges is beginning to emerge. Habitat concerns are 
highly subjective and both region- and species-specific, hence it is near impossible to state 
definitively the extent of the threat posed to all cetaceans by habitat degradation and 
disturbance. Although often compounded by data deficiencies, a broad range of conservation 
concerns are becoming increasingly apparent.
An issue of particular importance is considered to be the diminishing areas of critical habitats 
for a number of species of cetaceans caused by the impacts of anthropogenic disturbance 
within the marine environment,264 given the importance of sound to cetaceans.265 Increased 
maritime activities in recent decades have expanded considerably the range of acoustic 
disturbances in the oceans, which has had a displacement effect upon a number of species 266 
While individual species of cetaceans often react in very different ways to ocean noise,267 
adverse impacts have been observed in the context of icebreaking, aircraft overflight,
970and general shipping activities. Scientific research activities and the operation of acoustic 
by-catch mitigation devices271 have also been identified as potential adverse noise sources in 
the cetacean environment. Of particular concern however is the impact of low-frequency 
active sonar, especially devices used in military operations, which has been linked to
263 Reeves et al., “Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises”, at 18-21.
264 P. Tyack, “Implications for Marine Mammals o f Large-Scale Changes in the Marine Acoustic Environment” 
(2008) 89 Journal o f Mammalogy 549.
265 Indeed, “[m]arine mammals create sounds to communicate about the presence of danger, food, a conspecific 
or other animal; and about their own position, identity and territorial or reproductive status. In addition, 
odontocete cetaceans use echolocation sounds to detect, localize and characterize objects, including obstacles, 
prey, and one another”: W. J. Richardson, C. R. Greene, Jr., C. I. Malme and D. H. Thomson, Marine Mammals 
and Noise (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), at 159.
266 See for instance L. Bejder et al., “Decline in Relative Abundance o f Bottlenose Dolphins Exposed to Long- 
Term Disturbance” (2006) 20 Conservation Biology 1791; D. P. Nowacek, L. H. Thome, D. W. Johnson and P. 
L. Tyack, “Responses of Cetaceans to Anthropogenic Noise” (2007) 37 Mammal Review 81; and A. Frid and L. 
Dill, “Human-Caused Disturbance Stimulii as a Form o f Predation Risk” (2006) 6 Conservation Ecology 11.
267 S. M. Nowacek, R. S. Wells and A. R. Solow, “Short-Term Effects of Boat Traffic on Bottlenose Dolphins, 
Tursiops Truncatus, in Sarasota Bay, Florida” (2001) 17 Marine Mammal Science 673 (noting that responses to 
noise vary significantly on a species-by-species basis: at 674).
268 C. Erbe and D. M. Farmer, “Masked Hearing Thresholds o f a Beluga Whale (Delphinapterus leucas) in 
Icebreaker Noise” (1998) 45 Deep Sea Research Part I I 1378.
269 N. J. Patenauk et al., “Aircraft Sound and Disturbance to Bowhead and Beluga Whales during Spring 
Migration in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea” (2002) 18 Marine Mammal Science 309.
270 For instance, the Acoustic Thermography o f Ocean Climate project (ATOC -  now renamed the North Pacific 
Acoustic Laboratory) attracted controversy when scientists planned to transmit a number of low-frequency 
sounds through the ocean to monitor global climate change: E. M. McCarthy, “International Regulation of 
Transboundary Pollutants: The Emerging Challenge o f Ocean Noise” (2001) 6 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 
251,0X211-12.
271 T.M. Cox, et al., “Behavioral Responses o f Bottlenose Dolphins, Tursiops truncatus, to Gillnets and 
Acoustic Alarms” (2003) 115 Biological Conservation 203.
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979increased vocalisation and manifestations of physical distress, as well as mass fatalities 
through stranding273 and the risk o f injury and decompression sickness in performing 
emergency avoidance techniques.274 Disturbance is also created by the growing whale- 
watching industries,275 although “it is very challenging to assess the potential long-term 
effects of anthropogenic activities, such as whalewatching, which elicit subtle, short-term 
reactions”.276
The increasing volume o f shipping in areas of critical habitat poses a risk of injury and death
777 77fi 770 98Hfrom ship-strikes, with sperm, fin and right whales having proven to be particularly 
vulnerable in this regard. More insidiously, the impact of pollution -  especially by oil281 -  
may also pose considerable risks to cetacean health, although it appears that small
901
cetaceans may be more susceptible in this respect, especially from chemical pollution in
0 O A  9 O C
the form of toxic substances such as PCBs and heavy metals. The accumulation of
272P. J. O. Miller, N. Biassoni, A. Samuels and P. L. Tyack, “Whale Songs Lengthen in Response to Sonar” 
(2000) 405 Nature 903.
273 See especially M. P. Simmonds and L. F. Lopez-Jurado, “Whales and the Military” (1992) 351 Nature 448; 
A. Frantzis, “Does Acoustic Testing Strand Whales?” (1998) 392 Nature 29 and E. C. M. Parsons et al., “Naval 
Sonar and Cetaceans: Just How Much Does the Gun Need to Smoke Before We Act?” (2008) 56 Marine 
Pollution Bulletin 1248.
274 W. M. X. Zimmer and P. L. Tyack, “Repetitive Shallow Dives Pose Decompression Risk in Deep-Diving 
Beaked Whales” (2007) 23 Marine Mammal Science 888 (noting that avoidance techniques adopted by beaked 
whales in particular -  namely a series of shallow dives to escape the pernicious effects of sustained exposure to 
adverse stimulii -  places them at an increased risk o f serious injury or mortality due to decompression sickness:, 
at 917-18); see also M. J. Moore and G. A. Early, “Cumulative Sperm Whale Bone Damage and the Bends”
(2004) 306 Science 2215.
275 See, for instance, R. Constantine, D. H. Brunton and T. Dennis, “Dolphin-Watching Boats Change 
Bottlenose Dolphin (Tursipos truncatus) Behaviour” (2004) 117 Biological Conservation 299; D. Lusseau and 
J. E. S. Higham, “Managing the Impacts o f Dolphin-Based Tourism through the Definition of Critical Habitats: 
The Case o f Bottlenose Dolphins (Tursiops spp.) in Doubtful Sound, New Zealand” (2005) 25 Tourism 
Management 657; and C. Richter, S. Dawson and E. Slooten, “Impacts of Commercial Whale Watching on 
Male Sperm Whales at Kaikoura, New Zealand” (2006) 21 Marine Mammal Science 46.
276 R. Williams, D. Lusseau and P. S. Hammond, “Estimating Relative Energetic Costs o f Human Disturbance 
to Killer Whales (Orcinus orca)” (2006) 133 Biological Conservation 301, at 302.
277 On this issue generally see D. W. Laist “Collisions between Whales and Ships” (2001) 17 Marine Mammal 
Science 35; see also Clapham et al., “Baleen whales” (noting that “[a]ll whales are potentially subject to 
collisions with ships, and incidents have been reported with most species”: ibid., at 38).
278 Laist, ibid.
279 S. Panigada et al., “Mediterranean Fin Whales at Risk from Fatal Ship Strikes” (2006) 52 Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 1287; see also G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, et al., “The Fin Whale Balaenopteraphysalus (L. 1758) in the 
Mediterranean Sea” (2003) 33 Mammal Review 105.
280 S. D. Kraus, “Rates and Potential Causes of Mortality in North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena glacialis)” 
(1990) 6 Marine Mammal Science 278.
281 Clapham et al.,'“Baleen Whales”, at 39.
282 C. D. Harvell et al., “Emerging Marine Diseases -  Climate Links and Anthropogenic Factors” (1999) 285 
Science 1505.
283 Clapham et al., “Baleen Whales”, at 39.
284 M. P. Simmonds, “Evaluating the Threat from Public Pollution to Whales” in Bums and Gillespie, “Future of 
Cetaceans”, at 317.
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contaminants in whales may also have adverse impacts higher up the food chain, especially in
9 o A 9 8 7indigenous consumers and in more commercial markets. Likewise, the ingestion of 
garbage and other non-biodegradable anthropogenic debris may also pose considerable risks
988to cetacean health. The effects o f overfishing may also render certain areas of critical 
habitats less capable of supporting large predators such as cetaceans.289 Finally, climate 
change has been identified as a further anthropogenic threat to cetaceans, with particular 
reference to habitat quality and abundance. Although “[e]ffects of climate change are 
complex and interactive, making them analytically almost intractable”,290 there is already 
evidence of displacement of some species o f cetaceans, with warm-water species such as the 
striped dolphin having started to regularly appear in previously colder waters,291 while 
conversely colder-water species are likely to also be displaced and their general range 
restricted.292 Such processes are likely to be especially pronounced in Polar Regions, with 
concerns having already been expressed over the projected impacts of climate change upon
293Arctic species.
2.8.2 The IWC and the regulation o f  anthropogenic threats to cetaceans
In addressing the expanded range of anthropogenic threats to cetaceans, three key operational 
disadvantages may be identified as hindering current IWC initiatives. First, there is as yet no
285 T. G. Seixas et al., “Total Mercury, Organic Mercury and Selenium on Liver and Kidney of a South 
American Coastal Dolphin” (2008) 154 Environmental Pollution 98.
286 C. T. Charlebois, “High Mercury Levels in Indians and Inuits (Eskimos) in Canada” (1978) 7 Ambio 204; see 
also M. P. Simmonds et al., “Organochlorines and Mercury in Pilot Whale Blubber Consumed by Faroe 
Islanders (1994) 149 The Science o f the Total Environment 97.
287 See for instance T. Endo et al., “Contamination by Mercury and Cadmium in the Cetacean Products from 
Japanese Market” (2004) Chemosphere 1653; and T. Endo et al., “Distribution and Toxicity o f Mercury in Rats 
after Oral Administration of Mercury-Contaminated Whale Red Meat Marketed for Human Consumption”
(2005) 61 Chemosphere 1069.
288 See for instance M. A. Stamper, B. R. Walker and T. D. Schofield, “Morbidity in a Pygmy Sperm Whale 
Kogia Breviceps due to Ocean-Boume Plastic (2006) 22 Marine Mammal Science 719; see also R. J. Tarpley 
and S. Marwitz, “Plastic Debris Ingestion by Cetaceans along the Texas Coast. Two Case Reports” (1993) 19 
Aquatic Mammals 93 and R. A. Kastelein and M. S. S. Lavaleije, “Foreign Bodies in the Stomach of a Female 
Harbour Porpoise (Phocoenaphocoena) from the North Sea” (1992) 18 Aquatic Mammals 40.
289 G. Bearzi et al., “Prey Depletion Caused by Overfishing and the Decline of Marine Megafauna in Eastern 
Ionian Sea Coastal Waters (Central Mediterranean)” (2006) 127 Biological Conservation 373.
290 Reeves et al., “Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises”, at 21.
291 C. D. MacLeod et al., “Climate Change and the Cetacean Community o f North-West Scotland” (2005) 124 
Biological Conservation A ll, at 482.
292 J. Harwood, “Marine Mammals and their Environment in the Twenty-First Century” (2001) 82 Journal o f 
Mammalogy 630, at 630.
293 C. T. Tynan and D. P. De Master, “Observations and Predictions o f Arctic Climate Change on Marine 
Mammals” (1997) 50 Arctic 308; see also K. L. Laidre and M. P. Heide-Jorgensen, “Arctic Sea Trends and 
Narwhal Vulnerability” (2005) 121 Biological Conservation 509; and H. P. Huntington, “A Preliminary 
Assessment of Threats to Arctic Marine Mammals and Their Conservation in the Coming Decades” (2009) 33 
Marine Policy 11.
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universal agreement over the precise range of species governed under the auspices of the 
ICRW, which has created a regulatory gap for a number of species of cetaceans. Second, 
political difficulties have hindered the development of particular conservation policies, 
notably the establishment of sanctuaries and the operation of a specific Conservation 
Committee established in 2003. Finally, many of these wider anthropogenic threats may be 
considered problems of global provenance. The ICRW may therefore be ill-equipped to 
address these fully, although the Commission may still have a key role to play in the 
advancement of scientific knowledge and in providing a degree of political impetus to 
complementary global initiatives.
2.8.2.(i) Small cetaceans
One particularly long-standing issue o f contention between the various parties to the ICRW 
remains the definitive range of species to which it may be considered to apply. In this respect 
there has been a tendency in both the academic literature and, indeed, in broader treaty 
practice to demarcate cetaceans into two essentially artificial categories, with whales 
generally considered “large” cetaceans and dolphins and porpoises often deemed “small” 
cetaceans. This practice is rather rudimentary and arbitrary, not least given that species 
ostensibly classed as large cetaceans, such as minke whales, may actually be considerably 
smaller than species such as beaked whales, which tend to be viewed as small cetaceans.294 
Such designations, however artificial, have considerable practical implications and a broad 
consensus on the precise role of the IWC towards so-called “small” cetaceans remains 
elusive.
The exact species coverage of the ICRW has long been subject to debate. At the original 
1946 negotiations a “Chart of Nomenclature o f Whales” was annexed to the Final Act of the 
Washington Conference,295 although the degree of precision that this document was intended 
to establish has remained a source of considerable dispute. This conflict has become 
especially pronounced since the early 1970s, as some parties have sought to translate 
concerns over the conservation status of dolphins into clear regulatory activity within the 
IWC, which has encountered a degree of opposition.
294 A. Gillespie, “Small Cetaceans, International Law and the International Whaling Commission” (2001) 2 
Melbourne Journal o f International Law 257, at 259-60.
295 Reproduced in Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 695.
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A number of parties, broadly aligned within the pro-whaling bloc at the IWC, contend that 
the Nomenclature constitutes an exhaustive list of species governed by the Convention and 
further regulatory initiatives addressing species beyond this list are thereby ultra vires. Such 
claims have nonetheless been rejected as an unduly narrow interpretation of the
7Q f\Nomenclature. It has likewise been argued that such a strict view of the Nomenclature has 
elevated this document to a legal status that it was never intended to merit. Bums observes 
that “the predominant purpose of nomenclature lists is to establish a ‘common language’ for 
regulatory regimes in question, not to circumscribe the ultimate purview of that regime”. In 
this respect the ICRW Chart of Nomenclature bears little resemblance to modem biodiversity 
treaties, which maintain detailed Annexes identifying clearly and unequivocally the precise 
range of species subject to the particular regulatory measures prescribed by that treaty, in 
conjunction with designated processes for the listing, adjustment and removal of species. 
Furthermore, it has been contended that the past practices of the IWC have encompassed a 
considerable degree of regulatory activity towards small cetaceans which, in line with Article 
31 (3)(b) of the VCLT, would justify an extension of the Commission’s remit to such
298species.
Although there is considerable evidence that the IWC has indeed sought to address small 
cetaceans, especially during the past thirty years, the Commission has nonetheless avoided 
definitive pronouncements regarding its competencies. The early practice of the IWC 
demonstrates considerable flexibility, with quotas for minke whales -  which were not 
originally listed upon the Nomenclature -  having been allocated since the third meeting of the 
Commission299 to little dissent. In the early 1960s the Commission expressed the cryptic and 
faintly Orwellian view that “[a]ll whales were covered by the wording of the Convention, but
296 P. W. Bimie, “Small Cetaceans and the International Whaling Commission” (1997) 10 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 1, (stridently dismissing such an argument as “spurious”: at 23).
297 W. C. Bums, “The International Whaling Commission and the Regulation of Consumptive and Non- 
Consumptive Uses of Small Cetaceans: The Critical Agenda for the 1990s” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 105. Bums further notes that in this regard, a nomenclature list is usually developed during the 
negotiation stage to provide a degree of uniformity in the identification of particular species which may be 
known by varying vernacular terms in different languages and jurisdictions: ibid. The IWC itself has arguably 
taken a similar line, noting that “the reference in the Final Act to the acceptance o f the chart as a guide only 
means that the names therein are to be taken as a guide”: Fortieth Report o f  the International Whaling 
Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1990), at 22.
298 See especially P. Bimie, “Are Twentieth-Century Marine Conservation Conventions Adaptable to Twenty- 
First Century Goals and Principles? Part II” (1997) 12 International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law 488; 
Bums, “Critical Agenda”, Gillespie, “Small Cetaceans” and Bowman, “Normalizing the IWC”.
299 Gillespie, “Small Cetaceans”, at 273.
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individual species when named in the Schedule to the Convention were subject to specific 
conservation measures”.300
Considerable research activities on small cetaceans have been conducted under the auspices 
of the Scientific Committee since the 1970s. The conservation needs of smaller cetaceans 
were first noted by the IWC in 1972, in the context of wholesale by-catches of dolphins
1A1
within the Eastern Pacific Ocean yellowfin tuna fishery. This prompted the establishment 
of a Sub-Committee on Small Cetaceans (SCSC) under the auspices of the Scientific 
Committee. By 1975, the SCSC advocated the establishment of an international body to 
effectively manage stocks of all cetaceans not covered by the ICRW Schedule, which “should 
concern itself with all types of exploitation of cetaceans, both incidental and deliberate”.302 
Three intergovernmental conferences were convened between 1978 and 1981 to discuss the 
potential revision of the ICRW; however these proposals were ultimately rejected by
.• 303parties.
The first clear initiatives by the IWC to regulate small cetaceans were advanced in 1977 with 
the establishment of a series of reporting requirements for so-called “small type whaling”, 
under which parties were requested to collect data on catches of small cetaceans, defined as 
“any toothed whale other than the sperm whale”.304 A Schedule amendment in 1979 
formalised data collection requirements for minke, bottlenose, beaked, pilot and killer 
whales.305 Moreover, in 1980 orcas were included in a list of species subject to a moratorium
300 Twelfth Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1962), at 21.
301 Here the Scientific Committee noted its “concern over the large incidental kill of porpoises and dolphins” 
(emphasis added): Twenty-Third Report o f the International Whaling Committee (Cambridge: IWC, 1973), at 
37. On this issue see J. Joseph, “The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, 
Economic and Political Impacts” (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 1.
302 Twenty-Seventh Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1977), at 480.
303 As noted by Bimie, these initiatives faltered because “[n]ot only did many states want to clearly exclude 
small cetaceans from the convention’s scope, but they also wanted to ensure that within their EEZs, any new 
convention would ensure that the coastal state would have the primary regulatory role and need only seek the 
advice of any commission or committees, except in relation to the great and minke whales already regulated”: 
“Four Decades of Experience”, at 919-20.
304 Resolution 1977-6: Reporting Requirements for Small-Type Whaling. As noted in Chapter V, this definition 
has been incorporated within the definition o f a “small cetacean” advanced by the Agreement on the 
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North-East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas 1995. Resolution 
1977-6 further observed that “existing international commissions and organisations concerned with marine 
resources do not, at the present time, provide a central agency for the collection of scientific information on 
captures of small cetaceans” and accordingly the IWC “is at the present time the sole international authority 
exclusively concerned with the regulation of major species o f cetaceans” (emphasis added).
305 Although as argued by Bimie, such a move was not intended to provide a definitive remit to address small 
cetaceans and instead constituted “merely a limited definition o f the term ‘small-type whaling’ as used in the
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on exploitation by factory ships, cited by the IWC as “an example of the execution of 
regulatory powers by the Commission on a species not included in the chart of 
nomenclature”, although the parties “could not reach consensus on whether this constituted 
a precedent”. In 1980, protection measures for beluga whales and narwhals where also 
introduced, although “the Convention itself does not define the species covered by the term
O AO
whale and Contracting Governments are not of one view on such a definition”.
Since 1990, a raft of Resolutions concerning small cetaceans has been adopted by the IWC. 
Such measures have often been qualified by statements diplomatically noting the lack of 
consensus on the issue309 and, on occasion, the clear opposition of particular parties to an 
official declaration of extended competence of the Commission in this regard.310 The IWC 
has nonetheless sought through the Scientific Committee to collate information on stock
311levels of small cetaceans and to address data deficiencies as well as identifying particular
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anthropogenic threats to these species, especially by-catches, although attempts to
ICRW, for purposes o f collecting information”: P. Bimie, “Small Cetaceans” (1981) 5 Marine Policy 277, at 
278.
306 Thirty-Fourth Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1984), at 16-17.
307 Ibid., at 17.
308 Resolution 1980-8: Resolution Concerning Extension o f the Commission’s Responsibility for Small 
Cetaceans.
309 See, for instance, Resolution 1990-3: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (noting that “there exist differences in 
views between member states on the regulatory competence o f the IWC with regard to small cetaceans, and 
noting that this resolution does not seek in any way to prejudice different members' positions”); Resolution 
1991-5: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (reproducing verbatim the qualification regarding national positions on 
small cetaceans); Resolution 1993-10: Resolution on the Directed Take o f Striped Dolphins (noting that “the 
Commission is aware o f the differences in views among member states on the regulatory competence of the 
International Whaling Commission with regard to small cetaceans”).
310 Resolution 1995-4: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (noting that “the governments of St Vincent and The 
Grenadines, St Lucia, Dominica and Grenada belong to the Organisation o f Eastern Caribbean States, which 
administers laws regulating fisheries and related research in the territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones 
of its Member States ... these Caribbean governments do not accept the competence o f the Commission in the 
management o f small cetaceans and related research”). The Caribbean states had initially sought a formal opt- 
out clause in the Schedule for parties that did not recognise the IWC’s competence over small cetaceans, with 
this Resolution representing a compromise settlement: Bimie, “Small Cetaceans and the IWC”, at 24.
311 See for instance Resolution 1990-3: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (requesting the Scientific Committee to 
collate all available information on the present status o f stocks o f small cetaceans subject to directed and 
incidental takes); Resolution 1991-5: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (noting data deficiencies regarding certain 
stocks); Resolution 1993-4: Resolution on Addressing Small Cetaceans (noting that future discussion should 
centre on inter alia mechanisms for improving the reliability o f data and funding small cetacean research within 
the parties).
312 Resolution 1994-2: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (identifying by-catches, directed takes and degradation of 
the marine environment as particular issues to address); Resolution 1996-4: Resolution on Small Cetaceans 
(noting the threats posed by incidental capture, habitat degradation and pollution to baijis in China); Resolution 
2000-9: Resolution on the Conservation o f Freshwater Cetaceans (noting that “habitat degradation and alteration 
is the primary threat to the survival o f freshwater cetaceans” with fragmentation caused by damming activities 
as well as by-catches also identified as issues o f strong concern).
313 Resolution 2001-13: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (noting “the continuing and critical threat to some small 
cetaceans posed by directed takes and their incidental capture in fisheries operations”).
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encourage parties to act in this respect have been largely restricted to vague invitations and 
recommendations for further action.314 Moreover, specific Resolutions have been addressed 
to particular states, most notably Mexico, in respect of the vaquita, China, in respect of the
31  f \  -5 1 7baiji, and Japan, regarding the directed take of Dali’s porpoises. More promisingly, 
perhaps, the IWC has sought to develop synergies with pertinent organisations to address 
small cetaceans,318 most notably the CMS319 and ASCOBANS.320
Ultimately, however, there remains a considerable degree of circularity in the debate
concerning small cetaceans. Despite further appeals for the development of an additional
391mechanism within the IWC to address small cetaceans, the prospects for an amendment to 
the ICRW to provide a more explicit regulatory remit for smaller species appear remote.
314 Indeed, perhaps the most telling articulation o f the limitations o f the IWC’s small cetacean remit may be seen 
in Resolution 1996-4: Resolution on Small Cetaceans, which invited the parties to “note the recommendations 
of the Scientific Committee”.
315 Resolution 1994-3: Resolution on Biosphere Reserve o f the Upper Gulf of California and the Colorado River 
Delta (noting the elaboration by Mexico of a specific management plan for the vaquita and inviting the parties to 
offer technical, scientific and financial assistance); Resolution 2007-5: The Vaquita, From Critically 
Endangered to Facing Extinction (noting that the “best hope for the species is that the international community 
and non-governmental organizations will support the Government of Mexico by providing technical and 
financial assistance in the implementation o f CIRVA’s Recovery Plan and the Biosphere Reserve”).
316 Resolution 1996-4: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (inviting parties “to provide appropriate technical, 
scientific and financial assistance to the People's Republic o f China, if requested, to assist in furthering its 
conservation programme for the Baiji”).
317 Resolution 1990-4: Resolution on Directed Take o f Dali’s Porpoises; Resolution 1993-10: Resolution on the 
Directed Take of Striped Dolphins; see also Resolution 1999-9: Resolution on Dali’s Porpoise (inviting Japan to 
“reconsider the level of its domestic quota”) Resolution 2001-12: Resolution on Dali’s Porpoise (urging Japan 
to halt directed takes until a full assessment o f stocks could be concluded by the Scientific Committee). As 
noted by Bums, between 1987 and 1990, 77% o f Dali’s porpoises were killed off the coast of the northern 
Pacific, primarily in Japanese directed hunting operations, while considerable numbers o f striped dolphins have 
also been harvested in these waters: “Critical Agenda”, at 116.
318 Resolution 1993-4: Resolution on Addressing Small Cetaceans in the IWC (recognising “the need for 
international cooperation to address problems relating to small cetaceans and to facilitate the conservation and 
restoration of depleted or threatened stocks” and further requesting the SCSC to examine “the roles of the IWC 
and international and regional organisations which, in the opinion o f many member States, have a crucial role to 
play with respect to small cetaceans”).
319 Resolution 1994-2: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (noting that “there is much benefit in maintaining a 
cooperative dialogue with other intergovernmental organisations with responsibility for or expertise in relation 
to small cetaceans, in particular UNEP and the bodies created under the Bonn Convention”); Resolution 2001- 
13: Resolution on Small Cetaceans (urging the IWC “under its Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) to pursue complementary and mutually supportive actions in respect 
of small cetaceans”). For a full discussion o f the inter-relationship between the IWC and the CMS, see Chapter 
IV of this thesis.
320 Resolution 1993-11: Resolution on Harbour Porpoise in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea (recognising 
“the relevance of the Agreement on the Conservation o f Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas 
(ASCOBANS) for the protection of harbour porpoise”). For a discussion o f the inter-relationship between the 
IWC and ASCOBANS, see Chapter V of this thesis.
321 At its Forty-Fourth Meeting in the IWC established a Working Group to Consider a Mechanism to Address 
Small Cetaceans within the Commission, “with a view to considering a consensual procedure for action on small 
cetaceans while respecting the differing views of Contracting Governments” (Resolution 1994:2 Resolution on 
Small Cetaceans), although attempts to foster a workable consensus on this issue ultimately foundered.
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Notwithstanding the immense political difficulties involved, it is likewise highly probable 
that any amendment to this effect would be unlikely to alter the status quo in any meaningful 
sense, given the spate of reservations that this would almost certainly provoke. Accordingly, 
beyond scientific research considerations, the regulation of small cetaceans has been largely 
displaced from the IWC to alternative fora. In the absence of more specialised and specific 
candidates, it is the contention o f this thesis that the supervisory mantle in this respect has 
been essentially assumed by the CMS, with the merits and limitations of this regime as a 
default regulator considered fully in Chapters IV to VII.
2.8.2.(ii) Environmental concerns
As with small cetaceans, the response o f the IWC thus far to wider environmental concerns 
has been primarily confined to directing research activities through the Scientific Committee 
and encouraging the parties to participate in appropriate multilateral regimes. As noted above, 
two distinct limitations have undermined the IWC’s pursuit of broader environmental 
policies. The first may be considered self-inflicted, as political difficulties have affected the 
operation of key policies. The second is reflective of the multi-faceted nature, causation and 
remediation of such threats and the limitations inherent in pursuing solutions for pressing 
global environmental problems through the confines of a specialist marine mammal regime. 
Accordingly, the approach taken under the ICRW may essentially represent the outer limits 
of the Commission’s supervisory utility.
A clear example of cetacean policies being undermined by political considerations is the 
designation of sanctuary areas. Closed areas were initially established under the auspices of 
the 1937 Agreement, while the first official multilateral sanctuaries, however symbolic they 
may ultimately have proven to be,322 were designated under the 1938 Protocol. Latterly, the 
ICRW has provided a mandate to allocate protected areas, whereby Article V(l)(c) permits 
the amendment of the Schedule so as to establish “open and closed waters, including the 
designation of sanctuary areas”, although no further formal definition has been expressly 
provided within the Convention or the Schedule o f the precise nature and function of a
• • 393sanctuary, which thereby remains somewhat open to interpretation. Like any Schedule
322 Rose and Crane, “Evolution of International Whaling Law”, at 163.
323 Nevertheless, a Working Group on Whale Sanctuaries established by the IWC Technical Committee in 1981 
elaborated indicative Guidelines for sanctuary proposals, which were referred to the Commission in 1982: 
Report o f the Technical Committee Working Group on Whale Sanctuaries', Document IWC/34/14. Although the
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amendment, sanctuaries require the political endorsement of three-quarters of the parties 
present and voting and may accordingly be abolished, subject to specific conditions imposed 
upon the review process.
‘j'yA
Having re-opened pre-existing protected areas to commercial whaling in 1955, the first
O'} c
IWC whale sanctuary was established in 1979 for an initial period of ten years. The Indian 
Ocean Sanctuary (IOS), which was intended to advance “a long term approach to the problem 
of preserving and increasing whale populations in areas sufficiently large for their needs”,326 
was reviewed in 1989 and subsequently established as a permanent sanctuary in 1992, which 
was further reaffirmed in 2002. To date, however, IOS practice has been rather mixed. The 
sanctuary has proved surprisingly uncontroversial, notwithstanding a commitment to the 
prohibition of whaling within these waters, which pre-dates the official moratorium, 
“irrespective of such catch limits for baleen or toothed whales as may from time to time be 
determined by the Commission”.327 Moreover, the IOS has been generally interpreted as 
applying to all species of cetaceans found within these waters. Nonetheless, despite the 
longevity of the sanctuary, “research and conservation could be said to be at an early 
stage”,329 and no specific management plan has yet been developed to address the host of
330anthropogenic pressures faced by cetaceans in these waters.
Guidelines have not ultimately been adopted by the Commission, as Morgera observes they have nonetheless 
proved highly influential in IWC sanctuary practice and “have been referred to frequently in subsequent 
submissions and counterarguments”: E. Morgera, “Whale Sanctuaries: An Evolving Concept within the 
International Whaling Commission” (2004) 35 Ocean Development and International Law 319, at 322.
324 Tonnessen and Johnsen, “History o f Modem Whaling”, at 560-66.
325 Resolution 1979-3: Resolution in Relation to the Establishment o f a Whale Sanctuary in the Indian Ocean.
326 Resolution 1981-3: Resolution on Communication between the IWC and the Indian Ocean Coastal States 
(further noting that “the success of this endeavour would require the co-operation of all states bordering Indian 
Ocean and beyond”).
327 Section 7(a) of the ICRW Schedule. As Morgera notes, “[t]he importance o f the amendment lies in the 
express provision that commercial whaling is banned within the sanctuary area even if whale stocks are found to 
be abundant at some stage”: “Whale Sanctuaries”, at 322. Nonetheless, this seemingly permanent position could 
in theory be reversed upon a successful motion to amend the Schedule to this effect, although there has been 
little indication to date that such a move has been considered desirable by the parties and, in any event, would be 
likely to encounter strong opposition.
328 E. Hoyt, Marine Protected Areas for Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: A World Handbook for Cetacean 
Habitat Conservation (London: Earthscan, 2005), at 15. However, for a more cautious view of the extent to 
which small cetaceans are addressed by the sanctuary see M. Prideaux, “Discussion of a Regional Agreement 
for Small Cetacean Conservation in the Indian Ocean” (2002) 32 California Western International Law Journal 
101 (although in advocating further regional measures to categorically ensure the application o f conservation 
measures to all species of cetaceans, the author nonetheless observes that “[t]here is a solid argument that the 
IWC does have competency for all cetacea but lacks the political will to exercise this competence”: at 121).
329 Hoyt, “Marine Protected Areas”, at 15.
330 M. N. de Boer, et al., Cetaceans in the Indian Ocean Sanctuary: A Review. A WDCS Science Report (Bath: 
Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, 2002).
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Particular controversy has arisen regarding the Southern Ocean Sanctuary (SOS), established 
in 1994.331 Like the IOS, the SOS prohibits commercial whaling in these waters, a position 
that is to be reviewed every ten years. The key difficulties have arisen over lethal scientific 
research conducted within the SOS, primarily by Japan. Although the terms of Section 7(b) of 
the Schedule, which prohibits “commercial whaling”, in conjunction with Article VIII of the 
ICRW would seemingly countenance such a programme, the Commission has adopted a 
series of Resolutions urging research activities within these waters to be strictly non-lethal in 
nature333 and, as noted above, has repeatedly called on Japan to refrain from lethal research. 
In subsequent meetings, amendments have been tabled to disband the sanctuary,334 raising 
arguments that the requisite scientific criteria had not been observed in establishing the SOS 
and, moreover, that the sanctuary obstructed the aims and objectives of the Convention.335 
The Commission has responded to such concerns by emphasising the intrinsic value of a 
precautionary outlook towards sanctuary proposals, advocating a broad presumption towards 
the establishment of protected areas, even where scientific concerns may not have been 
definitively established.336
331 See A. Gillespie, “The Southern Ocean Sanctuary and the Evolution o f International Environmental Law” 
(2000) 15 International Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law 293.
332 Nevertheless, there is a subtle but significant variation in the Schedule wording regarding the SOS, which 
notes that despite the commitment to review the sanctuary at ten-year intervals, it “could be revised at such 
times by the Commission” -  although as noted above, the same is technically true of the IOS. Moreover, given 
the location of the SOS within Antarctica, in keeping with other instruments addressing the marine resources of 
this region, Section 7(b) further specifies that this position is not intended to prejudice the special legal and 
political status of Antarctica.
333 Resolution 1995-8: Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit in Sanctuaries (considering that parties 
“should undertake, and collaborate in, the conduct o f a programme of research in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary 
using non-lethal methods and, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, refrain from issuing Special Permits for 
research involving the killing of cetaceans in such sanctuaries”); Resolution 1998-3 (noting that the objective of 
the SOS is to “provide the Commission with a long term framework for non-lethal research” and, moreover, that 
the IWC should “give priority to those proposals for non-lethal research which will address conservation and 
management objectives for the Sanctuary in a time frame consistent with contributing to the review in 2004 and 
beyond”).
334 Forty-Eighth Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1998), at 36.
335 The Japanese arguments, as advanced by Professor Burke, are reproduced at (1996) 27 Ocean Development 
and International Law 315, with an extended defence o f these claims reproduced at (1997) 28 Ocean 
Development and International Law 313, in response to a rebuttal tabled by the UK prepared by Professor 
Bimie.
336 Resolution 2002-1: Guidance to the Scientific Committee on the Sanctuary Review Process (noting that 
“sanctuaries were established and have been maintained for a number of reasons, of which scientific 
considerations, although important, should not be definitive in the validation process. When considering 
scientific arguments for sanctuary evaluation, if consensus is not possible, then a precautionary approach should 
prevail”. To this end, the Scientific Committee was instructed that in considering further sanctuary applications, 
“[tjemporary overlap of management measures, for example Para 10(e) of the Schedule and a sanctuary, cannot 
be used to invalidate any long-term scientific and conservation value of a given Sanctuary” and, furthermore, 
“[t]he application of the Precautionary Approach shall be determined in accordance to Principle 15 of the 1992 
Rio Declaration”.
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Since the establishment o f the SOS, further sanctuary proposals within the South Atlantic, 
advanced by Brazil, and the South Pacific, tabled by Australia and New Zealand,337 have 
consistently failed to secure the requisite three-quarters majority of the parties to enter into 
effect, a position largely indicative o f the simmering controversy regarding the SOS. More 
recently, as a political gesture in the context of ongoing RMS negotiations, the sponsoring 
states have confined themselves to general pro-sanctuary statements and refraining from 
submitting such proposals to a formal IWC vote. Indeed, it appears that this position within 
the Commission is likely to continue in the immediate short-term future. Although the IWC 
has remained “[cjonvinced that the establishment of Sanctuaries for conservation purposes
'X'XQrepresents an integral part of best management practices for wildlife in general”, the parties 
have themselves acknowledged that political considerations are likely to stymie productive 
consensus towards the establishment of further protected areas.340
A second source of political controversy in addressing environmental considerations has been 
the establishment of a Conservation Committee, designed primarily to assist the Commission 
“to effectively organise its future work in the pursuit of its objective by devising an 
appropriate agenda that places special emphasis on its benefits to conservation”.341 The 
Conservation Committee is primarily tasked with developing synergies with other pertinent
0 4 9
organisations and to reviewing “appropriate scientific research items”. Nevertheless, the 
highly political nature of the Resolution has ensured an uneasy tenure for the Conservation 
Committee to date. Some parties have viewed this body essentially as a vehicle to further 
advance protectionist claims within the IWC and have refused to cooperate, citing a general 
refusal to consider sustainable hunting as part o f the Committee’s agenda as an ideological 
basis for non-participation.343 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Conservation Committee
337 On these proposals generally see Morgera, “Whale Sanctuaries”, at 329-332.
338 Chair’s Report o f the Sixtieth Annual Meeting o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 
2008), at 26.
339 Resolution 2002-1.
340 For instance, the Brazilian delegation has “recognised that the Commission is deeply divided, ideologically 
more than anything, about the issue o f sanctuaries and their role in cetacean management”: Report o f the 
Conservation Committee: Annex H  to the Chair’s Report o f  the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting o f the 
International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2005), at 4.
341 Resolution 2003-1: The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International 
Whaling Commission. On these developments see W. C. G. Bums, “The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the 
Conservation Agenda of the International Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans” (2004) 13 
Review o f European Community and International Environmental Law 72.
342 Resolution 2003-1.
343 For instance, Japan has yet to attend a meeting o f the Conservation Committee, while Iceland has formally 
refused to enter into substantive discussions and Norway has taken a very cautious line towards full 
participation within the work o f the Committee.
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determined at an early stage that the divisive issue of directed hunting would be more 
prudently addressed within the full IWC debate.344 At a preliminary stage, a number of items 
of “common interest” were identified, namely endangered species and populations; human 
impacts; habitat protection; whalewatching; reporting systems for strandings, entanglements 
and by-catches; and legal and regulatory arrangements for cetacean conservation.345
Particular attention has been focused on chemical pollution and ship-strikes,346 with the latter 
issue perhaps better demonstrating the potential for supportive action raised by a fully- 
functional Conservation Committee. In this respect, in 2005 a Ship Strikes Working Group 
(SSWG) was established under the auspices of the Conservation Committee, which has 
advanced broad recommendations and a non-binding action plan.347 Furthermore, the SSWG 
has developed an on-line database o f ship-strikes, which has started to generate clear data 
concerning priority areas and species, while mitigation strategies will be explored in 
conjunction with ACCOBAMS in 2010, in the form of a joint workshop.348 More recently, 
the Committee has identified whalewatching as an area of future regulatory interest, with this 
forum considered “ideally suited” to following-up the work of the Scientific Committee in 
this regard.349 Thus far, and while it should be observed that the Conservation Committee 
remains at a preliminary stage in its operations and is seeking to develop long-term strategies 
for multifaceted problems, its primary contribution appears to be confined to further 
voluntary reporting by some of its members and in providing an additional platform for 
scientific and policy debate within the IWC. Nevertheless, a familiar tale of chronic 
underfunding and political distractions has largely characterised the brief tenure of the 
Conservation Committee to date. Indeed, while some encouraging projects are beginning to 
emerge in the context of ship-strikes, the overall initiatives thus far advanced may 
nonetheless represent a rather modest return on the heavy political cost of this institution.
344 Report o f  the Conservation Committee, at 2; reproduced as Annex H of the Chair’s Report o f  the Fifty- 
Seventh Annual Meeting o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2005).
345 Indeed, at the inaugural meeting of the Conservation Committee, convened in 2004, a series of: Report o f the 
Conservation Committee, at 3; reproduced as Annex H of the Chair’s Report o f  the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting 
of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2004).
346 “Report of the Conservation Committee” (2005), at 3.
347 Report o f the Conservation Committee, at 2; reproduced as Annex G of the Chair’s Report o f the Fifty-Eighth 
Annual Meeting o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2006).
348 Report o f the Conservation Committee', Document IWC/61/Rep5, at 5.
349 Chair’s Report o f the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: 
IWC, 2007), at 97. This was further noted at the following meeting: Chair’s Report o f  the Fifty-Eighth Annual 
Meeting o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2008), at 106.
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Beyond these political considerations, environmental issues have been primarily examined 
through the Scientific Committee, and, more specifically, a Standing Working Group on 
Environmental Concerns (SWGEC), established in 1996, alongside the Conservation 
Committee. Although the Scientific Committee has considered reports regarding habitat- 
related issues since 1972, concerns over wider anthropogenic pressures on cetaceans were 
first acknowledged by the IWC in 1980, noting that “the survival and health of whale 
populations is dependent upon maintenance o f a healthy marine and coastal environment”, 
and calling for parties to “take every possible measure to ensure that degradation of the 
marine environment, resulting in damage to whale populations and subsequent harm to 
affected peoples, does not occur”.350 Nevertheless, although a further Resolution in the 
following Meeting observed the “serious threat” to whale stocks from “increasing levels of 
heavy metals, PCBs and other organochlorides detected in cetaceans”,351 no further 
substantive Resolution addressing such issues was adopted until 1992, at which point the 
Scientific Committee established the impact o f environmental changes on whale stocks as a 
regular agenda item.
In 1993 a series of Resolutions noted that “since 1982, scientific evidence has emerged 
regarding detrimental changes in the marine environment which may threaten whale 
stocks”353 and observed that “the increasing evidence of degradation of the marine 
environment which threatens whales and other marine living resources and makes more 
difficult the attainment of the objectives o f the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling”.354 By 1994, the Scientific Committee had identified global warming, ozone 
depletion, pollution, direct and indirect effects o f fisheries and noise as key factors to be 
considered in the context of cetaceans and encouraged parties to cooperate to provide 
pertinent information on these issues.355 In 1997, SWGEC identified eight “topics of 
particular importance” namely “climate/environmental change, ozone depletion and UV-B 
radiation, chemical pollution, impact of noise, physical and biological habitat degradation,
350 Resolution 1980-10: Resolution on the Habitat o f Whales and the Marine Environment.
351 Resolution 1981-7: Resolution Relating to Pollutants in Whales.
352 Resolution 1992-2: Resolution on the Need for Research on the Environment and Whale Stocks in the 
Antarctic Region.
353 Resolution 1993-12: Resolution on Research on the Environment and Whale Stocks. Here the Scientific 
Committee was requested to “give priority to research on the effects o f environmental changes on cetaceans in 
order to provide the best scientific advice for the Commission to determine appropriate response strategies to 
these new challenges”.
354 Resolution 1993-13: Resolution on the Preservation o f the Marine Environment.
355 Resolution 1994-13: Resolution on Research on the Environmental and Whale Stocks.
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effects of fisheries, Arctic issues, disease and mortality events”. To date, SWGEC has 
primarily concentrated on aspects of pollution, by-catches and habitat degradation and 
disturbance in discharging its operational remit.
With regard to pollution, concerns were initially raised in the context of the safety to human 
consumers of whale products, whereby the IWC undertook to develop closer links with the
' icn
World Health Organisation to review this issue. Since these developments, the IWC has 
essentially followed a dual policy in addressing pollution concerns, through research 
endeavours and facilitating cooperation with other pertinent bodies that may be better placed 
to deal with such issues. The Scientific Committee has primarily advanced its research 
agenda through the POLLUTION 2000+ project, which entailed an interdisciplinary 
programme of work to investigate the impact of pollutants upon cetaceans,358 and through the 
Cetacean Emerging and Resurging Disease (CERD) group, established in 2007 to examine 
natural and pollution-induced diseases.359 Particular emphasis has been placed on developing 
mutually supportive links with relevant bodies which is considered “essential”.360 Most 
explicitly, the Commission has urged the parties to sign and ratify protocols on persistent 
organic pollutants and heavy metals adopted under the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution 1979,361 and to “sign, ratify and adhere to” the Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants 2001.362
356 Resolution 1997-7: Resolution on Environmental Change and Cetaceans.
357 Resolution 1998-11: Resolution on IWC Concern about Human Health Effects From the Consumption of 
Cetaceans (noting “scientific evidence indicating that some Arctic communities are currently faced with the 
threat of organic contaminants and heavy metals from the consumption of certain cetacean products” and 
encouraging the WHO “and other appropriate agencies to put this issue on their own agenda”); Resolution 1999- 
4: Resolution on Health Effects from the Consumption of Cetaceans (calling on “relevant countries to take 
measures to reduce pollution that may cause negative health effects from the consumption of cetacean 
products”). While the latter Resolution established the impacts on health from the consumption of cetaceans as a 
permanent agenda item on environmental concerns, there has been no further substantive IWC Resolution on 
this issue to date.
358 For a full review of the results o f this research see P. J. H. Reijnders, A. Aguilar and G. P. Donovan (eds.), 
Journal o f  Cetacean Research and Management, Special Issue 1: Chemical Pollutants and Cetaceans 
(Cambridge: IWC, 1999).
359 To date this group has examined pathogens, biotoxins and disease reports, with a view to establishing 
standardised databases to centrally collate the scattered array o f national information on these issues: Chair’s 
Report o f the Sixtieth Annual Meeting o f  the International Whaling Commission, op. cit., at 29.
360 Resolution 1995-10: Resolution on the Environment and Whale Stocks. This Resolution further directed the 
Scientific Committee to elaborate a list o f multilateral bodies and cited ICES, IOP, UNEP and OSPARCOM as 
particular examples.
361 Resolution 2000-6: Resolution on POPs and Heavy Metals. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution is reproduced at 1302 UNTS 217.
362 Resolution 2001-10: Resolution on the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (further 
noting that “the International Whaling Commission with its specific responsibility in the management and 
conservation o f whale stocks may have a mutual interest in supporting the ratification o f international treaties
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As far as by-catches are concerned, the IWC has taken a key scientific, as opposed to 
regulatory, role. The Scientific Committee which, as noted above, has studied by-catches 
since the 1970s, has acted as a central repository for research reports. Small cetaceans are 
generally most susceptible to incidental capture, hence uncertainties over the IWC’s 
competence have caused regulatory difficulties in this regard. By-catches were first 
considered in 1977, where the Scientific Committee recommended that members submit an 
annual report on incidental and deliberate catches of all species of cetaceans.364 The IWC 
convened a global workshop on incidental mortality in 1990 in La Jolla, USA, and 
subsequently considered by-catches through resolutions addressing small cetaceans.365 The 
IWC has called for the effective monitoring of incidental catches366 and promoted 
collaborative research activities.367 By-catch information is also to be incorporated into the 
CLA for the future commercial quotas.
Beyond general concerns about incidental mortality, IWC practice has been to identify by- 
catch threats to particular stocks such as freshwater cetaceans,370 right whales,371 Dali’s 
Porpoise,372 grey whales,373 and the vaquita.374 However, despite this increased focus, a 
specific management committee on by-catches under the IWC umbrella continues to be rather 
conspicuous by its absence. Although a Working Group on Bycatch was established in 2001, 
this body is charged with examining the by-catch issue in the context of developing the RMP 
and does not explicitly address this problem as a threat to cetaceans per s e 315 Accordingly, 
unless and until a free-standing By-Catch Committee is established, the incidental mortality 
of cetaceans will be primarily examined by the Conservation Committee and the continuing 
research activities of the Scientific Committee.
with overlapping concerns”). The Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants is reproduced at (2001) 40 
International Legal Materials 532.
363 Twenty-Seventh Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1979) at 26.
364 Resolution 1977-6 on Reporting Requirements for Small-Type Whaling.
365 Resolution 1990-3 on Small Cetaceans; Resolution 1993-11 on Harbour Porpoise in the North Atlantic and 
Baltic Sea.
366 Resolution 1997-4 on Cetacean Bycatch Reporting and Bycatch Reduction.
367 Resolution 1997-8 on Small Cetaceans.
368 Resolution 1998-2 on Total Catches over Time.
369 Resolution 2001-4 on the Incidental Capture o f Cetaceans.
370 Resolution 2000-9 on the Conservation o f Freshwater Cetaceans.
371 Resolution 2000-8 on Western North Atlantic Right Whales.
372 Resolution 2001-12 on Dali’s Porpoise.
373 Resolution 2005-3 on the Western North Pacific Grey Whale.
374 Resolution 2007-5: the Vaquita, From Critically Endangered to Facing Extinction.
375 Personal communication with Dr. Nicky Grandy, Secretary to the IWC, 6 October 2004 (on file).
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Regarding habitats, aside from the broad recognition that “the destruction of coastal habitat
'inf.
may have a detrimental impact upon cetaceans”, and the corresponding designation of two 
whale sanctuaries, such concerns have been generally accorded a relatively light treatment by 
the IWC. Despite the recognition o f particular threats posed to identified stocks and species
'inn
by ship strikes and oil and gas exploration activities, as with pollution concerns the 
broad response of the Commission has been to advocate further research and, where 
appropriate, to advocate participation within complementary specialised fora. This has been 
particularly true in the case o f climate change, for which the IWC adopted its first specific 
Resolution in 2009, noting the “real potential for elevated risks of extinction” and appealing 
for “urgent action to reduce the rate and extent o f climate change”.379 The Resolution has 
further called on parties to incorporate climate change considerations into existing 
conservation and management plans, a departure to the previous IWC response of seeking 
further research activities and urging participation in international programmes to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.380 Despite the vague commitment towards national action at the 
2009 meeting, the Commission remains relatively poorly placed to address the threat to 
cetaceans from climate change, beyond the development of specific research projects and the 
application of political pressure upon its constituent members. Indeed, as observed by
376 Resolution 2001-11: Resolution on the Importance o f Habitat Protection and Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management.
377 Resolution 2000-8: Resolution on Western North Atlantic Right Whales, in which the IWC noted its 
concerns that “the two major causes o f human-induced mortality for this species are ship strikes and 
entanglement in fishing nets and gear” and, in endorsing the results of three previous IWC workshops 
addressing this species, commended the development within the IMO of a mandatory ship reporting system and 
encouraged parties with an interest in navigation in these waters to “to pursue actively, practicable actions to 
reduce as far as possible ship strikes on right whales”. On the application of the IMO programme generally see 
J. P. Luster, “The International Maritime Organization’s New Mandatory Ship Reporting System for the 
Northern Right Whale’s Critical Habitat: A Legitimate Approach to Strengthening the Endangered Species 
Act?” (1999) 46 Naval Law Review 153.
378 Resolution 2001-3: Resolution on Western North Pacific Gray Whale (stressing “that it is a matter of 
absolute urgency that every effort be made to reduce anthropogenic mortality to zero and to reduce various types 
of anthropogenic disturbances to the lowest possible level”); Resolution 2004-1: Resolution on Western North 
Pacific Gray Whale (noting the “deep concern” o f the Commission that “the recovery and growth of the 
population appear to be hindered by a variety o f biological difficulties and that the onset of oil and gas 
development programs is of particular concern with regard to the survival o f this population” and calling on the 
Secretariat to act in an advisory capacity in this regard); Resolution 2005-3: Resolution on Western North 
Pacific Gray Whale (calling on range states “to take all practical measures to avoid all anthropogenic mortality, 
and in particular to develop and implement strategies to prevent accidental deaths”).
379 Consensus Resolution on Climate and Other Environmental Changes and Cetaceans, Document IWC/61/16.
380 Forty-Seventh Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1997), at 40. For a full 
discussion of the limitations of the IWC in addressing climate change issues see W. C. G. Bums, “Climate 
Change and the International Whaling Commission in the 21st Century” in Bums and Gillespie, “Future of 
Cetaceans”, at 339.
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Gillespie, “this ‘urging’ is probably the only option available to the IWC”381 given the limited 
scope of the Commission to address the root causes of global climate change, with such 
issues necessitating a more specialist and binding global regulatory response than the ICRW 
is in practice able to provide.
Likewise, as regards disturbance, the IWC has yet to adopt a substantive Resolution on ocean 
noise. Despite an early acknowledgment in 1981 of “the possible effects on whale stocks 
which may be caused by shipping and off-shore mining and drilling activities”,382 to date, 
noise-producing activities have been evaluated primarily through SWGEC. As noted above, 
“noise” was expressly identified as an area o f further study for the Scientific Committee, for 
which the clearest manifestation o f collaborative research activity was the convening in 2006 
of a Workshop on Seismic Surveys. More tangentially, the problems raised by whale­
watching activities have been considered by the Scientific Committee, which in 1996
383developed a concise series o f guidelines to regulate these activities. In practice, however, it 
has been observed that the Scientific Committee has been largely unable to follow up on its 
examination of whale-watching,384 a shortcoming that is nonetheless mitigated by 
independent national action, given that a growing number of states have since developed 
localised guidelines and regulations in order to promote responsible practices.385
Overall, the IWC’s response to wider anthropogenic pressures upon cetaceans must be 
considered limited. Furthermore, on a practical level, concerns have also been raised over the 
ability of the IWC to fund such research effectively,386 as well as political reticence by certain
387parties to accept a wider regulatory mandate in this regard. Despite these practical and 
institutional difficulties, it may nonetheless be considered that the IWC could have a stronger 
role to play in addressing such broader concerns, both as a central “clearing house” for
381 A. Gillespie, “Environmental Threats to Cetaceans and the Limits o f Existing Management Structures” 
(2002) 6 New Zealand Journal o f  Environmental Law 97, at 135.
382 Resolution 1981-7.
383 Reproduced on-line at http://www.iwcoffice.Org/conservation/wwguidelines.htm#manage (last visited 31 
August 2009).
384 Fifty-Ninth Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2007), at 97; Sixtieth Report 
of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2008), at 106.
385 Reproduced in C. Carlson, A Review o f  Whale Watch Guidelines and Regulations around the World 
(Cambridge: IWC, 2008).
386 Bums, “Climate Change and the IWC”, at 366-68. Bums notes further that “[t]he IWC’s efforts to conduct 
critical cetacean research have been hobbled by the failure o f its members to provide adequate funding” while 
efforts to obtain alternative finances through the tmst funds characteristic of other multilateral environmental 
accords “have failed abjectly”: Bums, “Berlin Initiative”, at 82.
387 Bums, “Berlin Initiative” at, 82.
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scientific data, as well as potentially advancing a further political impetus in alternative fora. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the often beleaguered reputation of the IWC, the Scientific 
Committee remains an internationally-respected forum for debate on many of these issues. 
Moreover, given the role of cetaceans as potential “ecosystem sentinels”,388 through which 
the effects of anthropogenic pressures on such species may constitute an indicative barometer 
of the health of the marine environment generally, the IWC accordingly retains considerable 
scope to contribute to the wider debate. The challenge for the Commission is therefore to 
galvanise its disparate members into maximising the potential of this institution in this regard, 
otherwise as Gillespie cautions, “the ultimate conservation of cetaceans may be decided
lOQ
elsewhere, not within traditional whaling debates”. Whether the IWC will ultimately 
manage to achieve this depends to a considerable extent upon securing a broad consensus on 
the future direction of this body, an increasingly vexed issue to which this thesis now turns.
2.8.3 Future directions fo r  the IWC
Finally, an enduring impediment to further IWC policies is a failure thus far to identify a 
defining ethos and direction for the Commission. The IWC has been considered close to 
implosion for a number of years,390 with the Commission largely divided into two mutually 
antagonistic blocs, separated essentially by their views on the desirability of a long-term 
resumption of commercial whaling. In recent years, the membership of the IWC has become 
increasingly polarised as some parties have joined specifically to advance an intractably 
protectionist agenda within the Commission.391 Moreover, parties with little historical interest 
in the whaling debate have also acceded to the Convention for less than orthodox reasons, as 
both blocs have sought to manipulate the numerical composition of the IWC via diplomatic 
pressure and latterly through “aid-diplomacy” or “vote-buying” in the form of structural
'IQ '1inducements to support a particular position, much to the chagrin of the Commission.
388 S. E. Moore, “Marine Mammals as Ecosystem Sentinels” (2008) 89 Journal o f Mammalogy 534.
389 Gillespie, “Environmental Threats”, at 138.
390 S. Holt, “Is the IWC Finished as an Instrument for the Conservation o f Whales and the Regulation of 
Whaling?” (2003) 46 Marine Pollution Bulletin 924.
391 For example, upon acceding to the Convention in 1985, the Indian government declared its motivation for 
membership of the IWC as being “to save this most fascinating and remarkable member o f our planet’s living 
fraternity”: Letter to the IWC from Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, reproduced in D ’Amato and Chopra, 
“Emerging Right” at 47. Likewise, as noted in Chapter VIII, the European Commission has urged the EU 
Member States to accede to the ICRW and to promote a broad pro-moratorium stance within the IWC.
392 Japan has admitted to using “tools o f diplomatic communication and promises o f overseas development aid 
to influence members of the International Whaling Commission”: “Japan Accused o f Whaling Bribes”, The 
Times, 18 July 2001. Likewise, Andresen observes that this tactic was seemingly pioneered by the anti-whaling 
lobby: “Making and Implementation o f Whaling Policies”, at 439-40.
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The comparatively welcome accession of self-confessed “peacemakers”, most prominently 
Ireland, which joined specifically to facilitate debate and consensus between the two 
camps,394 has nonetheless exercised little discernible effect upon the long-term stability of the 
Commission. These divisions are significant, as the modem regulatory direction of the 
IWC has ebbed and flowed according to the stated aims of its constituent members. This 
uncertainty also has considerable practical implications, both for the ability of the IWC to 
prescribe clear conservation leadership for cetaceans beyond its traditional quota-setting 
duties and, correspondingly, the degree o f external supplementation required by alternative 
multilateral regimes to facilitate this broader objective. The precise operational role of the 
IWC in the Twenty-First Century therefore remains an issue of considerable debate and 
controversy.
This issue has been compounded in recent years by the adoption of two fundamentally 
conflicting and highly politicised Resolutions, which have each sought to readjust the 
regulatory direction o f the Commission. In 2003 the Berlin Initiative was adopted by the 
parties, primarily to establish the Conservation Committee and to generate further finances to 
underwrite additional research, and to realign the emphasis of the IWC towards “an extensive 
conservation-orientated agenda”.396 More significantly, the Berlin Initiative further observed 
that the Commission was “developing into a broad-based conservation organization whose 
focus now extends beyond the mere regulation o f whaling, to address the multitude of threats
Q^7that cetaceans face and will be facing to an increasing degree”. It is contended that this is a 
desirable and logical progression for the IWC to follow in the modem era, away from the 
narrow quota-setting functions with which it is traditionally associated, towards a more 
proactive role in addressing emerging environmental threats that clearly pose a threat to 
whale stocks. Indeed, in principle, this could represent a desirable objective for the majority
393 Resolution 2001-1: Resolution on Transparency within the International Whaling Commission.
394 Ireland commenced commercial whaling in 1940, although the industry subsequently lapsed. The Dail 
ratified the ICRW in 1986 and, as observed by Symmons, was motivated to do so almost exclusively in 
anticipation of “playing a ‘balancing role’ between the conservationist and whaling states on the International 
Whaling Commission”: C. R. Symmons, Ireland and the Law o f  the Sea (Dublin: The Round Hall Press, 1993), 
at 12-13. For an overview of early Irish policies at the IWC see ibid., at 151-53.
395 Indeed, in 1997 an attempt to break the deadlock surrounding the further development o f the RMS, the then 
Chair of the IWC and Irish Whaling Commissioner, Michael Canney, proposed a limited resumption of 
commercial harvesting, envisaged as occurring within the coastal areas o f pertinent IWC parties: Opening 
Statement o f the Government o f Ireland, Document IWC/49/OS. The so-called “Canney Compromise” was 
nonetheless firmly rejected by all sides o f the whaling debate: the anti-whaling bloc considered a resumption of 
commercial whaling to be ideologically repellent, while pro-whaling parties deemed the proposal to be an 
unacceptable restriction on rights o f high seas fishing as established under the LOSC.
396 Resolution 2003-1; op. cit.
397 Ibid., at Annex II.
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of parties on both sides o f the whaling debate, given that there is a vested interest in 
advancing improved conservatory measures for their own intrinsic value, as well as in 
furthering the operation o f the RMS in respect of future commercial quotas. Nevertheless, 
considerable difficulties have ensued in seeking to establish this objective as an overall 
regulatory direction for the Commission.
The Berlin Initiative was highly contentious at the material time -  due less to the specific 
establishment of a supplementary research and policy-development group than to the 
perceived preservationist implications o f the (undefined) term “conservation” -  and has
1QO
remained a source of further rancour at subsequent Meetings. Indeed, this acrimony 
culminated in the adoption of a controversial Resolution on “normalising” the IWC,399 which 
was swiftly denounced by a considerable number of parties.400 The so-called “normalisation” 
of the Commission, first advocated by Japan in 1985,401 is not explicitly defined within the 
Resolution,402 but appears to encompass a swift return to formal quota-setting, founded on the 
contentious and sweeping basis that “the moratorium which was clearly intended as a 
temporary measure is no longer necessary”, and eschewing “rule-making for emotional 
reasons” which is considered to set a “bad precedent”.403 Likewise, the Resolution ultimately 
advocates the elaboration o f “conservation and management measures which will allow 
controlled and sustainable whaling which would not mean a return to historic over­
harvesting”. Some sentiments o f the St. Kitts Declaration would clearly engender universal 
support, notably the need to prevent institutional implosion, the bolstering of the IWC’s 
scientific mandate and a rational and legitimate basis for decision-making. In many other
398 Indeed, Bums observes that the this endeavour might have constituted a decidedly Pyrrhic victory for the 
anti-whaling cohort, which “may ultimately come to view the passage o f the Berlin Initiative as misguided, 
because it likely will not enhance the conservation status o f cetaceans, while exacerbating the animus between 
the regime’s pro- and anti-whaling factions”: Bums, “Berlin Initiative”, at 82.
399 Resolution 2006-1: St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration.
400 Chair’s Report o f  the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: 
IWC, 2006), at 65.
401 Holt, “Whale Mining, Whale Saving”, at 210.
402 Some debate occurred at the Meeting as to whether the term “normalisation” would have been more 
appropriately substituted with “modernisation”, given the considerable changes that had occurred in relation to 
whaling issues since the conclusion o f the ICRW. This proposal was rejected on the rather circular logic that 
while “normalisation” was a rather inchoate concept, so too was “modernisation” and, more importantly from an 
administrative perspective, no such appeal for a change in terminology had been made during the earlier 
exchange of documents in advance o f the Meeting: Chair’s Report o f  the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting, op. cit., 
at 11. Therefore, and for quite unsatisfactory reasons, the term “normalisation” became entrenched within the 
final draft of this key IWC Resolution with minimal prior consideration of its meaning, scope or a potential 
alternative.
403 Resolution 2006-1.
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respects however, the Resolution, tabled by Japan,404 appears to be little more than a vehicle 
for some of the more contentious Japanese policy claims. This is particularly true given the 
stated commitments towards cultural whaling and, especially, the unequivocal assertion by 
the Resolution that “scientific research has shown that whales consume huge quantities of 
fish making the issue a matter of food security”,405 a polemical claim that cannot be 
objectively viewed as carrying universal endorsement.406
The deliberations over the adoption of the St. Kitts Declaration revealed three potential 
adjustments to the status quo within the IWC: the “normalisation” advocated by Japan and 
subsequently established in Resolution 2006-1, “modernisation” as advanced by Australia in 
response to the Japanese submission, and a further Swedish proposal for “harmonisation”. 
Such concepts are currently at an embryonic stage and generally lack substantive definition. 
Japan has remained coy as to the precise meaning of “normalisation”, which appears to 
encompass the allocation of sustainable quotas based upon the application of the Convention 
and “other relevant international law”, with particular emphasis on cultural values and the 
rights of coastal peoples. However, such assertions in the St. Kitts Declaration generally lack 
further elaboration, with little indication of precisely what is envisaged by the spectrum of 
rights claimed or the normative background deemed pertinent to the “normalisation” process. 
Some discussion of the elements of “sustainable use” has been tentatively advanced, 
encompassing sustainable quotas calculated by “an RMP-like or other appropriate 
methodology”, combined with enforcement measures, reporting requirements, trade 
restrictions and voluntary DNA registries.407 Nevertheless, while many of these proposed 
components of “sustainable use” are non-controversial (beyond, o f course, the principle of a 
resumption of commercial whaling), and are in fact advocated under the RMS, the ambiguity 
surrounding possible alternatives to the RMP is likely to prove contentious, while critics of 
“normalisation” would also note an absence of further environmental conservation measures 
beyond numerical caps upon quotas as a point of concern.
404 Document IWC/58/12, Nomalizing the International Whaling Commission; Agenda Item 19 of the Fifty- 
Eighth Annual Meeting of the Whaling Commission, submitted by Japan.
405 Interestingly, the latter claim towards scientific research fails to provide a preceding adjective such as 
“credible”, “extensive” or “recognised” as is common in the Resolutions of other multilateral agreements when 
justifying a policy based on science and, unlike the Berlin Initiative, the St. Kitts Declaration eschews an Annex 
within which to substantiate such claims.
406 Indeed, as Donohue observes, the Scientific Committee remains sceptical towards such claims and “[wjhile 
this argument may appear to have some superficial logic, its scientific basis is questionable”: Donohue, “Whales 
-  The New Scapegoat”, at 384.
407 Document IWC/58/12.
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The remaining two proposals, “modernisation” and “harmonisation”, may yet prove to be two 
sides of the same broad conservation coin. “Modernisation” is perhaps the least defined of the 
three and appears to be a relatively spontaneous term in response to the St. Kitts concept, 
subsequently embraced by a number o f opponents to “normalisation”, and entails updating 
the ICRW in the light of pertinent international measures adopted since the conclusion of the 
Convention. The Swedish delegation nonetheless rejected both formulations and preferred an 
alternative concept to “harmonise the 1946 Convention with current thinking about 
conservation and the sustainable use o f marine resources in today’s society as well as with a 
number of more recently agreed conventions”.408 The distinction between the Australian 
proposal and the Swedish initiative -  which also involves viewing the Convention in the 
context of (unspecified) contemporary developments -  appears largely tonal, with the latter 
concept reflecting the need to mitigate the collective discord between the parties and to adopt 
a more conciliatory umbrella term for the reform process. The prolonged discussions over 
terminology, however, demonstrate that the semantics of the process and the precise 
nomenclature of the new direction of the Commission may yet prove to be of considerable 
political significance.
Irrespective of whichever concept the IWC ultimately chooses to embrace it is clear that the 
Commission will necessarily move beyond the original letter of its constituent Convention, 
either to introduce ecosystem-based culls as advocated by the St. Kitts Declaration, or to 
reinforce its regulatory mandate in line with modem international environmental law. The 
practice of the IWC reveals some evidence o f flexibility in approach to its mandate where 
confronted with novel issues.409 For instance in 1977, the Commission sought to impose a 
prohibition on certain aboriginal quotas, although the ICRW was silent on whether such a 
power existed. Independent legal advice received by the Commission suggested that this 
policy would be intra vires, a conclusion that was largely unchallenged by the parties.410 Two 
years later, concerning attempts to impose an enhanced degree of IWC scrutiny over 
scientific permits, further legal advice considered that a treaty establishing a decision-making 
organ with specific regulatory functions should be treated as a “‘dynamic’ instmment, akin to 
a Constitution in a State, capable of adaptation to changing circumstances by a process of
408 Chair’s Report o f the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting, at 63.
409 P. Bimie, “Are Twentieth-Century Marine Conservation Conventions Adaptable to Twenty-First Century 
Goals and Principles? Part I” (1997) 12 International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law 307, at 331.
410 Bimie, “Twentieth-Century: Part II”, at 495.
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interpretation rather than as a static statement of rights and duties the content of which is 
fixed and unchangeable”.411 Nevertheless, it is also apparent that enthusiasm within the IWC 
for an expansively autonomous approach is far from unanimous, and has steadily diminished 
as applied to some of the more controversial facets of Commission practice, not least in the 
context of small cetaceans, scientific catches, sanctuary arrangements and, latterly, “food 
security” concerns and cultural whaling.
Notwithstanding the ongoing elaboration of all three proposed concepts, it would appear that 
the Swedish articulation of “harmonisation” -  insofar as it may be tentatively distinguished 
from “modernisation” -  would most closely encapsulate modem principles of treaty 
interpretation and recent judicial moves towards viewing such instruments within their wider 
normative context.412 In recent years, international adjudicatory bodies have noted with 
increasing frequency that the traditional rule of inter-temporality is subject to considerable 
qualification and that treaties are not hermetically sealed against the shifting landscape of 
international law. Such a position has been clearly -  and not unpredictably -  observed in the 
context of peremptory norms,413 and, increasingly, towards other pertinent mles of 
international law.414 Indeed, mindful that “[w]hat might have been a correct application of the 
law in 1989 or 1992, if the case had been before the Court then, could be a miscarriage of
411 D. W. Bowett, QC, Legal Opinion on Two Questions Concerning the Interpretation o f the 1946 Convention; 
reproduced in Bowman, “Normalizing the IWC”, at 350.
412 Such an approach applies essentially where the instrument in question largely defies a definitive 
interpretation from its individual provisions, in which case the principle o f “systemic integration” has been 
increasingly deployed. This approach entails the recognition that, while particular treaties may constitute lex 
specialis, they nonetheless remain a constituent component o f an overarching system of international law. 
Accordingly, in the absence of contrary intention within the treaty -  and presuming that any purported 
derogation would in fact be legally acceptable -  the treaty ought to be interpreted in the light o f the pertinent 
rules of international law. Systemic integration is most explicitly evidenced in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, 
which provides that a treaty may be interpreted in the context o f “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”. For an excellent appraisal of the development of this interpretive 
concept see C. McLachlan, “The Principle o f Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention” (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279; see also M. Koskenniemi, 
Fragmentation o f International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion o f 
International Law. Report o f  the Study Group o f  the International Law Commission (Geneva: United Nations, 
2006), especially 206-32.
413 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic o f Iran v. United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, 
at 181 (noting that “[t]he Court cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty was intended 
to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules o f international law on the use o f force, so as to be capable 
of being successfully invoked, even in the limited context o f a claim for breach o f the Treaty, in relation to an 
unlawful use of force. The application o f the relevant rules o f international law relating to this question thus 
forms an integral part of the task of interpretation entrusted to the Court”).
414 On this issue generally see P. Sands, “Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization 
of International Law” in A. Boyle and D. Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 39.
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justice if prescribed in 1997”,415 it has been observed that as a matter of practice, “[l]est it 
produce anachronistic results that are inconsistent with current international law, a tribunal 
must certainly engage in actualisation or contemporization when construing an international 
instrument that was concluded in an earlier period”.416
The wider normative context is considered especially pertinent where the subject matter of 
the treaty is expressed in generic terms417 and is broadly evolutionary in nature418 in the sense 
that it either expressly419 or by implication420 requires interpretive adjustment over time. Such 
matters are inherently subjective, although it seems relatively clear that a concept such as the 
“proper conservation of whale stocks” should be treated in this manner, since the 
conservation needs of stocks will alter significantly over time based on the identification of 
emerging environmental pressures and in the light of further research. Indeed, evolutive 
interpretation has been consistently applied in previous disputes in which technological 
developments affecting the subject matter o f the treaty in question could not have been 
envisaged at the time of its conclusion.421 Such a perspective could clearly apply to the
415 Case Concerning the Gabcikivo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, at 76.
416 Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 o f the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. UK); 
reproduced on-line at www.pca-cpa.org (last visited 31 August 2009), at para 103 (emphasis present within the 
original text of the Award).
417 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey) [1978] ICJ Rep 3, at 32 (noting that “the presumption 
necessarily arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the 
meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at any given time”).
418 Legal Consequences for States o f  the Continued Presence o f  South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 (noting “[e]vents subsequent to the 
adoption of the instruments in question should also be considered ... Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of 
interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions o f the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court 
is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant -  “the strenuous 
conditions of the modem world” and “the well-being and development” o f the peoples concerned -  were not 
static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the “sacred trust”. The parties 
to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such ... the Court must take into 
consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot 
remain unaffected by the subsequent development o f law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way 
of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework 
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time o f the interpretation”: at 30-31.
419 Case Concerning the Gabcikivo-Nagymaros Project (noting that “[i]n order to evaluate the environmental 
risks, current standards must be taken into consideration. This is not only allowed by the wording of Articles 15 
and 19, but even prescribed, to the extent that these articles impose a continuing -  and thus necessarily evolving 
-  obligation on the parties to maintain the quality of the water o f the Danube and to protect nature”: at 77-78).
420 See Report by the WTO Appellate Body in US -  Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(1999) 38 International Legal Materials 118 (noting that “[t]he words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’, were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment... 
we note that the generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference but is 
rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’”: at paras. 129-30).
421 In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (IJzeren Rijn) Railway (Belgium v. The Netherlands); 
reproduced on-line at www.pca-cpa.org (last visited 31 August 2009), noting that “it seems that an evolutive 
interpretation, which would ensure an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of its object and
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changing anthropogenic uses of the oceans, for which the IWC and similar institutions have 
noted with increasing concern the adverse implications for the conservation status of 
cetaceans. Whether the same is true of the notion of ecosystem-based culls, which seemingly 
promotes neither of the ICRW’s core objectives -  indeed, facilitating anthropogenic removals 
to promote the orderly development, in essence, of undetermined fishing industries -  remains 
rather questionable.
Although there appears in principle to be a strand of unanimity between the three proposed 
concepts of “normalisation”, “modernisation” and “harmonisation” -  supported by judicial 
trends in treaty interpretation -  that the IWC should operate “based on the terms of the ICRW 
and other relevant international law”, it is nonetheless difficult to identify precisely which 
external international laws should be applied. There is no shortage of normative candidates. 
Indeed, since the inception of the IWC, there have been two codifications of the law of the 
sea and an unprecedented degree of regulatory activity towards the elaboration of overarching 
environmental principles, which has heavily influenced the development and operation of 
subsequent resources-based treaties. Despite their general influence, however, many such 
principles have experienced a somewhat twilight existence, in that they are considered 
desirable components of national and multilateral instruments addressing marine 
environmental concerns, yet it remains a matter of particular uncertainty as to whether they 
have attained customary or peremptory status within the international legal order and can
499therefore be classed as “rules” in this respect.
The distinction between rules and “mere” principles is significant, as tribunals have proved 
markedly reluctant to apply evolving environmental concepts in their adjudication of 
disputes. Indeed, while noting that new rules o f international environmental law “have to be
A ' ) ' l
taken into consideration and such new standards given proper weight”, they are seemingly 
relevant only to treaty interpretation where they have formally acquired the status of rules.424
purpose, will be preferred to a strict application o f the intertemporal rule”: at para 80). The Panel further 
observed that this approach had been taken in municipal law in the context of submarine cables in a previous 
Dutch dispute: The Netherlands (PIT) and the Post Office (London) v. Ned Lloyd; reproduced at (1987) 74 
International Law Reports 212.
422 For an excellent discussion of the regulatory trajectory o f emergent environmental concepts see N. de 
Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005).
423 Case Concerning the Gabcikivo-Nagymaros Project, at 78.
424 Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 o f  the OSPAR Convention (noting that “the 
Tribunal has not been authorized to apply ‘evolving international law and practice’ and cannot do so” and that in
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Indeed, as Sands observes, “[i]t is only after the existence, relevance, and applicability of a 
customary norm has been recognized by an adjudicatory body that its precise impact upon the 
interpretation of a treaty falls to be determined”;425 the implication of the converse position 
being that a concept deemed to carry a lesser normative weight is excluded from express 
consideration in treaty interpretation. This has led to a tentative process of identifying on a 
case-by-case basis the principles that may be considered to have evolved to the extent that 
they may support such interpretative status. To date, aspects of the concept of sustainable 
development426 and the duty to mitigate harm caused by development projects427 have been 
so regarded, but considerable reluctance has been expressed towards extending the same
A n  o # #
status to the “polluter pays” principle and in providing definitive recognition for the 
precautionary principle as a rule o f international law.429 Thus far, the only principle to have 
been explicitly advocated for consideration within the particular context of the ICRW is that 
of ecosystem management, which the St. Kitts Declaration boldly considers “has now 
become an international standard”. However, it is highly questionable whether an 
international tribunal would endorse this sentiment, as ecosystem management rather 
exemplifies the type of principle that remains conceptually attractive yet legally amorphous, 
and thereby less suggestive of a firm rule in a manner similar to current judicial perceptions 
of the “polluter pays” approach. In the meantime, a degree of “principle shopping” remains
expressing the need to consider new international rules in the Gabcikivo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ “was not 
proposing that it -  and arguably other international tribunals -  had an inherent authority to apply law in statu 
nascendr: at para. 101). Moreover, Article 31(3)(c) o f the VCLT specifically uses the term “rules of 
international law” (emphasis added) as opposed to mere concepts or principles.
425 Sands, “Cross-Fertilisation of International Law”, at 57.
426 Case Concerning the Gabcikivo-Nagymaros Project (stating “[t]his need to reconcile economic development 
with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept o f sustainable development. For the 
purposes of the present case, this means that the Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the 
environment of the operation of the Gabcikivo power plant. In particular they must find a satisfactory solution 
for the volume of water to be released into the old bed o f the Danube and into the side-arms on both sides of the 
river”: at 78).
427 In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (IJzeren Rijn) Railway, (observing that “[tjhis duty, in the 
opinion of the Tribunal, has now become a principle o f general international law. This principle applies not only 
in autonomous activities but also in activities undertaken in implementation of specific treaties between the 
Parties”: at para. 59).
428 Case Concerning the Auditing o f Accounts between the Kingdom o f the Netherlands and the French Republic 
Pursuant to the Additional Protocol o f  25 September 1991 to the Convention on the Protection o f the Rhine 
against Pollution by Chlorides o f 3 December 1976’, reproduced on-line at www.pca-cpa.org (last visited 31 
August 2009), stating that “[l]e Tribunal observe que ce principe figure dans certains instruments 
intemationaux, tant bilatereaux que multilatereaux, et se situe a des niveaux d’effectivite variables. Sans nier 
son importance en droit conventionnel, le Tribunal ne pense pas que ce principe fasse partie du droit 
international general”: at para 103.
429 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) decision by the Appellate Body of the 
WTO; WT/DS48/AB/R, at para. 123. Precaution was also absent from a brief list of emerging principles 
considered potentially applicable to the development o f customary international law by the Panel in the IJzeren 
Rijn Arbitration: op. cit., at para. 58.
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rather inevitable as the parties seek to further elaborate proposals for the revision process, 
based predominantly upon their political positions regarding the whaling issue.
Since the St. Kitts Meeting, a tentative process of detente has emerged within the 
Commission, which continues to shape the on-going search for a new direction for the IWC. 
Following the 2006 Meeting a series of bloc conferences were convened, with Japan holding 
a Conference on Normalisation in February 2007, the Pew Foundation following suit with a 
symposium on whale conservation in April 2007, with a similar event staged by the Latin 
American parties in December 2006.430 This process, whereby like-minded parties have 
discussed their positions and tentatively examined grounds for compromise, has been 
complemented by a process of “Ocean Diplomacy”, agreed at the 2007 Annual Meeting with 
the appointment of a neutral Special Advisor to the IWC to canvass the views of all parties 
towards overcoming the current impasse within the Commission.431 The parties subsequently
• ♦ ASK*)agreed to convene a Steering Group to pursue discussions further, which led to the 
establishment of a Small Working Group on the Future of the IWC, charged with 
“developing a package or packages for review by the Commission” 433 At the first meeting of 
the Small Working Group, some thirty-three elements of importance to the parties were 
identified,434 and subsequently divided into issues of controversy that needed to be addressed 
immediately, and less controversial matters that require resolution but do not threaten the 
short-term stability of the Commission.435
Considerable divisions between the parties remain, and there is a palpable air of realism 
regarding the absence of guarantees of success, yet there is an emerging sense that some of 
the acrimony that has dogged IWC Meetings for the past twenty years is beginning to ease as 
the parties have started to adopt a more inclusive and collaborative mentality to their 
deliberations. Although the precise articulation of a way forward for the beleaguered 
Commission remains elusive, and the nature of the subject matter renders further flashpoints
430 Chair’s Report o f the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: 
IWC, 2007), at 26.
431 In 2007 Professor Calestous Juma of Harvard University, a former Executive Secretary of the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity, was appointed to this position.
432 Chair’s Report o f the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting, at 31.
433 Chair’s Report o f  the Sixtieth Annual Meeting o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 
2008), at 8.
434 An Overview o f the Elements/Issues Identified as Being o f  Importance to One or More Contracting 
Governments in Relation to the Future o f IWC; Document IWC/S08/SWG3.
435 Chair’s Report o f the Intersessional Meeting o f the Commission on the Future o f IWC; Document IWC/61/7.
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and fautlines virtually inevitable, it appears that -  as of August 2009 -  if  further progress is to 
be forthcoming, the future direction of the IWC is most likely to be shaped as a broad 
package deal of measures, negotiated by consensus and requiring difficult political 
compromises by both sides of the whaling debate.
2.9. Concluding remarks
The whaling question remains one o f the most emotive and divisive issues in the modem 
regulation of marine living resources. As Freidheim observes, “[t]he history of whaling is a 
record of extraordinarily rapacious behavior”.436 The damage inflicted upon stocks by the 
wholesale overhunting of whales, which reached its peak in the early Twentieth Century, has 
been compounded by considerable limitations in the international management regimes 
established which, while highly innovative at the material time, have nonetheless proved 
deeply flawed in many key respects. The earliest initiatives of the 1930s failed to attract the 
participation of key whaling states, while important stock protection measures also failed to 
gamer the support of the parties. The ICRW, which has in many respects operated as a 
prototype for modem natural resources treaties, has also suffered from serious limitations. 
Not only has the Convention itself proved subject to substantial loopholes, but its operative 
body, the IWC, has long been mired in controversy. In the early years of its existence the 
Commission proved largely ineffectual in establishing sustainable quotas, while the past 
thirty years has seen IWC meetings routinely degenerate into acrimony as the whaling issue 
has become heavily politicised. As the pro- and anti-whaling blocs of the IWC have reached 
an operational impasse, a regulatory vacuum has perpetuated. Despite considerable soul- 
searching and promising recent moves towards detente, a number of questions remain 
surrounding the precise role of the IWC in the Twenty-First Century and, thereby, the future 
international regulation of cetaceans.
In the first instance, there is a need to define a new ethos for the IWC, a task that is likely to 
prove highly challenging and one that necessitates difficult compromises on both sides of the 
political divide. It is increasingly clear that a blanket moratorium on the commercial hunting 
of all species of whales -  which has never been fully operational given the application of 
loopholes within the Convention -  and the right to life famously advocated by D’Amato and
436 Freidheim, “Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice”, at 352.
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Chopra is becoming ever more untenable. While the D’Amato-Chopra thesis undoubtedly 
captured the Zeitgeist within many ICRW parties at the material time, it is clear that, as noted 
in Chapter III of this thesis, such an intractable position will simply drive the most ardent of 
whaling nations away from global participatory regimes and towards exploring closed 
bespoke regional arrangements. It seems likely that a resumption of commercial whaling is 
now a question of “when” rather than “i f ’. To this end, the precise concept of the “sustainable 
use” of whales as advocated by key whaling states must be explored and defined more 
clearly, with input from the anti-whaling lobby. Moreover, if  the anti-whaling bloc is to 
tentatively accept sustainable hunting, it must be accompanied by clear concessions on the 
part of the pro-whaling cohort, especially concerning welfare standards and more rigid 
controls over “scientific” whaling. Given the continued political difficulties inherent in 
redrafting the Convention or adopting a specific amending Protocol, it is likely that such 
issues -  if  successful -  will emerge through a series of package negotiations in adjunct 
meetings of the IWC.
Secondly, and arguably most importantly, the precise remit of the IWC in respect of 
anthropogenic threats facing cetaceans beyond the traditional concerns of overhunting must 
be determined. Although such issues do not generally carry the same degree of political 
attention as commercial hunting, it is nonetheless clear that the survival of whales and other 
cetaceans will be increasingly determined not by catch quotas and associated bargaining, but 
in addressing the raft of more insidious pressures upon such species. At present, the ability of 
the IWC to do so effectively has been heavily compromised by political considerations. 
“Conservation” has long been viewed -  by both sides of the political divide -  as virtually 
synonymous with “preservationism”, which has undoubtedly hindered the development of 
regulatory activity beyond scientific research and on-going collaboration with similar 
organisations. There appear to be few fundamental legal barriers to a more explicit regulatory 
interest in such matters by the Commission. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that 
-  in the view of a considerable proportion of its members -  the IWC will have to develop 
effective institutional policies towards wider environmental issues if  it is to fully advance the 
proper conservation of whale stocks, not least given the impact that such environmental 
factors will inflict upon future RMP calculations and, ergo, the orderly development of the 
whaling industry. Although the ICRW faces considerable limitations in seeking to foster 
practical solutions to what are essentially key global environmental concerns, such as climate 
change and pollution, that impact far beyond the narrow confines of the whaling regime, the
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current lack of consensus within the Commission not only fails to provide conservation 
leadership in the specific context of cetaceans but also fails to harness the considerable 
political power of the IWC as a participant within the wider debate on these issues.
Finally, and allied to the need to define the wider environmental remit of the IWC, a 
particularly pressing issue remains the legal status of so-called “small cetaceans”. The 
widespread disagreement over the precise species coverage of the ICRW has perpetuated a 
supervisory lacuna for such species, for which there has long been “an obvious need for 
international regulation in some form”.437 In the absence of a unanimous regulatory direction 
within the IWC, many such species are subject to an uncertain legal status and are essentially 
reliant upon specific regional arrangements and alternative multilateral provisions and 
national laws for explicit protection. In this respect, the policy pursued by the international 
community, beyond abortive attempts to reform the ICRW, has been to address small 
cetaceans and wider environmental threats on an ad hoc basis by default through alternative 
fora, with varying degrees of success. Accordingly, this thesis now proceeds to consider the 
practice and prospects of these alternative regimes as surrogate regulators of cetaceans.
437 Scarff, “Interdisciplinary Assessment”, at 380.
87
CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE REGULATION OF 
CETACEANS: THE LAW OF THE SEA AND INTERNATIONAL
BIODIVERSITY LAW
3.1. Introduction
Having identified the key deficiencies and debates within the ICRW regime, this thesis now 
proceeds to appraise the wider regulatory framework addressing cetaceans. Given the 
difficulties experienced within the IWC in seeking to advance global regulatory initiatives for 
such species, this Chapter aims to establish the scope for pursuing additional measures and 
policies through alternative regimes. In this respect three key regimes will be analysed, 
namely the pertinent rules of the law o f the sea and the role of two key biodiversity-related
treaties: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
1 * 2  Flora and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
This Chapter commences with an appraisal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,3 
with particular attention to Articles 65 and 120, which provide a global mandate for states to 
work through appropriate organisations for the conservation, management and study of 
cetaceans. Moreover, this Chapter examines the scope for developing potential regulatory 
rivals to the IWC under Article 65, with specific reference to the North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission (NAMMCO).
The theme of alternative regulation is continued throughout the remainder of this Chapter 
with an analysis of CITES, which has proved to be one of the key fora to which the 
contemporary debate on whaling has been displaced. This Chapter presents an analysis of the 
operation of CITES in respect of cetaceans and its contribution to the global regulation of 
whaling. Finally, this Chapter will consider the role of the CBD, the leading biodiversity 
treaty in terms of global profile and participation, in the regulation of cetaceans.
3.2 Cetaceans and the law of the sea
1 993 UNTS 243 [Hereinafter “CITES”].
2 1790 UNTS 79 [hereinafter “CBD”].
3 1883 UNTS 396 [hereinafter “LOSC”].
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As previously observed, there is currently no global treaty that is universally accepted as 
definitively and exclusively regulating all species of cetaceans. Accordingly, the law of the 
sea provides an overarching framework for the regulation of marine living resources 
generally and is therefore of particular relevance for the international regulation of cetaceans. 
Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter II, customary international law has historically offered little 
explicit protection for marine mammals. Moreover, little ostensible basis was provided for 
the regulation of cetaceans under various codifying initiatives until the conclusion of the 
LOSC in 1982, which contains a number of key provisions specifically addressing these 
species.
3.2.1 Early codifications o f  the law o f  the sea
Historical endeavours towards the codification of the law of the sea4 failed to establish a clear 
position with regard to cetaceans. The first such initiatives were instituted by the League of 
Nations in 1924. Despite Suarez’s call for a “new jurisprudence”5 for whales, the draft 
articles on the law of the sea presented at the 1930 Codification Conference were neither 
adopted, nor indeed did they advance any specific principles of cetacean conservation. 
Accordingly, prior to the inception of the ICRW, whaling and associated issues were instead 
regulated through the hybrid system of multilateral instruments and industry arrangements 
detailed in Chapter II.
In 1958, the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)6 was convened in 
Geneva, resulting in the adoption of four codifying treaties,7 none o f which explicitly 
addressed cetaceans. Some broad obligations towards cetaceans may be distilled from the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which
4 For a concise overview of the codification process see R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law o f the Sea 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), at 13-22.
5 Reproduced at (1926) 20 American Journal o f International Law: Special Supplement 230, at 237.
6 Given the wide range of nomenclature used by commentators (as well as by international organisations and 
subsequent treaties) in referring to the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea, this thesis follows the model 
adopted by the leading journals and treatises on law of the sea issues and therefore uses the term “LOSC” to 
denote the Convention and “UNCLOS” to represent the international conferences from which this instrument 
was ultimately derived: see W. R. Edeson, “Confusion over the Use o f ‘UNCLOS’ and References to Other 
Recent Agreements” (2000) 15 International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law  413.
7 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 516 UNTS 205 [hereinafter the “Territorial Sea 
Convention”]; Convention on the High Seas, 450 UNTS 11 [hereinafter the “High Seas Convention”]; 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 UNTS 311 [hereinafter the Continental Shelf Convention”]; and the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources o f the High Seas, 559 UNTS 285 [hereinafter the 
“Fishing Convention”].
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sought to prevent the overexploitation of stocks by virtue of “cooperation through the
o
concerted action of all the States involved”. While the 1958 High Seas Convention had 
enshrined rights of freedom of fishing in these waters,9 the Fishing Convention introduced a 
series of conservation measures in respect of high seas living resources, albeit predicated 
exclusively on anthropocentric requirements. Indeed, “conservation” under the 1958 
Convention was considered “the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum 
sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other 
marine products”, with specific programmes advanced “with a view to securing in the first 
place a supply of food for human consumption”.10 Accordingly, parties were under a duty to 
adopt or cooperate to develop such measures “as may be necessary for the conservation of the 
marine living resources of the high seas”.11 In the context of whaling, such cooperation was 
pursued through the IWC which, as observed in Chapter II above, embraced and applied the 
MSY principle to its quota calculations throughout the 1960s and 70s. As noted previously, 
however, the data limitations concerning stocks at the material time were considered to have 
heavily undermined the effectiveness of this policy in the particular case of whaling.
The proliferation of maritime claims following the Second World War also had implications 
for international regulation. In the wake of the 1945 Truman Proclamation, in which the US 
asserted jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the 
continental shelf beneath the high seas and contiguous to the national coast, a number of 
other states -  especially in South America and Africa -  declared claims over extended areas 
of the sea, largely to advance national fisheries interests. A small number of claims, notably 
those of Chile to a 200-mile fishing/whaling zone,12 were primarily motivated towards the 
regulation of cetacean resources within their pelagic habitats.13
Following the 1958 Geneva Conferences, a number of coastal states began to formalise 
claims over economic resources in waters significantly in excess o f the limits recognised 
under customary international law at the material time. Combined with emerging concerns
8 Preamble to the Convention; second recital.
9 Article 2(2).
10 Article 2.
11 Article 1(2).
12 On this issue generally see P. S. Kibel, “Alone at Sea: Chile’s Presencial Ocean Policy” (2000) 12 Journal o f  
Environmental Law 43.
13 F. Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Nature o f  High Seas Fisheries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), at 37 (noting that this declaration was inspired by “the need to end exploitation of 
whales and to make available a limited number of species for the local industry”).
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over the allocation of rights over mineral resources of the deep-sea bed and pressure from 
newly independent countries to re-evaluate the existing regime, the UN General Assembly 
undertook in 1970 to convene a further conference on the law of the sea.14 UNCLOS III was 
convened in 1973 and culminated in the adoption on 30 April 1982 of the LOSC. The LOSC, 
which entered into force in November 1994, contains a number of specific -  and not 
uncontroversial -  provisions addressing marine mammals, which have considerable 
implications for the management of cetaceans both by states and international regulatory 
bodies.
3.2.2 Cetaceans and the LOSC framework
In assessing the role of the LOSC in the regulation of cetaceans, two key observations may be 
advanced at this juncture. In the first instance, the LOSC has provided a uniform basis for 
previously ad hoc 200-mile claims in the form of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which 
brings a considerable majority of cetacean habitats under the jurisdiction of coastal states. 
The relevant rules concerning the EEZ are therefore of central importance to the international 
regulation of cetaceans. Secondly, the need to conclude a treaty with universal appeal has 
rendered the various cetacean provisions of the LOSC light on substantive detail. As Bimie 
observes, Articles 65 and 120 are afflicted by “bland phrasing and latent ambiguities”,15 
which has generated discord over varying national interpretations of these commitments.
As had been previously recognised in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention states retain 
exclusive sovereignty over cetaceans in their coastal habitats under the LOSC. Accordingly, 
where such species are located in the internal waters of a state, most commonly freshwater 
cetaceans in major navigable rivers, such as the river dolphins of the Platanistoidea family, 
or habitually resident within port areas and bays, such as the harbour porpoise, the strength or 
otherwise of applicable conservation measures is determined exclusively by the coastal state,
14 Resolution 2750 (XXV) of 17 December 1970: Reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed 
and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national 
jurisdiction and use of their resources in the interests o f mankind, and convening a conference on the law of the 
sea.
15 P. W. Bimie, “Marine Mammals: Exploiting the Ambiguities o f Article 65 o f the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and Related Provisions: Practice under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling” in 
D. Freestone, R. Bames and D. Ong (eds.), The Law o f the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), at 278.
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in line with any pertinent international commitments.16 This is no abstract issue in the case of 
particularly threatened freshwater species, as the Yangtze River Dolphin was declared 
“functionally extinct” in December 2006, with a failure to regulate by-catches of critically 
endangered populations deemed to have facilitated the demise of this species.17 Likewise, the 
regulation of cetaceans and their habitats in the territorial sea is also subject to the
1 Ssovereignty of the coastal state, while certain activities affecting such species in these 
waters by foreign vessels are precluded under the regime of innocent passage.19
Pelagic species and habitats are addressed under the regime of the EEZ and high seas. Within 
the EEZ, the coastal state exercises sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing” marine living resources,21 for which the LOSC 
provides a broad framework for such activities under Articles 61 and 62. Although this 
framework is in practice heavily qualified by the operation of Article 65 which, as noted 
below, operates as lex specialis in the context of cetaceans, a series of pertinent commitments 
are nonetheless established. Primarily, under Article 61(2), the coastal state must take “proper 
conservation and management measures” to prevent over-exploitation, using the “best 
scientific evidence available to it”. Such measures are intended to maintain or restore
harvestable populations at MSY level, “as qualified by relevant environmental and economic
22 • • •factors”. Moreover, in discharging this obligation, states must consider the effects on
species associated with or dependent upon hunted species,23 thereby providing an explicit 
mandate to address by-catches and prey depletion of cetaceans. The EEZ framework requires 
the state to establish the total allowable catch of living resources24 and, having determined the 
capacity of the national fleet to harvest such resources, may control access by foreign vessels
16 The exercise of exclusive sovereignty in these areas was established under Article 5(1) TSC and Article 2(1) 
LOSC, and recognised as a rule of custom by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case [1986] ICJ 
Rep 14, at 111.
17 S. T. Turvey et al., “First Human-Caused Extinction of a Cetacean Species?” (2007) 3 Biology Letters 537.
18 Article 1(1) TSC and Article 2(1) LOSC.
19 Notably “wilful and serious pollution”, any fishing activities and unauthorised scientific research: Article 
19(2) LOSC.
20 The EEZ is defined in Article 55 as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific 
legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction o f the coastal State and the rights 
and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions o f this Convention”. An EEZ “shall not 
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth o f the territorial sea is measured”: 
Article 57. Shortly after the conclusion of the LOSC, the ICJ declared that the passage into customary 
international law of the EEZ concept was “incontestable”: Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case [1985] ICJ Rep 
13, at 33.
21 Article 56(l)(a).
22 Article 61(3).
23 Article 61(4).
24 Article 61(1).
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to any surplus.25 In so doing, the coastal state shall consider the significance of the living 
resources to its economy26 and may set conditions on exploitation that include inter alia by- 
catch mitigation requirements27 and the use of observers.28
Additional requirements are established in the context of highly migratory species although,
29again, such provisions are broadly considered lex generalis to the lex specialis of Article 65.
In this regard, under Article 64 the coastal state and any other pertinent states fishing in the 
region for highly migratory species listed in Annex I to the Convention -  which includes 
virtually all species of cetaceans30 -  shall cooperate directly or through appropriate 
international organisations to ensure their conservation and promote the objective of optimal
31utilisation. Where no such organisation exists, states involved in the harvest of such species 
shall cooperate to establish a pertinent body and participate in its work.
In addition to these general requirements, under Article 56(1) states also exercise sovereign 
rights in relation to economic exploitation and exploration of these areas, including energy 
production. This has regulatory implications for offshore wind turbines and barrages, for 
which some concerns have been raised -  most notably within the CMS, as observed in 
Chapter IV -  over the displacement effect upon cetaceans of such appliances through noise 
and vibrations. States also exercise sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural
 ^ ' 'J'J
resources of the continental shelf, and to regulate drilling thereon, which has also 
generated concerns in respect of cetaceans and their habitats.
The EEZ regime also provides for additional controls by the coastal state, which may 
exercise jurisdiction over inter alia scientific research and the protection and preservation of
25 Article 62(2).
26 Article 62(3). Accordingly, this may also concern the impact of such policies on any cetacean-watching 
industries.
27 Article 64(4)(c).
28 Article 64(4)(g).
29 Bimie, “Exploiting the Ambiguities”, at 274.
30 Annex I applies to seven broad families of cetaceans, as well as, somewhat confusingly, two species of 
“dolphin”, which are in fact fish (common and pompano dolphinfish).
31 The term “harvest” is not defined in the LOSC, although an ordinary construction implies an intentional 
anthropogenic removal o f individuals from a stock. Accordingly, in the context of cetaceans, this could extend 
to removals for trade purposes.
32 Article 76(1).
33 Article 81.
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the marine environment.34 Occasional controversy has been generated in the regulation of 
research projects. Most notably, lethal scientific research in Antarctica has provoked a 
dispute between Australia and Japan.35 Generally speaking, however, coastal states have 
proved relatively supportive of (non-lethal) research activities within their EEZs, although 
cooperation has been revoked on occasion. In 2001 the UK withdrew access for Norwegian 
and Faeroese vessels to its EFZ, which had been scheduled to undertake sighting surveys as 
part of a flagship NAMMCO research project.36 This move was subsequently “deplored” by 
NAMMCO as “counter-productive to the conservation and sustainable management of 
cetaceans in the area”,37 although the continuing ban on access demonstrates the powerful 
effect -  for good or ill -  that the infrequent exercise of such powers may exert in practice.
Beyond the EEZ, a series of traditional freedoms apply on the high seas, which have been 
enshrined in the LOSC,38 including fishing39 and scientific research. Moreover, states are 
required to cooperate in the conservation and management of marine living resources40 in 
establishing non-discriminatory measures to maintain or restore populations at MSY levels 
and to take into account associated or dependent species.41 Nevertheless, as is the case with 
the EEZ, this general framework is qualified in respect of cetaceans, given that the 
obligations established under Article 65 apply mutatis mutandis to the high seas under Article 
120. Accordingly, as observed by Orrego Vicuna, “[sjince this approach also applies to 
whaling on the high seas, it follows that freedom of exploitation is no longer the prevailing 
principle of international law in this context” 42
3.2.3 Article 65 and the regulation o f  cetaceans
34 Article 56(1 )(b). In addition to the exercise of jurisdiction over the protection of the marine environment in 
the EEZ under Article 56(1), a general obligation to “protect and preserve the marine environment” is 
incumbent upon all parties to the LOSC: Article 192.
35 See R. Davies, “Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The HSI Litigation” (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal o f 
International Law 6.
36 The North Atlantic Sightings Surveys were inaugurated in 1995, while a second phase o f the project 
commenced in 2001.
37 North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: Annual Report 2001 (Tromso: NAMMCO, 2001), at 19-20.
38 Article 87(1).
39 Although this is qualified by the operations of Article 87(2), which requires “due regard for the interests of 
other States in their exercise o f the freedom of the high seas”.
40 Article 118.
41 Article 119.
42 F. Orrego Vicuna, “The International Law of High Seas Fisheries: From Freedom of Fishing to Sustainable 
Use” in O. S. Stokke (ed.), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay o f Global and Regional Regimes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 27.
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Article 65 constitutes the key provision addressing cetaceans under the LOSC and proved to 
be a controversial issue during UNCLOS III, undergoing considerable redrafting throughout 
the course of the negotiations.43 Throughout the negotiations, however, there was near 
unanimous support for the multilateral regulation of marine mammals to at least some degree, 
although considerable difficulties remained concerning the precise parameters of external 
control. Some states considered compulsory universal participation in a global regulatory 
body the optimal solution, while others advocated a more consensual approach.44 Likewise, 
there was a wide divergence of views surrounding the jurisdictional reach of any overarching 
regulatory organisation, with some states arguing that it should be confined to the high seas, 
while others sought a mandate in respect of individual EEZs.45
Eventually, after considerable revision, the final version of Article 65 reads:
“Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an 
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation 
of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate 
with a view to the conservation o f marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall 
in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their 
conservation, management and study.”
The final text is ambiguous in a number of respects and has accordingly generated sustained 
uncertainty since the conclusion of the LOSC. In the immediate aftermath of the UNCLOS 
III negotiations, contemporary commentators were initially perplexed by the relationship 
between this provision and Article 64, addressing highly migratory species. These initial 
difficulties were perhaps unsurprising, given that the two clauses were initially drafted in 
unison as a single Article and divided at a relatively late stage in the negotiations 46 Despite
43 For a useful overview of the drafting history o f Article 65 see K. S. Davis, “International Management o f  
Cetaceans under the New Law o f the Sea Convention” (1985) 3 Boston University International Law Journal 
477, at 508-13.
44 Bimie, “Exploiting the Ambiguities”, at 273.
45 Ibid.
46 Davis, “International Management o f Cetaceans”, at 500. Accordingly, Davis considered that “[t]his creates a 
strong inference that article 65 merely modifies the management regime established in article 64”: ibid. 
Nonetheless, at the material time, there were also strong suggestions that the rules governing highly migratory 
species should be clarified further by removing all reference to cetaceans from Annex I and addressing such 
species in a stand-alone regime under Article 65: J. A. R. Nafziger, “Global Conservation and Management o f  
Marine Mammals” (1980) 17 San Diego Law Review 591, at 610.
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Canada has articulated an official opinion on this issue, considering that the obligation may 
be discharged by providing scientific and technical advice to pertinent international bodies.51 
Beyond this individual articulation, however, which should also be read in the light of the 
Canadian policy of non-membership of the IWC, it appears that the “work through” clause is 
largely indefinable. Indeed, it is perhaps easier to exemplify aspects of practice towards 
discharging this obligation -  such as voluntary reporting o f statistics by non-parties, 
attendance of meetings as an observer state, the designation of national focal points, 
participation by national scientists at institutionally-sponsored conferences and symposia -  
than to elucidate a precise operative threshold in unequivocal terms.
An issue of considerably greater perplexity in the modem interpretation of Article 65 has 
proved to be the precise role of the IWC in discharging commitments under the LOSC. In this 
regard, primary difficulties stem from the subsequent proliferation of regulatory bodies 
exercising functional competence over cetaceans in a manner highly unlikely to have been 
foreseen by the drafting team at the material time. The institutional plurality facilitated by the 
wording of Article 65 has therefore raised the provocative theoretical possibility that a state 
may eschew participation within the IWC, yet still fulfil its LOSC commitments in respect of 
the directed hunting of cetaceans through an “appropriate” alternative forum. Accordingly, as 
wryly observed by one senior Icelandic whaling official, “[t]he ‘s’ at the end of the word 
‘organisations’ has therefore become one of the most famous individual letters in the field of 
the law of the sea”.52
It is at least relatively clear that the IWC was intended to exemplify an “appropriate 
organisation”, given the lack of an obvious global alternative for the conservation, 
management and study of cetaceans. Instead, the use o f the plural “organisations” was 
seemingly reflective of concerns raised at the material time over wholesale by-catches of 
small cetaceans in key fishing areas for which, as noted in Chapter II, the IWC was divided 
on the issue of regulation. Indeed, reporting in 1980 on the final amendments to the draft of 
Article 65, the US delegation observed that the provision “preserves and enhances the role of 
the International Whaling Commission (or a successor organization) especially, but not 
exclusively, with regard to whales. It recognizes the role of regional organizations in the
51 T. L. MacDorman, “Canada and Whaling: An Analysis o f Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention” 
(1998) 29 Ocean Development and International Law 179, at 182.
52 S. Asmundsson, Legal Aspects Regarding Whaling (Reykjavik: Foreign Ministry o f Iceland, 2006), at 3 (on 
file).
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protection of marine mammals, which are often taken incidental to fishing operations”. 
Particular reference in this regard was made to the work of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission in the Eastern Pacific Ocean,54 which represented the first concerted efforts by a 
regional fisheries management body to address incidental cetacean mortality. The term 
“organisations” therefore seems originally intended to provide a further mandate for the 
development of by-catch mitigation policies by the IATTC and any other interested fisheries 
management body.
Initial interpretations of this provision accorded a high degree of deference to the role of the 
IWC, to the extent that parties to the LOSC ought to be considered bound by the terms of the 
whaling convention and the policies of its constituent management organisation, irrespective 
of individual ratification of the ICRW.55 A number of states have, however, expressly 
rejected this view, which has seemingly declined in prominence.56 As noted in Chapter II, the 
IWC has interpreted this issue in the context o f non-affiliated whaling, noting that the ICRW
57offers a clear avenue to discharge Article 65 commitments.
3.2.4 NAMMCO and “appropriate ” organisations
The most controversial aspects of the modem application of Article 65 encompass the 
concept of an “appropriate” organisation for the conservation, management and study of 
cetaceans and the extent to which an alternative forum to the IWC may fulfil this 
requirement. The LOSC prescribes no explicit criteria to qualify an organisation as 
“appropriate”, while few clues may be uncovered within the traveaux preparatoires of the 
Convention, given that the drafters seemingly -  and not entirely unreasonably -  failed to
53 US Delegation Report to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea, Ninth Session 
(February 27-April 4 1980); reproduced in Davis, “International Management of Cetaceans”, at 512.
54 Ibid.
55 See, for instance, Davis, “International Management o f Cetaceans”, at 481 (noting that “Article 65 defers to
the IWC to set minimum conservation measures and makes IWC regulations binding upon the parties to the 
Convention in ways not countenanced in the ICRW”); see also J. P. Rosati, “Enforcement Questions of the 
International Whaling Commission: Are Exclusive Economic Zones the Solution?” (1984) 14 California 
Western International Law Journal 114, at 116 (noting that the effect o f Article 65 “requires whaling states to 
cooperate with the IWC”) and S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis o f International Treaties
Concerned with the Conservation o f Wildlife (Cambridge: Grotius, 1985), at 36 (noting “[t]he implication of 
Article 65, although some States dispute this, is that States must abide by the regulation of the IWC, whether or 
not they are Parties to the Whaling Convention, except where they adopt stricter domestic measures for the 
conservation of whaling”).
56 Freeland and Drysdale, “Baleen Out the IWC”, at 19-20.
57 Resolution 2000-2: Resolution on Whaling o f Highly Endangered Bowhead Whales in the Eastern Canadian 
Arctic.
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consider such a scenario. In practice there is little meaningful dissent to the identification of 
the IWC as an “appropriate organisation”, although the wording of Article 65, by accident or 
design, does not preclude the operation o f multiple regulators in the pursuit of such 
objectives.
There is little global consensus regarding indicative criteria for an “appropriate organisation”. 
Moreover, as Burke observes, attempts at articulating a theoretical model for the purposes of 
Article 65, encompassing broad aspirational factors such as a conservationist orientation, 
suitable membership, an effective institutional structure, necessary competences and 
enforcement powers, sufficient funding and access to extensive and informed scientific data 
and advice, are of limited utility since “[tjhere are very few, if  any, international fishery
r  o
organizations that meet all of these criteria”.
Objective interpretations of Article 65 on a global basis are sporadic, and often raise more 
questions than answers. One influential articulation -  albeit in soft law -  is contained in the 
pertinent Chapter of Agenda 21,59 which repeats Article 65 verbatim at various points in 
qualifying broad commitments to MSY principles.60 Moreover, Paras. 17.62 and 17.89 
observe that states recognise “[t]he responsibility of the International Whaling Commission 
for the conservation and management of whale stocks and the regulation of whaling pursuant 
to the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling”. These paragraphs 
further recognise the work of the IWC Scientific Committee “in carrying out studies of large 
whales in particular, as well as of other cetaceans”, while the IATTC and ASCOBANS are 
explicitly recognised for the conservation, management and study of cetaceans and other 
marine mammals.
Nevertheless, this is of limited value in assessing organisations that have been developed 
since the adoption of Agenda 21. While the identification of ASCOBANS -  a relative leap of 
faith, considering that the Agreement had yet to enter into force at the material time -  
suggests that ACCOBAMS would be likely to receive similar recognition on this basis, no 
reasoning is advanced for the selection of these regimes. A case may also be made for at least
58 W. T. Burke, “Whaling and International Law” in G. Petursdottir (ed.), Whaling in the North Atlantic: 
Economic and Political Perspectives (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 1997), at 119.
59 Chapter Seventeen: Protection o f the Oceans, All Kinds o f Seas, Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas 
and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of their Living Resources.
60 UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992); at paras. 17.47 and 17.76.
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f\ 1 fDsome recognition of CITES and the CMS in this manner. Likewise, the wording of 
Agenda 21 in this regard remains non-exhaustive, merely indicating bodies “such as” the 
IATTC and ASCOBANS as relevant. Most confusingly, perhaps, Agenda 21 is largely silent 
on the regulation of small cetaceans under the ICRW, omitting any reference to such species 
in endorsing the IWC and noting the work of the Scientific Committee in this regard. Agenda 
21 also provides scope for its relevant provisions to be read in a manner as to designate the 
IWC as appropriate for whales, with other organisations deemed more pertinent for small 
cetaceans. A subsequent declaration by the UN Office of Legal Affairs regarding its 
interpretation of Article 65 has proved equally vague, recognising the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation and UNEP as appropriate organisations, while merely reserving judgment over 
the possibility of recognising the claims of other bodies.
In practice, little controversy has arisen in the case of organisations for small cetaceans -  
which, as noted in subsequent Chapters, have largely prohibited directed hunting, thereby 
rather avoiding the protracted political conflicts that tend to cloud opinion on the legitimacy 
of other bodies. Instead concerns are most prevalent over the development of alternative fora 
with potential competences to set whaling quotas. A degree of regulatory competition to the 
ICRW has sporadically existed since its early years of operation, most notably in the form of 
the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, which raised controversy in 1960s for 
setting regional whaling standards that were considerably more permissive than those of the 
IWC.64 Currently, notwithstanding the establishment in 2000 of the Eastern Caribbean 
Cetacean Commission as an intergovernmental forum for whaling advocacy, as well as non­
binding and more community-based institutions such as the High North Alliance and World 
Council for Whalers,65 such concerns have been almost exclusively directed in the context of 
NAMMCO.
61 See A. Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2005), at 334-343.
62 Agenda 21 refers only to the CMS in this context en passant, as the parent convention of ASCOBANS, 
creating something of a “chicken and egg” scenario over the means by which an appropriate body may be 
generated.
63 Reproduced at (1996) 31 Law o f the Sea Bulletin 79.
64 P. W. Bimie, The International Regulation o f Whaling: From Conservation o f Whaling to the Conservation of 
Whales and the Regulation o f Whale-Watching (New York: Oceana Publications, 1985), at 230; see also 
Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 324.
65 For a useful overview of this issue generally see H. S. Schiffman, “The Competence of Pro-Consumptive 
International Organizations to Regulate Cetacean Resources” in W. C. G. Bums and A. Gillespie (eds.), The 
Future o f Cetaceans in a Changing World (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2003).
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The formation of NAMMCO is commonly perceived as a cautionary tale regarding the 
uncompromising nature of whaling negotiations in the early 1990s.66 Nonetheless, while 
disillusionment at IWC practices provided a significant political spur to the establishment of 
the organisation, in truth NAMMCO currently operates rather more to regulate stocks of seals 
and walruses and to address fisheries interactions within the region.67 NAMMCO has been 
operational since 1992, although an official basis for the coordination of common policies 
within the region was established through a series of intergovernmental conferences 
convened between 1988 and 1992. These initiatives led to the adoption in 1990 of a 
Memorandum of Understanding, which created the scope to develop a formal management 
body to advance this process further.68 In September 1992, the Agreement on Cooperation in 
Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic69 was 
signed between Iceland, Norway, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, thereby formally bringing 
NAMMCO into effect.
NAMMCO has the broad objective to “contribute through regional consultation and 
cooperation to the conservation, rational management and study of marine mammals in the 
North Atlantic”.70 To this end, NAMMCO has advanced an extensive institutional structure, 
similar to the CMS subsidiary Agreements discussed in Chapters V to VI. The operative body 
of NAMMCO is the Council, which provides a platform for the study, analysis and exchange 
of information on marine mammals in the North Atlantic,71 complemented by a Scientific 
Committee as a forum for expert advice,72 with the Agreement administered by a small 
Secretariat.73 Despite this prosaic structure, concerns have been raised by elements within the 
IWC by the role of Management Committees, created by the Council to “propose to their
66 See especially D. D. Caron, “The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission: The Institutional Risks o f Coercion in Consensual Structures” (1995) 89 American Journal o f 
International Law 154.
67 G. Hovelsrud-Broda, “NAMMCO, Regional Cooperation, Sustainable Use, Sustainable Communities” in 
Bums and Gillespie, “Future of Cetaceans”, at 145-46. Nonetheless, the perception of NAMMCO as a 
“renegade group” within the IWC still broadly lingers: personal communication with Dr. Christina Lockyer, 
General Secretary to NAMMCO (on file).
68 On the development and early operation of NAMMCO see A. H. Hoel, “Regionalization of International 
Whale Management: The Case of the North Atlantic Marine Mammals Commission” (1993) 46 Arctic 116, at 
118-21; see also K. Sanderson, “The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission -  In Principle and Practice” 
in Petursdottir, “Whaling in the North Atlantic”, at 67-69.
69 Reproduced on the NAMMCO institutional website at www.nammco.no (last visited 31 August 2009).
70 Article 2 of the NAMMCO Agreement.
71 Article 4.
72 Article 6.
73 Article 7. Secretariat facilities are provided by Norway, with the operational base of NAMMCO situated 
within the Polar Research Centre at Tromso.
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members measures for conservation and management”,74 which may potentially include 
setting catch quotas for cetaceans. A Management Committee for Cetaceans has been created 
under the auspices of NAMMCO, under which any future quotas in respect of whales would 
be set. Nevertheless, to date, the practice of NAMMCO has been to merely recommend 
through its Scientific Committee desirable numbers in respect of particular stocks of 
cetaceans, most notably humpback limits for Greenlanders, thereby assisting pertinent 
national bodies responsible for administering catches as opposed to setting official quotas 
under the Agreement.
Shortly after its inauguration, Norway asserted within the IWC that NAMMCO should be 
considered an appropriate organisation for the conservation, management and study of 
cetaceans.75 Again, however, in the absence of objective criteria for the discharge of Article 
65 obligations, it is difficult to state definitively whether this is in fact the case. Advocates of 
this view would emphasise a number of positive and promising initiatives advanced by 
NAMMCO to date, not least the development of hunting regulations and the establishment of 
a regional monitoring programme operational since 1998,76 while significant scientific and 
research projects have also been conducted.77 Nevertheless, considerable opposition remains, 
with opponents of NAMMCO raising concerns over the small number of actual states 
involved,78 a perceived lack of resources79 and, perhaps most significantly, constraints on
OA
participation with the original signatories exercising a right o f veto over new members.
74 Article 5(1 )(a).
75 Forty-Third Report o f  the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1993), at 32.
76 Joint NAMMCO Coastal Scheme for the Hunting o f Marine Mammals (Troms0: NAMMCO, 1997); 
reproduced on-line at www.nammco.no (last visited 31 August 2009).
77 For an overview of these developments see Hovelsrud-Broda, “NAMMCO”, at 153-57.
78 Indeed, notwithstanding recent developments within Greenland towards a greater degree of autonomy from 
Denmark, two of the four signatories to NAMMCO remain dependent territories, an issue that may affect the 
global credibility of the organisation given that “the parties may be too few to represent a viable management 
alternative as Norway and Iceland are the only two independent state-members”: S. Andresen, “NAMMCO, 
IWC and the Nordic Countries” in Petursdottir, “Whaling in the North Atlantic”, at 80 (emphasis present within 
the original text).
79 Initial concerns were voiced by some authors at the time o f the inception of the Agreement that NAMMCO 
“is a fledgling that lacks the resources and expertise o f the IWC”: G. Rose and S. Crane, “The Evolution of 
International Whaling Law” in P. Sands (ed.), Greening International Law (London: Earthscan, 1993), at 179. 
Nevertheless, the intervening years have seen a steady improvement in this respect.
80 Article 10(2) of the Agreement requires the consent o f the existing signatories for any further members of
NAMMCO. In the recent past Russia and Japan have attended various meetings as observers, while Canada has
been consistently represented within NAMMCO for a number o f years. Given the importance of the regulation
of seal stocks in these waters, NAMMCO is “very eager” for Canada to join officially, but the Canadian
authorities have thus far declined to sign the Agreement: personal communication with Dr. Christina Lockyer,
General Secretary to NAMMCO (on file).
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aspect of IWC practice. This position is further illustrated in the context of CITES, to which 
this thesis now turns.
3.3 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, 1973
The elaboration of an instrument to address the detrimental impacts of international trade in 
specimens and products from stocks of vulnerable species was initially mandated by the 
IUCN in 1963. Further impetus towards was generated at the 1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment, where the Stockholm Action Plan called for the development of a 
convention “on export, import and transit o f certain species of wild animals and wild 
plants”.89 CITES was opened for signature in March 1973 and entered into force on 1 July 
1975. It has since become one of the most widely-ratified multilateral environmental 
agreements to date with 175 current parties.90
As far as cetaceans are concerned, CITES represents a rather more specialised forum within 
the broader mosaic of pertinent regulatory regimes. CITES maintains a highly specific focus 
upon international trade; it is not therefore designed to provide an holistic framework to 
address the myriad threats to vulnerable species, as is the case with other regimes detailed in 
this thesis. Moreover, although cetaceans have attracted regulatory attention since the 
inception of the treaty CITES has historically been rather more preoccupied with endangered 
land mammals.91 Nevertheless, CITES is worthy of closer consideration in the specific 
context of cetaceans for two main reasons. Firstly, it provides a framework to regulate the 
increasingly significant issue of cross-border trade in live specimens -  almost exclusively 
involving small cetaceans -  for aquaria and other tourist-based industries such as therapeutic 
“dolphin contact” activities. Secondly, CITES has consistently demonstrated that it has an 
important role to play alongside the IWC in regulating the trade in whale meat and related 
products.
89 Recommendation 99 of the Stockholm Action Plan, reproduced at (1972) 11 International Legal Materials 
1416.
90 As of 31 August 2009.
91 See, for instance, M. J. Glennon, “Has International Law Failed the Elephant?” (1990) 84 American Journal 
of International Law 1; V. Kamo, “Protection of Endangered Gorillas and Chimpanzees in International Trade: 
Can CITES Help?” (1991) 14 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 989; P. Sand, “Whither 
CITES? The Evolution of a Trade Regime on the Borderland of Trade and Environment” (1997) 8 Journal o f  
Environmental Law 29.
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Despite these clear roles for CITES within the general framework for the protection of 
cetaceans, complications have nevertheless been encountered in the discharge of both 
functions. In the first instance, the capture and transport of live cetaceans -  including 
endangered species -  has proved problematic to regulate in practice. Indeed, a small but 
significant number of parties have become “hotspots” for export trade, due to the weak and 
permissive regulation of the activities of operators at the local level, for which CITES has 
experienced considerable difficulties in addressing. Secondly, since the establishment of the 
IWC moratorium on commercial whaling, aspects of this debate have become increasingly 
displaced to CITES. Although CITES has sought to maintain a close and harmonious 
relationship with the IWC, a number of parties have attempted to by-pass IWC restrictions on 
trade by seeking to dilute CITES protection for whale species and develop it as an alternative 
forum to promote the trade in whale meat and associated products.
3.3.1 Fundamental principles
As with most biodiversity-orientated treaties, CITES recognises the intrinsic value of wild 
flora and fauna and seeks to protect it for the benefit of present and future generations.94 To 
this end, CITES aims to facilitate international cooperation to safeguard against the over­
exploitation of “certain species” through trade.95 With regard to the concept of “trade” as 
recognised by CITES, two central issues ought to be observed at this preliminary stage. 
Firstly, as stated categorically in its preamble, CITES deals solely with “international” trade. 
CITES therefore has no application to the internal trade in cetaceans landed, processed and 
sold exclusively within the jurisdictional confines o f an individual party. This position 
thereby provides no mandate to regulate the development of markets in certain coastal areas 
for cetaceans that have either been directly hunted or taken as by-catches in national waters. 
Internal trade is accordingly a matter exclusively for domestic law or, alternatively, for a 
union or regional trade agreement affecting customs boundaries.96
92 On this issue generally see S. J. Fisher and R. R. Reeves, “Global Trade in Live Cetaceans: Implications for 
Conservation” (2005) 8 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 340.
93 A. Gillespie, “Forum Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC, CITES and the Management 
of Cetaceans” (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law 17.
94 Preamble.
95 Ibid.
96 Article XIV(3). In practice, this latter position will essentially apply only to Member States of the European 
Union which has, as discussed in Chapter VIII of this thesis, established a distinct Regulation addressing the 
trade in endangered species in order to give effect to the provisions o f CITES within the common market: 
Council Regulation 338/97/EC of 3 March 1997 on the protection o f species of wild fauna and flora by 
regulating trade therein [1997] Official Journal L61/1. As noted in Chapter VIII, specific provisions have been
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Secondly, four broad concepts of “trade” are recognised under CITES, namely export, re­
export, import and “introduction from the sea”,97 of which the latter is most ostensibly 
connected with the use of cetaceans and derivative products. While the first three components 
of trade are relatively self-explanatory,98 the concept of “introduction from the sea” has been 
a source of on-going controversy within CITES, especially given both the increasing volume 
of designations of marine species in recent years and the entry into force of the LOSC.99 
“Introduction from the sea” is defined within the Convention as “transportation into a State of 
specimens of any species which were taken in the marine environment not under the 
jurisdiction of any State”.100 This concept is interpreted by CITES with reference to the 
LOSC, although this remains controversial in some quarters, especially among those parties 
that have yet to endorse the LOSC regime.101
Under Article II, CITES operates by listing protected species upon one of three Appendices 
according to their individual conservation status. Under Article 11(1), Appendix I includes all 
species threatened with extinction which are or may be threatened by trade. Trade in these 
species is subject to “particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their 
survival and must only be authorised in exceptional circumstances”. At present twenty-one 
species of cetaceans are listed on Appendix I, predominantly the larger species of whales.
Appendix II addresses all species which “although not necessarily threatened with extinction 
may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in
introduced for the importation of cetacean products into the EU: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 348/81 of 20 
January 1981 on common rules for imports of whales or other cetacean products [1981] Official Journal L39/1. 
On the application of CITES generally under EU law see W. C. Bums and C. T. D. Mosedale, “European 
Implementation of CITES and the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Protection of Species of Wild Flora 
and Fauna” (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 389. Although the implications for 
the trade in cetaceans and cetacean products is likely to be minimal, some concerns have been raised by the 
capacity of a number o f more recent EU Member States to police the import o f CITES-listed species which, by 
virtue of the operation of the EU common market, will permit such items to be freely traded within the 
Community upon entry: R. Parry-Jones and A. Knapp (eds.) Country Profiles Compiled for the EU Wildlife 
Trade Enforcement Co-ordination Workshop, 25-27 October 2005 (London: DEFRA, 2005).
97 Article 1(c).
98 “Export” and “import” are not defined within CITES, while “re-export” is stated simply to constitute the 
“export of any specimen that has previously been imported”: Article 1(d).
99 E. Franckx, “The Protection of Biodiversity and Fisheries Management: Issues Raised by the Relationship 
between CITES and LOSC” in Freestone, Bames and Ong, “Progress and Prospects”, at 212-14.
100 Article 1(e).
101 For instance, the Turkish delegation has expressed dissatisfaction with this formulation as a non-party to the 
LOSC: Report o f the Fifty-Seventh Meeting o f the Standing Committee (Geneva: CITES, 2008), at 12. Turkey is 
a significant export state of small cetaceans, especially bottlenose dolphins.
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109order to avoid utilisation incompatible with their survival”. Additionally, species may be 
listed in Appendix II if  they do not fulfil this criterion, but nevertheless require protection in 
order to bring trade in such species under effective control. To date, West Greenland 
populations of minke whales, Black Sea bottlenose dolphins and “all species” of cetaceans 
not currently listed in Appendix I have been listed in Appendix II. Accordingly, Appendix III 
-  which permits parties to list additional species subject to national protection and requiring
1 OTthe cooperation of other parties to restrict trade -  has no practical application to cetaceans.
The cornerstone principle of CITES is that parties shall not trade in species listed in the 
Appendices “except in accordance with the provisions o f the present Convention”.104 To this 
end, the parties are to take “appropriate measures” to enforce CITES and prohibit trade in 
species in violation of the Convention, including legal penalties and the confiscation and 
repatriation of specimens.105
3.3.2 Institutional structure
CITES places a strong emphasis upon the establishment of national bodies to implement the 
Convention. Parties are required to designate national Management Authorities, which are 
charged with granting permits and certificates for the import and export of listed species, and 
Scientific Authorities, which are responsible for providing advice and guidance on the merit 
or otherwise of issuing such permits.106 Accordingly, the practical efficiency of CITES 
depends to a substantial extent upon the resources and powers allocated to such Authorities 
by the individual contracting parties.
On a central level CITES has developed an innovative institutional structure. The key forum 
established under CITES is the Conference of the Parties (COP), convened on a biennial
• 107 108basis and charged with reviewing the implementation of the Convention. Two key tasks 
of the COP may be considered to be of particular relevance to cetaceans. Firstly, the COP is 
charged with considering amendments to the CITES Appendices;109 this has given rise to
102 Article 11(2).
103 Article 11(3).
104 Article 11(4).
105 Article VIII(l).
106 Article IX.
107 Article XI(2).
108 Article XI(3).
109 Article XI(3)(b).
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considerable acrimony between the parties in the context of large whales. Secondly, the COP 
is to make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the Convention,110 primarily 
through the adoption of Resolutions and Decisions. A number of Resolutions pertinent to 
cetaceans have been adopted to shape CITES policies both towards stocks of whales and the 
IWC itself.
The COP is supported by a Standing Committee, which operates effectively as an 
intersessional advisory body; its functions include inter alia providing general policy and 
operational direction to the Secretariat, preparing draft Resolutions for the COP and 
coordinating other essential committees.111 Some consideration o f cetaceans has been 
undertaken within this forum, such as the status of dependent territories regarding the trade in 
whale products.112 Nevertheless, in recent years a rather more limited degree of attention has 
been focussed on cetaceans within the Standing Committee, as proceedings have been rather 
dominated by consideration of land mammals. The COP has also established separate 
specialist Committees to provide scientific and expert technical advices on plants and animals 
respectively. The Animals Committee exercises an advisory role in reviewing proposed 
amendments to the CITES Appendices, as well as other trade-related issues, and can 
undertake periodic reviews of CITES-listed species.113 In this capacity, the Animals 
Committee may issue Recommendations to the COP and to the parties themselves; for 
instance, most recently Denmark and Canada were subject to a Recommendation regarding 
trade in narwhal products.114
The institutional structure of CITES is completed by a Secretariat, primarily tasked with 
providing administrative support, but also endowed with the power to make 
recommendations for the further implementation of the Convention and to “invite the 
attention of the Parties to any matter pertaining to the aims of the present Convention”.115 
These broad powers have not proved uncontroversial, and concerns have been raised that the 
Secretariat has a history of acting unilaterally and may be overly reliant upon donations from
110 Article XI(3)(e).
111 Resolution Conf. 11.1: Establishment of Committees; Annex 1.
112 Report of the Fiftieth Meeting o f the Standing Committee (Geneva: CITES, 2004), at 24.
113 Resolution Conf. 11.1, Annex 2.
114 Report o f the Fifty-First Meeting o f the Standing Committee (Geneva: CITES, 2004), at 6.
115 Article XII.
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hunting interests, especially in relation to the ivory trade.116 In the context of cetaceans, the 
Secretariat has also been criticised for its apparent willingness to enter into political bargains 
with certain key pro-whaling parties, in which it was seemingly prepared to endorse the 
official downlisting of particular species of whales from Appendix I to Appendix II in 
exchange for “zero quota” assurances on minke whales.117 The Secretariat swiftly withdrew 
these comments in response to criticism by a number of parties, but such institutional 
difficulties are somewhat indicative of the controversy generated over the listing criteria for 
whales.
3.4 CITES and the trade in live specimens of cetaceans
The trade in live specimens of cetaceans is considered to have commenced in earnest in the 
1960s, driven primarily by the popularity of charismatic marine mammals in aquaria and 
zoos.118 The anthropogenic removal of individuals from stocks of cetaceans for the purpose 
of international trade is considered to pose a pressing conservation threat to particular 
species. Indeed, the IUCN Cetacean Specialist Group deems such removals as analogous to 
incidental or directed killing, given that “animals brought into captivity (or killed during 
capture operations) are no longer available to help maintain their natural populations”.119
The trade in live specimens is almost exclusively confined to smaller species -  for instance 
the IUCN refers solely to “dolphins” in its appraisal of the issue.120 Bottlenose dolphins are 
by some distance the most common subject of trade within the present-day industry.121 
Accordingly, depending on local population levels, the trade in live specimens constitutes a 
varying degree of risk to different stocks. Indeed, even the removal of small numbers of 
animals from endangered stocks that can ill-afford individual losses may have a substantial 
impact upon the ability of the population in question to regenerate. Accordingly, concerns 
have been raised over the impact of trade on particular species, including critically
116 R. Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty and Compliance (London: 
Earthscan, 2002), at 258-66.
117 Ibid., at 264. The controversy was raised by a draft document issued in advance of the Eleventh COP -  a 
meeting which ultimately resulted in the further clarification o f the CITES position on cetaceans: Notification to 
the Parties No. 1999/97, “Provisional Assessments by the Secretariat of Amendment Proposals”.
118 Fisher and Reeves, “Global Trade in Cetaceans”, at 315-16.
119 R. R. Reeves, B. D. Smith, E. A. Crespo and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises: 
2002-2010 Conservation Action Plan for the World’s Cetaceans (Gland: IUCN, 2003), at 17.
120 Ibid.
121 Fisher and Reeves, “Global Trade in Cetaceans”, at 323-4.
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endangered stocks of river dolphins,122 bottlenose dolphins and the “substantial, and growing, 
demand” for Indo-Pacific hump-backed dolphins for aquaria throughout southern Asia.
As noted above, all species of cetaceans have been listed on either Appendix I or II of 
CITES, and therefore qualify for protective measures under the Convention to mitigate the 
potential adverse impacts of international trade. The export of Appendix I species requires the 
prior grant and presentation of an export permit, which should be issued only where the 
national Scientific Authority has advised that export will be not be detrimental to the survival 
of the species in question, and the Management Authority is satisfied that the specimen was 
not obtained in contravention of national laws, that live specimens will be prepared and 
shipped in a manner as to minimise the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment, 
and that an import permit has been granted.124 Importation of an Appendix I species is also 
conditional upon the finding that it is not detrimental to the survival of the species; that the 
Scientific Authority of the importing state is satisfied that the recipient of a live specimen in 
suitably equipped to house and care for it; and that the Management Authority is satisfied that
125the specimen is not to be used for “primarily commercial purposes”.
Of particular reference to Appendix I cetaceans is the application o f Article 111(5), which 
addresses the introduction from the sea of such species. This provision perhaps relates less to 
orthodox “international” trade, in the sense that a particular species is bartered between two 
separate CITES parties -  although such a position would also be covered by the Convention 
within the standard import-export provisions. Instead, it operates to address the capture of 
specimens in areas beyond national jurisdiction -  and technically not owned by any state -  
and the subsequent landing of that specimen within a CITES party, which might not 
otherwise have been caught by the provisions of the Convention if  based on a simple model 
of importation and export between the individual parties.
122 Reeves et al., “Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises”, at 43.
123 Ibid., at 47.
124 Article 111(2).
125 Article 111(3). This concept is defined as an activity undertaken “to obtain economic benefit, including profit 
(whether in cash or in kind) and is directed toward resale, exchange, provision of a service or other form of 
economic use or benefit”: Resolution Conf. 5.10: Definition of “primarily commercial purposes”. Nevertheless, 
this remains a rather amorphous term and the Resolution acknowledges that it “may be interpreted by the Parties 
in different ways”.
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The regulation of trade in Appendix II species offers a considerably lighter touch to that in 
relation to Appendix I species. Regarding exports, the CITES criteria is materially similar to 
that for Appendix I species, except a permit may be granted without the need to produce a 
corresponding import permit.126 Perhaps more significantly, for the introduction from the sea 
of Appendix II species there is no requirement that such specimens are not to be used for 
“primarily commercial purposes”, with the state of introduction obliged only to demonstrate 
that receipt of the specimen is not detrimental to the survival of the species and that the
127necessary care and accommodation will be provided for live specimens.
Despite the application of Appendices I and II, CITES faces challenges in respect of its 
ability to effectively regulate the trade in live specimens of cetaceans, with particular 
reference to no-detriment findings and to animal welfare standards during capture and 
transportation.
3.4.1 No-detriment findings
“No-detriment” findings have provided considerable practical difficulties in the discharge of 
CITES commitments. The no-detriment requirement, or an equivalent regime, is considered 
by the IUCN to constitute a vital component of any supervisory system for the trade in 
cetaceans, which advises against removals “unless that specific population has been assessed 
and it has been determined that a certain amount of culling can be allowed without reducing
• i o o
the population’s long-term viability or compromising its role in the ecosystem”.
Given the widespread uncertainty that surrounds the state of scientific knowledge of 
population numbers and conservation status of many species of cetaceans, it is in many 
instances extremely difficult to provide an accurate no-detriment finding. Indeed, the most
190recent version of the IUCN Red List, published in 2008, listed over forty species of 
cetaceans as “data deficient”, including commonly traded species such as the Indo-Pacific 
bottlenose dolphin. That the data concerning the global status of a particular species are 
considered deficient need not necessarily provide an insurmountable impediment to trade 
under CITES. However, it is nonetheless clear that under such circumstances, the national
126 Article IV(2).
127 Article IV(6).
128 Reeves et al., “Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises”, at 17.
129 Reproduced on-line at www.iucnredlist.org (last visited 31 August 2009).
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Scientific Authority should have credible and accurate information to demonstrate objectively 
that the prospective removals will not harm the local stock or population, from which a no­
detriment finding could be legitimately granted.
While the concept of “no-detriment” itself is not explicitly defined within the Convention, the 
parties have established that “the findings and advice of the Scientific Authority of the 
country of export be based on the scientific review of available information on the population 
status, distribution, population trend, harvest and other biological and ecological factors, as
1 30appropriate, and trade information relating to the species concerned”. However, it has been
observed with concern that “under-resourced, understaffed and, in some cases, non-existent
or marginalized Scientific Authorities have long undermined the implementation of
CITES”.131 The non-designation of Scientific Authorities has been identified by the COP as a
substantial impediment to the correct operation o f CITES, given that the granting of permits
by Management Authorities without an appropriate independent scientific appraisal
“constitutes a lack of compliance with the provisions of the Convention and seriously
1 ^
undermines species conservation”.
Moreover, where the requisite national institutions have been established, concerns have been 
raised that no-detriment findings have been issued on a relatively superficial basis, with little 
meaningful data and minimal research, meaning that some designations may constitute little 
more than a “rubber-stamping” exercise. Indeed, at the most recent meeting of the Animals 
Committee, Israel called for the Solomon Islands population of Indo-Pacific bottlenose 
dolphins to be included in the CITES review o f significant trade, in a bid to introduce 
stronger controls over the routine exportation o f considerable numbers of individual animals
» • 133from a population of highly uncertain numerical and conservation status. Supporting 
evidence for the Israeli submission noted that “[tjhere have been no published dedicated 
scientific surveys of the distribution and abundance o f Tursiops aduncus in the Solomon
130 Resolution Conf. 10.3: Designation and Role o f the Scientific Authorities. It is envisaged by the IUCN that 
such a process in relation to cetaceans is highly rigorous and should also be subject to subsequent independent 
peer-review: “[s]uch an assessment, including delineation of stock boundaries, abundance, reproductive 
potential, mortality, and status (trend) cannot be achieved quickly or inexpensively, and the results should be 
reviewed by an independent group of scientists before any captures are made”: Reeves et al., “Dolphins, Whales 
and Porpoises”, at 17.
131 Reeve, “Policing International Trade”, at 152.
132 Resolution Conf. 10.3.
133 Selection o f the Solomon Islands Population o/Tursiops Aduncus for Inclusion in the Review o f Significant 
Trade', Document 8.5.1 presented at the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Animals Committee, April 2008 
(reproduced on-line at www.cites.org; last visited 31 August 2009).
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Islands. This means it is impossible to evaluate the overall significance of the removal of 
these individuals from the wild”.134 Accordingly, with little overall knowledge of the local 
population it would appear that the national Scientific Authority would be poorly placed to 
make a meaningful no-detriment finding, hence the validity of such permits might be 
considered somewhat questionable. While the Israeli submission was ultimately
withdrawn,135 a subsequent review o f the Solomon Islands stock of Indo-Pacific bottlenose
1dolphins suggested strongly that further research on population levels was necessary, 
although plans nevertheless remain in force to export up to 100 individuals per year.
Some limited scope exists to address these difficulties through the activities of the importing 
state. For Appendix I cetaceans, there is a clear obligation for the importing authority to also
1 "XI __render a no-detriment finding prior to the grant of an import permit. Therefore the 
possibility exists for an importing state to reject a permit application and subsequently 
confiscate and repatriate the specimen under the powers provided by Article VIII -  although 
the practical and welfare benefits to the individual specimen in question are somewhat less 
apparent. For Appendix II cetaceans the regulatory onus is placed firmly upon the exporting 
state, since the importing state is only required by CITES to demand the prior production of a
11Svalid export certificate. An importing party with concerns over the ecological provenance
of a particular specimen would thereby presumably be required to rely upon relevant powers
110under national law -  if, indeed, they exist -  to address this situation.
Nevertheless, CITES prescribes little obligation for a collaborative relationship between the 
states of origin and destination of a particular specimen -  especially if  (like the majority of 
cetaceans) it is listed on Appendix II o f the Convention. Likewise, there is neither clarity nor 
uniformity of practice as to how disputes over the validity of an export permit for cetaceans
134 Ibid., at 4.
135 Report o f the Twenty-Third Meeting o f the Animals Committee (Geneva: CITES, 2008), at 16.
136 R. R. Reeves and R. L. Brownell, Jr., Indo-Pacific Bottlenose Dolphin Assessment Workshop Report: 
Solomon Islands Case Study o/Tursiops aduncus. Occasional Paper o f  the Species Survival Commission No. 40 
(Gland: IUCN, 2009). The authors concluded that for export activities to continue at the level sanctioned by the 
national Scientific Authority, local population levels would need to be at between 5000 to 10,000 individuals, 
although the data currently available indicated that abundance is “well below 5000”: at 33.
137 Article IV(2)(a).
138 Article IV(4). The rationale behind this appears to be that the issue o f a valid permit or certificate “serves as a 
certification scheme for assuring that trade is not detrimental to the survival of the species in question”: 
Resolution Conf. 13.3: Permits and Certificates.
139 Article XIV(l) permits the elaboration of stricter domestic measures than are provided under CITES, thereby 
providing in principle a regulatory basis for the importing state to impose a high standard of diligence in this 
respect.
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are to proceed.140 The concept of no-detriment findings is the subject of on-going 
consideration, pending an international expert workshop to further elaborate both the capacity 
and practice of national Scientific Authorities in this regard.141 Accordingly, it is to be hoped 
that effective and informative guiding principles can be developed in a timely fashion to 
address many of these difficulties, otherwise the CITES regulation of live trade will be 
heavily undermined if unsustainable capture and harvesting practices remain entrenched 
within the system.
3.4.2 Animal welfare issues
A further challenge to the effective regulation of live trade is the highly variable nature of 
national practices, which may have particular implications for animal welfare considerations 
in respect of the capture and transportation of live specimens. For instance, the monitoring of 
live-capture programmes ranges from strict controls exercised over US capture fisheries,142 to 
rather more ad hoc and illusory supervision experienced in other jurisdictions.143 Moreover, 
certain hotspots of activity for live-capture operations can be identified and, as with the trade 
in other species subject to global conservation concern, “there seems to be a close correlation 
between local economic desperation (often as a result of civil strife, poorly managed resource 
exploitation, or geographic/climatic isolation) and the level of interest in selling cetaceans for 
profit”.144 Accordingly, under such circumstances concerns may be raised that the monitoring 
and regulation of these activities is likely to be even more superficial. Despite these concerns, 
however, there appears at present to be minimal central guidance on live-capture issues -  
either within CITES or under the auspices of any other pertinent expert forum -  which serves 
to contribute further to the current variability in national standards.
CITES is silent on the issue of acquisition of specimens for export purposes, beyond a 
general requirement for national Management Authorities to ensure that such specimens are 
“not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and
140 Fisher and Reeves, “Global Trade in Live Cetaceans”, at 335 (observing that the matter of where the burden 
of proof should lie in such instances is highly uncertain).
141 Decision 14.49, adopted at the Fourteenth COP.
142 G. P. Scott, “Management-Orientated Research of Bottlenose Dolphins by the Southeast Fisheries Center” in 
S. Leatherwood and R. R. Reeves, The Bottlenose Dolphin (San Diego: Academic Press, 1990), at 623.
143 For instance, concerns have been raised over the lack o f regulation in Mexican and Cuban dolphin-capture 
industries: Reeves et al., “Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises”, at 72.
144 Fisher and Reeves, “Global Trade in Live Cetaceans”, at 337. The authors identify Cuba, Russia, Ukraine, 
Cambodia and Thailand as particular exponents of the export trade: at 336-38.
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flora”.145 There is therefore little obligation beyond the enforcement of standards voluntarily 
developed under national law to address welfare issues during live capture, nor any 
Convention-based mandate to develop or improve domestic standards. Moreover, there does 
not appear to have been any elaboration within COP Resolutions of the role of Management 
Authorities in this respect. As a result, unless and until some form of guidance is provided or 
endorsed by the CITES institutions, the high degree of national variability in live capture 
regulation currently experienced would appear likely to continue.
In contrast to the position regarding live-capture, there is significantly greater scope under 
CITES for the regulation of the physical transportation of live specimens. Indeed, there is a 
clear acknowledgement within the Convention that the national Management Authority of an 
exporting state must verify that “any living specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to 
minimize the risk of injury, damage to heath or cruel treatment”.146 The on-going 
development of standards for the transportation of live specimens has long occupied a 
significant position on the CITES agenda, with Guidelines for Transport and Preparation for 
Shipment of Live Wild Animals and Plants adopted at the Second COP in 1979. In more 
recent years, a Working Group on the Transport of Live Animals has been established to 
address the practical difficulties inherent in the transit o f live specimens. In this regard, 
mindful of the need to avoid a costly duplication or conflict of regulatory standards, CITES 
has operated less as a forum through which to elaborate technical measures, opting instead to 
endorse indicative guidance and models of best practice advanced by specialist transportation 
organisations.
CITES has emphasised the value of the Live Animals Regulations of the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), with the parties recommended to take “suitable measures” in 
order to promote the “full and effective use” by national Management Authorities of these 
standards.147 Given that the IATA Guidelines relate solely to air transportation, the parties 
have been directed to the Guidelines developed by the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE) in respect of carriage by land and sea.148 Nevertheless, the pertinent CITES 
Resolutions are articulated in hortatory and permissive terms, with parties “recommended”
145 Article III(2)(b) in respect of Appendix I species and Article IV(2)(b) in respect of Appendix II species.
146 Article III(2)(c) in respect of Appendix I species and Article IV(2)(c) in respect of Appendix II species. 
Nevertheless, these provisions operate ex post facto to any live-capture operation and are again silent on welfare 
issues during the acquisition of the specimen.
147 Resolution Conf. 10.21: Transport of Live Specimens.
148 Decision 14.58, adopted at the Fourteenth COP.
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and “encouraged” to adhere to these standards.149 Accordingly, national practices for the 
transportation of live specimens of cetaceans are often highly variable.150 The further 
aggregation and consolidation of transportation standards therefore remains a mid- to long­
term project within the Animals Committee.151 In the meantime, however, it appears that the 
most effective method of improving transportation conditions for live specimens of cetaceans 
may be through unilateral action by individual parties to ban imports from certain countries 
with poor welfare records until such standards improve, with the recent blacklisting of
1 59Russian exporters by the Argentinean authorities a pertinent example of this practice.
3.5 CITES and the trade in whale products
Notwithstanding the problems raised by live specimens, the greatest degree of controversy 
encountered under the auspices of CITES in relation to cetaceans concerns the trade in whale 
meat and associated products. CITES is the specialist global forum governing the trade in 
endangered and vulnerable species and, with all species of cetaceans having been listed in its 
Appendices, the Convention clearly has a key role to play within the wider regulation of the 
commercial exploitation of whale stocks. CITES policies towards whales are therefore of 
significant interest to the IWC and the importance of a strong cooperative relationship 
between the two fora has been repeatedly expressed by both regimes. To date, CITES has 
consistently maintained a strong degree of solidarity with pertinent IWC policies in respect of 
whales. Accordingly, the controversy associated with the present IWC position on 
commercial hunting has, to an extent, been transplanted to the various CITES institutions.
To date, the stated policy of the COP to CITES has been to guarantee Appendix I protection 
for species of whales subject to the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling, based on the 
advice of the IWC Scientific Committee, while negotiations towards the conclusion of the
149 Ibid.
150 For instance, Fisher and Reeves observe that Russian practice -  one of the key export jurisdictions for 
bottlenose dolphins -  often differs in a number of key respects to the IATA air transportation Guidelines: 
“Global Trade in Live Cetaceans”, at 321.
151 Decision 14.59, adopted at the Fourteenth COP.
152 Notification to the Parties No. 201/029 of 18 May 2001 -  Argentina: Dolphin Imports. Here, Argentina 
suspended imports of bottlenose dolphins from Russia until further notice, after two individuals out of a 
consignment of five animals were found to be dead on arrival. In addition to national bans, the impact of adverse 
publicity generated by poor animal welfare practices has also led some commercial carriers to refuse cargoes of 
live animals, with the aeronautical company Lufthansa taking this action following the Argentinean dolphins 
incident: Fisher and Reeves, “Global Trade in Live Cetaceans”, at 321. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether such 
actions by leading commercial carriers induce exporters to improve their practices or merely displaces 
transportation trade to less rigorous operators.
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RMS remain on-going. However, political difficulties within the IWC has led a number of 
pro-whaling states to explore alternative regulatory avenues to by-pass the current restrictions 
under the ICRW, hence a series of attempts have been made to downscale CITES protection. 
A number of parties have questioned the continued Appendix I status of particular species, 
arguing that such protection may not be merited on a strict application of the CITES criteria. 
These contentions have raised the possibility o f the downlisting of certain species, which 
would thereby provide an increased scope for trade in whale products under CITES. Difficult 
questions have arisen concerning the inter-relationship between the trade convention and the 
ICRW, as well as CITES policies regarding protected species of whales.
Since its inception, the need for a close and cooperative working relationship with other 
pertinent regimes has been clearly appreciated under CITES. To this end, a series of 
provisions relating to the effect of international treaties was envisaged throughout the 
negotiation stage.153 The CITES text displays considerable deference to both pre-existing and 
subsequent treaties specifically dealing with “aspects of trade, taking, possession or 
transportation of specimens”,154 to which the ICRW -  as a treaty addressing the “taking” of 
species of cetaceans, as well as “trade” issues -  is clearly relevant.
Moreover, a specific conflict clause is advanced in respect of pre-existing regimes pertaining 
to “marine species included in Appendix II”, for which a CITES party that is a party also to 
such a treaty “shall be relieved of the obligations imposed on it under the provisions of the 
present Convention with respect to trade in specimens of species included in Appendix II that 
are taken by ships registered in that State and in accordance with the provisions of such other 
treaty, convention or international agreement”.155 This deferential position in the marine 
context appears primarily to be a quid pro quo during the CITES negotiations, in which a 
number of delegates expressed concerns over potential overlap and conflict with, inter alia, 
the ICRW.156
153 On this issue generally, see Franckx, “Biodiversity and Fisheries Management”, at 223-25.
154 Article XIV(2). The full text of this provision states, “[t]he provisions o f the present Convention shall in no 
way affect the provisions of any domestic measures or the obligations o f Parties deriving from any treaty, 
convention, or international agreement relating to other aspects of trade, taking, possession or transport of 
specimens which is in force or subsequently may enter into force for any Party including any measure pertaining 
to the Customs, public health, veterinary or plant quarantine fields”.
155 Article XIV(4).
156 Indeed, Franckx observes that the Japanese delegation was particularly keen to avoid conflict with ICRW 
obligations: “Biodiversity and Fisheries Management”, at 224. At the negotiation stage a number of delegations
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The possibility of conflict between CITES and the ICRW was also considered by the IWC at 
the time of the conclusion of the fledgling trade convention.157 Indeed, throughout the early 
years of the operation of CITES, the IWC was itself targeting aspects of trade within the 
commercial whaling industry. As part of a wider campaign to promote further adherence to 
the ICRW standards, the IWC in 1978 noted the desirability of using “each international 
opportunity to stop the taking and to ban trade in those species and stocks of whales which 
receive total protection” and accordingly requested CITES at its impending Second COP to 
“take all possible measures to support the IWC ban on commercial whaling for certain 
species and stocks of whales as provided in the Schedule of the ICRW”.
In response to the IWC Resolution, cetaceans occupied a prominent position upon the agenda 
of the Second COP to CITES, convened in 1979. Prior to the Second COP, a series of 
threatened species of whales had been afforded protection under the auspices of CITES: in 
1975 blue, humpback, grey, right and bowhead whales were listed on Appendix I, while in 
1977 stocks of fin and sei whales were added to Appendix II.159 The substantial attention 
focussed on cetaceans at the Second COP to CITES had two key outcomes. In the first 
instance, all species of cetaceans that had not been previously protected through designation 
upon Appendix I were listed on Appendix II to the Convention. Secondly, the CITES parties 
adopted three Resolutions outlining the policies of the trade convention vis-a-vis whales and 
its relationship with the IWC.
supported the insertion of a further Appendix to CITES, listing pertinent multilateral agreements in this regard, 
but this proposed adjunct to the convention was ultimately omitted from the final text.
157 Indeed, at the Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the IWC, convened in 1973, the Technical Committee noted 
the possibility of “conflict between decisions taken by the Commission on the taking of certain species of 
whales and action taken under the provisions of this convention on the capture of whales or trading in the 
products of such whales”, while individual Commissioners were urged to communicate this issue to their 
governments in order to facilitate reservations to CITES on this basis: Twenty-Third Report o f the International 
Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1975), at 33. Nevertheless, a more conciliatory line was taken at the 
Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting o f the IWC in 1976, at which the IWC offered to act as the official advisor to 
CITES on cetaceans: Twenty-Sixth Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1978), 
at 23.
158 Resolution to the CITES, adopted at the Special Meeting of the IWC in 1978. Nevertheless, a degree of 
wariness remained towards the nascent CITES regime within the IWC at this juncture, with a number of parties 
having “expressed their views on the difficulties o f equating the IWC stock management categories with the 
CITES classifications and questioned what the Resolution might achieve”: Twenty-Eighth Report o f the 
International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1980), at 5.
159 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 337.
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The CITES parties noted that the IWC had in recent years taken “increasingly vigorous 
action” for the conservation of whales and that “any commercial utilisation of species and 
stocks protected by the IWC jeopardizes their continued existence”, thereby specifying that 
trade in whale products should be subject to “particularly strict regulation”.160 Recognising 
that the trade in whale products “cannot be controlled effectively by the IWC alone”, the 
parties agreed not to issue any import or export permit, or certificate for the introduction from 
the sea, for primarily commercial purposes of any species of whale protected under the 
ICRW.161 Moreover the desirability of providing the “maximum protection possible” for 
cetaceans listed in the Appendices was noted, with parties to “use their best endeavours to 
apply their responsibilities under the Convention in relation to cetaceans”.162 The COP 
further called upon CITES parties “which do not currently adhere to” the ICRW to do so.163
At the Third and Fourth COPs to CITES, proposals were successfully adopted to upgrade the 
status of several species of whales to Appendix 1.164At the Third COP, “the need for special 
attention to the conservation of whales and other cetaceans” was reaffirmed.165 Sperm, sei 
and fin whales were successfully up-listed, a controversial move considering that such 
species now qualified for a greater degree of protection under CITES than the ICRW itself,166 
thereby prompting calls for further restrictions on commercial hunting within the IWC. 
Consequently, the pace of developments in respect of great whales within CITES meant that 
the IWC began to be increasingly dragged on the coat-tails of the trade convention. Indeed, as 
Bimie observes, “the entry into force of the CITES Convention in 1975 and the extension of 
its annexes began to have a considerable effect on the voting patterns and other practices of
160 Resolution Conf. 2.9: Trade in Certain Species and Stocks o f Whales Protected by the International Whaling 
Commission from Commercial Whaling.
161 Ibid.
162 Resolution Conf. 2.8: Introduction from the Sea.
163 Resolution Conf. 2.7: Relationship with the International Whaling Commission.
164 Gillespie, “Forum Shopping”, at 221.
165 Resolution Conf. 3.13: Trade in Whale Products. The Resolution further reiterated the call for adherence to 
the ICRW and to ensure that documentation requirements under Articles IV and XIV were observed. A series of 
trade-related Resolutions had been adopted by the IWC at Meetings convened in the intervening period between 
the Second and Third COP to CITES: Resolution on Adherence of Peru to the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (Resolution adopted at the Special Meeting of the IWC in 1979); Resolution 1979-9: 
Resolution on Importation of Whale Products From, Export o f Equipment to, and Prohibition of Whaling by 
Non-Member Countries (both adopted at the Thirty-First Annual Meeting in 1979); Resolution 1980-6: 
Resolution Aimed at Discouraging Whaling Operations outside IWC Regulations; Resolution 1980-7: 
Resolution Establishing a Working Group on non-IWC Whaling. Regarding this latter initiative, it was 
“expected that the Working Group would cooperate fully” with CITES: Twenty-Ninth Report o f the 
International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1981), at 24.
166 Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 337; see also A. D ’Amato and S. K. Chopra, “Whales: Their Emerging 
Right to Life” (1991) 85 American Journal o f International Law 21, at 43.
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certain members of the IWC that still traded in whales and whale products”.167 Further 
amendments to the CITES Appendices were made at the Fourth COP, convened after the 
IWC’s decision to impose a moratorium on commercial hunting. In this respect, Bryde’s, 
beaked, pygmy and most stocks of minke whales were up-listed to Appendix I, with an 
exemption for Western Greenland stocks of minke whales in order to facilitate hunting and
1 AXtrade in products by aboriginal users as envisaged by the IWC, with the up-listing formally 
entering into effect concurrent with the commencement of the IWC moratorium.
Following the Fourth COP and the entry into effect of the IWC moratorium on commercial 
whaling, cetaceans received minimal attention within CITES until the Ninth COP, convened 
at Fort Lauderdale, USA, in 1994. Two significant developments at the Ninth COP 
substantively reopened the debate over the trade in Appendix I species of whales within 
CITES. The first attempt to downlist particular species of whales from Appendix I to 
Appendix II was made at this COP. Secondly, and of enduring importance in the current 
debate over whale protection under CITES, the criteria for the listing of species within the 
Convention’s Appendices were extensively revised.
Amendments to Appendices I and II may be proposed by any party to CITES and will be 
adopted if it secures the votes of a two-thirds majority of the parties present and voting.169 
Specific considerations apply in the case of marine species, for which the Secretariat is 
obliged to “consult inter-governmental bodies having a function in relation to those species 
especially with a view to obtaining scientific data these bodies may be able to provide and to 
ensuring co-ordination with any conservation measures enforced by such bodies”.170 In the 
specific context of cetaceans, this obligation is interpreted with reference to the IWC 
Scientific Committee.
At the Tenth COP in 1997, the new “Fort Lauderdale Criteria” adopted at the Ninth COP 
were applied for the first time to proposals for the amendment of the CITES Appendices. The
167 P. W. Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 405. In this respect, D’Amato and Chopra consider the IWC to 
have been “outflanked” by the trade convention, to which it responded “by moving ever closer to the CITES 
position”: “Emerging Right”, at 43.
168 J. Bemey, “CITES and International Trade in Whale Products” in Petursdottir, “Whaling in the North 
Atlantic”, at 105. Accordingly, the West Greenland stock of minke whales has continued to remain on Appendix 
II and, as noted above, under Article XIV(4) of the convention, trade in such products by the CITES parties is 
subject in practice to the regulatory regime prescribed under the ICRW.
169 Article XV(l)(b).
170 Article XV(2)(b).
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initial criteria for species listings,171 adopted at the First COP, had been widely criticised as 
inflexible172 and of limited practical utility.173 Particular concerns were raised the context of 
the ivory trade, leading to ideological clashes over whether CITES was intended to entrench 
preservationist principles in respect of certain species, or promote the “sustainable use” of 
threatened species. A number of states argued acted that the Beme Criteria acted as a barrier 
to the development of national biological resources, imposed by fellow parties far removed 
from the direct socio-economic consequences of such decisions.174 Accordingly, at the Ninth 
COP the Beme Criteria was substantively revisited and replaced with the Fort Lauderdale 
Criteria.175
The Fort Lauderdale Criteria recognised the need to adopt “appropriate criteria” in order to 
secure the “proper” implementation of Article II of the Convention. Moreover, in the specific 
case of marine species, the new criteria acknowledged that the CITES Secretariat should 
consult intergovernmental bodies having a function towards such species which, in the case 
of cetaceans and the trade in whale products, would clearly encompass the Scientific 
Committee of the IWC. The parties agreed that decisions to amend the CITES Appendices 
ought to be subject to a precautionary approach and “founded on sound and relevant scientific 
information, take into account socio-economic factors, and meet agreed biological and trade
1 7f\criteria for such amendments”.
171 Resolution Conf. 1.1: Criteria for the Addition of Species and Other Taxa to Appendices I and II and for the 
Transfer of Species and Other Taxa from Appendix II to Appendix I [hereinafter the “Beme Criteria”]. For an 
overview of the Beme Criteria in operation see Anonymous, “The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses 
and Limits of Science in International Conservation Decision Making” (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 1769, 
at 1775-79.
172 P. Matthews, “Problems Related to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species” (1996) 45 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 421, at 422-24.
173 K. Eldridge, “Whale for Sale? New Developments in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora” (1995) 24 Georgia Journal o f International and Comparative Law 549, at 
559).
174 For a critical discussion of the equitability of this position see T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law 
and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 409-12. On these developments generally see R. 
Bonner, “Western Conservation Groups and the Ivory Ban Wagon” in M. M. R. Freeman and U. P. Kreuter, 
Elephants and Whales: Resources fo r Whom? (Basel: Gordon and Breach, 1994), at 59. Although the acrimony 
over the Beme Criteria was played out within CITES almost exclusively in the context of the ivory trade, 
considerable parallels exist in the arguments advanced in the modem day meetings o f CITES and the IWC by 
pro-consumptive states in respect o f whales.
175 Resolution Conf. 9.24: Criteria for the Amendment of Appendices I and II. For an overview of this process 
see A. G. Blundell and B. D. Rodan, “Confusing Controversy with Failure: The Ft. Lauderdale Listing Criteria 
and CITES Appendix I and II Species Proposals” (2001) 4 Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 35
116 Ibid.
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The change in focus at the Ninth COP did not lead to a wholesale adjustment in policy 
towards whales, as a Norwegian proposal to downlist minke whales to Appendix II was 
defeated. Furthermore, a Resolution against the trade in whale meat was adopted by the COP, 
noting concerns that “the international trade in meat and other products of whales is lacking 
adequate international monitoring or control” and further affirming that “any illegal trade in
I nn
Appendix-I whale specimens undermines the effectiveness of both the IWC and CITES”. 
Accordingly the COP reiterated its commitment to a close working relationship with the IWC 
and urged the parties to address the illegal trade in whale meat and investigate the provenance 
of such products.
Between the Ninth COP and to CITES and the Tenth COP, convened in 1997, trade issues 
returned to prominence within the IWC, with the adoption of Resolutions addressing both the
178relationship with the trade convention and to improve the regulation of the trade in
1 n q
stockpiled products, as well as Resolutions on specific stocks of minke whales, including
i on
aspects of trade, directed at Norway. Meanwhile, at the Tenth COP to CITES, proposals to 
downlist whale species were tabled by Japan and Norway. Although both proposals were 
ultimately defeated, the Norwegian motion to downlist stocks of minke whales secured more 
votes in favour than against, although it fell short of the two-thirds majority required under 
Article XV(l)(b) of the Convention.
177 Resolution Conf. 9.12: Illegal Trade in Whale Meat.
178 Resolution 1994-7: Resolution on International Trade in Whale Meat and Products, which reiterated the 
desire of the IWC to “use each international opportunity to ban trade in those species and stocks of whales that 
receive total protection from commercial whaling” and called on the parties to ensure the strict enforcement of 
obligations under both the ICRW and CITES, as well as reinforcing the need for whale meat obtained through 
lethal research to be restricted solely to domestic markets.
179 Resolution 1995-6: Resolution on Improving Mechanisms to Prevent Illegal Trade in Whale Meat; 
Resolution 1996-3: Resolution on Improving Mechanisms to Restrict Trade and Prevent Illegal Trade in Whale 
Meat, which urged the parties “to continue to support IWC recommendations and CITES obligations through 
increased controls to prevent any further illegal whale meat trade activities and to take appropriate action against 
offenders”; Resolution 1997-2: Resolution on Improved Monitoring of Whale Product Stockpiles. At this 
juncture, a proposed Resolution by Japan for the IWC for the IWC Scientific Committee to review the 
effectiveness of the inclusion o f relevant species of cetaceans upon the CITES Appendices was defeated: Forty- 
Sixth Report o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1996), at 34.
180 Resolution 1996-5: Resolution on Northeast Atlantic Minke Whales; Resolution 1997-3: Resolution on 
Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales. The latter Resolution noted “attempts to smuggle products of the 
Norwegian hunt into the markets o f other countries, which highlight the need to establish a transparent 
supervision and control scheme so that commercial harvests can be monitored through the retail market”. While 
the control scheme envisaged in the Resolution was undoubtedly a helpful proposal, it may be suggested that the 
attempts at smuggling noted in somewhat dramatic fashion appear in fact to refer to an isolated individual 
misdemeanour perpetrated in 1993: C. Raymakers, Monitoring Progress in Norway’s Development o f a DNA 
Register as Part o f its Domestic Management System for Whale Meat, Investigating Local Whale Meat Trade, 
and Investigating Reports o f Illegal Trade in Blubber (Cambridge: TRAFFIC, 2001), at 14.
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At the Eleventh COP to CITES, convened in 2000, the trade in whale meat and associated 
products received substantial attention and further raised concerns within the COP that the 
political difficulties encountered within the IWC might become an increasing distraction 
within the various CITES institutions. The Eleventh COP was preceded by a Resolution 
adopted by the IWC in 1999, reiterating the need for a close and mutually cooperative 
relationship between the two organisations, while also asserting the expertise of the IWC as a 
forum for whale management.181 Indeed, while rather strikingly accepting responsibility for 
“the global demise of whale stocks”, the IWC sought to reaffirm its position as “the 
universally recognised competent international organisation for the management of whale 
stocks”, with a firm reminder to ICRW parties with aspirations to downlist certain species 
within the CITES Appendices that the RMS had not yet been concluded and that a zero catch 
limit for commercial whaling remained in effect. Nevertheless, the wording o f Resolution 
1999-6 did little to discourage downlisting proposals from Norway and Japan, which were 
again defeated by a popular vote, although accompanied by words of strong concern from the 
Secretary-General of CITES that such proposals imperilled the working relationship between 
the trade convention and the ICRW.182
I  o - j
The CITES parties adopted a Resolution elucidating the relationship with the IWC, which 
also represents the first (and only) such measure targeted at cetaceans, as opposed merely to 
aspects of the trade in whale products. In so doing, Resolution 11.4 repealed the previous 
Resolutions on whale issues adopted at preceding COPs, yet also entrenched a significant 
number of the key sentiments advanced within these instruments. To this end, and perhaps 
somewhat pointedly given the tone of Resolution 1999-6 adopted by the IWC, the CITES 
parties observed that “the meat and other products of such protected species of whales are 
subject to international trade which cannot be controlled effectively by the IWC alone”. 
Reiterating that “maximum attention” should be afforded to cetaceans under CITES, and the 
“need for special attention to the conservation of whales and other cetaceans”, the parties 
observed that commercial harvesting “circumvents and diminishes the effectiveness of the 
protected regime of the IWC” and that “any illegal international trade in Appendix-I whale
181 Resolution 1999-6: Resolution on Cooperation between the IWC and CITES.
182 Indeed, Secretary-General Willem Wijnstekers observed that “the difficult political discussions that had 
created divisions in that body [the IWC] were now appearing in the CITES meetings of the Conference of the 
Parties and might have negative effects on the relationship between the parties”: Summary Report o f the 
Committee I  Meeting (Geneva: CITES, 2000), at 24.
183 Resolution Conf. 11.4: Conservation o f Cetaceans, Trade in Cetacean Specimens and the Relationship with 
the International Whaling Commission.
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specimens undermines the effectiveness of both the IWC and CITES”. Accordingly, the 
parties resolved that no permit should be issued for primarily commercial purposes of any 
specimen of a species or stock protected under the IWC moratorium and that CITES parties 
that do not currently adhere to the ICRW should be encouraged to do so. Moreover, the 
parties were urged to cooperate to prevent the illegal trade in whale meat and encouraged to 
voluntarily establish inventories and DNA identification systems for stockpiles of whale 
products.
Proposals to downlist certain species of whales from Appendix I and Appendix II were again 
submitted by Japan at the Twelfth and Thirteenth COPs to CITES, convened in 2002 and 
2004 respectively, and again failed to gamer the requisite two-thirds majority in order to
1 SAsuccessfully enter into effect. Nevertheless, at the Thirteenth COP advocates of the 
downlisting of whales “succeeded in making their voices heard, in gaining more votes for 
their proposals than in the past and in reminding CITES Parties that the current harmonious 
relationship between CITES and the IWC is not so stable as many assume”.185 As far as this 
relationship is concerned, subsequent to the adoption of Resolution 11.4, trade concerns arose 
sporadically within the intervening IWC Meetings, resulting in Resolutions calling on parties 
to refrain from the commercial exchange of incidentally-captured whales,186 expressing 
disapproval of Norwegian intentions to resume trade in minke whales under a reservation to
i  on
CITES and condemning the international trade in whales caught for scientific research 
purposes under Article VIII of the ICRW.188
Particular consideration was accorded to the trade in whale products at the Fourteenth, and 
most recent, COP to CITES, in 2007, primarily due to the somewhat uncomfortable timing of 
the meeting, which was convened effectively back-to-back with the IWC Annual Meeting. At
i on
the prior IWC Meeting a further Resolution was addressed to CITES, in which the 
importance of continued cooperation between the two organisations was reaffirmed and 
mutual parties were requested to respect this relationship and “not to seek the transfer of
184 Proposals for the downlisting o f whales within CITES have been raised solely by Japan since the Eleventh 
COP, as the Norwegian authorities have sanctioned the trade in minke whale products by virtue o f a reservation 
to CITES, as noted below.
185 C. P. Carlane, “Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International Institutions, Recent Developments 
and the Future of International Whaling Policies” (2005) 24 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 1.
186 Resolution 2001-4.
187 Resolution 2001-5: Resolution on Commercial Whaling.
188 Resolution 2003-2: Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit.
189 Resolution 2007-4: Resolution on CITES.
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cetacean species from CITES Appendix I while the moratorium remains in place”.190 
Nevertheless, downlisting proposals were again tabled and defeated within the COP. In 
response, a Decision was adopted by the COP, directed at the Animals Committee, stating 
clearly that “[n]o periodic review of any great whale, including the fin whale, should occur 
while the moratorium by the International Whaling Commission is in place”.191
It appears likely that motions to downlist the status of certain species of whales from 
Appendix I to II will continue in subsequent COPs. Nevertheless, such proposals may be 
considered essentially symbolic and appear calculated primarily to maintain political pressure 
for future progress on the RMS. Indeed, not only are downlisting proposals largely 
condemned to failure given the clear position of CITES regarding Appendix I status for 
whales protected by the IWC moratorium, but in any event the proposing states have 
considerable scope to resume trade in whale products by entering a reservation pursuant to 
Article XXIII of the trade convention. While CITES is not subject to general reservations,192 
parties may nonetheless enter reservations to the listing of particular species upon the 
Appendices, in which case they are considered non-parties for the purpose of trade in the 
species in question.193 Reservations have been entered against the Appendix I listing of 
cetaceans by Iceland,194 Japan,195 Norway,196 Palau197 and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.198
190 The use of the term “cetacean” in this paragraph of the Resolution is rather striking, given that previous IWC 
Resolutions of this nature had referred exclusively to “whales and “whale products”, while Resolution 2007-4 
itself also refers throughout to “whale stocks” and “whales”. Given the controversy surrounding the competence 
of the IWC to regulate small cetaceans, it is unclear whether this Resolution was intended to apply to the full 
range of “cetaceans” listed in Appendix I to CITES. Nonetheless, a number of species o f dolphins are 
designated on Appendix I, notably the vaquita, which was also the subject of a targeted IWC Resolution at the 
2007 Meeting, due to concerns over the threat posed to this species by incidental catches: Resolution 2007-5: 
The Vaquita, from Critically Endangered to Facing Extinction.
191 Decision 14.81: Great Whales.
192 Article XXIII(l).
193 Article XXIII(3). This position is not uncontroversial, however; for instance, Sands observes that “[t]he 
reservation clauses seem contradictory to the general goals o f CITES, and there is little doubt that their 
operation has detrimental effects on listed endangered species”: P. Sands, Principles o f International 
Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 512.
194 Iceland has entered a reservation against the listing of common minke, Antarctic minke, sei, blue, fin, 
humpback, sperm and northern bottlenose whales on Appendix I, as well as West Greenland minke whales, 
long-beaked common dolphins, common dolphins, long-finned pilot whales, Atlantic white-sided, white-beaked, 
Indo-Pacific bottlenose and bottlenose dolphins, killer whales and harbour porpoises on Appendix II.
195 Japan has entered a reservation against the listing o f common minke, Antarctic minke, Bryde’s, fin and 
sperm whales, Baird’s beaked whales, Irrawaddy dolphins and certain populations of sei whales on Appendix I.
196 Norway has entered a reservation against the listing o f common minke, Antarctic minke and sperm whales, 
as well as particular populations of sei and fin whales on Appendix I.
197 Palau has entered a reservation against the listing o f minke and sperm whales on Appendix I.
198 St. Vincent and the Grenadines has entered a reservation against the listing of humpback whales on Appendix 
I.
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Accordingly, as noted above, the Norwegian authorities may sanction the resumption of trade 
in minke whale products through the admission of reservations to both CITES and the ICRW.
Ultimately, it is clear that the considerable challenges inherent in regulating the trade in 
whale products requires the aggregation of efforts under both CITES and the ICRW, and that 
neither regime can realistically aspire to meaningfully address these issues in isolation to the 
other. The importance of a cooperative and mutually supportive relationship has been 
consistently reiterated by both organisations, although a degree of attempted forum shopping 
by certain mutual parties has raised questions concerning the precise demarcation of roles 
between the two regimes. Gillespie has argued that the relationship between CITES and the 
IWC should operate on a hierarchical basis, founded primarily on the longevity and 
specificity of the ICRW, to which the trade convention ought to defer to the perceived 
primacy of the whaling regime.199 There is nonetheless an ironic degree of circularity in this 
approach, not least since “this view has been expressed by both proponents and by opponents 
of whaling, for different tactical reasons”.200 Instead, CITES practice to date suggests that the 
partnership with the ICRW is founded on a rather more egalitarian basis than an 
unconditional endorsement of IWC policies.
CITES has played a proactive and innovative role in further advancing regulatory initiatives 
in respect of the trade in whale products, which may be considered unlikely to have been 
applied as widely or as forcefully under the auspices of the IWC. CITES has consistently 
maintained a far greater numerical and geographical cohort of parties than the ICRW, thereby 
increasing the possibilities for the application and enforcement of pertinent policies. 
Moreover, unlike the largely Resolution-based approach towards such issues taken by the 
IWC, CITES mandates a tangible system of controls over trade to be applied under national 
law. In this respect, Bimie considers that the trade convention “has had an impressive effect, 
making it impossible, for example, for a nascent whaling industry in Taiwan to find outlets 
for its whale meat”.201 In addition, CITES-affiliated organisations, such as TRAFFIC, have
199 See especially Gillespie, “Forum Shopping”, at 31; Gillespie, “Whaling Diplomacy”, at 318-45.
200 P. H. Sand, “Japan’s ‘Research Whaling’ in the Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean in the 
Face of the Endangered Species Convention (CITES)” (2008) 17 Review o f European Community and 
International Environmental Law 56, at 61; similar sentiments are also expressed by Bemey: “International 
Trade in Whale Products”, at 111.
201 Bimie, “International Regulation”, at 577.
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also played an effective role in monitoring trade and commercial practices in whale products 
in key jurisdictions.202
Conversely, given the vast and eclectic array o f species listed on the Appendices of the trade 
convention, it is clear that the scientific capacity o f CITES is profoundly overstretched. Since 
cetaceans compete for attention with a substantial range of other species within the Animals 
Committee, and the resources allocated to improving data deficiencies regarding the impacts 
of trade on whales within CITES is minimal in comparison to that of the IWC Scientific 
Committee, it is rather unsurprising that a strong degree of “outsourcing” of scientific advice 
has been pursued in relation to whales. Indeed, such an approach is explicitly mandated 
within the Fort Lauderdale Criteria, which provides that “the views, if any, of 
intergovernmental bodies with competence for the management of the species concerned 
should be taken into account”. This arrangement therefore appears to be based less on 
deference to assumed ICRW primacy than on an application of the relevant CITES criteria, as 
well as a healthy degree of realism and a desire not to squander limited funds on research that 
is already extensively and continuously conducted within the IWC. Tellingly, perhaps, the 
most recent IWC Resolution on trade issues observed that “CITES recognises the IWC’s 
Scientific Committee as the universally recognised international institution with international 
expertise to review and evaluate the status of the world’s whale stocks”,204 while CITES 
Resolution 11.4 correspondingly recognises the IWC as “the major source of information” on 
global whale stocks.
An interesting point if  and when the IWC successfully concludes the RMS, and accordingly 
lifts the moratorium on commercial whaling. Under such circumstances, the Fort Lauderdale 
Criteria would thereby permit the downlisting of certain species of whales to Appendix II, for 
which a commercial quota would be allocated under a fully operational RMP. Aspects of 
trade in such species would therefore be essentially regulated by the IWC, by virtue of Article
202 See for instance J. Mills et al., Whale Meat Trade in East Asia: A Review o f the Markets in 1997 
(Cambridge: TRAFFIC, 1997); A. Ishihara and J. Yoshii, A Survey o f the Commercial Trade in Whale Meat 
Products in Japan (Cambridge: TRAFFIC, 2000); S. Kang and M. Phipps, A Survey o f Whale Meat Markets 
along South Korea’s Coast (Cambridge: TRAFFIC, 2000); A. Ishihara and J. Yoshii, A Survey o f the 
Commercial Trade in Whale Meat Products in Japan (Cambridge: TRAFFIC, 2003).
203 Resolution Conf. 11.4; Criterion (k).
204 Resolution 2007-4; emphasis added. Resolution 2007-4 thereby marks a subtle but significant departure to 
the wording of the previous IWC Resolution addressing CITES, Resolution 1999-6, which had declared that 
“the IWC is the universally recognised competent international organisation for the management of whale 
stocks”.
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long as the development of the RMS remains incomplete. Consequently, the COP to CIr 
remains relatively closed as an avenue through which to circumvent IWC poli< 
Nevertheless, it is also equally apparent that once the RMS is completed, the expedit 
downlisting of certain species o f whales will be required in any post-moratorium era if  5 
advice is ultimately forthcoming from the IWC Scientific Committee. Indeed, any politic; 
ideological intransigence exercised by the COP towards such a development will serv 
jeopardise both the practical operation of the trade convention itself, as well as fu 
harmony and cooperation between CITES and the ICRW.
3.6 The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
Finally, consideration ought to be afforded to the Convention on Biological Diversity, w] 
remains among the most widely ratified and geographically expansive of all multilal 
environmental agreements adopted to date. The origins o f the CBD lay in the adoption ol 
World Conservation Strategy in 1980, developed as a joint project between UNEP, the IE 
and WWF, and subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly. A series of draft t 
were elaborated within the IUCN, which endorsed a proposal for the further development 
global treaty on biodiversity at its seventeenth General Assembly, convened in 1988 
which point a working group was established under the auspices o f UNEP to finalise 
instrument. The CBD was formally opened for signature at the UN Conference 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 and entered into force or
905
M. Curlier and S. Andresen, “International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Regime” in E. L. IV 
et al. (eds.), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (Cambri 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), at 370 (noting “their high commercial value and the fact that these anil 
are not attractive to humans, in contrast to the panda, the cetaceans or the elephants”).
206 A/Res/35/74 o f 5 December 1980.
207 For a full discussion o f the origins o f the CBD see F. Burhenne-Guilmin and S. Casey-Lefkowitz, “ 
Convention on Biological Diversity: A  Hard Won Global Achievement” (1992) 3 Yearbook of Internatu 
Environmental Law 43; see also C. Shine and P. T. B. Kohona, “The Convention on Biological Divers 
Bridging the Gap between Conservation and Development” (1992) 1 Review o f European Community 
International Environmental Law 307.
December 1993. The Convention currently has some 191 parties and, famously, one 
signatory, in the form of the USA.208
The conservation value of the CBD to cetaceans specifically is rather less ostentatious than a 
number of other treaty regimes examined in this thesis. The CBD contains no Annexes upon 
which cetaceans may be identified as meriting an advanced degree of protection. Likewise, 
the political compromises inherent in developing a multilateral agreement seeking near- 
universal appeal and approval has essentially rendered the possibility of strong and extensive 
conservation obligations relatively remote. Commitments towards biodiversity within the 
Convention are therefore largely aspirational and amorphous. Nevertheless, the CBD does 
advance a number of unique features of value to the overall regulatory mosaic addressing 
cetaceans. On a global level, the Convention may be considered to provide clear leadership 
towards the need to halt biodiversity losses. Indeed, while the current target set under the 
auspices of the CBD of halting biodiversity losses by 2010 may be considered rather 
unworldly, it has nonetheless been embraced by the parties, as well as other multilateral 
environmental agreements and entities such as the EU.
Moreover, within a broad framework of ocean policies, considerable emphasis has been 
placed under the CBD towards the further development of marine protected areas, both 
within and beyond areas of national jurisdiction, which is likely to constitute an increasingly 
significant aspect of the management of cetaceans in future years. In addition, a largely 
unheralded aspect of institutional practice under the CBD has been to promote further 
cooperation between a number of leading biodiversity-related conventions, thereby providing 
a rare forum to develop a greater degree o f coordination of policies and to mitigate so-called 
“treaty congestion” which has dogged the implementation of commitments under key 
multilateral environmental agreements to date.
3.6.1 Fundamental obligations and institutional framework
The CBD is a lengthy document and essentially provides a broad framework by which to 
attain its stated three objectives, which are articulated in Article 1 as being “the conservation 
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by
208 As of 31 August 2009.
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appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, 
taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding”. Nevertheless, consolidation of these three individual goals into a coherent unified 
purpose has to date proved rather elusive in practice. Indeed, the broad scope of the CBD’s 
objectives is considered by the parties themselves to pose a “fundamental challenge to the 
Convention”,209 hence the precise ideological direction of the Convention remains somewhat 
unpredictable. However the pursuit o f these objectives is advanced in practice, there is 
nonetheless a central recognition within the Convention that states are accorded the ultimate 
responsibility in this respect and “have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
91 0of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.
Some scope -  albeit rather indirect -  is established for the advancement of conservation 
measures for cetaceans under Articles 6 and 8 respectively. Article 6 requires each party “in 
accordance with its particular conditions and capabilities” to develop national strategies, 
plans of programmes for conservation and sustainable development of biodiversity, or to 
adapt existing initiatives,211 to “reflect, inter alia, the measures set out in this convention
9 1 9  • •relevant to the Contracting Party concerned”. Additionally, parties are to integrate “as far 
as possible and appropriate” the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity into relevant 
sectoral or cross sectoral plans, projects and policies.213 As a practical means of fulfilling 
national obligations under Article 6, parties to the CBD are required to develop National 
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (BSAPs);214 such instruments thereby provide a 
formal basis for the coordination of biodiversity conservation policies at a national level. In 
this respect, a number of parties have included species and habitats of cetaceans as key
209 Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision VI/26 adopted at the Sixth Conference of 
the Parties in 2002, at para. 8.
210 Article 3. In addition, the preamble further reflects this position, with the assertion that “States have 
sovereign rights over their own resources”.
211 In this respect, further guidance was elaborated by the CBD at the Ninth Conference of the Parties: Decision 
IX/8: Review of Implementation of Goals 2 and 3 o f the Strategic Plan.
212 Article 6(a).
213 Article 6 (b). This provision is reinforced in conjunction with Article 10(a), which requires parties “as far as 
possible and appropriate” to integrate “consideration of the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
resources into national decision-making”.
214 Moreover, under Article 26, parties are required to report periodically upon the implementation of national 
BSAPs, with the current reporting deadline set at March 2009.
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ecosystem components to be addressed under the national BSAP. For instance, the UK 
Biodiversity Action Plan identifies a number of species of cetaceans as “priority species” and 
thereby seeks to implement national CBD commitments through, inter alia, the coordination
^ 1 c
of management and conservation measures in respect of such species.
Perhaps the most significant aspect o f the CBD in practice has been the emphasis placed 
upon the in situ conservation of biodiversity under Article 8, which has accordingly 
established a global mandate for the creation of protected areas on land and at sea. Although 
this project has moved relatively slowly, considerable attention has been focussed within 
various meetings and working groups towards the development of guiding principles for 
these areas. General commitments are incumbent upon the parties “as far as possible and as 
appropriate” to elaborate a system of protected areas and develop necessary guidelines for 
their selection, establishment and management. Accordingly, the development of marine 
protected areas has constituted a significant aspect of activities undertaken through the 
“Jakarta Mandate”.
In implementing these commitments, in a similar manner to CITES, the CBD is subject to a 
broad conflict clause, under which the provisions of the biodiversity convention do not affect 
the rights of the parties from any existing international agreement, “except where the exercise 
of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological 
diversity”.216 Nevertheless, this latter qualification may be considered rather symbolic in 
practice, given that there is no indication provided under the auspices of the Convention as to 
what a “serious” damage or threat may comprise. Although the relationship between CBD 
commitments and obligations under Articles 65 and 120 of the LOSC is not articulated, there 
would appear to be relatively little scope for conflict. Indeed, the pursuit of policies such as 
the development of protected areas under the “Jakarta Mandate” is likely to complement 
rather than contravene the “conservation, management and study” of cetaceans.
The CBD has developed a strong institutional structure, which comprises a decision-making 
organ operating in association with administrative and scientific bodies. The Conference of 
the Parties, elaborated and established under Article 23 of the Convention, constitutes the 
operational mechanism of the CBD. To date, the COP has yet to adopt a specific Decision
215 Reproduced on-line at www.ukbap.org.uk (last visited 31 August 2009).
216 Article 22(1).
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addressing cetaceans, beyond its general policies constituting the on-going elaboration of the 
Jakarta Mandate. Indeed, as a particular concern, cetaceans have correspondingly received 
peripheral attention under the auspices of the CBD thus far. Nevertheless, two key policies 
developed within the various COPs may be considered to pose a degree of relevance in the 
context of cetaceans, although whether such initiatives may be objectively viewed as having 
inspired clear regulatory activity remains nonetheless rather questionable.
Perhaps the most visible initiative advanced by the CBD in recent years has been the 
establishment in 2002 of an overall commitment “to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction 
of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as a 
contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on earth.” Although the 
2010 deadline was unaccompanied by a clear programme of action, it has nonetheless 
provided a degree of political impetus towards a re-evaluation of biodiversity policies at both 
a national and multilateral level. The 2010 target cannot be objectively considered a 
regulatory initiative for cetaceans in anything beyond the most indirect of terms. However, as 
noted for instance in Chapter VIII, the EU re-evaluation of biodiversity policies has 
subsequently placed a greater degree of attention on the conservation needs of marine 
species, for which cetaceans have been particular beneficiaries. Nonetheless, this remains a 
somewhat abstract link between the 2010 target and legislative activity, with EC cetacean 
policies having been driven rather more ostensibly by their high political visibility within the 
various EU institutions than pertinent CBD rhetoric. Indeed, beyond this rather peripheral 
application in the EU context, as well as broad statements made in support of the 2010 target 
within other multilateral fora with an application towards cetaceans, such as the CMS, there 
is little evidence that this initiative has translated into direct regulatory activity in relation to 
cetaceans.
Secondly, considerable attention has been paid under the auspices of the CBD to the issue of 
the “sustainable use” of biodiversity. At the Seventh COP a series of guiding principles were 
endorsed for the sustainable use of biodiversity.218 However, the Addis Ababa Principles 
offer little indication as to how sustainable use may be applied within the specific context of 
cetaceans, aside from an observation that it may entail both consumptive and non-
217 Decision VI/26, at para. 11.
218 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity; Annexed to Decision VII/12: 
Sustainable Use.
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9 9 0and counselling that “not all principles were o f relevance” to the trade convention.
3.6.2. The Jakarta Mandate and the conservation o f cetaceans 
As noted above, the CBD does not provide clear and targeted obligations in respect of mar 
species; moreover, initial critiques of the Convention lamented the relatively peripta
991attention accorded to marine environmental concerns. Accordingly, progress towa 
addressing the marine regulatory deficit has in practice been advanced through an on-go 
process of activity within working groups and the COP, termed the “Jakarta Mandal 
Policies developed under the CBD, insofar as they relate to the practical conservation nei
9 9 9of cetaceans, are therefore pursued under this broad umbrella.
Initial developments under the Jakarta Mandate offered minimal consideration to 
conservation needs of species such as cetaceans, focussing instead on coral bleaching and
999sustainable development of small island states. Some attention to issues of importance 
large marine species has developed on an incremental basis under the CBD, commencing 
the Fifth COP with a call to consider, inter alia, by-catches and the development of mar
219 Operational Guidelines to Practical Principal 5. Nevertheless, on a general basis certain aspects of  
principles reflect a number o f provisions advanced in the multilateral agreements pertinent to cetace 
examined in this thesis, for instance the need to develop institutional linkages (Practical Principle 1), 
promotion o f research activities (Practical Principle 6), the needs o f  indigenous communities (Practical Princi 
12) and the need to promote educational and public awareness programmes (Practical Principle 14).
220 Resolution Conf. 13.2: Sustainable Use o f Biodiversity: Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (at Am 
2 ).
221 D. Freestone, “The Conservation o f Marine Ecosystems under International Law” in M. Bowman and 
Redgwell (eds.), International Law and the Conservation of Biodiversity (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996), at ' 
(noting that “the particular problems o f the conservation o f marine ecosystems and biodiversity have bi
largely overlooked by the Convention”).
->22
For a full discussion o f the processes and meetings constituting the primary development o f the Jake 
Mandate see M. M. Groote, “The Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biodiversity” (1997) 12 Internatio, 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 337; see also A. C. de Fontaubert, D. R. Downes and T. S. Agar 
“Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity in Marine and Coastal Habit 
(1998) 10 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 753.
223 Decision IV/5: Conservation and Sustainable Use o f  Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity; including 
Programme o f Work; adopted at the Fourth COP.
extensive politicisation of the whaling debate and a perceived preservation bias within the 
IWC, has raised the possibility of the development of further quota-setting bodies for the 
hunting of whales and other cetaceans. To date, this has remained essentially theoretical as 
key states have allowed the detente process within the IWC a degree of time to run, although 
it remains a provocative option for which a number of whaling states may be prepared to 
exercise. Ultimately, there remains little indication of what an “appropriate organisation” 
may constitute and, while an exhaustive definition may be near impossible to secure in 
practice, a highly positive development in this regard is the on-going progress of the Small 
Working Group on the Future of the IWC. As part of this process, IWC parties have been 
charged with articulating elements of importance for an international cetacean regulator.228 
This initiative, broadly reminiscent of the survey process in advance of the 1930 Hague 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, is likely to provide unprecedented illumination of official 
views of concerned states regarding many aspects of their Article 65 obligations.
Thus far, discussion of NAMMCO in this context has been equally polarised, focussing on 
the possibilities for conflict as opposed to collaborative activity. Nevertheless, if the political 
furore surrounding the establishment of NAMMCO is divorced from such an appraisal, it 
appears that this body could be of considerable practical value to the work of the IWC, 
providing that a clear demarcation of responsibilities can be agreed between both entities and, 
crucially, key parties to both Conventions. NAMMCO has strong scope for the development 
of hunting standards and, combined with its effective inspection network, offers considerable 
possibilities to discharge IWC whaling quotas set under the RMP if and when it is applied. 
Such a relationship is likely to constitute the optimal implementation of Article 65 
obligations in this region, taking into account the projected plurality of regulators and the 
need for cooperation envisaged by the LOSC. In this way, Article 65 may be developed 
further as a collaborative, as opposed to divisive, provision.
In the meantime, the IWC has sought to develop clear lines of communication with pertinent 
bodies to clarify their working relationship. This has been achieved to relatively good effect 
within CITES, to which key aspects o f the IWC debated had been increasingly displaced,
227 In this respect, Iceland has indicated a degree of tolerance to this process, but has reserved the right to 
exclusively work through NAMMCO if progress within the IWC fails in the mid-term future: personal 
communication with Dr. Christina Lockyer, General Secretary to NAMMCO (on file).
228 An Overview o f the Elements/Issues Identified as Being o f Importance to One or More Contracting 
Governments in Relation to the Future o f IWC; Document IWC/S08/SWG3.
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much to the chagrin of the trade convention. In this respect at least, the position in respect of 
cetaceans appears settled,229 although a number of questions remain over the ability of CITES 
-  and, more pertinently, particular parties -  to effectively regulate trade in live specimens, 
which is likely to represent a key challenge to the cetacean agenda in future years as 
controversy over whale products recedes.
Further challenges of collaboration are raised between the IWC and other key regulators, if 
not explicitly with the CBD, due to its limited role concerning cetaceans. In this respect, the 
sprawling supervisory system of the CMS represents a further challenge -  and regulatory 
opportunity -  to which this thesis now turns.
229 Given the vast range of species regulated by CITES, the central attention accorded to cetaceans within the 
mid-1990s appears to be declining significantly. Indeed, as observed by Carlane, “although the international 
debate over whaling rages stronger than ever, other species (such as elephants, rhinos and sea turtles) are 
increasingly taking the spotlight at CITES meetings, leaving the IWC to function as the ‘primary battleground’ 
for whaling”: “Saving Whales in the New Millennium”, at 28.
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CHAPTER IV
REGULATING (SM)ALL CETACEANS: THE CONVENTION ON THE 
CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES OF WILD ANIMALS
4.1 Introduction
Within the general framework of the various international conventions pertinent to cetaceans, 
one particular instrument has emerged as a mechanism through which certain key 
deficiencies within the ICRW may potentially be addressed, namely the Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.1 The CMS is the leading international 
instrument addressing the conservation needs o f migratory species as a distinct class of fauna. 
The Convention, which was developed in the wake of the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in 1972, was opened for signature in Bonn, FDR, in June 1979 and entered into 
force on 1 November 1983.
The CMS offers particular scope to address the conservation status of cetaceans. Firstly, a 
considerable number of species of cetaceans are listed under the Convention, thereby 
establishing a series of general obligations and commitments towards such animals. With the 
conclusion of the LOSC and, more pertinently, the widespread acceptance in international 
law of the entitlement to an extensive EEZ on the part of coastal states, the overwhelming 
majority of areas of cetacean habitats have been brought under the purview of national 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CMS -  if  widely adopted and adhered to by a significant body 
of coastal states -  offers distinct possibilities to develop coordinated policies in respect of the 
cetaceans protected under its auspices.
Furthermore, the Bonn Convention provides for the development of species-specific and 
region-specific subsidiary Agreements, of which four such instruments concerning cetaceans 
have been elaborated to date. Thus far, in contrast to other international treaties, the CMS 
regime has demonstrated a particular focus on the smaller species of cetaceans. As noted in 
Chapter II, the ability of the IWC to prescribe meaningful conservation measures for smaller 
species of cetaceans has been hamstrung by disputes over its regulatory competence. In the
'1651 UNTS 333 [hereinafter the “CMS” or “Bonn Convention”]. There are currently 112 parties to the Bonn 
Convention, as well as a further two signatories -  Central African Republic and Jamaica -  that have yet to ratify 
the convention (as of 31 August 2009).
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absence of a universally-accepted remit for the IWC to act in this manner, co-ordinated action 
to address the specific conservation needs of small cetaceans has instead proceeded on a 
predominantly regional basis, with the Bonn Convention having played a leading role in this 
respect. Although the CMS regime has often been forced to operate largely in the face of 
adversity since its inauguration, it nevertheless merits substantial consideration as a regime 
through which the conservation needs of cetaceans -  in particular those of the smaller species 
-  may be advanced.
This Chapter will discuss the role o f the CMS in seeking to establish coordinated regulatory 
solutions for cetaceans -  especially the smaller species -  and its prospects for supplementing 
the regulatory lacunae raised by current IWC practices. Accordingly, this Chapter will 
analyse the specific provisions and institutional structure of the Bonn Convention and its 
application to cetaceans and the various policies pursued to date under the CMS umbrella in 
this regard. Finally, the inter-relationship between the Bonn Convention regime and the IWC 
will be explored. The following three Chapters of this thesis will examine the operation of the 
subsidiary Agreements adopted to date and outline the prospects for the further development 
of cetacean coverage under the CMS.
4.2 Fundamental principles and objectives
The Bonn Convention recognises that “wild animals in their innumerable forms are an 
irreplaceable part of the earth’s natural system which must be conserved for the good of 
mankind” and that “each generation of man holds the resources of the earth for future 
generations and has an obligation to ensure that this legacy is conserved and, where utilised, 
is used wisely”. As a result, in the light of the constant movement of such species and the 
implications of this cross-boundary travel, the parties note that successful conservation and 
management measures in relation to migratory animals will require “the concerted action of 
all States within the national jurisdictional boundaries of which such species spend any part 
of their life cycle”.
In pursuing such aspirations, the parties expressly acknowledge “the importance of migratory 
species being conserved and of Range States agreeing to take action to this end whenever
2 Preamble to the Bonn Convention.
3 Ibid.
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possible and appropriate”.4 “Migratory species” are defined expansively within the CMS as 
“the entire population or any geographically separate part of the population of any species or 
lower taxon of wild animals, a significant proportion of whose members cyclically and 
predictably cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries”.5 Nevertheless, despite this 
flexibility, Burke has observed that the rather vague definitional criteria for migratory species 
might technically preclude the listing of certain marine species due to a lack of data 
concerning their migratory pathways.6
Parties to the Bonn Convention agree to take action to avoid any migratory species from 
becoming endangered7 and to promote, cooperate in and support research relating to 
migratory species.8 The CMS draws a distinction between species identified as “endangered” 
and those considered to have an “unfavourable conservation status”, with differing 
obligations and policies prescribed in relation to each category. To this end, following the 
practice of other international biodiversity treaties, such species are clearly identified and 
listed the Convention, with “endangered” species assigned to Appendix I and those with an 
“unfavourable conservation status” to Appendix II. Parties are to “endeavour to provide 
immediate protection” for Appendix I species,9 while for those species listed in Appendix II, 
they are to endeavour to conclude a series of subsidiary instruments to address the long-term 
conservation and management needs of these animals.10
4.2.1 Appendix I  Species
“Endangered species” are defined as those “in danger of extinction throughout all or a 
significant part of its range”.11 Species may be listed in Appendix I “provided that reliable 
evidence, including the best scientific evidence available, indicates that the species is
4 Article 11(1). “Range States” are defined as any State “that exercises jurisdiction over any part o f the range of 
that migratory species, or a State, flag vessels o f which are engaged outside national jurisdictional limits in 
taking that migratory species” -  Article I(l)(h).
5 Article 1(1 )(a).
6 W. T. Burke, The New International Law o f Fisheries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), at 283.
7 Article 11(2).
8 Article II(3)(a).
9 Article II(3)(b).
10 Article II(3)(c).
11 Article 1(1 )(e).
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endangered”.12 To date, over 100 species have been so designated, including twelve species 
of cetaceans.13
Three broad objectives are prescribed for Range States of species listed in Appendix I. Parties 
should conserve and, where feasible and appropriate, restore those habitats of the species 
which are of importance in removing the species from danger of extinction; to prevent, 
remove, compensate for or minimise, as appropriate, the adverse effects of activities or 
obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the migration of the species; and “to the extent 
feasible and appropriate”, to prevent, reduce or control factors that are endangering or are 
likely to further endanger the species, including strictly controlling and regulating the 
presence of exotic species.14 In addition to these requirements, the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) may recommend “further measures considered appropriate to benefit the species” 
which are to be taken by the relevant Range States in relation to such animals.15
Article 111(5) is of particular importance to Appendix I cetaceans, which requires parties to
prohibit the “taking” of such animals. The concept of “taking” -  while concentrated
predominantly on hunting activities -  is nonetheless broadly defined,16 and mirrors a growing
11trend in domestic fisheries law to include “harassment” of the species. Accordingly, this 
provision may be interpreted as establishing stronger holistic obligations on parties to address 
habitat-related issues, such as the growing threats to cetaceans from ocean noise, eco-tourism 
and other adverse coastal activities, in addition to the more obvious matter of the directed 
capture and killing of cetaceans.
Limited exceptions are permitted in respect o f this provision, with two such circumstances 
broadly reminiscent of the terms of the ICRW in their application to cetaceans. Firstly, taking 
is permitted for “scientific purposes” which could technically permit a state such as Norway, 
which is a party to both the CMS and the ICRW, to undertake a proposed scientific hunt
12 Article 111(2). Under Article 111(3), migratory species may be removed from Appendix I by a vote at the 
Conference of the Parties stating that reliable evidence -  including the “best scientific evidence available” -  
indicates that the species is no longer endangered and the species is not likely to become endangered again 
because of a loss of protection due to its removal from Appendix I.
13 Appendix I; reproduced at www.cms.int/documents/appendix/cms_appl_2.htm (last visited 31 August 2009).
14 Article 111(4).
15 Article 111(6).
16 “Taking” is defined in Article 1(1 )(i) as “Taking, hunting, fishing, capturing, harassing, deliberate killing, or 
attempting to engage in such conduct”.
17 For instance, for activities in US waters, the current version of the Marine Mammal Protection Act operational 
defines “taking” as “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine 
mammal”: Section 3(13).
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under the auspices of either of the two Conventions. Unlike the plethora of Resolutions 
adopted by the IWC addressing scientific whaling, there are few specific pronouncements on 
this activity under the auspices of the CMS. The emotive issue of scientific whaling has been 
essentially marginalised within the CMS, since neither Japan nor Iceland -  two leading 
advocates of lethal research within the IWC -  have demonstrated any meaningful inclination 
to accede to the Convention. The CMS Scientific Council has thus largely avoided this 
difficult issue, unlike its IWC counterpart. Nevertheless, the scientific whaling issue has had 
a practical effect upon Norwegian participation in ASCOBANS, one of the key CMS 
subsidiary Agreements addressing cetaceans. As noted in Chapter V, Norway considers the 
de facto prohibition of lethal research under the Agreement to be fundamentally incompatible 
with current national policy and has accordingly declined to consider the possibility of 
membership on these terms.
The second key exception to the taking o f Appendix I species accommodates the needs of 
“traditional subsistence users” o f the species in question, a provision that echoes the 
aboriginal subsistence exception advanced under the ICRW. However, by avoiding the term 
“aborigine”, the CMS has avoided the awkward definitional debate that has enmeshed the 
IWC in on-going controversy on this issue, as detailed in Chapter II.
The right to “take” cetaceans, whether for scientific or subsistence purposes, is not 
unqualified under the Bonn Convention; such activities must be “precise as to content and 
limited in space and time” and should not operate to the disadvantage of the species.18 In 
practice, however, directed catches of cetaceans has been a peripheral issue within the CMS. 
On the isolated occasions in which a party has considered particular hunting restrictions 
contrary to the national interest, it has simply entered a general reservation to the CMS listing 
or, as in the specific case of Norway, remained politely impervious to invitations to accede to 
the subsidiary Agreement in question.
4.2.2 Appendix II Species
Appendix II lists species with an “unfavourable conservation status”. The conservation status 
of a migratory species is defined under the Bonn Convention as being favourable where:
18 Article 111(5). Where taking is permitted pursuant to this provision, under Article 111(7) the party in question 
must inform the Secretariat o f the CMS “as soon as possible”.
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“(i) population dynamics data indicate that the migratory species is maintaining itself on a 
long-term basis as a viable component of its ecosystems;
(ii) the range of the migratory species is neither currently being reduced, nor is likely to be 
reduced, on a long-term basis;
(iii) there is, and will be in the foreseeable future, sufficient habitat to maintain the population 
of the migratory species on a long-term basis; and
(iv) the distribution and abundance of the migratory species approach historic coverage and 
levels to the extent that potentially suitable ecosystems exist and to the extent consistent with 
wise wildlife management”.19
The conservation status of a particular species is therefore considered “unfavourable” where
any of these four criteria are not met.20 To date, some 39 species of cetaceans have been
01listed incrementally on Appendix II.
For Appendix II species, the parties undertake to develop “international agreements for their
00 _conservation and management”. Two types of instrument are envisaged for species listed in 
Appendix II, namely an AGREEMENT established under Article IV(3) of the Convention, or
0 3an agreement concluded pursuant to Article IV(4).
4.2.3 AGREEMENTS
Under Article IV(3), “[pjarties that are Range States of migratory species listed in Appendix 
II shall endeavour to conclude AGREEMENTS where these would benefit the species and 
should give priority to those species in an unfavourable conservation status”. Guidelines for 
the conclusion of such AGREEMENTS are advanced under Article V of the CMS, with their 
primary objective stated as being “to restore the migratory species concerned to a favourable
19 Article 1(1 )(c).
20 Article 1(1 )(d). The “conservation status” of a migratory species is defined as “the sum of the influences 
acting on the migratory species that may affect its long-term distribution and abundance”: Article 1(1 )(b).
21 Appendix I; reproduced at www.cms.int/documents/appendix/cms_appl_2.htm (last visited 31 August 2009).
22 Article IV(1). Article IV(2) permits migratory species to be listed in both Appendix I and Appendix II, “if the 
circumstances so warrant”. Unlike Appendix I species, once a particular species has been listed on Appendix II 
there is no procedure under the Bonn Convention to reverse this designation.
23 The term AGREEMENT is emphasised in capital letters in order to distinguish this type of instrument from 
the kind provided for under Article IV(4); Resolution 2.6: Implementation of Articles IV and V of the 
Convention, adopted at the Second Conference of the Parties in October 1989.
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conservation status or to maintain it in such a status”.24 To date, four AGREEMENTS have 
been concluded under the CMS umbrella, relating to European bats, African-Eurasian
9 9  90
waterbirds, Southern Hemisphere albatrosses and petrels and African gorillas.
Article IV(3) provides the clearest basis for the development of cetacean instruments under 
the CMS. While Article V(4) prescribes particular features common to each AGREEMENT, 
migratory cetaceans are specifically addressed in Article V(4)(f). To this end, “at a 
minimum” such instruments must prohibit “any taking that is not permitted for that migratory 
species under any other multilateral agreement and provide for accession to the 
AGREEMENT by States that are not Range States of that migratory species”. The application 
of this criterion could mitigate difficulties encountered within the IWC concerning its 
competence to regulate small cetaceans. Article V(4)(f) does not distinguish between species 
of cetaceans -  referring simply to “migratory species of the Order Cetacea” -  thereby 
establishing an unequivocal remit to address the various anthropogenic threats facing both 
large and small species of cetaceans.
Likewise, the reference in Article V(4)(f) to the “taking” of cetaceans may also be considered 
significant. Unlike Appendix I species, the CMS declines to prescribe conditions for the 
directed hunting of Appendix II species. It appears that this provision was originally intended 
to apply to the limitations and quotas on directed hunting imposed by the IWC, since at the 
material time of the conclusion of the CMS the only viable multilateral agreement addressing 
the taking of migratory cetaceans would have been the ICRW. Nevertheless, given the recent 
development of alternative regulatory bodies such as NAMMCO, the pluralistic wording of 
this provision may potentially raise similar problems of construction as experienced under 
Article 65 LOSC.
24 Article V(l).
25 Originally entitled the Agreement on the Conservation o f Bats in Europe (EUROBATS), the agreement was 
concluded in December 1991 and entered into force on 16 January 1994. In July 2000 this instrument was 
formally renamed the “Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats”: Resolution 3.7, 
adopted at the Third Session of the Meeting of the Parties. The text of the Agreement is reproduced in full (as 
amended) on the EUROBATS institutional website at www.eurobats.org (last visited 31 August 2009).
26 The African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA) opened for signature in June 1995 and entered into 
force on 1 November 1999. The text of the Agreement is reproduced in full on the AEWA institutional website 
at www.unep-aewa.org (last visited 31 August 2009).
27 The Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP) opened for signature in June 2001 
and entered into force on 1 February 2004. The text o f the Agreement is reproduced in full on the ACAP 
institutional website at www.acap.aq (last visited 31 August 2009).
28 The Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas opened for signature in October 2007 and entered into force
on 1 June 2008. The text of the Agreement is reproduced in full on the CMS website at www.cms.int (last
visited 31 August 2009).
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The instruments concluded to date under Article IV(4) have tended to fall into one of two 
categories, namely formal Agreements following a similar structure to Article IV(3) 
AGREEMENTS, and less formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).31 The more formal 
agreements relate to seal populations in the Wadden Sea,32 small cetaceans in the Baltic and 
North Seas and cetaceans of the Mediterranean and Black Seas and contiguous Atlantic area. 
The operation of the two cetacean Agreements is outlined in Chapters V and VI respectively.
4.2.5 Non-binding instruments
Thus far, seventeen MOUs have been established under the CMS, addressing the 
conservation needs of a variety of species ranging from birds, to marine turtles to deer and 
antelopes.33 Of particular importance to cetaceans is the development of an MOU on the 
Conservation of Cetaceans and their Habitats in the Pacific Islands Region, concluded in 
2006 and a MOU Concerning the Conservation of the West African Manatee and Small 
Cetaceans of Western Africa and Macaronesia, concluded in 2008. Both MOUs are analysed 
fully in Chapter VII of this thesis.
In addition, the CMS parties may also elaborate Action Plans or Initiatives for certain 
Appendix II species, which may be a precursor to a further multilateral instrument, 
commonly in the form of an MOU.34 Indeed, as noted in Chapter VII, the Western African 
MOU commenced as a CMS Initiative in 2002 and subsequently evolved into an official 
CMS subsidiary instrument.
The expanding range of less formal instruments, primarily concluded over the course of the 
past five years, may be considered an encouraging sign that the CMS is at least moving to
31 On the role of such instruments within the CMS umbrella see C. Shine, “Selected Agreements Concluded 
Pursuant to the Convention on the Conservation o f Migratory Species of Wild Animals” in D. Shelton (ed.), 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role o f Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), at 196.
32 The Wadden Sea Seal Agreement was the first subsidiary instrument to be concluded under the auspices of 
the Bonn Convention. The Agreement was signed in October 1990 and entered into force on 1 October 1991. 
The text of the Agreement is reproduced in full on the institutional website o f the Wadden Sea Secretariat at 
www.waddensea-secretariat.org (last visited 31 August 2009).
33 For a concise discussion o f these developments see R. Caddell, “International Law and the Protection of 
Migratory Wildlife: An Appraisal of Twenty-Five Years o f the Bonn Convention”, (2005) 16 Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Policy 113, at 137-9.
34 Moreover, the CMS Gorilla Agreement started as an Action Plan, hence such initiatives may also eventually 
crystallise into more binding commitments.
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acknowledge the conservation needs of an extended range of species. However, as noted in 
Chapter VII, it also reflects a general softening of CMS measures towards non-binding 
instruments that, while attracting media attention and Range State interest, do not necessarily 
commit participants to any meaningful conservation obligations.
4.3 Institutional Arrangements
Like most other multilateral environmental agreements concluded to date, the Bonn 
Convention has developed a strong institutional structure. In keeping with the current trend 
in international institutional practice, the CMS itself provided a mandate for the creation of 
its various component institutions, as well as the establishment of a designated forum for 
debate and decision-making. In this regard, a regular Conference of the Parties (COP) is 
convened, in which policies towards migratory species are debated and advanced. The COP 
receives administrative support from a Secretariat, alongside a Scientific Council and a 
Standing Committee which are charged with providing and disseminating expert technical 
advice.
4.3.1 The Conference o f  the Parties
The COP is convened by the Secretariat of the Bonn Convention and each such meeting is to 
be held “at intervals of not more than three years”.37 To date, nine such meetings have been 
convened.
The COP is charged with reviewing the implementation of the Bonn Convention,38 and has 
particular responsibility for, inter alia reviewing and assessing the conservation status of 
migratory species, as well as making recommendations to the parties concerning the 
implementation of the Convention. Decisions made at a COP generally require the assent of a
<5Q
two-thirds majority of the parties present and voting. Observers may attend the COP;
35 N. Matz, “Chaos or Coherence? Implementing and Enforcing the Convention on Migratory Species through 
various Legal Instruments” (2005) 65 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 197, at 
202 .
36 On this issue generally see R. R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law” (2000) 94 
American Journal o f International Law 623.
37 Article VII(3). The period between these meetings can be altered by a vote at the COP, and an extraordinary 
meeting may be held “at any time” on the written request o f at least one-third of the parties.
38 Article VII(5).
39 Article VII(7). The exceptions to this principle relate to financial matters.
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however, in marked contrast to the Annual Meetings of the IWC, each prospective observer 
must be “technically qualified in protection, conservation or management migratory
• »  40species .
To date cetaceans have received sustained attention on the agenda of the COP, where an 
increasing number of Resolutions advancing conservation policies have been advanced in 
recent years. Initially, particular emphasis was placed on the smaller species, for which a 
targeted Resolution was adopted in each o f the first three COPs, reflecting concerted efforts 
under the CMS umbrella to establish subsidiary agreements in this regard.41 Following these 
initial developments, however, the subsequent two COPs were primarily focussed on research 
initiatives, with few substantive regulatory initiatives developed in respect of cetaceans. The 
Fourth COP noted the paucity o f scientific data on migrations of small cetaceans, 
recommending further studies “giving priority to species and populations of threatened or 
uncertain status”.42 This was followed by specific attention at the next COP on climate 
change, whereby a further Recommendation observed the work conducted by inter alia the 
IWC, recommending an assessment o f its relevance for the CMS and to strengthen existing 
links in this regard.43 Likewise, at the Sixth COP, further consideration was accorded to the 
problems raised by cetacean by-catches.44
At the Seventh COP a first specific Resolution on large cetaceans was adopted.45 Here, the 
parties were called upon to address indirect threats facing Antarctic minke, Bryde’s and 
pygmy right whales, noting that a lack of scientific consensus had prevented the Scientific 
Council from recommending the formal listing o f these species on Appendix I. Accordingly, 
the Resolution called on parties to further clarify the nature of anthropogenic threats to these 
species and to enhance conservation efforts, both on a national basis and through relevant 
international and regional organisations.
40 Prospective observers may be refused admission if  one-third o f the parties present at the COP object to their 
attendance.
41 Resolution 1.7: Small Cetaceans, adopted at the First COP in 1985; Resolution 2.3: Small Cetaceans, adopted 
at the Second COP in 1988; Resolution 3.3: Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Third COP in 1991.
42 Recommendation 4.2: Research on Migration in Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Fourth COP in 1994.
43 Recommendation 5.5: Climate Change and its Implications for the Bonn Convention, adopted at the Fifth 
COP in 1997. A further Resolution on climate change was adopted on this issue at the Eighth COP, which 
reiterated the call for general cooperation but made no specific reference to the IWC on this occasion: 
Resolution 8.13: Climate Change, adopted at the Eighth COP in 2005.
44 Resolution 6.2: Bycatch, adopted at the Sixth COP in 1999.
45 Resolution 7.15: Future Action on the Antarctic Minke, Bryde’s and Pygmy Right Whales under the 
Convention on Migratory Species, adopted at the Seventh COP in 2002.
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Of particular significance to the present and future agenda of the CMS in respect of cetacean 
conservation, is the adoption at the Eighth COP of a specific Resolution on anthropogenic 
impacts on cetaceans,46 which formally acknowledged that “human induced impacts on 
cetaceans are increasing”. The Resolution identified six main areas of concern, namely by- 
catches and entanglements, climate change, ship-strikes, pollution, habitat and feeding 
ground degradation and marine noise. Accordingly, the Resolution called for the 
development of a comprehensive programme of action -  in conjunction with the IWC and 
other relevant organisations -  to address human-induced impacts on cetaceans. Following the 
adoption of Resolution 8.22, the CMS Secretariat developed a formal Programme of Work 
for Cetaceans, which was endorsed at the Ninth COP 47 This Programme reviewed existing 
synergies between the CMS and other pertinent organisations with a view to identifying gaps 
and overlaps, thereby further ascertaining the precise contribution that the Bonn Convention 
may provide to the current international framework.
To date, as far as the six priority actions identified in Resolution 8.22 are concerned, 
concerted activity has been most ostensibly developed in respect of by-catches and marine 
noise. With regard to by-catches, concerns over the incidental mortality of cetaceans were 
first addressed in a targeted Resolution adopted at the Sixth COP, and subsequently 
reinforced at successive COPs as a key policy of the CMS in respect of marine mammals
A O
generally. The negative effects of ocean noise were first identified at the Seventh COP in 
the specific context of wind turbines,49 in which the Parties expressed concerns over the 
possible impact of offshore wind developments on migratory species of mammals and birds, 
including inter alia the “emission of noise and vibrations into the water”. More specifically, 
at the Ninth COP substantial consideration was given to this issue, with “marine noise 
impacts” identified as one of the “multiple, cumulative and often synergistic threats” to 
cetaceans.50 Moreover, at this juncture the parties adopted their first Resolution explicitly 
addressing the impact of noise on cetaceans,51 commending developments within
46 Resolution 8.22: Adverse Human Induced Impacts on Cetaceans, adopted at the Eighth COP in 2005.
47 Resolution 9.9: Migratory Marine Species, adopted at the Ninth COP in 2008.
48 Recommendation 7.2: Implementation of Resolution 6.2 on Bycatch, adopted at the Seventh COP in 2002; 
Resolution 8.14: Bycatch, adopted at the Eighth COP in 2005; Resolution 9.18: Bycatch, adopted at the Ninth 
COP in 2008.
49 Resolution 7.5: Wind Turbines and Migratory Species.
50 Resolution 9.9: Migratory Marine Species.
51 Resolution 9.19: Adverse Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise Impacts on Cetaceans and Other Biota.
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ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS on this issue, and urging special care to control emissions of 
anthropogenic noise. Resolution 9.19 also called for the adoption of migration measures for 
high intensity active naval sonar, to consult with relevant stakeholders on issues of best 
practice, to undertake further research regarding sources and impacts of ocean noise and, in 
particular, to “endeavour to develop provisions for the effective management of 
anthropogenic noise in CMS daughter agreements and other relevant bodies and 
conventions”.
In this respect, as far as ocean noise -  and the other five sources of human induced impact -  
are concerned, future regulatory initiatives are likely to be advanced through the flagship 
CMS cetacean Agreements, acting in conjunction with relevant intergovernmental bodies. 
Moreover, significant policy guidance will be generated as a result of the on-going 
Programme of Work endorsed at the Ninth COP. This project will permit the CMS to develop 
targeted initiatives to advance the conservation status of migratory cetaceans, while better 
harnessing the collaborative possibilities raised by pertinent external agencies.
4.3.2 The Secretariat
Article IX(1) of the Bonn Convention provides that a Secretariat shall be established, and this 
institution was duly founded when the CMS entered into force. The CMS Secretariat operates 
under the administrative auspices o f UNEP and is based in Bonn where, having previously 
cohabited with a host of other UN Agencies, is now housed in its own purpose-built 
accommodation, together with the Secretariats o f the various subsidiary Agreements. The 
functions of the Secretariat are elaborated in Article IX(4) of the CMS and, in addition to 
general administrative duties, include promoting liaison between the parties, institutions 
established under AGREEMENTS and other relevant international organisations concerned 
with migratory species. As part of this remit, in the context of cetacean conservation, the 
CMS Secretariat has played a key role in facilitating meetings and workshops for the 
development of further subsidiary agreements addressing cetaceans, most recently in relation 
to the Pacific Islands MOU52 and Western African MOU.
52 In this regard, as noted in Chapter VII, the CMS Secretariat co-sponsored a series of workshops to promote 
activities to address the conservation status o f cetaceans in the Pacific Islands Region, which proved highly 
significant in ultimately brokering the MOU inaugurated in 2006.
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The CMS envisages an ambitious role for the Secretariat, which is not always matched by its 
funding capabilities.53 Nevertheless, such difficulties aside -  and the Bonn Convention is 
hardly the only multilateral treaty to suffer from budgetary constraints within its 
administrative framework -  the Secretariat remains a vital component of the infrastructure of 
the CMS. In addition, the CMS Secretariat has, in recent years, begun to develop a significant 
inter-agency liaison role in conjunction with the other Secretariats of the leading wildlife 
treaties, and plays an active part in the Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-Related 
Conventions, which aims to foster closer links with these bodies as well as attempting to 
mitigate the potential duplication or conflict of work within these organisations.54
As noted in Chapter V, in 2007 the CMS Secretariat was formally merged with that of 
ASCOBANS, with the Executive Director of the CMS also appointed as the Acting 
Executive Director of ASCOBANS. The roots of these developments are based in discontent 
generated by the perceived over-spending on personnel and administrative matters within 
ASCOBANS. The current hybrid administration of the CMS and ASCOBANS remains 
subject to ongoing review and, as noted in the following Chapter, the present arrangements 
have received a decidedly mixed response from parties both within and outside the current 
ASCOBANS structure.
4.3.3 The Scientific Council
Under Article VIII(l) a Scientific Council was established at the first COP, to provide 
“advice on scientific matters”. Any party may appoint a “qualified expert” as a member of the 
Scientific Council.55 In addition to these members, experts may also be selected and 
appointed by the COP.56 Where such experts are appointed, they are distinguished from those 
appointed by the parties with the title “Appointed Councillor” and the criteria for their 
selection and the terms of their tenure are specifically established by the COP. Eight such
53 Caddell, “Twenty-Five Years of the Bonn Convention”, at 140-1; on this issue see further P. W. Bimie and A. 
E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 622. This 
shortcoming has also been replicated within the subsidiary instruments of the CMS, which has led to a 
sometimes strained relationship between the various Agreement Secretariats and the constituent parties and 
Range States.
54 The other members of the Liaison Group are the Secretariats o f the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), CITES, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the UNESCO World Heritage Convention. The Group 
was established following the Fifth COP of the CBD.
55 Article VIII(2).
56 At present, there are some 77 members of this body: see the Scientific Council’s webpage on the CMS 
institutional website at www.cms.int/bodies/ScC_homepage.htm (last visited 31 August 2009).
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experts were appointed for the triennium 2006-08.57 Of immediate relevance to cetaceans is 
the appointment in 2006 of Dr William F. Perrin as Appointed Councillor for “aquatic 
mammals”; a further Appointed Councillor has responsibility for “by-catch” and will 
accordingly have a key role to play in the formulation of conservation and management 
measures in respect of cetaceans under the CMS umbrella.
The COP determines the precise functions of the Scientific Council, hence the CMS cetacean 
agenda is largely dictated by the scientific priorities of the parties. Initial drafts of the Bonn 
Convention suggested that the Scientific Council was intended to be a largely autonomous 
body,58 in a manner broadly analogous to the Scientific Committee of the IWC. However, 
Lyster suggests that the decision to ultimately subordinate the autonomy of the Scientific 
Council to the COP “indicates that some States were concerned lest it might become involved 
in issues that were scientifically interesting but politically undesirable”.59
Notwithstanding this position, cetaceans have occupied a significant position on the agenda 
of the Scientific Council since its inauguration in 1988. Indeed, at the first meeting of the 
Scientific Council, a distinct Working Group on Small Cetaceans was established although, 
somewhat portentously, it was unclear at this juncture whether the Working Group was itself 
intended to form a permanent part of the CMS scientific structure or whether it was to be 
formally disbanded after the second COP.60 Nevertheless, a broad remit was envisaged for 
the Working Group, irrespective of the uncertainty surrounding its ultimate tenure, and it was 
decided that the Scientific Council should study the conservation of small cetaceans globally, 
including freshwater species.61 In any event, the Working Group appears ultimately to have 
been confined to brokering interest for the elaboration of an instrument addressing small 
cetaceans in northern Europe -  which eventually became the present-day ASCOBANS -  
rather than exercising a broad-ranging remit to identify and develop conservation priorities 
and policies for cetaceans addressed under the umbrella of the Bonn Convention.
57 Resolution 8.21, Institutional Arrangements: Standing Committee and Scientific Council, adopted at the 
Eighth COP. These scientific arrangements were left undisturbed at the Ninth COP.
58 Lyster, “The Bonn Convention”, at 994.
59 Ibid. at 995.
60 Report o f the First Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1988), at 1. The Working Group was 
indeed disbanded at this point, having delivered a comprehensive report on the proposed development of a 
regional agreement for small cetaceans in the Baltic and North Seas.
61 Ibid.
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Since these developments, practical issues o f cetacean conservation have been directed 
through the Scientific Council, as part of its remit to evaluate the impact of the CMS on the 
species regulated under its auspices. A significant development in this respect was the 
establishment in 2005 of a distinct Cetacean Liaison Group (CLG), which has become a 
broader incarnation of the old Working Group formed in the early years of the Bonn 
Convention. The CLG grew from a proposal by the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society 
to establish a standing working group in support of cetacean research and conservation 
priorities. This body aims to prioritise funding and implementation of cetacean conservation 
projects submitted to the institutions of the Bonn Convention, as a means of contributing to 
the CMS Strategic Plan 2006-11,62
The CLG extends its consideration to all species of cetaceans. This has afforded a specialist 
platform under the scientific auspices of the CMS for experts to consider research reports on 
the specific conservation needs of cetaceans. The group is also charged with providing advice 
and recommendations on cetacean issues, both to the parent convention as well as its relevant 
subsidiary Agreements. In particular, the CLG has made a significant contribution in recent 
years to the elaboration of the WATCH initiative, culminating in the conclusion of the 
Western African MOU.
4.3.4 The Standing Committee
The final institution established under the Bonn Convention’s administrative framework is 
the Standing Committee, established at the first COP.63 The functions and purpose of the 
Standing Committee are to act on behalf of the COP in developing policies and providing 
administrative guidance between the regular meetings of the parties to the Convention.64 The 
Standing Committee has historically exercised a limited role in relation to cetaceans. 
Nevertheless, at present it continues to provide a substantial input to the on-going review of 
the current CMS/ASCOBANS administration experiment, and the views of the Standing 
Committee are likely to be influential upon the evaluation of the current arrangement 
between the CMS Secretariat and its additional ASCOBANS responsibilities.
62 Report o f the Thirteenth Meeting o f the CMS Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2005), at 17. The establishment 
of the Cetacean Liaison Group on these terms echoes a trend experienced within some of the subsidiary 
Agreements of the Bonn Convention -  especially AEWA and ACCOBAMS -  towards formally reviewing 
proposed projects on an institutional level and allocating the limited funds available upon a strict priority basis.
63 Resolution 1.1.
64 Ibid.
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This arrangement was placed on a more formal footing through the conclusion of a
71Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations in July 2000. The MOU 
aims to “establish a framework of information and consultation between UNEP/CMS and the 
IWC in the field of conserving migratory species and the world’s natural heritage, with a 
view to identifying synergies and ensuring effective cooperation in joint activities by the 
relevant international bodies established under both conventions and national institutions of 
their Contracting Parties”.72 In this regard, the respective Secretariats undertake to facilitate 
mutual participation as observers in relevant meetings of convened under both conventions,
I'Xand to improve coordination between national focal points in their constituent parties, while 
regularly exchanging data and pertinent documentation.74 Furthermore, the two Secretariats 
undertake that they will, “to the extent possible, coordinate their programme of activities to 
ensure that their implementation is complementary and mutually supportive”.75 The 
conclusion of the MOU was strongly endorsed by the IWC at its Fifty-third Meeting in 2001, 
with the constituent bodies of the ICRW urged “under its Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) to pursue complementary and mutually
*Ifsupportive actions in respect of small cetaceans”.
The CMS views its remit in this regard as essentially to address small cetaceans and specific 
problems relating to cetacean migration. While the Bonn Convention technically applies to 
whale stocks, the pronouncements on whales are relatively infrequent in this forum. As 
Gillespie observes, the CMS has largely refrained from the wholesale listing of large whales 
in its Appendices, primarily on the basis that such species are afforded a stronger degree of 
protection under the ICRW.77 Indeed, the CMS employs highly deferential language in 
addressing the whaling issue which, as noted above, largely views issues such as quota- 
setting and other aspects of hunting management as falling under the distinct purview of other 
organisations. Furthermore, vociferous protests against the listing of further species of large 
whales by pro-consumption parties, primarily Norway and Denmark, have ensured that such
71 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat o f the International Whaling Commission and the 
Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation o f Migratory Species of Wild Animals; reproduced as Annex 
1 of Document UNEP/CMS/Conf.7.11, presented at the Seventh COP to the CMS.
72 Article I.
73 Article II.
74 Article III.
75 Article IV. Under Article V, both Secretariats undertake to report on the effectiveness of the MOU and “seek 
further guidance on new areas of cooperation”.
76 Resolution 2001-13: On Small Cetaceans.
77 A. Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2005), at 333.
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a policy has remained consistent within the various CMS institutions. This avoidance of 
controversy with regard to whales has meant that the CMS has thereby largely played a
no
“supporting non-conflicting role” with the IWC to date.
Instead, the CMS institutions have long focussed on small cetaceans, noting the perpetual 
difficulties experienced by the IWC in this respect. Indeed, at the Fourth Meeting of the 
Scientific Council it was explicitly declared that “the IWC lacked the political framework -  
which CMS can offer -  to follow through on its recommendations ... the IWC was unlikely 
to come to a decision in the near future on the sensitive issue of competence for small
7Q
cetaceans”. Further clarification of the prospective remit apropos small cetaceans was 
forthcoming a year later at the Fourth COP, with the scientific functions of the CMS 
seemingly confined to “migratory aspects of the species while the IWC Scientific Committee
OA
was concerned with its habitat and population”.
Nevertheless, the comparative roles of the Bonn Convention and the IWC are perhaps not as 
simplistically divided as this earlier arrangement may suggest. The recent inauguration of the 
IWC Conservation Committee, alongside a greater consideration of the impacts of 
anthropogenic activities upon cetaceans under the CMS, has brought a more fluid 
interpretation of the regulatory frontier between the organisations in more recent years. 
Indeed, prior to the establishment of the Conservation Committee, interactions between the 
IWC and the CMS umbrella were predominantly confined to the scientific arena. The 
development of the Conservation Committee has provided a further platform for 
collaborative work, in which the IWC has been swift to embrace the Bonn Convention. 
Although this arrangement has been characterised largely by vague statements of support for 
future cooperation and undertakings towards exploring prospective collaborative work 
programmes, there are signs that a mutually-supportive agenda is starting to come to fruition.
78 Ibid. Furthermore, it is clear that if the Bonn Convention did permit future exploitation of whale stocks, 
especially minke whales, then “such quotas would be in accordance with the IWC Revised Management 
Procedure”: Report o f the Eleventh Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2002), at 22. It appears that 
this position would apply notwithstanding that the CMS Scientific Council has formally noted a “lack of 
confidence in the effectiveness” of the RMP, further considering that there are “considerable uncertainties about 
population trends and the species was subject to a range o f threats owing to its aquatic habitat”: ibid.
79 Report o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1993), at 3.
80 Proceedings o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties (Bonn: CMS, 1994), at 52.
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As noted above, at the Eighth COP to the CMS a broad Resolution was adopted on adverse
Q 1
anthropogenic activities in the cetacean environment; this was swiftly noted by the 
Conservation Committee, which expressed its support for this development and to working 
with the CMS on this issue.82 More explicitly, at the Sixtieth Meeting of the IWC in 2008, the 
Conservation Committee actively discussed the role of the CMS in cetacean conservation in a 
manner that suggests that its assistance may not be restricted to scientific aspects of 
migration. Indeed, building on an earlier proposal to develop a joint work programme 
between the IWC’s Scientific and Conservation Committees and ASCOBANS, the 
Conservation Committee called for collaboration between the IWC and the CMS in respect of 
entanglements and by-catches, ship-strikes, climate change, habitat degradation and prey 
depletion. The IWC has noted the development by the CMS of a Programme of Work for 
Cetaceans, for which a close working relationship with the IWC is envisaged. Accordingly, 
it appears that the further elaboration of this programme will prove highly instructive in the 
development of future working practices between the CMS and the IWC.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
As noted above, the CMS may be considered to offer considerable conservation possibilities 
for the species of cetaceans protected under its auspices. Indeed, the Bonn Convention 
provides a framework under which their conservation status may be advanced in a 
coordinated and holistic manner, addressing a broad range of anthropogenic threats to such 
species. Accordingly, a number of key advantages may be identified in the operation of the 
CMS as a regime by which to promote the conservation of cetaceans.
Firstly, cetaceans have occupied a prominent position on the CMS agenda since its inception. 
Notwithstanding some individual discord between parties over certain species -  most notably 
the minke whale -  the consideration of cetaceans under the Bonn Convention has largely 
avoided the controversy experienced within the IWC. One possible explanation is that a 
number of key pro-whaling states have consistently declined to participate within the CMS. 
Consequently, discussions of cetacean issues have not been dominated by the directed
81 Resolution 8.22: Adverse Human Induced Impacts on Cetaceans.
82 Report o f the Conservation Committee (Cambridge: IWC, 2006) at 3; adopted at the Fifty-Eighth Meeting of 
the IWC.
83 Report o f the Conservation Committee (Cambridge: IWC, 2008) at 7; adopted at the Sixtieth Meeting of the 
IWC.
84 Ibid.
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hunting debate, which has facilitated greater opportunities to develop policies addressing a 
host of conservation problems in a manner that has not historically been forthcoming to such 
an extent under the ICRW.
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, unprecedented attention has been focussed upon 
small cetaceans under the CMS regime, within both the general framework of the parent 
convention and the individual subsidiary Agreements. A strong case can therefore be made to 
identify the CMS as the leading current multilateral forum in practice to address the 
conservation needs of small cetaceans. The ongoing debate over IWC competence presents a 
considerable impediment to developing meaningful conservation and management initiatives 
for small cetaceans under the auspices of the ICRW. The lack of equivalent political 
obstacles has permitted a greater volume o f productive conservation initiatives to emerge for 
small cetaceans through the CMS, as opposed to the ICRW.
In this regard, the specific threats to cetaceans -  both large and small species -  have received 
particular attention within the CMS regime, especially in the context of ocean noise and by- 
catches. Furthermore, the CMS has largely avoided the generic conservation approaches 
taken by other multilateral fora, emphasising region-specific solutions to the anthropogenic 
threats to these species. This is significant since cetaceans may be exposed to very different 
threats in certain regions. For instance, as noted in the following Chapter, even within the 
relatively narrow geographical confines of ASCOBANS, the key mortality factors vary 
considerably between the Baltic and North Seas respectively.
Despite some initial difficulties, with the CMS initially dubbed a “sleeping treaty”,85 and one 
that has, at times, lacked both teeth and participants,86 the Convention structure demonstrates 
clear scope to address cetaceans effectively. Some problems remain, however, especially the 
acute financial pressures that have arisen as the CMS umbrella has expanded significantly in 
recent years. As noted in Chapter VII, such pressures have impacted upon its ability to 
generate further binding cetacean Agreements. Moreover, cetaceans constitute a small, but 
significant, aspect of the Convention’s remit. The CMS may therefore lack both the necessary 
resources and focus to act as a long-term default option to regulate small cetaceans globally.
85 S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis o f  International Treaties Concerned with the Conservation 
of Wildlife (Cambridge: Grotius, 1985) at 301.
86 Matz, “Chaos or Coherence”, at 208-10.
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In sum, the Bonn Convention has advanced a number of positive initiatives for the regulation 
of (sm)all cetaceans. These policies have, however, been somewhat undermined by resource 
pressures, competing regulatory priorities and uncertainty over the precise position of the 
CMS in the overall framework for cetacean conservation. The ongoing development of the 
COP’s Programme of Work for Cetaceans should provide considerable illumination as to 
future working practices for the CMS in relation to other pertinent multilateral agreements, 
which will undoubtedly help to sharpen the focus of institutional policies accordingly. 
Nevertheless, many of the shortcomings currently experienced by the CMS are likely to be 
mirrored if -  presupposing that the IWC is unable to generate the political conditions 
necessary to perform such duties -  a global regulator could be established with specific 
responsibility for small cetaceans. Therefore, in the absence of a new and better-resourced 
global alternative, the Bonn Convention regime remains likely to remain the most viable 
current forum through which the specific conservation needs of small cetaceans may be 
advanced. Small cetaceans are regulated under the CMS framework through a growing 
network of Agreements and MOUs. It is to the merits of this framework that this thesis now 
turns, commencing with an evaluation of ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS respectively, 
before analysing the possibilities generated by a more MOU-based approach and the 
prospects for the further expansion of the CMS cetacean umbrella.
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CHAPTER V 
THE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSERVATION OF SMALL 
CETACEANS OF THE BALTIC SEA. NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC, 
IRISH AND NORTH SEAS. 1992
5.1 Introduction
The first CMS subsidiary Agreement to address cetaceans was the Agreement on the 
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas, as this instrument was 
originally named.1 ASCOBANS represents the first multilateral instrument elaborated 
specifically to address the conservation needs of small cetaceans, in contrast to previous 
international initiatives that focussed primarily on large whales. Having been operational 
since early 1994, the experience of ASCOBANS therefore represents an insightful case-study 
of the operation of an Agreement pertaining to these particular species.
ASCOBANS occupies an interesting position within the regulatory framework addressing 
cetaceans within these waters. As the only international forum with a particular focus on 
small cetaceans, it cohabits -  sometimes uneasily -  with a number of other supervisory 
bodies in the region. The precise role of ASCOBANS has been a matter of considerable 
debate, with questions raised over the continuing utility of the Agreement. Although broad 
support for ASCOBANS remains, it is nonetheless clear that the regime has reached a critical 
point in its development, both in terms of conservation policies and its role within the CMS 
family. ASCOBANS has accordingly experienced an eventful tenure to date, which may be 
somewhat illustrative of contemporary difficulties in regulating specifically for small 
cetaceans.
This Chapter will analyse the operation of ASCOBANS thus far, outlining its negotiation, 
application and position within the current regulatory framework. This Chapter also considers 
the reformed institutional structure of the Agreement and key conservation policies pursued 
by ASCOBANS to date. Finally, a series of conclusions are advanced regarding the future 
operation of the Agreement.
1 1772 UNTS 217 [hereinafter “ASCOBANS”]. The Agreement area was expanded in 2003, a development that 
officially entered into effect in 2008, following the requisite five ratifications of the enabling Resolution. 
ASCOBANS was formally renamed at this juncture, retaining its original acronym.
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5.2 Negotiating history
The conclusion of an instrument to address the conservation needs of migratory cetaceans 
was envisaged at a preliminary stage under the Bonn Convention. The initial mandate for the 
elaboration of ASCOBANS was provided at the first COP to the CMS in 1985, which 
instructed the Secretariat to take “appropriate measures” to develop Agreements for 
numerous species, including North and Baltic Sea populations of harbour porpoises and 
bottlenose dolphins.2 A Working Group was accordingly convened under the auspices of the 
CMS Scientific Council to develop a suitable instrument.3
These preliminary consultations provided little immediate optimism that an Agreement on 
cetaceans could be swiftly brokered between the Baltic and North Sea coastal states, with the 
initial negotiations producing “irreconcilable differences of opinion on the scope and 
content”.4 A draft Agreement produced by the Working Group failed even to secure an 
official sponsor from among the relevant CMS parties. These inauspicious developments saw 
the Working Group disbanded in 1988, with the lack of a discernible consensus deemed 
“inappropriate for further resources to be expended by the Secretariat on this issue at this 
time”.5
Despite these initial difficulties, enthusiasm remained to develop an instrument for migratory 
cetaceans within the region. One particular impediment to the negotiations was removed at 
the Second and Third COPs to the CMS, where a number of species of small cetaceans -  
including many species commonly resident in the Baltic and North Seas -  were listed on 
Appendix II of the parent convention. This was highly significant since, as noted in Chapter 
IV, Article IV(1) of the CMS requires subsidiary agreements to be concluded for Appendix II 
species. These designations thereby broadened the potential application of the proposed 
subsidiary agreement to encompass species that were previously excluded from its auspices. 
The negotiation process received a fresh political impetus in 1990, with the adoption of a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Small Cetaceans of the North Sea at the Third Ministerial
2 Resolution 1.6: Agreements.
3 Proceedings o f the First Meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties (Bonn: CMS, 1985), at 50.
4 Report o f the First Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1988), at 2.
5 Ibid.
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Conference of the North Sea in 1990.6 In September 1990, Sweden agreed to sponsor the 
agreement which prompted a further series of negotiations, culminating in the conclusion of 
ASCOBANS at the Third COP of the CMS in 1991. The Agreement was opened for 
signature in 1992 and formally entered into force on 29 March 1994.
ASCOBANS was ultimately adopted under the aegis of Article IV(4) of the parent 
convention, as opposed to the more explicitly cetacean-orientated Article IV(3). As noted by 
Nijkamp and Nollkaemper, Article IV(4) formed the basis for the first CMS cetacean 
Agreement for two key reasons.7 Firstly, the range and migratory route of small cetaceans 
remained largely unknown at the time at which the Agreement was concluded, thereby failing 
to satisfy the precise requirements of Article V(4)(b) of the CMS for the establishment of an 
Article IV(3) AGREEMENT. Secondly, Article IV(4) Agreements are considered to offer a 
greater degree of flexibility than those concluded under Article IV(3) and are therefore more
fteasily tailored to the specific conservation needs of the species in question.
5.3 Scope
ASCOBANS applies ratione materiae to “all small cetaceans found within the area of the 
Agreement”.9 As observed in Chapter II, the term “small cetacean” has given rise to 
considerable definitional difficulties in multilateral conventions. Gillespie notes that 
cetaceans are often considered “small” not as a result of their physical dimensions, but 
primarily “because they happen to possess certain characteristics that fall within various 
relevant categories”.10 ASCOBANS follows the IWC in defining such animals as “any 
species, subspecies or population of toothed whales Odontoceti, except the sperm whale 
Physter macrocephalus”.11
6 Reproduced in D. Freestone and T. IJlstra (eds.), The North Sea: Basic Legal Documents on Regional 
Environmental Cooperation (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), at 277.
7 H. Nijkamp and A. Nollkaemper, “The Protection of Small Cetaceans in the Face o f Uncertainty: An Analysis 
of the ASCOBANS Agreement” (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 281, at 288.
8 Ibid., at 288-9.
9 Para. 1.1.
10 A. Gillespie, “Small Cetaceans, International Law and the International Whaling Commission” in W. C. G. 
Bums and A. Gillespie, The Future o f Cetaceans in a Changing World (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2003), at 219.
11 Para 1.2(a). The IWC definition was outlined in Resolution 1977-6: Reporting Requirements for Small-Type 
Whaling.
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This definition deliberately excludes the sperm whale, which is considered scientifically to be 
the sole member of the Order Odontoceti that is a large species of cetacean. It is thereby 
disqualified from the purview of an Agreement that seeks, in its present format, to address 
only small species. Likewise, the minke whale is excluded, since it is a baleen as opposed to a 
toothed species. The omission of minke whales unsurprising, given the controversy generated 
by attempts to list this species on Appendix II o f the CMS at the time at which ASCOBANS 
was concluded. Indeed, concerns were raised within the Scientific Council at this juncture as 
to whether such a move “was either appropriate or meaningful”, given that this species was 
already governed under the ICRW.12 The potential listing of the minke whale on the CMS 
Appendices -  given that it is the most numerically abundant of all the species of 
commercially-exploited cetaceans -  remains an emotive issue within the parent convention, 
and one that ASCOBANS has largely sought to avoid.
At the time of its conclusion, the state of scientific knowledge concerning the species of small 
cetaceans caught by the ASCOBANS definition within these waters was alarmingly 
deficient.13 Shortly after the Agreement entered into force in 1994, the first coordinated 
project was initiated to map populations o f cetaceans within an extended study zone broadly 
similar to, but not an exact template of, the ASCOBANS Area. The SCANS project (Small 
Cetacean Abundance in the North Seas), considered to be “the best professional judgement 
on the status and distribution of small cetaceans in this region”,14 examined cetacean 
populations in the North Sea “and adjacent areas”15 and ultimately concluded that nine 
species of small cetaceans were resident in these waters, all of which were listed on Appendix 
II of the CMS.16
12 Report o f the First Meeting o f the Scientific Council, (Bonn: CMS, 1988), at 5. Indeed, a motion within the 
Scientific Council with a view towards recommending to the COP the formal listing o f listing minke whales on 
the CMS Appendices was comprehensively defeated by seven votes to three, while all other candidate species 
for potential designation at this juncture were accepted by a unanimous vote: ibid.
13 As noted by Nijkamp and Nollkaemper, “[u]ntil 1994, the scientific record on the presence o f small cetaceans 
in the Baltic and North Seas consisted o f non-systematically compiled data based on sightings from ships and 
land, and from strandings”: “Small Cetaceans in the Face o f Uncertainty”, at 282.
14 Ibid., at 282.
15 In practice the SCANS project primarily examined the North Sea and the Celtic Shelf. The findings of 
SCANS are reproduced in P. S. Hammond et al., Distribution and Abundance o f the Harbour Porpoise and 
Other Cetaceans in the North Sea and Adjacent Waters (SCANS) EU-Project LIFE 92-2/UK/027, Final Report, 
and presented in a more concise form in P. S. Hammond et ah, “Abundance of Harbour Porpoise and Other 
Cetaceans in the North Sea and Adjacent Waters” (2002) 39 Journal o f Applied Ecology 361.
16 Namely the harbour porpoise, bottlenose dolphin, white-beaked dolphin, Atlantic white-sided dolphin, 
common dolphin, striped dolphin, long-finned pilot whale, Risso’s dolphin and killer whale. Additionally, the 
SCANS survey found four species o f whale -  the sperm whale, minke whale, fin whale and humpback whale -  
within these waters, all o f which currently remain outside the purview of ASCOBANS.
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In its initial form, ASCOBANS applied ratione loci to the “marine environment of the Baltic 
and North Seas”, which included the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, the Swedish Kattegat and
1 7Skagerrak Seas, as well as the North Sea and English Channel. Nevertheless, it has long 
been acknowledged that the original Agreement Area failed to provide congruence with the 
known migratory pathways of the species protected under its auspices. Consequently, even as 
early as the first formal meeting convened under ASCOBANS, the prospect of a further
1 ftexpansion of the Agreement Area was mooted by the parties. Throughout the early years of 
the Agreement, however, the Advisory Committee (AC) to ASCOBANS concentrated 
predominantly upon encouraging existing Range State participation, rather than soliciting 
further constituents.
In 2003, at the Fourth MOP, the Agreement was extended westwards to incorporate Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain as additional Range States to ASCOBANS, thereby establishing a direct 
geographical link with ACCOBAMS.19 In redrawing the ASCOBANS frontiers, particular 
care was taken to avoid exceeding the limits of national jurisdiction and to prevent overlap 
with the existing ACCOBAMS Area, which might otherwise generate unnecessary practical 
difficulties.20 Valid amendments to the Agreement text require ratification by five parties,21 a 
pre-condition that initially proved somewhat elusive.22 In November 2007 Finland deposited 
the requisite fifth ratification, and the extended Agreement Area formally entered into force 
on 1 February 2008. However, the extension of the ASCOBANS Area subsequently proved 
rather anti-climactic, since none of the new Range States have expressed any meaningful 
intention to accede. Indeed, such a development may have inadvertently introduced practical 
complications, since potential parties have advocated the inclusion of large cetaceans under 
ASCOBANS, to attain parity of species coverage with ACCOBAMS, as a prerequisite to 
accession.23
17 The original Agreement area was defined in Para 1.2(b) and, due to some ambiguity over the precise limits of 
the westerly waters of the UK as listed in the initial definition, was subject to further clarification at the First 
MOP in 1994: Resolution on the Clarification of the Definition o f the Area o f the Agreement.
18 Report o f the First Meeting o f the Parties to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASOBANS, 1994), at 7.
19 Resolution No. 4: Extension o f the ASCOBANS Agreement Area.
20 Report o f the Ninth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2002), at 11.
21 Para 6.5.3.
22 Resolution No. 3: Extension of the ASCOBANS Agreement Area, adopted at the Fifth MOP in 2006.
23 Indeed, Spain has declared that “it would not make sense to have an agreement covering all species in one 
part of our territory and another agreement for small cetaceans only in the other part o f our waters”: Document 
MOP 5/Doc.29(S), submitted by the government o f Spain to the Fifth MOP of ASCOBANS, 5 December 2006.
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The potential expansion of species coverage under ASCOBANS has given rise to 
considerable debate between the parties in recent years. At the Twelfth AC Meeting, an ad 
hoc  Working Group was convened to consider the legal, political and scientific implications 
of an expanded subject scope.24 However, these investigations revealed considerable 
antagonism to this prospect, citing the displacement of resources away from critically 
endangered Baltic stocks of harbour porpoises, a likely adverse response from the IWC and 
substantial additional workload implications. Moreover, a crucial consideration of the parties 
was that, in its current format, ASCOBANS fulfils a unique niche role for the advancement 
of the particular conservation and management needs of small cetaceans, which should not be 
lightly disregarded.
Conversely, support for expansion has been forthcoming primarily from less influential 
quarters, particularly non-parties and NGOs. Such constituents advocate that issues addressed 
under the current purview of ASCOBANS also affect large cetaceans, hence there is likely to 
be little diversion of resources in practice.26 ACCOBAMS itself has also argued that 
expansion may present greater fundraising opportunities, while noting a lack of antagonism
99from the IWC in discharging its remit in relation to large cetaceans. The experience of 
France demonstrates that ratification of both ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS is not 
fundamentally irreconcilable. Moreover, all present and potential parties to ASCOBANS are
98EU Member States, and are tasked under the Habitats Directive with establishing strict 
protection measures for “all species” of cetaceans.29 However, while an expansion of the 
ASCOBANS remit is juridically uncomplicated, it is nonetheless clear that this proposal 
carries currently far from unanimous support among the current parties.
5.4 Participation
24 Report o f the Twelfth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2005), at 16.
25 Report o f the Thirteenth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2006), at 8.
26 Ibid., at 9.
27 Report o f the Fourteenth Meeting o f  the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2007), at 
16.
28 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation o f natural habitats and o f wild fauna and 
flora [1992] Official Journal L206/7.
29 A full appraisal o f commitments under the Habitats Directive towards cetaceans is advanced in Chapter VIII 
of this thesis.
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ASCOBANS is open to participation by all “Range States and Regional Economic 
Integration Organisations”.30 A Range State under ASCOBANS is construed in an expansive 
manner,31 and is considerably broader than the corresponding CMS definition. Interestingly, 
Spain considers itself to have been caught within this initial definition by virtue of national
39fishing activities, although future Spanish participation within ASCOBANS would be 
explicitly grounded in the geographical expansion of the Agreement area. Likewise, the 
potential application to external fishing practices has also proven to be “entirely theoretical as 
there are no parts of the Agreement area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”,33 a 
position that was deliberately perpetuated within the extended Agreement area.
Accordingly, parties and participants in ASCOBANS have thus far been drawn from the 
fourteen coastal states located within the original Agreement area, namely Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Russia, Sweden and the UK. To date, ten Range States have ratified the Agreement.34 
Estonia is an additional signatory and in 2006 stated that ratification was expected 
imminently,35 although this has yet to occur. Latvia has prioritised participation in other CMS 
Agreements over involvement within ASCOBANS, given since the marked lack of 
cetaceans in national waters.37 Some of Latvia’s Baltic neighbours have nonetheless argued 
that such a position rather misses the point of the Agreement, which operates as much to 
restore depleted stocks of small cetaceans and extend the natural range of these species as to 
conserve existing populations. Latvia nonetheless participates in the ASCOBANS Jastamia 
Group and receives seed funding to facilitate attendance. Beyond the NGO fraternity, there 
has been little official Russian engagement with ASCOBANS, with financial constraints long 
cited as an inhibiting factor. Meanwhile, Norway has declined to participate due to the 
prohibition on sustainable harvesting under the Agreement, although it has proved to be a
30 Para 8.4.
31 Under Para. 1.2(f), a Range State is defined as “any State, whether or not a party to the agreement, that 
exercises jurisdiction over any part o f the range o f a species covered by this agreement, or a State whose fishing 
vessels, outside national jurisdictional limits but within the area o f the agreement, are engaged in operations 
adversely affecting small cetaceans”.
32 Letter from the Ministry of the Environment o f the Kingdom of Spain to ASCOBANS, submitted at the 
Twelfth Meeting of the Advisory Committee, Document AC12/Doc.23(S).
33 R. R. Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Ascobans and Accobams 
Agreements” in A. E. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 234.
34 Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK.
35 Report o f the Fifth Meeting o f the Parties to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2006), at 1.
36 Report o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 1997), at 15.
37 Report o f the First Meeting o f  the Parties to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 1994), at 5.
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valuable scientific partner to ASCOBANS. Ireland has demonstrated little enthusiasm for 
participation -  somewhat surprisingly, given the designation of its national waters as a
IQ
cetacean sanctuary -  while Spain and Portugal have also declined to accede, as noted above.
Beyond Range State activities, the most significant non-participant within ASCOBANS 
remains the European Community. Since 2004, with the accession of Poland and the Baltic 
States to the European Union, the Baltic Sea has been subject to closer EC regulation, while 
as noted in Chapter VIII, cetaceans have enjoyed high political visibility on an EU level. The 
ongoing reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the development of the Habitats 
Directive have raised uncomfortable questions over the future role of ASCOBANS, with all 
the current parties subject to a series of overriding -  and potentially conflicting -  measures in 
relation to cetaceans under EC law.
The EC has historically maintained an ambivalent relationship with ASCOBANS, 
consistently rejecting the possibility of formal ratification. Indeed, throughout the early years 
of the Agreement, relations between ASCOBANS and the EC were relatively poor.40 EC 
officials have often cited workload considerations and time constraints as a bar to exploring 
mutual conservation possibilities, a position that ASCOBANS has considered “disappointing 
and unsatisfactory”41 and “not helpful”.42 Relations have softened in recent years, with EC 
officials noting that the Agreement could potentially have a valuable advisory role in the 
implementation of Habitats Directive obligations,43 while ASCOBANS expertise has been 
acknowledged in the formation o f EC by-catch policies.44 Some suggestion was also made 
that the Agreement’s views “particularly in the field of pollution” would be sought on the 
marine conservation strategy advanced in the EC’s Sixth Environmental Action
38 R. R. Churchill, “The Agreement on the Conservation o f Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas” in 
Bums and Gillespie, “Future o f Cetaceans”, at 310.
39 S. D. Berrow and E. Rogan, “Ireland -  A Sanctuary for Whales and Dolphins: The Implications of Ireland’s 
Sanctuary Declaration” (1994) 8 European Research on Cetaceans 12.
40 R. Caddell, “Biodiversity Loss and the Prospects for International Cooperation: EU Law and the Conservation 
of Migratory Species o f Wild Animals” (2008) 8 Yearbook o f European Environmental Law 218, at 247-250.
41 Report o f  the Third Meeting o f  the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 1996), at 6.
42 Report o f  the Fourth Meeting o f  the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 1997), at 15. 
Indeed, at this juncture it was observed that at Fifth COP to the CMS itself, the official EC representative rather 
patronisingly declared that the various ASCOBANS participants “should be pleased to have our research 
projects funded rather than be concerned about EC presence at our meetings”: ibid.
43 Ibid., at 12-13.
44 Report o f the Tenth Meeting o f  the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2003), at 9.
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Programme.45 Nevertheless, it appears that these intimations ultimately came to very little, 
with the AC subsequently lamenting that “ASCOBANS had not formally been engaged by 
the European Commission in the preparation of the European Marine Strategy”.46
A close and co-operative relationship with the EC remains a fundamental practical 
consideration for the future success of ASCOBANS initiatives. This is especially true in the 
case of fisheries by-catches -  an area of priority activity for ASCOBANS -  since its 
constituent parties have transferred exclusive competence over fisheries to the EC. The 
practical implications inherent in this position are discussed further in Chapter VIII. 
However, at this juncture it should be observed that the transfer of fisheries competence 
means essentially that the parties cannot effectively implement ASCOBANS by-catch 
commitments and policies without explicit EC endorsement. This creates a very real danger 
of stagnation in the pursuit o f ASCOBANS initiatives. Indeed, as noted below, the AC has 
repeatedly lamented the non-implementation of by-catch commitments in particular, with 
significant practical impediments posed by the nature of fisheries regulation in these waters.
Beyond these concerns, there are considerable practical attractions from the ASCOBANS 
perspective of a close association with the EC. In particular, closer Commission involvement 
would present opportunities to influence the EC cetacean agenda more prominently, while 
also creating greater scope to mitigate conflicts with Community legislation. Likewise, the 
experience of AEWA -  the only CMS subsidiary that the EC has ratified47 -  suggests that 
Community participation has also had a positive impact on the development of species action 
plans,48 which remains a prominent commitment under ASCOBANS. With such advantages 
in mind, the parties have resolved to “explore ways in which ASCOBANS can better liaise 
and work with the EC on issues of mutual interest” 49 Thus far, however, tangible cooperation 
has been modest and is primarily limited to official visits by the ASCOBANS Secretariat to 
the Commission, and sharing information on by-catch statistics.
45 Report o f  the Eighth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2001), at 13. 
As noted in Chapter VIII of this these, this initiative that would eventually become the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive.
46 Report o f the Twelfth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2005), at 25.
47 Council Decision 2006/871/EC [2006] Official Journal L345/25.
48 Caddell, “Biodiversity Loss”, at 254-257.
49 Resolution No. 6; Activities o f the ASCOBANS Advisory Committee 2007-2010, adopted at the Fifth MOP 
in 2006.
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Finally, participation in ASCOBANS is not limited simply to the relevant Range States. As 
Churchill observes, a considerable number o f relevant intergovernmental organisations with a 
proven regulatory interest in cetaceans also operate within the Agreement Area.50 This 
position creates a substantial risk of “treaty congestion”, which the ASCOBANS Secretariat 
has sought to mitigate through the establishment o f institutional linkages.
While small cetaceans remain a controversial issue under the ICRW, a cooperative working 
relationship has nonetheless been established with the IWC. Small cetaceans have received 
particular attention within the IWC Scientific Committee, which has provided technical 
advice and assistance to ASCOBANS in establishing by-catch mitigation targets and 
addressing pollutants. The IWC has “recognis[ed] the relevance” of ASCOBANS for the 
protection of harbour porpoises and called upon mutual parties to provide full information on 
population distribution and abundance, stock identities, pollutant levels, and by-catch 
mortality and to give “high priority” to reducing by-catches of such species.51 Senior IWC 
officials have also been regular and productive observers at the various MOPs to 
ASCOBANS.
The work of two key regional organisations that regulate the Baltic and North Seas -  
HELCOM and OSPAR -  has also been of particular interest to ASCOBANS. In the Baltic 
Sea, the Helsinki Convention52 requires the parties inter alia “to conserve natural habitats and
53biological diversity and to protect ecological processes”. Cetaceans have traditionally 
occupied a relatively peripheral position on the HELCOM agenda, with one such species -  
the harbour porpoise -  ordinarily resident in these waters. In 1996, a HELCOM 
Recommendation raised concerns over a dramatic decrease in population levels, with “by- 
catches, habitat deterioration and disturbance” identified as particular threats to this species.54 
Although HELCOM operates a Nature Protection and Biodiversity Group, conservation
50 Churchill observes no less than seven separate fora through which small cetacean conservation may be 
advanced to a greater or lesser extent, including the IWC, the Convention for the Protection o f the Marine 
Environment o f the North-East Atlantic 1992 (OSPAR), the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission 
(HELCOM), the Council o f Europe and NAMMCO, as well as further political and scientific organisations such 
as ICES and the North Sea Ministerial Conferences: “Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas”, at 300- 
307.
51 Resolution 1993-11: Resolution on Harbour Porpoise in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea.
52 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment o f the Baltic Sea Area; 1507 UNTS 167.
53 Article 15.
54 Recommendation 17/2: Protection o f Harbour Porpoise in the Baltic Sea Area.
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activities for Baltic harbour porpoises have been primarily channelled through ASCOBANS, 
with a close working relationship having been established between the two organisations 
since the inception of the Agreement. HELCOM has explicitly identified ASCOBANS as a 
key partner for the conservation of marine biodiversity in the Baltic Sea area, and has pledged 
to undertake research programmes and develop a coordinated reporting system and database 
on sightings, by-catches and strandings in conjunction with ASCOBANS by 2010.55 
HELCOM has also committed itself to supporting the implementation of key aspects of the 
Jastamia Plan.56
Likewise, OSPAR has been specifically identified as a forum through which the 
ASCOBANS agenda against contaminants in the North Sea may be effectively advanced.57 
Moreover, OSPAR was centrally identified by the CMS at its Eighth COP as one of the 
“relevant international bodies” with which to determine work programmes and ensure a “full 
exchange of information and collaboration”.58 Like HELCOM, the OSPAR Convention59 is 
of particular of relevance to ASCOBANS, given its commitments towards the restoration of 
the ecological integrity of the North-East Atlantic and, especially, the conservation of marine 
ecosystems.60 The OSPAR framework also offers possibilities for the development of marine 
protected areas within the region. Of most immediate relevance to ASCOBANS is the 
OSPAR programme of Ecological Quality Objectives (EcoQOs), with an EcoQO project 
having been established in 2005 for by-catches of North Sea populations of harbour 
porpoises.61 As noted below, the recent conclusion by ASCOBANS of the North Sea 
Conservation Plan for this species is therefore likely to constitute a significant component of 
this wider OSPAR strategy and offer further opportunities for operational synergies.
Finally, while the consumptive use of small cetaceans is essentially prohibited under 
ASCOBANS, a tentative relationship has been formed with NAMMCO to facilitate and
55 Document AC 15/Doc. 34 (O), Co-operation between ASCOBANS and HELCOM in Cetacean Conservation, 
submitted by HELCOM to the Fifteenth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS in 2008.
56 Indeed, the HELCOM Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 25 June 2003 at the HELCOM Ministerial Meeting 
in Bremen pledged to “give political support to the adoption and implementation o f the Recovery Plan for Baltic 
Harbour Porpoises”: reproduced on-line at www.helcom.fi (last visited 31 August 2009).
57 Report o f the Seventh Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2000), at 10.
58 Resolution 8.22: Adverse Human Induced Impacts on Cetaceans.
59 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment o f the North-East Atlantic 1992; 2354 UNTS 67.
60 Article 2(1).
61 Background Document on the Ecological Quality Objective on Bycatch o f Harbour Porpoises in the North 
Sea (London: OSPAR, 2005), at 3.
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ff)promote the transfer of scientific data. Beyond this broad commitment, however, it appears 
that both ASCOBANS and NAMMCO operate largely in isolation to each other with little 
more than sporadic formal contact.
5.5 Institutional arrangements
Much of the substantive text of ASCOBANS provides for the creation of operational 
institutions to oversee the activities of the parties, which broadly mirror those of the parent 
convention. Concerns have been raised over the efficiency of the original institutional 
structure and, in 2006, substantial reforms were introduced at the executive level of the 
Agreement. This has provoked a strong divergence of views, both within and beyond the 
confines of ASCOBANS, as to whether such developments are suitable, effective or 
appropriate.
The primary decision-making body of ASCOBANS is the Meeting o f the Parties (MOP) 
which is convened on a triennial basis, of which five have been held to date. The purpose of 
the MOP is stated as being to review progress made and difficulties encountered in the 
implementation and operation of the Agreement, with particular reference to financial matters 
and the work of the other ASCOBANS institutions.64 The MOP is the primary forum through 
which the key policies of the Agreement are elaborated, scrutinised and ultimately adopted. 
Decisions made by the MOP are adopted by a simple majority o f the parties present and 
voting, with each party allocated one vote, aside from financial decisions and amendments to 
the Agreement and its Annex, which require a three-quarters majority.65 Observers are 
entitled to attend the MOP, provided that they belong either to a lengthy catalogue of listed 
invitees66 or are “qualified in cetacean conservation and management” and have been 
accepted by the ASCOBANS parties.67 Interestingly, the requisite expertise of prospective 
observers is not confined to “small cetaceans”, although this is something of a moot point 
given that formal discussion of other species is generally tangential. In practice, NGO 
observers to ASCOBANS have played an unheralded yet highly significant role in the 
operation of the Agreement, frequently taking responsibility for the organisation and
62 Report o f the Twelfth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2005), at 24.
63 Personal communication with Dr. Christina Lockyer (on file).
64 Para. 6.1.
65 Para. 6.3.
66 Para. 6.2.1.
67 Para. 6.2.2. Such observers are essentially NGO representatives.
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management of Working Groups and research events, which is often beyond the capacity of 
national delegations to donate to the further activities of ASCOBANS.
The MOP receives operational support from the AC, which meets annually to review 
progress and to provide “expert advice ... on the conservation and management of small 
cetaceans”.68 Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that this forum often lacks the 
necessary breadth of expertise and sufficient time to fully discuss key issues.69 Likewise, the 
AC has been criticised as overly bureaucratic, often prioritising administrative and budgetary 
matters over the conservation and management objectives of the Agreement.70 At the Fifth 
MOP the AC was reformed, with meetings formally demarcated into two distinct sections
71 *addressing administrative issues and scientific and policy matters respectively. This 
arrangement has seemingly provided a greater degree of coherence in discharging the AC 
agenda, although considerable pressure remains on the time available to the delegates. 
However, reservations remain over the scientific capacity of ASCOBANS in comparison to 
other CMS Agreements. For instance, ACCOBAMS and EUROBATS have established 
strong scientific bodies, which have proved a fertile source of conservation policies and 
initiatives. Within ASCOBANS, such issues continue to compete for attention alongside a 
heavy administrative agenda within the AC, which may be considered a less efficient 
administrative structure than that encountered within other CMS bodies.
Finally ASCOBANS receives management support from its Secretariat, which is charged 
with undertaking essential administrative duties. Moreover, the Secretariat has in recent years 
assumed the important task of promoting synergies and productive working practices with 
other related IGOs. Despite this apparently prosaic remit, the Secretariat has in recent years 
experienced a somewhat fractious relationship with some of its party “shareholders”. The 
Secretariat has traditionally operated a rather modest office and, much of its tenure, has often 
struggled to keep pace with the ever-expanding workload and increasing commitments of 
ASCOBANS. The Secretariat has often proved to be under-funded and over-reliant upon a
79steady stream of interns and short-term consultants to discharge its functions. Since 2007
68 Para 5.1.
69 Churchill, “Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas”, at 293.
70 See R. Caddell, ASCOBANS -  Progress and Prospects: A Report to WWF (Doc MOP 5/ Doc.24 (O), 
submitted by WWF for consideration at the Fifth MOP, September 2006, at 21-22.
71 Resolution 2b: Financial, Budgetary and Administrative Matters -  Operating Procedures of the Agreement 
2007-2010.
72 Caddell, “ASCOBANS -  Progress and Prospects”, at 18-19.
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7^the ASCOBANS Secretariat has been merged with that of the parent convention, a position 
that has not always met with universal approval. Although this arrangement is considered to 
have reduced the Agreement’s running costs, with potential advantages for the funding of 
conservation projects, it appears that “a significant component of the ASCOBANS 
constituency has regarded and to some extent is still regarding the new arrangements with 
suspicion, when it is not openly opposing them”.74 The CMS Standing Committee has also 
observed disquiet within the parent convention that central staff and resources have been 
diverted into a subsidiary Agreement with few obvious conservation benefits for the non-
n c
ASCOBANS parties. Concerns may also be raised that these arrangements have not fully 
addressed the core problems of under-staffing and resource problems, which continue to 
affect the practical administration of the Agreement.
5.6 Conservation and management initiatives
ASCOBANS cites by-catches, habitat deterioration and disturbance as the key factors that 
may adversely affect populations of small cetaceans within the Agreement area, with a lack 
of scientific data also identified as a shortcoming to effective conservation efforts.76 
ASCOBANS aims to facilitate co-operation to achieve and maintain a “favourable 
conservation status” for all cetaceans in the Agreement area.77 This concept is not explicitly 
defined within the Agreement text; however it is widely interpreted as carrying the same 
meaning as that advanced under the parent convention.
5.6.1 General conservation measures
In order to facilitate these objectives, a targeted Conservation and Management Plan is 
appended to the Agreement. The ASCOBANS Conservation and Management Plan 
establishes five areas of activity which each party is to apply “within the limits of its
no
jurisdiction and in accordance with its international obligations”. Firstly, a series of habitat 
conservation and management objectives are explicitly identified, which have constituted a
73 Resolution 2d: Joining the Forces o f ASCOBANS and CMS for Improved Management and Operation of the 
ASCOBANS Secretariat, adopted at the Fifth MOP in 2006.
74 Report o f the Thirty-Second Meeting o f the CMS Standing Committee (Bonn: CMS, 2007), “Merger of CMS 
and ASCOBANS Secretariats: Progress”, Doc. CMS/StC32/8.
75 Ibid.
76 Preamble.
77 Para. 2.1.
78 Para. 2.2.
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significant proportion of the work undertaken by ASCOBANS to date. Secondly, further 
research activities are prescribed to assess the migratory behaviour of small cetaceans, to 
establish areas of importance to these species and present and potential threats to their 
conservation status. These activities have been pursued mainly through the on-going SCANS 
II project, encompassing a further survey of small cetacean populations in the Baltic and 
North Seas. Thirdly, the parties undertake to establish an effective system for reporting and 
retrieving by-catches. Fourthly, parties are to “endeavour” to establish under national law a 
prohibition on the intentional taking and killing of small cetaceans. This commitment falls 
technically short of an outright ban on directed hunting -  although the spirit of ASCOBANS 
practice to date has been to treat this provision as a key feature of the Agreement. Finally, a 
strong emphasis is also made on the provision of information and education about the aims of 
ASCOBANS, both to the general public as well as to the fishing industry. The various 
requirements of the Conservation and Management Plan have been elaborated through 
Resolutions adopted at the various MOPs, which are then to be applied by the parties within 
national policies addressing small cetaceans.
As noted above, the primary emphasis of the ASCOBANS Conservation and Management 
Plan to date has focussed upon the conservation and management of habitats of small 
cetaceans. In this respect, four key areas of work are identified, namely preventing the release 
of harmful substances; developing modifications of fishing gear and practices to reduce by- 
catches and prevent the netting from being discarded; regulating activities which seriously 
affect food resources of small cetaceans; and prevention of other significant disturbances, 
especially of an acoustic nature.79
Thus far, by-catch mitigation has been generally viewed as the primary area of regulatory 
activity under ASCOBANS. Incidental mortality is the most significant causal factor in the 
depletion of stocks of small cetaceans in the Baltic and North Seas.80 In the North Sea, 
considerable by-catch problems are raised by the widespread use of bottom-set gillnets,81
79 Para. 1 of the ASCOBANS Conservation and Management Plan.
80 Churchill, “Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas”, at 285.
81 T. A. Jefferson and B. E. Curry, “A Global Review of Porpoise (Cetacea: Phocoenidae) Mortality in 
Gillnets” (1994) 67 Biological Conservation 167, at 168. Porpoises are considered to be especially susceptible 
to by-catches in this equipment due to their feeding and foraging habits.
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pelagic trawl fisheries and the previously widespread use of driftnets. In the Baltic Sea, the 
heavily depleted numbers of harbour porpoises is attributed to historically high levels of by- 
catches in driftnets and bottom-set gillnets.83
To date, the ASCOBANS parties have examined the by-catch issue in considerable detail, 
and have adopted a number of Resolutions aimed at facilitating the development of a 
coordinated policy towards mitigating incidental cetacean mortality in the Agreement area. 
At the First MOP to the Agreement, a distinct Resolution was adopted in which a number of 
priority actions were established for the years 1995-97, including the “reduction of direct 
interactions with fisheries”.84 Early mitigation strategies involved the establishment of viable 
by-catch limits in the Baltic and North Seas.85 In conjunction with the IWC, the AC 
considered that the long-term aspirational goal of ASCOBANS should be to reduce by-catch 
to less than 1% of the best available abundance estimate, with a general (and rather 
unworldly) aim of ultimately eradicating all incidental catches in fisheries within the 
ASCOBANS area.86
However, as noted above it remains highly difficult -  if  not virtually impossible -  in practice 
to translate this objective into clear by-catch limits for particular fisheries within the 
Agreement Area. Indeed, not only would such a policy draw vociferous objections from the 
EC, which exercises exclusive competence over fisheries in respect of all the current 
ASCOBANS parties, but furthermore, given the paucity of data concerning stock numbers of 
small cetaceans in these waters, the current ASCOBANS by-catch limit accordingly applies 
to 1 % of a largely unknown figure. Consequently, the parties have repeatedly lamented that 
this objective has, unsurprisingly, “probably not been fulfilled”.87
82 K. Kaschner, Review o f Small Cetacean Bycatch in the ASCOBANS Agreement Area and Adjacent Waters -  
Current Status and Suggested Future Actions (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2003) at 30.
83 P. Berggren, P. R. Wade, J. Carlstrom and A. J. Reid, “Potential Limits to Anthropogenic Mortality of 
Harbour Porpoises in the Baltic Region” (2002) 103 Biological Conservation 313, at 320.
84 Resolution on the Implementation of the Conservation and Management Plan.
85 On the difficulties and conservation benefits inherent in this process see P. R. Wade, “Calculating Limits to 
the Allowable Human-Caused Mortality of Cetaceans and Pinnipeds” (1998) 14 Marine Mammal Science 1.
86 Resolution No. 3, Incidental Catches of Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Third MOP in 2000.
87 Resolution No. 5, Incidental Take of Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Fifth MOP in 2006.
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As far as the other key aspects of the ASCOBANS habitat conservation objectives are 
concerned, significant attention has been given to acoustic disturbances, which have long
oo
been identified as a considerable threat to marine mammals. In this respect, the parties have 
endorsed a series of national guidelines advanced by the UK to mitigate the impacts of
OQ
anthropogenic noise created as a result of oil and gas exploration. Moreover, ASCOBANS 
was one of the first legal avenues through which the ecological implications of military sonar 
activities were formally recognised and evaluated. In 2008, an Intersessional Working Group 
on the assessment of acoustic disturbance was created to develop guidelines for certain 
maritime activities known to create sources of disturbance within the cetacean environment.90 
In 2009 a series of indicative Guidelines were developed, using those of ACCOBAMS as a 
foundation, with the document due to be finalised for consideration at the Sixth MOP in 
September 2009.91
Few substantive actions have been pursued through ASCOBANS to directly regulate the 
discharge of hazardous substances, primarily due to limitations on legal competence and 
operational resources. Instead, the response of the Agreement has been essentially two-fold. 
This encompasses a series of research projects and, of greater operational importance, 
ASCOBANS has sought to work through key regional fora to promote its objectives in this 
respect. Pollution reduction was first addressed at the First MOP in 1994, where the parties 
established pollution reduction as a “priority action” for the initial operational period of the 
Agreement.92 An Intersessional Working Group on the effects of pollution was established in 
1995,93 but experienced a highly inauspicious start since all its members aside from the Chair 
had withdrawn within twelve months.94 Particular concern was reserved for the lack of a 
comprehensive list of management needs for small cetaceans with respect to pollutants and 
considerable emphasis was placed on collaboration with relevant bodies.95 At the Second 
MOP a Resolution noted the role of key multilateral organisations and advocated action
88 On this issue generally, see W. J. Richardson, C. R. Greene, Jr., C. I. Malme and D. H. Thomson, Marine 
Mammals and Noise (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995).
89 Resolution No. 4, Disturbance, adopted at the Third MOP in 2000.
90 Report o f  the Fifteenth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2008), at 15. 
The Working Group ultimately considered vessel-source noise, seismic surveys and pile-driving as particular
issues.
91 Report o f the Sixteenth Meeting o f  the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2009), at 9.
92 Resolution on the Implementation of the Conservation and Management Plan.
93 Report o f the Second Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 1995), at 13.
94 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 1996), at 2.
95 Ibid., at 11-12.
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within OSPAR and HELCOM for a “significant reduction of pollutant emissions and sources 
in the ASCOBANS area”.96 Subsequent activity in respect of pollution has followed the 
broad trend that management and regulation of hazardous substances is better pursued 
through the agenda of more specialist operators. ASCOBANS has sought to “support this 
work in an advisory capacity”,97 a commitment reinforced at successive MOPs.98 Most 
recently, ASCOBANS has resolved to support the IWC’s POLLUTION 2000+ initiative, 
alongside specific priority research projects advanced under OSPAR and HELCOM.99
Aside from the conservation and management of small cetacean habitats, particular 
significance is attached to information and educational remit exercised by ASCOBANS.100 
The information and education programme has become an increasingly important aspect of 
the work of the ASCOBANS Secretariat in recent years. In addition to maintaining a 
considerable volume of promotional literature in a variety of languages, one particularly 
significant initiative has been the elaboration of the International Day o f the Baltic Harbour 
Porpoise. This event, held annually in May since 2003, is the flagship educational programme 
within the various Baltic parties to ASCOBANS. On a wider level, ASCOBANS launched 
the “Year of the Dolphin” programme in 2007, which was subsequently extended into 
2008.101 This campaign, which is the most high-profile public information project launched 
under the auspices of the CMS to date, comprises a series of coordinated promotional events, 
pooling the promotional capabilities of the parent convention and relevant subsidiaries, to 
raise awareness of the conservation needs of small cetaceans. Furthermore, the Agreement 
also seeks to engage closely with the fishing industry, to support scientific objectives and to 
improve compliance with by-catch initiatives.102 However, it appears that this aspiration may 
pose substantial difficulties in practice. Indeed, representatives from the fishing industry have 
to date demonstrated limited enthusiasm to become involved in the operation of the 
Agreement, and some parties have in fact reported increasing hostility from the fisheries
96 Resolution on Management and Further Needs.
97 Resolution No. 7: Further Implementation of ASCOBANS (adopted at the Third MOP in 2000).
98 Resolution No. 8: Further Implementation of ASCOBANS (adopted at the Fourth MOP in 2003).
99 Resolution No. 7, Research on Habitat Quality, Health and Status of Small Cetaceans in the Agreement Area 
(adopted at the Fifth MOP in 2006).
100 Para 5 of the ASCOBANS Conservation and Management Plan.
101 See the Year of the Dolphin website at www.YOD.com (last visited 31 August 2009).
102 Resolution No. 6: Activities o f the ASCOBANS Advisory Committee 2007-2010.
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sector, with ASCOBANS often erroneously blamed for restrictive and unpopular fishing
103policies that have been ultimately imposed by the EC to mitigate cetacean by-catches.
5.6.2 Species conservation and recovery plans
In addition to these general policies, a particularly significant development under 
ASCOBANS has been the elaboration of distinct conservation and recovery plans for harbour 
porpoises. Indeed, of the species of cetaceans governed under the regulatory purview of the 
Agreement, the diminished numbers of harbour porpoises in the North Sea and, especially, 
the Baltic region are of particular concern. As a priority action, ASCOBANS is currently 
developing a series of conservation and recovery plans, establishing clear coherent 
conservation targets for these particular stocks.
As far as Baltic populations are concerned, a distinct Recovery Plan was elaborated in 
2002,104 and formally adopted at the Fourth MOP.105 The “Jastamia Plan”, as this programme 
is popularly known, advances a series of recommendations aimed at regenerating the heavily 
depleted stocks of harbour porpoises in this region, and is predominantly concerned with by- 
catch mitigation.106 The Recovery Plan is designed to be implemented by the various Parties 
bordering the Baltic Sea area, with progress and potential problems monitored by a 
designated Jastamia Group, established in conjunction with UNEP. Five meetings have been 
convened since the establishment of the Group in March 2005. Regrettably, a series of 
considerable impediments to progress have been observed -  not least chronic under-funding, 
which has impacted upon the ability of those charged with advancing the Recovery Plan to do 
so successfully, a lack of data on the use of certain types of nets (especially gillnets) and the 
operation of by-catch mitigation policies. The parties have noted such concerns and, at the
• 107Fifth MOP, called for swift action to step up implementation of the Jastamia Plan.
103 Personal communication with Dr. Krzysztof Sk6ra, Hel Marine Station, University o f Gdansk (on file).
104 ASCOBANS Recovery Plan for Baltic Harbour Porpoises (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2002). The Recovery Plan 
was largely elaborated at a workshop in Jastamia, Poland, in January 2002: see R. Strempel, “The ASCOBANS 
Jastamia Plan: Towards a New Lease o f Life for Baltic Harbor Porpoises” (2003) 6 Journal o f International 
Wildlife Law and Policy 53.
105 Resolution No. 6, Incidental Take of Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Fourth MOP in 2003.
106 The Jastamia Plan itself explicitly states that its primary focus is to address by-catches, intoning that “none of 
the recommendations . . . should be viewed as a higher priority than the by-catch reduction initiatives”: Jastamia 
Plan, at 13.
107 Resolution 9, Implementation of the Jastamia Plan.
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The Jastamia Plan acknowledges that it is intended to be neither a static nor a definitive 
document and establishes a formal process of re-evaluation and revision “no less than every 
five years”. At the Fourth Meeting of the Jastamia Group, convened in February 2008, the 
Jastamia Plan was substantially revised and updated. Particular emphasis was placed upon 
incorporating developments in harbour porpoise conservation across a variety of fora, 
especially under the EC law and the emerging HELCOM programme of marine protected 
areas in the Baltic Sea. The revised version of the Jastamia Plan was subsequently advanced 
for adoption at the Fifteenth Meeting of the AC, where it failed to find favour among the 
various delegations. In particular, the revised version was considered to be “too long, intricate
10R •and academic” and unlikely to receive endorsement by the fishing industry. Indeed, given 
that the draft of the revised Jastamia Plan currently stands at over thirty pages of text, with 
extensive referencing and discussion of the main conservation issues, scientific developments 
and operative legislation, there is merit in these criticisms. Accordingly, it appears that the 
new model proposed for the Jastamia Plan’s North Sea counterpart will prove instmctive in 
the redrafting of the Baltic Sea Recovery Plan, for which a further revision was undertaken in 
early 2009, with a view to adoption at the Sixth MOP.
Since the adoption of the Jastamia Plan, attention within ASCOBANS has shifted towards 
developing a programme of action for North Sea populations of harbour porpoises. The 
political impetus towards the elaboration of such a programme has been substantively 
assisted by forces outside the scope of the Agreement. In March 2002, at the Fifth 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, the Bergen Declaration was 
issued in which the need for enhanced selectivity in fishing activities was emphasised.109 In 
particular, the Bergen Declaration stated that the agreed aim of the Ministerial representatives 
was to reduce by-catches of harbour porpoises to levels below 1.7% of the best population 
estimate and set a “precautionary objective to reduce by-catches of marine mammals to less 
than 1% of the best population estimate”,110 with the development and adoption of a recovery 
plan for North Sea harbour porpoises to be conducted “as soon as possible”.111
108 The Finnish Point o f View o f the Jastamia Plan Revision, Document AC 15/Doc. 41 (P), submitted at the 
Fifteenth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS. As a member of the drafting team, the present 
author ought to acknowledge a degree of collective responsibility in this respect!
109 Ministerial Declaration of the Fifth International Conference on the Protection o f the North Sea, at para. 28.
110 Para. 29.
111 Para. 30.
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In June 2003, a declaration of the Joint Ministerial Meeting of the Helsinki and OSPAR
Commissions was issued, advancing a common statement to develop and promote the
112implementation of a recovery plan for harbour porpoises in the North Sea. At the same 
time, the European Commission was engaged in elaborating its draft of a legislative measure 
that would eventually become Regulation 812/2004 and was also, in the longer term, in the 
process of elaborating a draft European Marine Strategy. At the Fourth MOP, the Parties and 
Range States, together with the AC and other relevant bodies, undertook to develop a distinct
113instrument in respect of harbour porpoises in the North Sea.
At this point, the parties adopted a specific Resolution, in which the development of a
recovery plan for harbour porpoises of the North Sea was endorsed,114 taking “a holistic and
inclusive approach to the development of such a plan”. Some initial preparations for a distinct 
recovery plan for harbour porpoises in the North Sea had already been developed by the 
Advisory Committee at its Ninth and Tenth Meetings, and an outline timetable was 
established for this initiative, annexed to the Resolution. In 2003 a preparatory scientific 
group was to be convened, along with a steering group that was tasked with guiding the 
development of the recovery plan and providing a forum for the interests of all parties in 
question to be considered. The recovery plan itself was to be formulated throughout 2004, 
and a draft version would be considered by the Advisory Committee in 2005, with a 
provisional deadline for June 2005 set for finalising this instrument.
Since the Fourth MOP, some progress had been made on the recovery plan, although work 
was somewhat stymied by disagreement within ASCOBANS as to how the initiative should 
proceed, especially in relation to scope.115 A small drafting group based in Germany was 
established to consider anthropogenic threats to harbour porpoises in the North Sea area, with 
the aim of producing an updated version of this instrument -  since christened a “Conservation 
Plan” as opposed to a “Recovery Plan” -  in time for the Fifth MOP. Such a document was 
duly produced116 and evaluated, at which point a number of strong concerns were raised. 
Primary among these was an observation that in its current format the Conservation Plan was
112 “Towards an Ecosystem Approach to the Management of Human Activities”, at para. 13.
113 Resolution No. 6: Incidental Take of Small Cetaceans.
114 Resolution No. 10: Recovery Plan for Harbour Porpoise in the North Sea.
115 In particular, some parties were concerned that the recovery plan should have a narrower remit and focus on 
individual stocks of small cetaceans, instead of addressing the North Sea as a whole, while others believed that 
this initiative should focus on areas in which populations o f harbour porpoises are in need of recovery.
116 MOP5/Doc.7 (S) Rev. 1.
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largely unfit for purpose, since the document did not prescribe a detailed timetable of 
concerted action for the various parties to strive towards. There was also some concern about 
a potential clash with aspects of EC law. With these issues in mind, the document was
117endorsed and supported as a basis for a Conservation Plan and largely formalised in 
2008.118
The objectives of the Conservation Plan have not altered since the initial mandate prescribed 
for this initiative in 2003, with an overarching aim to “restore and/or maintain North Sea 
harbour porpoises at a favourable conservation status . . . and the distribution and abundance 
of harbour porpoises in the North Sea are returned to historic coverage and levels wherever 
biologically feasible”. To this end, twelve substantive actions have been prescribed within the 
Conservation Plan, divided loosely into a series of categories, namely institutional 
implementation, management and related monitoring, mitigation measure research, scientific 
actions essential for providing adequate management advice and investigation of further 
anthropogenic threats to harbour porpoises.
Like the Jastamia Plan, incidental capture of small cetaceans is considered to be of overriding 
importance to the success of the North Sea Conservation Plan, and a high priority is placed 
upon implementing existing (EC) provisions on by-catches, establishing observation 
programmes and regular evaluation of fisheries interactions, as well as reviewing mitigation 
measures and finalising maximum allowable by-catch limits in the region. Furthermore, the 
collection of relevant data on population trends and stock structures is also considered to be a 
high priority, on the basis that without such information it is virtually impossible to 
objectively assess the success of the Conservation Plan and the need for further 
modifications. As with the Jastamia Plan, the North Sea Conservation Plan will also be 
subject to periodic review and adjustment. A distinct Steering Committee is envisaged for the 
North Sea Conservation Plan that appears to operate on a more formal basis to its Baltic 
counterpart, with the appointment of a “suitably qualified full-time coordinator” considered 
necessary for the effective operation of the programme.119 Following minor data
117 Resolution 1.
118 Document AC 15/Doc. 14 (O), ASCOBANS Conservation Plan for Harbour Porpoises (Phocoena phocoena 
L.) in the North Sea.
119 North Sea Conservation Plan (2008 draft), at 12.
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amendments,120 it appears likely that the document will be formally adopted at the 
forthcoming Sixth MOP.
5.7 Concluding remarks
Despite the initiatives undertaken to date under the auspices of the Agreement, and the 
progress made in terms of scientific knowledge and in advancing regulatory measures for 
emerging threats such as ocean noise, ASCOBANS has been subject to sustained criticism 
concerning its ability to elaborate meaningful and binding conservation solutions for small 
cetaceans on its current construction. Indeed, notwithstanding the pioneering nature of the 
Agreement, commentators have observed that the text of the Agreement is marked by a 
distinct lack of precision and undermined further by the “modest decision-making powers” 
exercised by its constituent institutions.121 Furthermore, the operative strength of the
Conservation and Management Plan is also limited, and has been considered “notable for
122being couched in vague, flexible and hortatory, rather than prescriptive language”, with
19^parties having undertaken to “work towards” and “endeavour” to fulfil such commitments. 
Nijkamp and Nollkaemper, while lamenting the explicit absence of the precautionary 
principle and ecosystem-based management within the Agreement itself, further observe that 
ASCOBANS is “dominated by flexibility, long-term, non-committal objectives, faith in 
research and more faith in future cooperation”.124
Many of these criticisms of the Agreement text and the conservation policies accordingly 
envisaged by these constituent commitments are legitimate. As a result, given that 
ASCOBANS is primarily a generator of soft law, with its policies advanced through 
recommendations and guidance documents, difficult questions have been raised within 
ASCOBANS as to the ultimate effectiveness of this body, especially when compared to more 
binding commitments towards cetaceans, as advanced for instance under EU law. Likewise, 
the various meetings of the AC suggest that ASCOBANS itself has historically exercised a 
limited influence upon national policies. While further, clearly targeted, research is necessary
120 Report o f the Sixteenth Meeting o f  the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2009), at 5- 
6 .
121 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 243.
122 Churchill, “Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas”, at 296.
123 Accordingly, Churchill considers that such wording has facilitated a culture whereby “there has been much 
said, but considerably less done in the way of effective action to address the conservation needs of small 
cetaceans”: ibid., at 311.
124 “Small Cetaceans in the Face of Uncertainty”, at 290.
181
to assess more precisely the impact of such conservation and management policies upon the 
various parties, the repeated adoption of Resolutions calling on the parties to implement 
agreed commitments does not suggest that such criticism is entirely misplaced.
It can be considered that ASCOBANS faces three significant -  and interrelated -  practical 
impediments to its operations. In the first instance, there has been a marked lack of support -  
and latterly active competition -  from the EC. This issue has been considerably more 
pronounced in recent years as the EC has placed an unprecedented degree of emphasis upon 
the conservation of cetaceans as a priority component of Community marine policy, a 
development that was largely unanticipated during the early years of ASCOBANS. 
Accordingly, with the emergence of the EC as a key regulatory body for cetaceans in the 
Baltic and North Seas, the case for a separate and less binding framework to address the 
conservation needs of small cetaceans in these waters has, in the view of certain parties to 
ASCOBANS, been diluted.
As a result, it has been argued that ASCOBANS “will probably function best as a stimulus 
and forum for promoting and conducting research and the adoption of conservation measures 
by other organisations, rather than by attempting to adopt a comprehensive set of 
conservation measures of its own”. Such a pessimistic viewpoint is indicative of the raft of 
regulatory bodies that pre-exist ASCOBANS. Many of these are undoubtedly better placed to 
address certain threats to the cetacean environment -  especially in the context of marine 
pollution and fisheries by-catches -  than the Agreement can realistically aspire to achieve. 
Nevertheless, at the Fifteenth AC Meeting in 2008, a suggestion that ASCOBANS should 
essentially operate as a specialist cetacean advisory body to the EC -  justified on this exact 
basis -  was clearly rejected by a considerable majority of the parties. This demonstrates a 
continuing core of support for the objectives and ideals of ASCOBANS from its parties, 
alongside recognition of the practical difficulties that the Agreement faces.
While there is some logic in this proposal -  not least since the present and future membership 
of ASCOBANS is in practice likely to be drawn from the ranks of current EU Member States 
-  the relegation of the Agreement to the status of an EC conservation adjunct must be seen as 
a retrograde step. The various EU institutions amply served by a host of technical committees
125 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 244.
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conservation bodies, financial constraints upon ASCOBANS have, in recent years, been 
particularly acute. The cost-cutting activities attempted by the parties to date have largely 
failed to facilitate the desired evolution of the institutional structure of the Agreement, which 
continues to be one the main CMS subsidiaries without a distinct scientific wing. Moreover, 
the projected funding for further conservation initiatives that such reforms were intended to 
generate has not, as yet, materialised in a manner that would dramatically impact upon the 
conservation record of the Agreement.
Ultimately, perhaps the most pressing impediment to the development of meaningful 
conservation initiatives for small cetaceans in the Baltic and North Seas is the chronic lack of 
data concerning the conservation status and needs of these species. Without this information 
it is near impossible to gauge the success or otherwise o f the various policies developed by 
the raft o f regulatory bodies operating in respect of these waters. Unless and until this 
position is significantly improved, it appears that present and future conservation measures, 
irrespective of the strength of obligation imposed upon the constituent actors by the regulator 
in question, are likely to be undermined by lack of benchmarks to measure their 
effectiveness. It appears ironic that, given the significant criticism aimed at ASCOBANS 
over its “further research” philosophy as a substitute for more precise commitments, the 
Agreement itself may appear to be better placed than many of its regulatory competitors to 
address the parlous state of scientific knowledge concerning the cetacean environment and, 
therefore, assist in creating a more productive climate for the future advancement of clear and 
effective conservation measures for these species.
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CHAPTER VI
THE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSERVATION OF CETACEANS OF 
THE BLACK SEA. MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND CONTIGUOUS
ATLANTIC AREA, 1996
6.1 Introduction
The second subsidiary Agreement adopted by the CMS relating to cetaceans was the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans o f the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and 
Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS).1 ACCOBAMS is broader in scope to 
ASCOBANS and represents one of the first binding regional treaties to explicitly address 
both large and small species of cetaceans. O f the two main CMS cetacean Agreements, 
ACCOBAMS is largely considered the superior instrument, endowed with stronger 
conservation obligations and a unique institutional structure that provides a more formalised 
basis for interaction with pre-existing regulatory fora. Moreover, it has also taken a number 
of pioneering steps to address anthropogenic threats to cetaceans that have often been 
neglected in other fora, such as ship-strikes, ecotourism and the use of acoustic by-catch 
mitigation devices.
Despite these strengths, ACCOBAMS faces similar challenges to those experienced under 
ASCOBANS, particularly in the development, coordination and implementation of 
conservation policies. This Chapter therefore offers an appraisal of ACCOBAMS as a distinct 
regional actor for the regulation of both large and small cetaceans, working outside -  but in 
cooperation with -  the IWC. This Chapter commences with a review of the development of 
the Agreement before examining its scope and the inter-relationship with other key regulatory 
actors. There then follows an evaluation o f the pioneering institutional framework of 
ACCOBAMS and its conservation measures adopted to date. Finally, a series of conclusions 
are advanced regarding the key challenges and opportunities facing the ASCOBANS and 
ACCOBAMS Agreements.
6.2 Negotiating history
1 2183 UNTS 303.
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Although ACCOBAMS was ultimately concluded under the aegis of the Bonn Convention, it 
was initially developed through a working group on small cetaceans convened in 1989 by the 
Council of Europe. These developments were especially timely given the parlous 
conservation status of small cetaceans in the region, with a substantial volume of striped 
dolphins killed in a morbillivirus epizootic in the Mediterranean region.2 Although ultimately 
attributed to natural causes, the epizootic may have proved especially deadly due to the 
damage sustained to the immune systems of these animals due to exposure to extremely high 
levels of PCBs.3
In February 1991, the secretariats of the Bern Convention,4 the CMS and the Barcelona 
Convention, as well as the IUCN, met to consider a draft instrument prepared by Greenpeace 
International to address the conservation needs of small cetaceans in the region. Of these 
bodies, the CMS was considered to provide the clearest prospects to develop a distinct 
regional instrument for cetaceans in these waters. The Third COP to the CMS subsequently 
adopted a Resolution on small cetaceans, identifying the draft Agreement as the basis for a 
future CMS subsidiary, operating closely with other regulatory fora.5
The substantive negotiations to develop ACCOBAMS were convened between 1991 and 
1996. At an early stage in this process it became clear that sustained inter-Secretariat liaison 
would be required in order to effectively implement the nascent Agreement. Considerable 
attention was paid to establishing the various mechanisms by which conservation 
responsibilities and data-sharing were to be facilitated. Nonetheless, a number of 
controversial issues remained between the various negotiating parties, with matters of species 
coverage, operative obligations and geographical scope proving particularly problematic. 
These issues were largely resolved in a series of meetings between 1995 and 1996, sponsored 
by Monaco. By September 1995, the draft text of the Agreement had been amended from its 
original focus on small cetaceans to incorporate the larger species, an extension based upon
2 A. Aguilar and J. A. Raga, “The Striped Dolphin Epizootic in the Mediterranean Sea” (1993) 22 Ambio 524. 
The epizootic started in 1990 and continued through to 1992: ibid.
3 W. C. G. Bums, “The Agreement on the Conservation o f Cetaceans o f the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and 
Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS): A Regional Response to the Threats Facing Cetaceans” (1998) 1 
Journal o f International Wildlife Law and Policy 113, at 114. These concerns were mirrored in respect of other 
stocks of Mediterranean cetaceans considered susceptible to the effects of pollution: G. Notarbartolo di Sciara et 
al., “The Fin Whale Balaenoptera physalus (L. 1758) in the Mediterranean Sea” (2003) 33 Mammal Review 
105, at 128
4 1982 UKTS 56 [hereinafter “Bern Convention”].
5 Resolution 3.3, Small Cetaceans.
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the recognition that both large and small cetaceans in these waters exhibited similar 
conservation needs, thereby rendering an explicit distinction between species somewhat 
superfluous.6 Finally, in November 1996, a further intergovernmental meeting was convened 
in Monaco in order to finalise the text and to establish the precise geographical scope of the 
Agreement. ACCOBAMS was opened for signature at the close of this meeting and formally 
entered into force on 1 June 2001.
ACCOBAMS represents a challenging and ambitious project to connect two regions for 
which no previous instrument had been advanced on a similar scale to address the 
conservation needs of particular marine species. In seeking to avoid a pronounced regional 
disparity in membership, in order to formally enter into force ACCOBAMS required the 
ratification of seven eligible participants, of which at least two were to be drawn from the 
Black Sea region.7 However, political conditions in the Black Sea at the time were not 
conducive to swift ratification of the Agreement. Indeed, a considerable delay was 
experienced in the entry into force of ACCOBAMS due to protracted boundary disputes 
following the dissolution of the USSR, as well as a seemingly abortive initiative to establish a
o
common fisheries policy within the Black Sea.
Like ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS was ultimately concluded under Article IV(4) of the parent 
convention, primarily because few species of cetaceans resident in the Black and 
Mediterranean Seas were listed on Appendix II of the CMS at the material time.9 Likewise, a 
lack of scientific data about the precise range of migratory cetaceans further reduced the 
possibilities of fulfilling the criteria for the establishment of an Article IV(3) AGREEMENT, 
hence Article IV(4) proved a more appropriate channel for regulatory activity on this basis.
Indeed, the deficiency of scientific knowledge concerning the conservation needs of 
cetaceans in these waters is considered to pose a key challenge to the future operation of the
6 A. Gillespie “Small Cetaceans, International Law and the International Whaling Commission” in W. C. G. 
Bums and A. Gillespie (eds.), The Future o f Cetaceans in a Changing World (New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 2003), at 279. Nevertheless, these developments were not entirely uncontroversial within CMS 
Scientific Council as “some Councillors expressed the view that the IWC should remain the competent agency 
for large cetaceans”: Report o f the Sixth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1995), at 2.
7 Article XIV(l).
8 R. Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Ascobans and Accobams 
Agreements” in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 246-7.
9 Indeed, in November 1996 only four species of cetaceans commonly found in these waters had been so listed, 
namely the bottlenose dolphin, common dolphin, harbour porpoise and striped dolphin.
187
Agreement. It is currently acknowledged that “present knowledge on the status of cetacean 
populations in the Agreement area, on their threats, and on how such threats affect their 
survival, is dramatically inadequate, and a major hindrance to appropriate conservation and 
management measures”.10 Moreover, the paucity of accurate and meaningful data is explicitly 
recognised within the Agreement itself, with the parties noting in the preamble that “despite 
past or ongoing scientific research, knowledge of the biology, ecology, and population 
dynamics of cetaceans is deficient”.
While an unsatisfactory knowledge base appears to be something of a running theme within 
multilateral cetacean conservation bodies, the position within ACCOBAMS must be 
considered particularly acute. Unlike ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS has yet to complete a 
SCANS-style survey of the Agreement area, although a project is currently on-going in order 
to collate data to form a workable baseline abundance estimate for a number of species 
protected under the Agreement. Following an initial proposal to conduct a sperm-whale 
survey in the Mediterranean basin,11 this project was dramatically expanded in scope and 
ambition to replicate a SCANS approach to population monitoring to be pursued through a 
series of workshops, with a particular emphasis on establishing reliable population statistics 
for harbour porpoises, common dolphins, bottlenose dolphins, sperm whales, striped
19dolphins, fin whales and Cuvier’s beaked whales throughout the Agreement area. 
Nevertheless, despite these efforts in relation to certain key species, considerable uncertainty 
remains over the precise numerical and conservation status of many of the species commonly 
or occasionally present within the ACCOBAMS area, which will ultimately continue to pose 
a considerable practical impediment to the conservation and management initiatives advanced 
under the auspices of the Agreement in future years.
6.3 Scope
ACCOBAMS is considerably broader in scope than ASCOBANS and applies, ratione 
materiae, to “all cetaceans that have a range which lies entirely or partly within the
10 G. Notarbartolo di Sciara (ed.), Cetaceans o f the Mediterranean and Black Seas: State o f Knowledge and 
Conservation Strategies. A Report to the ACCOBAMS Secretariat (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2002), at 1.
11 Report of the Second Meeting o f the Scientific Committee o f ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2003), at 
Annex XVIII.
12 Report of the Workshop on Obtaining Baseline Cetacean Abundance Information for the ACCOBAMS Area 
(Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2005), at 3.
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13Agreement area or that accidentally or occasionally frequent the Agreement area”. An 
“indicative list” is appended to the Agreement,14 specifying the Black Sea and Mediterranean 
Sea populations of some eighteen different species of cetaceans. This list is not intended to be 
exhaustive and Annex I specifically provides that ACCOBAMS is to apply to accidental or 
occasional visitors to the Agreement area.15 ACCOBAMS lists ten species of whale, seven 
dolphin species and the harbour porpoise as the most frequent inhabitants of the Agreement 
area. Notwithstanding the application to visiting species, the Annex I list may be considered 
to comprise the key species subject to regulation under ACCOBAMS.
Ratione loci, ACCOBAMS encompasses all the maritime waters of the Black Sea and 
Mediterranean Sea, their gulfs and seas and any connected or interconnecting internal waters, 
as well as the Atlantic area lying contiguous to the Mediterranean Sea west of the Straits of 
Gibraltar.16 As noted above, maritime boundaries within these waters have presented an 
ongoing source of dispute, unlike in the Baltic and North Seas, for which the process of 
maritime delimitation has to a considerable extent been settled. Accordingly, the final text of 
ACCOBAMS notes clearly that activities under the Agreement neither affect official views 
over territorial claims nor “constitute grounds for claiming, contending or disputing any
1 7claim to national sovereignty or jurisdiction”. Article XV of the Agreement precludes 
general reservations to ACCOBAMS, but permits particular reservations by a party “in 
respect of a specifically delimited part of its internal waters”, a position apparently
1 Rincorporated to accommodate the Turkish position on the Sea of Marmara.
The convoluted nature of maritime claims in the ACCOBAMS area, particularly in the 
Mediterranean Sea, has created further practical difficulties in the operation of the 
Agreement. Indeed, the current jurisdictional arrangements in this area have created a series 
of enclaves of high seas within the Mediterranean Sea, which may lead to practical
13 Article 1(2). Cetaceans are defined as “animals, including individuals, of those species, subspecies or 
populations of Odontoceti and M y s tic e t iArticle I(3)(a). The “range” o f a species extends to “all areas of water 
that a cetacean inhabits, stays in temporarily, or crosses at any time on its normal migration route within the 
Agreement area”: Article I(3)(f).
14 Annex I. Under Article 1(5), Annexes to the Agreement “form an integral part thereof, and any reference to 
the Agreement includes a reference to its annexes”.
15 For a full appraisal of the various species of cetaceans considered to frequent the ACCOBAMS area, either as 
regular inhabitants or as vagrant species, see R. Reeves and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara (eds.), The Status and 
Distribution o f Cetaceans in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea (Malaga: IUCN Centre for Mediterranean 
Cooperation, 2006).
16 Article I(l)(a).
17 Article 1(1).
18 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 245.
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difficulties in the enforcement of the Agreement within this area.19 The existence of these 
jurisdictional lacunae within the Agreement area is not an abstract problem and there is some 
evidence to suggest that certain conservation policies have been inhibited on occasion as a 
result. For instance, a recent Tunisian proposal to prohibit the use of driftnets throughout the 
entirety of the Agreement area was defeated on the basis that such obligations “could not, 
therefore, be imposed on nationals of non-parties on the high seas within the ACCOBAMS
90area”. Accordingly, the parties have emphasised the need to engage with third countries 
operating in the Mediterranean Sea to facilitate cooperation with the various ACCOBAMS
91policies within these high seas areas.
6.4 Participation
Like ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS adopts a highly inclusive approach to potential participants. 
Under Article XIII(l), the Agreement is open to “any Range State, whether or not areas under
its jurisdiction lie within the Agreement area”, a rather curious phrasing that stems from the
22generous approach taken to the concept o f a “Range State”. Nevertheless, as is the case 
under ASCOBANS, there has been little engagement by states that are geographically 
divorced from the ACCOBAMS area. To date, some twenty-one states have become full
9 ^parties to the Agreement. Additionally, the accession process is currently underway in both 
the UK24 and Montenegro, the latter o f which did not exist as an independent state at the time 
of the conclusion of ACCOBAMS.25 In 2004 Egypt, Russia and Turkey were identified by
19 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 250.
20 Report o f the Third Meeting o f  the ACCOBAMS Contacting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2007), at 12. 
The use of driftnets on the high seas is restricted to nets up to 2.5km: see Chapter VIII below.
21 Report o f the Second Meeting o f  the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2004), at 13.
22 Under Article I(3)(g), a Range State is defined as “any State that exercises sovereignty and/or jurisdiction 
over any part of the range o f a cetacean population covered by this Agreement, or a State, flag vessels of which 
are engaged in activities in the Agreement area which may affect the conservation of cetaceans”.
23 Namely Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, 
Monaco, Morocco, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. In addition, both the EC 
and Israel signed the Final Act o f the Meeting at which the Agreement was ultimately adopted, although neither 
has signed the actual Agreement itself.
24 The UK authorities have indicated that the process o f accession has commenced, but are currently unable to 
specify a precise date as to when this may be ultimately concluded: Report o f the Second Meeting o f the 
ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2004), at 5. In the interim, the UK continues to 
make a voluntary donation of €10,000 to the Agreement’s funds.
25 Montenegrin accession is nonetheless expected “shortly”: Report o f the Third Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS 
Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2007), at 11.
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the ACCOBAMS Secretariat as particular targets for recruitment efforts, albeit to seemingly 
little avail thus far.26
In addition to the various riparian states, like ASCOBANS the Agreement is open to 
participation by any “Regional Economic Integration Organisation”, provided that at least 
one of its constituent members is a Range State of ACCOBAMS. In practice, as with 
ASCOBANS, the most viable candidate in this respect is the EC. The EC has neither signed 
nor ratified the Agreement, although its interest in the Agreement area has increased since the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2008. As with ASCOBANS, the 
development of a productive and harmonious working relationship with EC officials must be 
considered a significant strategic objective for ACCOBAMS. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between ACCOBAMS and the EC may be considered to be distinct to the corresponding 
position with ASCOBANS. Unlike ASCOBANS, a considerable number of the parties to 
ACCOBAMS are not current EU Member States, hence ACCOBAMS is not generally as 
confined to the same EC straightjacket as is often donned by its sister Agreement.
Relations between ACCOBAMS and the EU have been essentially cordial since the inception 
of the Agreement. Although the EC appears to demonstrate little enthusiasm towards formal 
accession to ACCOBAMS, the atmosphere of friction that characterised the early years of 
ASCOBANS has been generally avoided in practice. Like ASCOBANS, EC Member States 
party to ACCOBAMS face practical constraints in implementing by-catch mitigation 
commitments, which constitute an important aspect of the Agreements activities. Some 
ACCOBAMS policies in this respect have drawn a response from the EC where they have 
created scope for conflict. Most notably, there has been a sharp divergence of views between 
the two bodies regarding the mandatory use of acoustic deterrent devices, or “pingers”, 
introduced by EC legislation, as outlined in Chapter VIII. ACCOBAMS adopts a rather more 
(pre)cautious approach to such devices and has raised concerns over their potentially negative
26 Report o f the Second Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2004), at 6. 
Egypt and Turkey attended the First MOP to ACCOBAMS as observers, but have since failed to attend 
subsequent meetings, while Russia has yet to attend any MOP. Nevertheless, all three states have appointed 
national ACCOBAMS Focal Points, as required under Article VIII(a) of the Agreement, as indeed has Israel. 
The remaining riparian state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, attended the inaugural MOP, but has yet to appoint a national 
ACCOBAMS Focal Point and has demonstrated little official interest in the Agreement to date.
27 Article XIII(l). A “Regional Economic Integration Organisation” is defined virtually verbatim to 
ASCOBANS as “an organisation constituted by sovereign States which has competence in respect of the 
negotiation, conclusion and application o f international agreements in matters covered by this Agreement”: 
Article I(3)(h).
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impacts within the cetacean environment.28 The ACCOBAMS approach is to endorse pingers
29only “after controlled studies to ensure that they are an effective mitigation measure”. In 
2004, the European Commission formally requested -  but failed to attain -  an amendment to 
the ACCOBAMS policy on pingers,30 which may present scope for a degree of future conflict 
on this issue. Beyond this technical mitigation policy, however, the EC has proved supportive 
of a number of policies developed by ACCOBAMS. This has been especially true in habitat- 
related initiatives like the recent Conservation Plan for Black Sea Cetaceans, for which 
consultations with the European Commission “had not revealed any obstacles to the adoption
*5 1
of the Plan by the European Union’s new Black Sea Member States”.
Like ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS co-exists with a series of multilateral regulatory bodies 
within its sphere of operation, with which clear synergies have been developed. A 
particularly promising relationship has been established with the Council of Europe which, 
given the lead role played by this body in brokering the initial negotiations for the 
Agreement, has retained a strong interest in the development and progress of ACCOBAMS. 
The Council of Europe has consistently stressed the availability of “its achievements and its 
institutional framework” to ACCOBAMS,32 as well as the desire to further nurture 
biodiversity synergies in the region.33 More tangibly, the Council of Europe has recently 
provided financial assistance for the development of the current Conservation Plan for Black 
Sea Cetaceans.34 Likewise, despite some initial concerns over potential conflicts,35 a 
productive working relationship has also been established with the IWC, for which the 
Director of Science also serves on the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee.
Clear links have also been formed with relevant regional Agreements but, unlike its sister 
Agreement, the ACCOBAMS text itself provides for a more formalised collaborative 
relationship with the Barcelona36 and Bucharest37 Conventions, as detailed below. As with
28 Resolution 3.12: By-catch, Competitive Interactions and Acoustic Devices, adopted at the Third MOP to 
ACCOBAMS.
29 Resolution 3.12, ibid.
30 Report o f  the Second Meeting o f  the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2004), at 14.
31 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2007), at 18.
32 Report o f the First Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2002) at 6.
33 Report o f the Second MOP, at 18-19.
34 Ibid.
35 See, for instance, Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 245.
36 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean; 1102
UNTS 27.
37 Convention on the Protection o f the Black Sea against Pollution; 1764 UNTS 3.
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ASCOBANS, these pre-existing regional bodies have a clear role to play in the practical 
operation of ACCOBAMS. In this respect, the Barcelona Convention and its allied 
Protocols38 have established a basis for the creation of protected areas,39 as well as for 
pollution control and mitigation. A specific Action Plan for the Conservation of Cetaceans in 
the Mediterranean Sea was adopted under the auspices o f the Barcelona regime in 1991,40 
although this has largely been superseded to all practical intents by ACCOBAMS and is 
essentially confined to organising expert seminars and data-collection activities. The Black 
Sea region offers a comparatively less established system of pre-existing commitments 
towards cetaceans. Instead, close alignment with ACCOBAMS will serve to develop the 
capacity of the Bucharest regime in this regard, while drawing on its specific remit to address 
pollution in these waters. Future developments of this nature within the Bucharest regime are 
likely to mirror those of OSPAR, following the adoption of a new Strategic Action Plan for 
the Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea,41 which has established the 
development of EcoQOs as a central policy for fisheries management and habitat 
conservation.42
Within the Mediterranean region, further impetus towards the protection o f cetacean habitats 
is provided by the designation of a protected area for marine mammals in the Ligurian Sea 
between Italy, France and Monaco,43 known as the “Pelagos Sanctuary”. The Agreement 
entered into force on 14 February 2002, and is the culmination o f a trilateral project to 
establish a sanctuary in the Western Mediterranean that began in March 1993.44 Under the
38 Seven distinct Protocols have been adopted under the auspices of the Barcelona Convention, of which the 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean is of clearest 
relevance for the conservation of cetaceans. The Protocol was adopted in June 1995 and entered into force in 
December 1999, replacing the earlier Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas previously 
adopted in April 1982 and in force since March 1986. Both Protocols are reproduced on-line at the UNEP 
Regional Seas institutional website at www.unep.org/regionalseas/ (last visited 31 August 2009).
39 Under Article 8 of the 1995 Protocol, parties are required to develop a list o f Specially Protected Areas of 
Mediterranean Importance (SPAMIs). Protected areas under the Protocol may be established in respect of, inter 
alia, endangered or threatened species, of which Annex II lists a host o f indicative species which specifically 
includes some nineteen species of cetaceans.
40 Reproduced on-line at www.rac-spa.org (last visited 31 August 2009).
41 Adopted on 17 April 2009 and reproduced on line at www.blacksea-commission.org (last visited 31 August 
2001).
42 Ibid., at Paragraph 3.2.
43 Agreement on the Creation o f a Mediterranean Sanctuary for Marine Mammals between France, Italy and the 
Principality of Monaco on 25 November 1999; reprinted at (2001) 16 International Journal o f Marine and 
Coastal Law 142.
44 On 22 March 1993 the three parties issued a joint declaration seeking to establish a sanctuary to protect 
marine mammals in this area: see T. Scovazzi, “The Declaration of a Sanctuary for the Protection of Marine 
Mammals in the Mediterranean” (1993) 8 International Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law 510. For a full 
discussion of the origins of the sanctuary see G. Notarbartolo di Sciara et al., “The Pelagos Sanctuary for
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Agreement, an area of 96,000 square kilometres has been designated a sanctuary within 
which “the Parties shall protect all species of marine mammals”.45 The taking of marine 
mammals in this area is prohibited, and the parties are also required to evaluate stocks of 
marine mammals, prevent the discharge of toxic substances and regulate cetacean-watching 
activities and boating competitions.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, unlike ASCOBANS a series of mutually-supportive 
synergies have been forged with the key Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
operating within the Agreement area, namely the General Fisheries Commission for the 
Mediterranean (GFCM). Indeed, while the inter-relationship between the two organisations 
was “somewhat difficult initially”46, such links are now considered to be close, with the 
GFCM having included problems of ship-strikes and prey depletion on the agenda of its 
General Meeting and several joint-workshops have also been convened. A particularly 
important working relationship has been developed on cetacean by-catch issues with the Sub- 
Committee on the Marine Environment and Ecosystems (SCMEE) of the GFCM Scientific 
Advisory Committee. Indeed, the development of this collaborative relationship has been 
viewed by the Scientific Committee as a major contribution in “better linking ACCOBAMS 
with the fishing sector”.47 To this end, the Agreement has convened a series of workshops in 
conjunction with SCMEE on interactions with fisheries, and the GFCM is also keen to
* 48contribute to the further implementation of ACCOBAMS by-catch initiatives.
6.5 Institutional arrangements
As is the case with ASCOBANS, many of the substantive provisions o f ACCOBAMS 
concern its institutional structure, which differs significantly to that of its sister Agreement. 
Under Article III, like ASCOBANS, the primary decision-making forum of ACCOBAMS is
Mediterranean Marine Mammals” (2008) 18 Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 367, at 
371-76.
45 Article 2(2). The Agreement Area is defined in Article 3, where there are eight species o f cetacean ordinarily 
resident in these waters: T. Scovazzi, “The Mediterranean Marine Mammal Sanctuary” (2001) 16 International 
Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law 132.
46 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2007), at 25.
47 Report o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Scientific Committee to ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2006), at 
3.
48 Ibid. In addition to this, in 2007 the GFCM also adopted a Recommendation in which its Secretariat 
undertakes to engage in a full exchange of relevant data with the Pelagos Sanctuary: Recommendation 
GFCM/31/2007/2; reproduced at General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean: Report o f  the Thirty- 
first Session (Rome: FAO, 2007), at 41.
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the Meeting of the Parties, convened at intervals o f not more than three years and of which 
three have been held to date.49 The basic features of the MOP are established under Article 
111(8) and include, inter alia, reviewing scientific assessments of the conservation status of 
cetaceans, monitoring implementation of the Agreement, and making recommendations to the 
parties. Decisions are adopted by general consensus, with voting rights restricted to one per 
party.50 Like ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS provides for the attendance of observers at MOPs, 
with NGOs having played an equally significant role in the operation of the Agreement. 
ACCOBAMS, however, recognises the contribution of such actors on a more formalised 
footing, and may designate “ACCOBAMS Partner” status upon organisations that “have the 
potential to contribute to the mission of the Agreement”.51 Partner status is not a token 
gesture. Partners make “a substantial contribution to the successful implementation of the 
Agreement”52 and receive scientific information on a priority basis. They must also report on 
their activities and may officially contribute to the development of ACCOBAMS policies and 
other technical instruments.
Meeting arrangements outside the MOPs differ strongly to those o f ASCOBANS. Instead of 
an Advisory Committee, ACCOBAMS has divided these functions between a Bureau and a 
Scientific Committee. The Bureau is designed to operate as a policy coordinator between the 
MOP and the Scientific Committee and seeks essentially to ensure a clear correlation 
between scientific endeavour and the guiding policies of the Agreement.54 Accordingly, 
much of the substantive research work and development o f conservation priorities and 
policies is undertaken through the Scientific Committee.55 The Scientific Committee has
49 As required under Article 111(2), the First MOP was convened within a year o f the formal entry into force of 
the Agreement.
50 Article III. This is qualified by Article X, under which any amendment to the Agreement requires a two-thirds 
majority of the parties present and voting. Thus far the ACCOBAMS text has been substantively amended on 
only one occasion with an adjustment to the Conservation Plan made in 2007 to formally prohibit the use of 
driftnets in areas under coastal state jurisdiction within the Agreement area, having previously provided for a 
toleration of nets o f 2.5km in length in accordance with generally accepted international standards.
51 Resolution 1.3: Awarding the Status of “ACCOBAMS Partner”, adopted at the First MOP in 2002. Partners 
are permitted to use a unique logo to demonstrate their affinity with ACCOBAMS: Resolution 1.4: Adopting a 
Logo for the Agreement, and Conditions for its Use.
52 Resolution 2.9: Recognising the Important Role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Cetacean 
Conservation, adopted at the Second MOP in 2004.
53 Resolution 3.5: Strengthening the Status of ACCOBAMS Partners, adopted at the Third MOP in 2007.
54 Nevertheless, some concerns have been raised as to the effectiveness of this body and an on-going process of 
review is occurring within ACCOBAMS to further develop “some kind o f interface between the Scientific 
Committee and the Parties”, with an enlarged Bureau considered to provide the strongest prospects to attain this 
objective: Report o f the Second Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 
2004), at 10.
55 Article VII(3).
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convened five meetings to date and is considered to be a major strength of the Agreement, 
having “secured the support of high-level specialists, working in an exemplary spirit of 
partnership”,56 although some concerns have been expressed over a perceived regional 
imbalance in the composition of this body,57 as well as significant funding limitations.
A further innovative feature of ACCOBAMS is the establishment of sub-regional 
coordination units, which are charged with implementing conservation priorities and 
collecting relevant data within the Black Sea and Mediterranean region respectively.58 
ACCOBAMS encompasses an ambitious and unprecedented project to regulate the marine 
environment of two previously unconnected regions and has sought wherever possible to 
involve pre-existing regional institutions. Accordingly, the Regional Activities Centre for 
Specially Protected Areas of the Barcelona Convention has been appointed as the sub­
regional coordination unit for the Mediterranean Sea and contiguous Atlantic area,59 while 
the Black Sea Commission has been so designated in respect o f the Black Sea.60 In this way, 
the Agreement has been able to consistently engender a strong spirit o f cooperation with 
relevant multilateral agreements since a preliminary stage in the operation o f ACCOBAMS.
Finally, ACCOBAMS is supported by a Secretariat,61 which is responsible for discharging 
the administrative tasks associated with the Agreement. The running costs of the Secretariat 
are underwritten entirely by an additional donation by Monaco, thereby largely avoiding the 
recent controversy generated within ASCOBANS.62 Nevertheless, the perennial problems of 
understaffing have been observed within this forum too, raising potential adverse 
implications for the administrative effectiveness o f ACCOBAMS as the Agreement develops 
further in future years.
56 Report o f the Second Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties, (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2004), at 7.
57 Ibid., at 10.
58 Article V(l).
59 Resolution 1.4: Establishing the Subregional Co-ordination Unit for the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Contiguous Atlantic Area, adopted at the First MOP.
60 Resolution 1.5: Establishment of the Subregional Co-ordination Unit for the Black Sea. Nevertheless, some 
concerns may be expressed given the comparatively low level o f participation exercised by the Black Sea 
Commission within ACCOBAMS to date: representatives o f this body attended neither the Second nor the Third 
MOPs due to “circumstances beyond their control”: Report o f  the Third Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS 
Contracting Parties (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2007), at 9.
61 Article IV.
62 Indeed, it appears that a culture o f institutional donation has emerged within ACCOBAMS with Italy having 
voluntarily funded additional administrative support where this has been required in recent years: Report o f the 
Second Meeting o f the ACCOBAMS Contracting Parties, (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2004), at 11.
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6.6 Conservation and management initiatives
In marked contrast to ASCOBANS, the regulatory tone o f ACCOBAMS is far stronger and 
more prescriptive, identifying clear objectives incumbent upon its constituent parties. 
ACCOBAMS has also advanced a number of novel features during its brief tenure to date, 
including the development of a series of targeted Guidelines on various anthropogenic 
activities affecting cetaceans, together with a pronounced application of the precautionary 
principle in its conservation policies.
ACCOBAMS specifically recognises cetaceans as “an integral part of the marine ecosystem”
A3that must accordingly be conserved “for the benefit o f present and future generations”. 
Moreover, it is recognised that the conservation status o f cetaceans may be adversely affected 
by habitat degradation and disturbance, pollution, reduction o f food sources, the use and 
abandonment of non-selective fishing gear and deliberate and incidental catches. The broad 
purpose of ACCOBAMS is to facilitate the adoption of coordinated measures by the parties 
to achieve and maintain a favourable conservation status for cetaceans.64 In this regard, 
Article 11(1) prescribes two key obligations incumbent upon the parties. First, ACCOBAMS 
explicitly prohibits the deliberate taking of cetaceans within the Agreement area, with parties 
required to “take all necessary measures to eliminate” directed hunting, while lethal research 
is also prohibited.65 Second, ACCOBAMS places a strong emphasis upon the development 
and operation of specially protected areas as a distinct conservation policy, with parties 
accordingly required to cooperate to this end.
As is the case under ASCOBANS, the primary conservation priorities to be advanced under 
ACCOBAMS are elaborated in a distinct Conservation Plan appended to the Agreement text. 
In this regard, parties are required to apply “within the limits o f their sovereignty and/or 
jurisdiction and in accordance with their international obligations” the various conservation, 
research and management measures prescribed in Annex 2 to the Agreement. This addresses 
six broad areas of conservation policy, namely the adoption and enforcement of national 
legislation; assessment and management o f human-cetacean interactions; habitat protection;
63 Preamble.
64 Article 11(1). Under Article 1(3) of the Agreement the concept o f a “favourable conservation status” as defined 
i in the parent convention carries the same meaning mutatis mutandis for ACCOBAMS.
j 65 Article 11(2).
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research and monitoring; capacity building, collaboration and dissemination of information, 
training and education; and responses to emergency situations.
Parties are required to adopt “the necessary legislative, regulatory or administrative measures 
to give full protection to cetaceans in waters under their sovereignty and/or national 
jurisdiction and outside these waters in respect of any vessel under their flag or registered 
within their territory engaged in activities which may affect the conservation of cetaceans”. 
Particular emphasis is placed upon the need to eradicate the use of driftnets, irrespective of 
length, in areas and by operatives under the jurisdiction of the contracting parties, a position 
that had previously been subject to a tolerance of 2.5km in accordance with the generally 
accepted limits prescribed under international law. Furthermore, parties are obliged to 
introduce or amend national policies on the discard of fishing gear, as well as requiring 
mandatory impact assessments for activities conducted in national waters that may adversely 
impact upon the conservation status of cetaceans. Additionally, parties are required to 
regulate the discharge at sea of harmful pollutants, with particular reference to utilising the 
‘framework of other appropriate legal instruments”, such as the Barcelona and Bucharest 
Conventions, as well as endeavouring to strengthen or create national institutions to further 
implement the objectives and policies of ACCOBAMS.
As far as human-cetacean interactions are concerned parties are required to collect and 
analyse data in relation to fisheries activities, as well as industrial and tourist activities, and 
develop appropriate remedial measures to mitigate such impacts. By-catches are considered 
;o be of particular significance under ACCOBAMS. The threat posed by by-catches “differs 
according to region and species” within the ACCOBAMS Area.66 In the Mediterranean Sea, 
aelagic species are considered to be most susceptible to incidental capture in fishing gear, 
vith largely due to the historically widespread use of driftnets. In contrast, in the Black Sea
/TO
irea, coastal species of cetaceans face the greatest risk of incidental capture. The collection 
)f scientific data on by-catches was considered an initial priority for the Agreement.69 This 
ssue has occupied a significant position on the agenda of the Scientific Committee, with
6 Report o f the First Meeting o f the Scientific Committee to ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2002), at 5.
7 G. Bearzi, “Interactions between Cetaceans and Fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea” in di Sciara, “Cetaceans 
if the Mediterranean and Black Seas”.
8 A. Birkun, Jr., “Interactions between Cetaceans and Fisheries in the Black Sea” in di Sciara, ibid.
9 Resolution 1.9, International Implementation Priorities for 2002-2006.
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particular attention paid to data deficiencies,70 as well as certain fishing gears71 and potential 
mitigation measures. Regulatory activity through ACCOBAMS has essentially followed 
these broad themes.
A number of Recommendations have been adopted by the MOP to address these issues. At 
the Second MOP, the parties endorsed a series o f research programmes for by-catches72 and
n*>
observed “significant cetacean mortality” caused by gillnets. Gillnets, especially driftnets 
have caused particular concern within ACCOBAMS. As noted above, the Agreement was 
amended at the Third MOP to introduce a complete prohibition on the use and keeping on 
board of this equipment within the ACCOBAMS Area.74 A continuing policy has been to 
collaborate with “relevant organisations and bodies” to further address cetacean interactions
nc
with fisheries, notably with the GFCM. Concerns have also been raised over mitigation 
strategies with the use of “pingers” subject to a series o f Guidelines to restrict their usage 
within the ACCOBAMS Area.76 Ultimately, however, it appears that the ACCOBAMS by- 
catch initiatives have been undermined by serial non-implementation, especially in the
nn
context of driftnetting, which “greatly harms cetaceans” and remains seemingly widespread
no
due to “illegal operations and the exploitation of legal loopholes”.
Habitat protection policies are advanced in conjunction with the obligation under Article 
11(1). Parties are required to establish and maintain a network of specially protected areas, 
with the existing network of the Barcelona Convention suggested as a particularly instructive
70model. Research and monitoring commitments are also listed as a particular priority, 
especially given the parlous state of scientific knowledge on this issue, with strong emphasis
70 Recommendation SC 1.2.
71 Report o f the First Meeting o f the Scientific Committee to ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2002), at 5 
(noting the particular threats posed by bottom-set gillnets in the Black Sea and pelagic driftnets in the 
Mediterranean region).
72 Resolution 2.7, Working Program 2005-2007.
73 Resolution 2.13, Pelagic Gillnets.
74 Amendment/Resolution 3.1: Amendment o f the Annex 2 to the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans 
of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area, Related to the Use of Drift Nets. Unlike 
ACCOBAMS, the ASCOBANS text does not contain any corresponding statement about the use of driftnets in 
the Agreement area.
75 Resolution 3.12: By-Catch, Competitive Interactions and Acoustic Devices.
76 Resolution 2.12, Guidelines for the Use o f Acoustic Deterrent Devices.
77 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the Scientific Committee to ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2005), at 8.
78 Recommendation SC 4.2: The Use of Driftnets in the Mediterranean Sea.
79 Likewise, for those parties that are also EU Member States, this obligation may be discharged through the 
demands of the Habitats Directive, which as noted in Chapter VIII prescribes the establishment of Special Areas 
of Conservation for particular species, including two species of cetaceans.
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placed on monitoring the status of populations as well as identifying migratory routes and 
predation requirements if  the species subject to the Agreement.
As with ASCOBANS, the dissemination of scientific and educational information and 
materials is also seen as a key aspect o f the work of ACCOBAMS, with parties required to 
coordinate to develop networks of appropriate experts across the Agreement area. 
ACCOBAMS has also played a key role in the broader Year of the Dolphin campaign and 
continues to generate publicity and information for its activities through its own regular 
newsletter, FINS, the success of which has led to the inception of a similar project under 
ASCOBANS. Finally, given the role of epizootics in generating political support for the 
formation of ACCOBAMS, parties are also required to develop contingency plans for 
emergency events and exceptional environmental conditions.
In addition to these general policies, in a manner similar to ASCOBANS, a series of 
Conservation Plans are currently under development in relation to specific species and 
populations of cetaceans that are considered to be particularly vulnerable to anthropogenic 
pressures within the ACCOBAMS area. In this respect, work has commenced on no less than 
six distinct Conservation Plans, with varying degrees of success to date. The elaboration of 
such instruments was initially mandated at the First MOP in 2002, which was primarily 
concerned with establishing the operative institutions of ACCOBAMS. At this juncture a
orv
Resolution was adopted, advancing a series of overarching priority activities for the nascent 
Agreement, which included the development o f Conservation Plans for cetaceans in the 
Black Sea, as well as for Mediterranean populations of short-beaked common dolphins and 
bottlenose dolphins.
The first of these initiatives to be successfully concluded was the Conservation Plan for 
Short-beaked Common Dolphins in the Mediterranean Sea, which was finalised and endorsed 
at the Second MOP in 2004. At this point, parties and riparian states were invited to 
“implement appropriate parts of the Conservation Plan for Mediterranean common dolphins 
without prejudice to other international obligations; introduce relevant activities into their 
national action plans and report on these efforts to the ACCOBAMS Permanent
80 Resolution 1.9: International Implementation Priorities for 2002-2006.
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Secretariat”. The Conservation Plan for common dolphins is a lengthy document of some 
ninety pages, comprising some twenty-five pages of substantive actions for the parties to 
implement. If the current version o f the revised Jastamia Plan is considered unwieldy by the 
parties, this certainly represents and even more extensive approach to conservation planning 
by ACCOBAMS. The Conservation Plan advances a range of actions and policies to be 
pursued, ranging from by-catch mitigation and the promotion of responsible dolphin- 
watching to increasing the legal protection afforded to this species and improving the state of 
public and scientific knowledge as to its population status and conservation needs.
Despite the conclusion of the Conservation Plan in 2003, it appears that little progress has 
been made towards implementing this initiative. The Conservation Plan has been seemingly 
undermined by a combination of inactivity and a chronic lack of financial resources. Given 
the considerable array of regulatory activities proposed under the Conservation Plan, the 
appointment of a formal coordinator was mandated under Resolution 2.20; nevertheless, such 
an operative has not been appointed due to financial constraints. Instead, a Jastamia-style 
Common Dolphin Steering Committee has been established under the ACCOBAMS 
Scientific Committee, which is responsible for reviewing, further developing and proposing 
amendments to the Conservation Plan and assessing the adequacy of its provisions. The 
Scientific Committee recently advanced a bleak assessment of the Conservation Plan to date, 
noting its grave concern “that no relevant action has been taken so far that may result in 
common dolphin recovery in the region”, observing that by-catches and prey depletion in 
particular continue to jeopardise the survival of individual groups and the Mediterranean 
population at large.82 This pessimistic appraisal was reiterated at the Third MOP in 2007, 
noting that “despite the strong evidence, strategic planning and multiple expressions of 
concern and recommendations, inter alia by the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee and 
relevant ACCOBAMS Partners, insufficient action has been taken to ensure recovery of the 
common dolphin in the region”.83
81 Resolution 2.20: Conservation Plan for Short-beaked Common Dolphins (Delphinus delphis).
82 Recommendation SC 4.1: Conservation of Mediterranean Common Dolphins, adopted by at the Fourth 
Meeting of the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee in November 2006. At this juncture the Scientific 
Committee rather stridently observed that “failure to act to preserve common dolphins can only be interpreted as 
a failure of the Parties to the commitment they made when signing the agreement to ‘maintain a favourable 
conservation status for cetaceans in the area’”.
83 Resolution 3.17: Conservation of the Mediterranean Common Dolphin Delphinus delphis.
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Despite these difficulties, ACCOBAMS remains strongly committed to the development of 
individual Conservation Plans as a particular management tool. A Conservation Plan was 
recently endorsed by both the Scientific Committee and the MOP as “an integral component” 
of coordinated conservation activities for “the Black Sea environment, biodiversity, living 
resources, marine mammals and cetaceans”. The Conservation Plan is a joint initiative 
between ACCOBAMS and the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea against 
Pollution and also received substantial funding from the Council of Europe. The
O c
Conservation Plan was initially mandated at the First MOP. An advanced draft was 
reviewed at the Third Meeting of the Scientific Committee in 2005, followed by an ad hoc 
Round Table on the conservation o f Black Sea Cetaceans in May 2006, prior to the Fourth 
Meeting of the Scientific Committee in November 2006, at which point the plan was
RAapproved and commended to the MOP.
As with the Conservation Plan for common dolphins, the Black Sea Conservation Plan is a 
lengthy document and prescribes some eighteen Action Points that are categorised into the 
six key activity areas specified within the ACCOBAMS Conservation Plan. Particular 
importance is placed on fisheries interactions, marine protected areas and public awareness 
camapigns. At the Round Table, four particular Action Points were identified as “matters of 
urgency”, namely the establishment of a regional by-catch network, developing the regional 
network of eligible protected areas, conducting a region-wide survey and assessment of 
cetacean abundance, distribution and hotspots, as well as developing national cetacean 
stranding networks. Accordingly, at the Third MOP the parties were invited to implement 
“appropriate parts of the conservation plan” and introduce relevant activities into their 
national policies. If the Conservation Plan for common dolphins is a reliable indicator, this 
will be largely attained through the establishment of a similar Steering Committee in due 
course.
Further Conservation Plans are also under development. A distinct instrument was mandated 
in respect of Mediterranean populations o f bottlenose dolphins at the First MOP, although 
work was deferred due to the high priority afforded to common dolphins. A series of working
84 Resolution 3.11: Conservation Plan for Black Sea Cetaceans.
85 Resolution 1.12: Conservation o f the Black Sea Tursiops truncatus: Bottlenose dolphin.
86 Recommendation SC 4.6: Conservation Plan for Black Sea Cetaceans.
202
an t
groups has since been established to develop the initiative further. Work is currently in 
progress to establish a Bottlenose Dolphin Steering Committee with a view towards 
elaborating local action plans, although as yet no fixed deadline appears to have been set for 
the conclusion of this project. In addition, in 2005 a workshop on fin whales was convened 
under the auspices of ACCOBAMS and the Pelagos sanctuary, which is intended as the
oo
preliminary work for a further Conservation Plan for this species. Nevertheless, before any 
such initiative may ultimately proceed, it is clear that substantial research and monitoring 
activities will have to be conducted to identify both the conservation status of relevant
OQ
populations as well as the key anthropogenic threats to this species. Similarly, an equivalent 
research initiative must also be successfully concluded in order for a mooted sperm whale 
Conservation Plan to come into fruition, although the parties have, at this preliminary stage, 
identified driftnet fishing and ship strikes as particular conservation problems in respect of 
this species.90 Further research activities are also required in respect of Mediterranean 
populations of harbour porpoises, which have also been earmarked as a candidate species for 
a future Conservation Plan.91 Additional Conservation Plans for other species of cetaceans 
are also likely to be developed under the auspices of ACCOBAMS in future years, with 
particular reference to the status assessments adopted in relation to killer whales by the IUCN 
and endorsed at the Third MOP.92
A further conservation and management policy pioneered by ACCOBAMS is the 
development of distinct Guidelines to regulate anthropogenic activities affecting cetaceans 
within the Agreement area, as mandated under Article IV(3). This facilitates the preparation 
of Guidelines concerning, inter alia, the reduction or elimination as far as possible of adverse 
human-cetacean interactions; habitat protection and natural resource management methods; 
emergency measures; and rescue methods. To date, seven such Guidelines have been 
developed under the auspices of ACCOBAMS addressing a host of issues, including 
cetacean-watching activities, the establishment and management of MPAs, strandings, the
87 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the Scientific Committee (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2005), at 6.
88 Report o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Scientific Committee (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2006), at 8.
89 Resolution 3.16: Conservation of Fin Whales in the Mediterranean Sea.
90 Resolution 3.4: Work Programme 2008-2010.
91 Ibid.
92 Resolution 3.19: IUCN Red List o f Cetaceans in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. At this juncture the 
parties noted Mediterranean short-beaked common dolphins, Mediterranean sperm whales and Black Sea and 
northern Aegean populations of harbour porpoises as requiring “specific, immediate attention”. Accordingly, the 
experience of both ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS suggests that these species are likely to be prioritised as 
candidates for further Conservation Plans in the medium-term future.
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release of cetaceans into the wild, the creation o f tissue banks and the mitigation of cetacean- 
fishery conflicts. Further Guidelines are currently in development to address the impact of 
anthropogenic noise upon “marine mammals” within the Agreement area, for which a
Q'XWorking Group was convened to advance this project further by the Fourth MOP. This 
particular strategy demonstrates strong potential as a distinct conservation mechanism, that 
has allowed ACCOBAMS to develop -  and, in some cases, pioneer -  influential and 
informative models of best practice for a host of issues that are subject to minimal or no 
regulatory attention in other multilateral fora.
In addition to this, ACCOBAMS differs from ASCOBANS -  and, indeed, many other long­
standing CMS subsidiary instruments -  due to the overt importance placed upon the 
application of the precautionary principle in relation to its conservation policies. Article 11(4) 
states that, in implementing the conservation measures advanced under the Agreement, “the 
Parties shall apply the precautionary principle”. There is no equivalent provision within 
ASCOBANS, which has been considered to operate to the great detriment of the 
Agreement.94 The central role envisaged for the precautionary principle under ACCOBAMS 
may be explained by the fact that the substantive negotiations for the conclusion of the 
Agreement were pursued subsequent to the Fourth COP to the CMS in 1994, at which point 
the parties undertook that any future Agreements concluded under the Bonn Convention 
umbrella “should incorporate the ‘precautionary principle”’.95 Accordingly, a series of 
Guidelines on the application of the precautionary principle are currently under development 
within the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee. However, due to the wide-ranging remit of 
the initiative, work has to date focussed upon establishing a precautionary approach to certain 
key conservation policies -  such as the use of pingers -  as opposed to finalising an
• • 96overarching institutional template for precautionary activities.
In conjunction with the broad conservation and management strategies advanced under the 
auspices of the Agreement in the form of Conservation Plans and specific Guidelines, at the
93 Resolution 3.10: Guidelines to Address the Impact o f Anthropogenic Noise on Marine Mammals in the 
ACCOBAMS Area. A further Resolution adopted at the Third MOP called for a series of revisions to be made 
to the existing guidelines on strandings to include impacts o f pollution upon cetaceans: Resolution 3.29: 
Guidelines for a Coordinated Stranding Response.
94 H. Nijkamp and A. Nollkaemper, “The Protection of Small Cetaceans in the Face o f Uncertainty: An Analysis 
of the ASCOBANS Agreement” (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 281, especially 
293-97.
95 Resolution 4.4: Strategy for the Future Development of the Convention.
96 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the Scientific Committee (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2005), at 11.
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Third MOP the parties established a series o f priority activities to be pursued within the
07
2008-2010 triennium. To this end, particular emphasis has been placed upon collating 
comprehensive population estimates and distribution and addressing interactions with 
fisheries and the threats posed by anthropogenic noise, ship strikes, cetacean-watching 
operations, captivity, climate change and marine debris, as well as improving the legal status 
of key species, coordinating emergency responses and developing a coordinated network of 
MPAs in key areas of cetacean habitats within the Agreement area.
6.7 Concluding remarks
ACCOBAMS has been operational since 2002 and, with three MOPs having been 
successfully convened, is now at a key stage in its development. To date, ACCOBAMS has 
been viewed as a superior instrument to ASCOBANS, not least since it is far more 
prescriptive in nature and largely avoids the vague, permissive and research-orientated tone
QQ
of its sister Agreement. Furthermore, ACCOBAMS has advanced a clearly defined remit 
for its conservation efforts within the region in a manner that has yet to be fully realised by 
ASCOBANS. The institutional strengths o f the Agreement are also supported by a clear 
Conservation Plan that is targeted and precise in terms of both obligation and strategy. In this 
respect, ACCOBAMS may be viewed favourably as a model for future CMS cetacean 
subsidiary instruments to follow.
Some initial concerns" of limited participation within ACCOBAMS have been largely 
assuaged by subsequent developments. The majority of the Range States have become parties 
to the Agreement and the remaining non-parties have exercised at least some degree of 
cooperation. Likewise, jurisdictional limitations have also been identified as a potential 
impediment to the enforcement of the Agreement, with maritime delimitation in the 
Mediterranean region having created enclaves of high seas.100 It appears that this has also had 
a limited impact upon the activities of ACCOBAMS. A contributing factor may be the 
considerable recognition within the Agreement’s institutions of the need to develop 
collaborative relations with third-party interests in order to advance the ACCOBAMS agenda 
in these waters. Additionally, as with ASCOBANS, further clearly-targeted and multi­
97 Resolution 3.4: Work Programme 2008-2010.
98 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 248-50.
99 Ibid., at 250.
100 Ibid.
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disciplinary research will be required to gauge the impact that the Agreement has had upon 
the conservation practices of its constituent parties. The wide range of Guidelines developed 
by ACCOBAMS nonetheless offers clear models of best practice to be incorporated by 
domestic regulators, suggesting that the influence of the Agreement may ultimately prove 
rather more pervasive than ASCOBANS.
Instead, ACCOBAMS faces its primary challenges in the context of the implementation of its 
various conservation commitments. The implementation history of existing marine 
environmental commitments on the part of the various Mediterranean and Black Sea riparian 
states has been chequered,101 a position that does not augur well for the long-term prospects 
of ACCOBAMS. This unsatisfactory position may be further compounded by the relative 
poverty of many eligible participants -  as noted by Bums, “the severe financial constraints 
faced by many nations in the region, particularly in the Black Sea, may render the ambitious 
objectives of the treaty chimerical”.102 Notwithstanding the individual generosity of certain 
parties, the CMS has officially appraised the resources of ACCOBAMS as “modest”,103 
which suggests that the Agreement may face similar financial pressures to ASCOBANS in 
future years, with similar adverse implications for the funding of key policies. The recent 
concerns raised by the Scientific Committee over the need to guarantee seed funding in order 
to attain its minimum conservation objectives represent further evidence of this alarming 
trend.
Although ACCOBAMS is still in a relatively early stage of its operations, a series of 
conservation priorities have been established under its latter MOPs. However, concerns may 
be raised that rhetorical support for these commitments has been slow to translate into 
comprehensive and coordinated activity by the parties. As with ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS 
has developed a series of commendable Conservation Plans for certain key species, yet 
progress towards the implementation of these initiatives has been troublingly slow to date, as 
lamented by the various ACCOBAMS institutions. As the Scientific Committee has pointedly 
observed, the Conservation Plans “are only tools to guide and elicit actions (research and
1U1 Bums, “ACCOBAMS” at 124-25.
102 Ibid., at 125. Indeed, ACCOBAMS has already experienced isolated incidences o f the non-payment of 
subscriptions -  for instance, at the Third MOP it was noted that Libya had failed to pay its requisite 
contributions: Report o f the Third Meeting o f the Parties to ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2007), at 8.
103 Report o f the Second Meeting o f the Parties to ACCOBAMS (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2005), at 2.
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conservation) and should not be seen as end-products in their own right”.104 In truth, 
however, this pertinent criticism is only part of the problem in respect of the various 
Conservation Plans adopted to date. As the Finnish delegation to ASCOBANS has 
compellingly argued,105 there has been a tendency under both ASCOBANS and 
ACCOBAMS to develop lengthy and complex action plans that are characterised more by 
their scholarly evaluation of the conservation status of the species in question than by 
providing a clear and easily identifiable programme o f activity. Indeed, many such initiatives 
developed under ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS appear closer in nature to academic papers 
as opposed to accessible, inclusive and clearly-targeted programmes of activity that can be 
swiftly and easily implemented by national authorities and relevant stakeholders.
It is vitally important for the future viability o f the various CMS cetacean Agreements that 
such bodies can demonstrate clear conservation advantages over and above those of their 
regulatory competitors. In this regard, the development of successful species- and region- 
specific conservation plans, which may be objectively demonstrated to enhance the 
conservation status of the species concerned, represents perhaps the best avenue by which to 
achieve this objective. Indeed, it is likely that ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS are far better 
placed than many other regulators to develop such initiatives, given that few equivalent 
strategies have as yet emerged from alternative bodies, such as the various habitat groups of 
the relevant Regional Seas Agreements or, indeed, the European Commission.
Given that the primary criticism of the various conservation plans adopted to date concerns 
the format rather than the ambition of such instruments, there is a clear need to investigate 
alternative models. One possible solution could be for ACCOBAMS (and, indeed, 
ASCOBANS) to emulate the model employed by the Council of Europe, whereby a number 
of instruments involving complex and complicated issues are published as a concise set of 
Recommendations and accompanied by a more substantial (and separate) explanatory 
memorandum. If ACCOBAMS were to follow this model, then the lengthy discussion of the 
scientific basis for the instrument adopted could be explored in full in a distinct document in 
a manner that would not impede or intimidate the sympathetic lay reader of a targeted action 
plan. However ACCOBAMS opts to address this issue, it is nonetheless clear that the
104 Report o f the Third Meeting o f the Scientific Committee (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2005), at 6.
105 The Finnish Point o f View o f the Jastarnia Plan Revision, Document AC 15/Doc. 41 (P), submitted at the 
Fifteenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS; reproduced on-line at www.ascobans.org (last 
visited 31 August 2009).
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development of an alternative approach to such instruments is required as a matter of priority. 
The Conservation Plans adopted thus far undoubtedly represent positive progress towards 
understanding, clarifying and addressing the primary threats to species of cetaceans in these 
waters. However, if  they continue to lack focus, clear targets and comprehensibility to the 
key stakeholders charged with operationalising such instruments, ACCOBAMS appears to be 
condemned to repeating its lament against serial non-implementation for the foreseeable 
future.
Thus far, as free-standing institutions, ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS have demonstrated 
significant political, financial and supervisory limitations that have undoubtedly impacted 
upon their ability to deliver tangible conservation benefits for cetaceans. These criticisms 
have often served to overshadow their strengths -  not least in that they represent the only 
current regional regimes that specifically operate to regulate cetaceans and, like the CMS 
itself, have filled a regulatory lacuna. Accordingly, it has been argued that the optimal 
deployment of the ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS regimes, given that their regulatory 
competitors are often considerably better placed to provide meaningful and binding 
conservation measures to marine fauna by addressing particular anthropogenic threats, is to 
play a largely facilitative role by identifying and coordinating various conservation policies 
through existing multilateral management structures.106
The unique institutional structure of ACCOBAMS strongly supports such a policy of 
facilitation while there is evidence of a strong facilitative motivation underpinning the 
conclusion of the Agreement.107 Whether facilitation should be considered the sole function 
of the CMS cetacean subsidiary Agreements, to the exclusion of the pursuit of autonomous 
conservation measures,108 is somewhat more questionable. There appears to be little practical 
impediment -  and indeed, considerable merit -  in the Agreements adopting a stance both as a 
facilitator and as an autonomous regulator. Indeed, this would appear to have been the 
practice of both ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS to date, which have sought to engender 
collaborative programmes of activity with pre-existing regulatory institutions, while also 
pursuing specific policies towards a host of conservation issues facing cetaceans.
106 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 250.
107 Indeed, the CMS has formally observed that as far as ACCOBAMS is concerned, the “negotiators wished 
that the tools for implementation be channelled through existing regional structures”: Proceedings o f the Fifth 
Meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties (Bonn: CMS, 1997), at 21.
108 Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans”, at 250.
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In this respect, the true value of the Agreements appears to be the advancement of particular 
measures, such as the development of Conservation Plans and specialist Guidelines that have 
not been pursued (and are unlikely to occupy sufficient attention) within alternative bodies, 
such as the EU and regional agreements. ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS can also act as a 
form of regulatory cement to coordinate the conservation objectives of a disparate group of 
supervisory institutions in respect of cetaceans. Nonetheless, a consistent struggle to secure 
sufficient financial and administrative resources to effect these measures, combined with a 
disappointing degree of implementation by many parties, means that questions concerning the 
long-term effectiveness of ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS are likely to remain.
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CHAPTER VII
NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS AND THE CONSERVATION OF 
CETACEANS UNDER THE CMS
7.1 Introduction
Having evaluated the most significant CMS Agreements adopted to date for cetaceans, this 
Chapter proceeds to analyse a series of relevant non-binding instruments that have emerged 
under the auspices of the Bonn Convention. As noted in Chapter IV, a trend has emerged 
within the CMS towards the development of less formal arrangements for the conservation of 
migratory species. This position is primarily driven by a desire to maximise the limited 
resources of the CMS regime, while establishing a basis for further regulatory activity and to 
utilise pre-existing institutional structures to advance the objectives of the Convention.1 
Accordingly, this Chapter examines the implications of this policy in the context of 
cetaceans.
Thus far, two Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) have been concluded in respect of 
cetaceans. The experience of these MOUs in shaping and coordinating national and regional 
policies will prove instructive as to the future utility of such an approach to cetacean 
conservation under the CMS. This Chapter commences with an analysis of the first such 
instrument, applicable to the Pacific Islands region, discussing its development and analysing 
its prospects for success. This is followed by a preliminary evaluation of the Western African 
MOU, adopted in late 2008 in respect of small cetaceans and manatees. Subsequently, this 
Chapter evaluates the scope developing further instruments addressing cetaceans within the 
South Atlantic, South-East Asia and Indian Ocean regions, before advancing a series of 
conclusions on the prospects of success for an MOU-based approach to cetacean 
conservation.
7.2 Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans and their 
Habitats in the Pacific Islands Region, 2006
The first MOU addressing cetaceans negotiated under the auspices of the Bonn Convention is 
the Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans and their Habitats in
1 Resolution 9.2: Priorities for CMS Agreements, adopted at the Ninth COP in 2008.
210
the Pacific Islands Region, which was opened for signature on 15 September 2006. The MOU 
represents the culmination of a series of initiatives concerning cetaceans that have been on­
going within various political and regulatory fora within the Pacific region since the early 
1990s.
7.2.1 Species status and negotiating history
As with ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS, the knowledge base on cetaceans in the Pacific 
Islands region is considered to be largely deficient, both in terms of the precise species 
ordinarily and occasionally resident in these waters and the scale o f the anthropogenic threats 
thereto. The limited research that exists in relation to cetaceans suggests that between thirty 
and forty different species may frequent these waters. While data on the precise extent of the 
threats posed to cetaceans is currently incomplete, they are nonetheless considered vulnerable 
to the main anthropogenic pressures that are generally experienced on a global basis and also 
replicated within other regions.4
A significant threat to cetacean stocks in the Pacific region is posed by directed hunting, 
hence the future agenda of the MOU may be considered likely to afford substantially greater 
attention to whaling issues than previously advanced under the CMS. Particular concerns 
have been raised by a number of the MOU signatories, not least Australia and New Zealand, 
over the current programme of lethal scientific research undertaken in these waters by Japan.5 
Furthermore, all species are considered vulnerable to by-catches, with fisheries interactions 
considered to pose a high threat to small and medium sized cetaceans in particular.6 
Additionally, further issues of concern include climate change, listed as “potentially a high 
threat to whales, dolphins and porpoises and their habitats in the region”,7 as well as pollution 
and habitat degradation generally which, although potentially significant, are considered at
2 C. Miller, Current State o f Knowledge o f Cetacean Threats, Diversity and Habitats in the Pacific Islands 
Region (Chippenham: WDCS, 2006), at 12.
3 Pacific Islands Regional Marine Species Programme 2008-2012 (Apia: SPREP, 2007), at 31. The Programme 
is reproduced in full on-line at www.sprep.org/topic/pdf/marinespeciesweb.pdf (last visited 31 August 2009).
4 Miller, “Current State of Knowledge”, at 12.
5 A. Gillespie, “Protecting Cetaceans in the South Pacific: The Dynamics of a Regional Agreement” (2002) 7 
Asia-Pacific Journal o f Environmental Law 71, at 72-73.
6 Pacific Islands Regional Marine Species Programme 2008-2012, at 36.
7 Ibid.
8 Miller, “Current State of Knowledge”, at 21-22.
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present to represent a “medium” threat to cetaceans.9 Finally, acoustic disturbances, eco- 
tourism activities and the trade in live specimens are also considered potential risks.10
Regional action to address cetaceans in these waters has been primarily coordinated through
the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). The first major
programme of activity coordinated under SPREP was the elaboration of a Regional Marine
Mammal Conservation Programme, operating between 1993 and 2003, which incorporated a
conservation strategy addressing a host of marine species, including whales and dolphins.
This led to the inauguration of a further Marine Species Programme Framework for 2003-
07,11 which comprised three distinct Action Plans addressing whales and dolphins, dugongs
1 0and marine turtles respectively. The SPREP Framework specifically identified whales and
1 3dolphins as “flagship species for Pacific marine ecosystems”. Moreover SPREP Framework 
sought to develop strategies for the “cooperative conservation management of these shared 
marine resources”, with the three marine mammal Action Plans forming a fundamental 
component of the overall vision to attain a “Pacific Ocean where populations of whales, 
dolphins, dugongs and marine turtles have recovered to healthy levels of abundance, have 
recovered their former distribution and continue to meet and sustain the cultural aspirations 
of the Pacific peoples”.14
In addition to these developments through SPREP -  for which the Whale and Dolphin Action 
Plan has also formed the primary operative basis for the Pacific Islands MOU under the CMS 
-  a parallel motivation towards the elaboration o f a distinct regional instrument has proved to 
be closely aligned with events within the IWC. As observed in Chapter II, a matter of 
particular controversy in current IWC policy has been the potential designation of sanctuaries 
for whales, an issue that has proven especially fractious in the South Pacific region. In this 
respect, it is the stated policy of Australia and New Zealand to facilitate the establishment of 
an IWC-based sanctuary in the South Pacific to link with the existing Southern Ocean
9 Pacific Islands Regional Marine Species Programme 2008-2012, at 36.
10 Ibid.
11 Reproduced at: www.sprep.org/YOST/pdfs/SPREPMarSpecActionPlans2003-07.pdf (last visited 31 August 
2009).
12 On the potential conservation benefits o f the SPREP Action Plans see A. Gillespie, “The Dugong Action Plan 
for the South Pacific: An Evaluation Based on the Need for International and Regional Conservation of 
Sirenians” (2005) 36 Ocean Development and International Law 135; and A. Gillespie, “The Slow Swim from 
Extinction: Saving Turtles in the South Pacific” (2006) 21 International Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law 57.
13 SPREP Marine Framework, at 1.
14 Ibid., at 4.
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Sanctuary established under the ICRW in 1995,15 a move that has been consistently resisted 
by Japan. To date, while raised as a distinct agenda item within the IWC on a virtually annual 
basis, the proposed sanctuary for the South Pacific has nonetheless repeatedly failed to secure 
the requisite three-quarters majority of the parties present and voting in order to be brought 
into effect under the ICRW. Consequently, the various island nations in the Pacific region 
have found themselves caught on the fault-line between the whaling policies of Australia and 
New Zealand on the one hand, and Japan on the other, all o f which exert substantial influence 
in the region in terms of development aid and bilateral trade. Accordingly, an understandable 
measure of realpolitik has meant that a number of the island microstates in the South Pacific 
have sought to distance themselves from overt support for the sanctuary proposals within the 
IWC,16 with the issue of protected areas for cetaceans thereby displaced to alternative -  and 
rather less incendiary -  fora, such as the CMS.
Initial attempts to link the activities of SPREP and the Bonn Convention regime in relation to 
cetaceans within occurred in March 2003, where a CMS workshop was convened at the 
SPREP headquarters in Apia, Samoa, with the aim o f examining the scope for developing
17conservation programmes in relation to marine turtles and marine mammals generally. A 
second workshop was held a year later, with a view towards developing a CMS subsidiary 
instrument for marine mammals in the region. At this juncture it became apparent that any 
future instrument would necessarily be confined to cetaceans, since few of the states and 
territories represented at the meeting were Range States for dugongs, with marine turtles
1Rconsidered to merit a separate regional Agreement. “[Significant progress” had been made 
on the instrument by the time of Sixteenth Meeting of SPREP in late 2005,19 where the terms
15 A. Gillespie, “The Southern Ocean Sanctuary and the Evolution of International Environmental Law” (2000)
15 International Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law 293.
16 For a useful summary of diplomatic contortions undertaken by a number of the South Pacific island nations in 
this regard see Gillespie, “Protecting Cetaceans in the South Pacific”, at 75-76. Some island states, notably the 
Cook Islands, have formally declared their jurisdictional waters to be a sanctuary for whales and dolphins. 
Conversely, other Pacific Island nations have themselves voiced concerns about the sanctuary proposals tabled 
by Australia and New Zealand, most notably Palau. The Solomon Islands, in which a drive hunt of cetaceans is 
conducted on an annual basis, has also demonstrated unease at the prospect of an IWC sanctuary by abstaining 
from key votes on the issue: at 72.
17 “Atelier SPREP sur la Conservation des Mammiferes Marins Regionaux et la CMS” (2003) 17 CMS Bulletin, 
at 30.
18 Report o f  the Second Workshop on the Convention on Migratory Species and Marine Mammal Conservation 
in the South Pacific (Bonn: CMS, 2004), at Annex 5.
19 Resolution 8.5, Implementation of Existing Agreements and the Development o f Future Agreements, adopted 
at the Eighth COP to the CMS in 2005.
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of the MOU were largely finalised. The Pacific Islands MOU was opened for signature at the 
Seventeenth Meeting of SPREP in 2006 and has attracted eleven signatories to date.20
Like ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS, the Pacific Islands MOU has been elaborated under 
Article IV(4) of the parent convention.21 Again, this reflects the overall paucity of 
comprehensive data concerning the population status and conservation threats to cetaceans 
within this region. Furthermore, the MOU explicitly states that it is not considered to be 
legally binding.22 Early negotiations revealed that a non-binding MOU would best serve the 
immediate need for multilateral action, but did “not preclude its subsequent development into 
a legally binding CMS Agreement in the future”.23 Since the Whale and Dolphin Action Plan 
incorporated under the SPREP Framework offered a ready-made programme of activity, this 
instrument was further adopted as the primary source of the Action Plan requirements of 
MOU. Moreover, since the various Action Plans developed by SPREP thus far had applied to 
“whales and dolphins”, the MOU was therefore logically extended to all species of cetaceans.
7.2.2 Conservation policies
The Pacific Islands MOU specifically acknowledges that it faces considerable challenges in 
seeking to promote the conservation of cetaceans, not least that “knowledge of the biology, 
ecology, migrations, population abundance, and conservation status of many cetaceans is 
deficient”.24 Furthermore, cetaceans are considered susceptible to a host of anthropogenic 
pressures including directed hunting, incidental capture, habitat degradation and disturbance, 
chemical and noise pollution, prey depletion, ship strikes and climate change.25 Accordingly, 
the MOU recognises that cetaceans should be conserved for the benefit of present and future 
generations, since they form “an integral part of the marine environment that connects 
ecosystems and cultures”. Uniquely, given the anthropological importance of cetaceans in the 
region, the signatories are required to take urgent action both to achieve and maintain a
20 The eligibility criteria for participation in the MOU are significantly different to that of the parent convention, 
with the MOU open to signature by “the States and Territories of the Pacific Islands Region”: Para 12 of the 
Pacific Islands MOU. Unlike the CMS, which is only applicable to states, it was agreed at a preliminary stage in 
the negotiations the MOU that territories as well as states should be eligible to participate: Report o f  the Second 
Workshop, at 23.
21 Para. 9 of the Pacific Islands MOU.
22 Ibid.
23 Report o f the Second Workshop, at 22.
24 Preamble to the MOU.
25 Ibid. It may be suggested that the litany of anthropogenic threats to cetaceans advanced in the preamble to the 
MOU may be considered to be listed in order of priority, following discussions to this effect during the drafting 
process.
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favourable conservation status for the species and their habitats as well as to safeguard the 
associated cultural values for Pacific Islands peoples. Signatories are to “take steps to 
conserve all cetaceans and fully protect species listed in CMS Appendix I that occur in the 
Pacific Islands Region”.26 Implementation possibilities include further participation in other
onrelevant multilateral biodiversity-related conventions, as well as reviewing, enacting or
98updating, as appropriate, national legislation to conserve cetaceans, while implementing 
“subject to the availability of necessary resources” the various provisions of the SPREP
90Whale and Dolphin Action Plan, which is formally appended to the MOU.
The initial Action Plan comprised some thirty-one action points of varying significance, with 
an over-arching vision to foster the recovery of cetaceans from past over-exploitation; 
improve the protection and conservation of these species and their habitats, with particular 
emphasis upon the establishment of sanctuaries on the national, regional and international 
levels; to ensure that Pacific Island peoples continue to benefit from the long-term survival of 
cetaceans; and to increase knowledge, awareness and understanding of these species and their 
role in Pacific marine ecosystems. The ultimate goal of the Action Plan was thereby stated as 
being “[t]o conserve whales and dolphins and their cultural values for the people of the 
Pacific”.
Despite the central importance of the Action Plan in framing multilateral efforts to address 
the conservation status of cetaceans this was, in truth, a somewhat disjointed and chaotic (if 
well-intentioned) document. Many of the action points advanced were assigned in a rather ad 
hoc and random order with little attempt to prioritise key activities, which in turn rendered 
the Action Plan a challenging instrument to seek to implement. These shortcomings were 
further compounded by a general dearth of clear targets. These limitations were formally 
acknowledged in a review of the MOU undertaken shortly after its inauguration described the 
Action Plan as an initiative that “lacks clear priorities/timelines, is too focussed on IWC 
issues and is not ‘implementation-friendly’”.30
26 Para. 1.
27 Para. 2.
28 -2
30 Report o f the Technical Meeting on Cetaceans in the Pacific Islands Region Doc. UNEP/CMS/PIC-1/5/Add. 1
(Bonn: CMS, 2007) at 8.
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Under Para 6 of the MOU, the signatories undertake to assess implementation at “regular 
meetings”, of which two have been convened to date. Under Para 14, the instrument -  and, 
more pertinently, its Annex -  may be amended by a consensus of the signatories. In 2008, a 
new Pacific Islands Regional Marine Species Programme 2008-12 was adopted under the 
auspices of SPREP, which superseded the 2003-07 version that initially formed the 
operational basis of the MOU. The 2008 version was accordingly adopted as the revised 
Action Plan for the MOU at the Second Meeting o f the Signatories, convened in July 2009.31
In many respects, the 2008-12 Programme operates on a similar basis to its predecessor,
prescribing three distinct Action Plans for marine mammals in the Pacific Islands region,
• 10while advancing an overall vision that is virtually identical to that of the 2003 version. 
Indeed, the 2008-12 Programme continues a number of the broad themes advanced by its 
predecessor, with particular reference towards facilitating national, regional and international 
cooperation; reducing threats to cetaceans; promoting ecosystem and habitat protection, 
capacity building and education and awareness; preserving native cultural traditions in 
relation to cetaceans; developing national legislation; improving research and monitoring 
activities; and fostering the development of whale and dolphin-based tourism. Within these 
general themes and objectives, particular importance is placed upon threat reduction, with 
considerable emphasis on the need to address direct and indirect interactions with fisheries as 
well as the impact of anthropogenic activities in the cetacean environment.
33Having observed that “substantial progress has been achieved” in addressing the 
conservation needs of marine species, the 2008-12 Programme has actively sought to avoid a 
number of the weaknesses that characterised its forerunner and prescribed a series of priority 
actions and also designated lead actors to implement these objectives. Nevertheless, some 
concerns remain as to whether the programme of activities established under its auspices is in 
fact realistically attainable. Given that virtually all o f the action points advanced are currently 
listed as a “high” priority, there remains a real risk that the parties may be overwhelmed on a 
number of conservation fronts to the detriment of a meaningful implementation of these
31 Document UNEP/CMS/PIC2/Doc.4-01; reproduced on-line at www.cms.int (last visited 31 August 2009). At 
the time of writing, the formal Report of the Second Meeting of the Signatories had not been finalised and 
published.
32 The 2008-12 Programme seeks to maintain “a healthy Pacific Ocean that sustains populations of whales, 
dolphins, dugongs and marine turtles, and meets the aspirations o f Pacific Island peoples and protects their 
natural and cultural heritage”: Pacific Islands Regional Marine Species Programme 2008-12, at 5.
33 Ibid., at 6.
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policies. Some attempts to mitigate this concern were made at the Second Meeting of the 
Signatories, which established mid-term planning objectives for the MOU with particular 
emphasis upon expanding the knowledge base concerning cetaceans in the region, identifying 
key threats and addressing fisheries interactions and tourism issues.34
Taken on its own terms, the Pacific Islands MOU is a welcome development from the 
perspective of the conservation of cetaceans in an area in which such species have been 
historically over-exploited and under-studied. While the MOU lacks binding commitments, it 
has nonetheless acted to entrench the current framework for conservationist activity by 
adding another formal tier to regional cooperation and maintaining the legislative visibility of 
these species. A close and cooperative working relationship has been developed with SPREP, 
while the considerable support for the nascent MOU has been pledged from within the CMS 
structure. Furthermore, the MOU may act as a useful guide for the formulation of further 
instruments of this nature to address the conservation needs of additional species of marine 
mammals, if  the requisite political will and funding is forthcoming. Such developments will 
thereby expand the profile of the parent convention in an area in which it has historically 
enjoyed limited coverage, as well as presenting opportunities to develop conservation 
measures for marine species that have also been somewhat neglected in other fora.
However, it appears rather unlikely that the MOU will ultimately crystallise into a binding 
Agreement. Indeed the general theme o f multilateral marine mammal conservation initiatives 
within this region -  both under the auspices of the CMS and beyond -  has been towards the 
establishment of broad action plans and less formal institutional arrangements. Given the 
continuing political controversy generated by whaling activities undertaken in these waters, if 
IWC practice is a reliable barometer, the various Pacific Island states may indeed favour the 
development of non-binding instruments in relation to marine mammals. Such a position 
establishes a broad atmosphere of conservation cooperation yet avoids inflaming political 
tensions that would be undoubtedly generated by the elaboration of a binding Agreement 
advancing strong obligations against directed hunting in these waters.
34 Document UNEP/CMS/PIC2/Doc.7-01.
35 Indeed, representatives of ACCOBAMS have already pledged to “collaborate and share experiences and 
expertise with the Pacific Islands Region”: Report o f  the First Meeting o f the Signatories to the Memorandum of  
Understanding for the Conservation o f Cetaceans and their Habitats in the Pacific Islands Region (Bonn: CMS, 
2007), at 3.
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Irrespective of the eventual strength of its commitments, it is clear that the Pacific Islands 
MOU and its associated institutional sponsors face significant resource constraints that are 
likely to impact adversely upon the practical conservation possibilities posed by these 
developments.36 The relative poverty of most of the Range States concerned may also act as a 
further inhibiting factor for the development of a more formal and binding cetacean 
conservation regime in this region. Incorporation within the CMS umbrella may provide 
some degree of additional funding, but it appears likely that a degree of reliance upon 
supplementary finances from signatory states, especially Australia and New Zealand, and 
other external sources may be necessary to fully underwrite the running costs and 
conservation projects associated with the MOU.
7.3 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Conservation of the Manatee and 
Small Cetaceans of Western Africa and Macaronesia, 2008
Following the development of the Pacific Islands MOU, a further instrument concerning 
marine mammals has been elaborated for Western Africa. This particular instrument is 
different in scope and specifically addresses small cetaceans and sirenians. The Memorandum 
of Understanding Concerning the Conservation of the Manatee and Small Cetaceans of 
Western Africa and Macaronesia was opened for signature on 3 October 2008 and represents 
the first multilateral initiative to date to address small cetaceans within this region.
7.3.1 Species concerns and negotiating history
An instrument to address cetaceans in western Africa under the auspices of the Bonn 
Convention was first mooted in 1995, whereby this region, together with South America, was 
identified as a priority area for activity by the Scientific Council and a designated Working 
Group was duly established.37 Following a series o f research projects,38 negotiations towards 
the eventual elaboration of a CMS subsidiary instrument commenced in May 2000, when a
36 Indeed, the past marine mammal initiatives operated under SPREP have been characterised by considerable 
austerity and the 2008-12 Programme explicitly identified the inability to fund a designated Marine Species 
Officer to oversee the coordination of these initiatives to be a considerable impediment to the progress of the 
various Action Plans to date: Pacific Islands Regional Marine Species Programme 2008-12, at 6. The lack of a 
formal coordinator for the MOU has been identified by the signatories as a key impediment to progress that 
must be addressed at the earliest opportunity: Report o f  the First Meeting o f the Signatories, at 7-8.
37 Report o f the Sixth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1995), at 3.
38 K. Van Waerebeek et al., A Survey o f  the Conservation Status o f  Cetaceans in Senegal, The Gambia and 
Guinea-Bissau (Bonn: CMS, 2000); K. Van Waerebeek et al., Conservation o f Cetaceans in The Gambia and 
Senegal, 1999-2001, and Status o f the Atlantic Humpback Dolphin in West Africa (Bonn: CMS, 2002).
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workshop was convened in Conakry, Guinea. An Action Plan for the conservation and 
management of small cetaceans of western Africa was developed, although consideration of a 
draft Agreement was deferred due to the lack of a lead country.39 Subsequently, at the 
Seventh COP of the CMS in 2002 a Resolution was adopted, mandating the conclusion of “an 
appropriate CMS instrument on small cetaceans and sirenians in West Africa” and calling for 
the allocation of sufficient resources for this purpose.40 This Resolution was supported by a 
targeted Recommendation, also adopted at the Seventh COP, calling for all parties in the 
distribution range of these species to consider the establishment of an MOU and the 
implementation of collaborative actions, “notably through action plans”, in relation to small 
cetaceans and sirenians in this region.41
A series of key threats to these species were identified, most notably destruction and 
modification of habitats, both in coastal areas and inland waters, as well as pollution, 
agricultural activities and increasing mortality and by-catches which “could, if  not properly 
managed, lead to further decline in their populations”.42 Accordingly, the Recommendation 
called upon all relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, major industrial institutions and 
government agencies, to participate in the preparation of an MOU, appealing for multilateral 
and bilateral technical and financial partners to facilitate further work on this initiative. 
Support for this project was reiterated at the Eighth COP to the CMS in 2005,43 and in 
October 2007 a first negotiation meeting between the various Range States convened by the 
CMS in Adeje, Spain. The meeting, held under the slight misnomer “Western African Talks 
on Cetaceans and their Habitats” (WATCH I), met to consider thretas to small cetaceans and 
sirenians and the legal scope to develop an MOU addressing such species. A proposal to 
consider the extension of the WATCH meeting to all cetaceans was ultimately rejected on the 
basis that the original CMS mandate to develop a subsidiary instrument was confined to 
“small cetaceans” and “sirenians”. Although the possibility o f a future expansion to larger
39 Report o f the Tenth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2001), at 16-17. The initiative was 
eventually sponsored by Guinea.
40 Resolution 7.7: Implementation of Existing Agreements and Development o f Future Agreements.
41 Recommendation 7.3: Regional Coordination for Small Cetaceans and Sirenians of Central and West Africa.
42 Ibid.
43 Resolution 8.5: Implementation of Existing Agreements and Development of Future Agreements.
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whales at an undetermined future point was maintained,44 there was a clear consensus that the 
exclusion of large cetaceans would also “avoid complicated relations with the IWC” 45
A preliminary draft MOU was developed at the meeting, alongside a specific Action Plan for 
these species. Unlike the position in the Pacific Islands Region, there was no pre-existing 
instrument to act as a primary base, hence the Action Plan developed ab initio from an early 
draft produced by the CMS in 2001 following the Conakry workshop, in conjunction with a 
document produced independently by WWF. The knowledge base on small cetaceans in the
4 f%Western African region is still considered alarmingly deficient and o f “varying reliability”. 
The Action Plan identified the primary threats to small cetaceans as by-catches, directed 
takes, global environmental change, tourism and human interactions, habitat degradation, 
pollution and disturbance.47 A second meeting of the negotiating parties was convened in 
October 2008 to formalise the MOU and its Action Plans. At this juncture the MOU was 
opened for signature and has attracted some seventeen participants to date. Like the Pacific 
Islands MOU, the Western African instrument is established pursuant to Article IV(4) of the 
CMS and is not legally binding.48
7.3.2 Conservation policies
As with the Pacific Islands MOU, the primary conservation policies advanced by the Western 
African MOU are those established within its constituent Action Plans. Particular emphasis is 
placed in the Action Plan on the need to minimise the impact of fisheries on small cetaceans 
by “using the ecosystem approach to fisheries” and improving selectivity of fishing gear, 
identifying critical habitats and instituting protected areas and addressing chemical pollution 
and acoustic disturbances. Data collection requirements are also accorded a priority status, as 
is capacity building, educational initiatives and the need to promote sustainable and 
responsible tourism in respect of small cetaceans within the Western African region. Unlike 
the Pacific Islands MOU, little specific activity had been previously advanced in respect of
44 Document UNEP/CMS-WATCH-Doc. 4, Options for International Cooperation on Cetaceans and Sirenians 
Conservation in the African Eastern Atlantic Basins under CMS (Bonn: CMS, 2007), at 1-2.
45 “WATCH Meeting in Progress in Tenerife”, CMS Press Release, 19 October 2007; reproduced on-line at the 
CMS institutional website (last visited 31 August 2009).
46 Document UNEP/CMS-WATCH-Inf. 6, The Small Cetacean Fauna o f the West Coast o f Africa and 
Macaronesia: Diversity and Distribution (Bonn: CMS, 2007), at 1.
47 Document UNEP/CMS-WATCH-Doc.5, Draft Action Plan for the Conservation o f Small Cetaceans o f the 
African Eastern Atlantic Basin (Bonn: CMS, 2007), at 3-4. These conclusions remained undisturbed within the 
final version of the Action Plan.
48 Para. 10 of the MOU.
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cetaceans by the relevant Regional Seas Agreement, the Abidjan Convention.49 Accordingly, 
the Action Plan identifies this forum as providing a useful framework to coordinate activities 
under the MOU “where practical”,50 while further emphasis is placed within on a close and 
harmonious relationship with pertinent CMS subsidiaries within the region.51
Given that the final version of the MOU has only recently been formally concluded, any 
assessment of this initiative must necessarily be preliminary in nature. Despite this, the 
conclusion of this instrument is undoubtedly a positive development for cetaceans in these 
waters, with the MOU representing the first targeted multilateral initiative to address the 
conservation needs of small cetaceans in Western Africa. Furthermore, this extension of 
coverage of cetaceans under the CMS umbrella may also have positive impacts on the 
existing Agreements, since the extension o f the geographical scope of the MOU to Moroccan 
waters brings this instrument into close regulatory proximity with both ASCOBANS and 
ACCOBAMS.
Nevertheless, the ultimate effectiveness of this initiative remains to be seen, and there are 
already signs that full and effective implementation of the MOU may be difficult in practice 
to attain without significant external financial and technical assistance. Indeed, shortly after 
the conclusion of the WATCH I meeting, the CMS Standing Committee reported that, while 
significant progress had been made towards the development of a new MOU, “funding to 
implement had still to be found”.52 Tellingly, the WATCH I meeting was underwritten in full 
by donations from key European parties to the Bonn Convention, which raises concerns for 
the future operation of the instrument if  a wealthy “champion” party fails to emerge from 
within the ranks of the eventual MOU signatories. Likewise, the fragmented scientific data
49 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development o f the Marine and Coastal Environment of 
the West and Central African Region 1981; reproduced at (1981) 20 International Legal Materials 746. The 
MOU also observes the “importance of the instruments, policies and strategies specific to the region” with 
specific reference to the Abidjan Convention, while the Secretariat of the Convention participated at the 
WATCH negotiations with particular reference to pollution concerns: Western African Talks on Cetaceans and 
their Habitats: Report o f the Government Negotiation Session (Bonn: CMS, 2007), at 4-5.
50 Action Plan for the Conservation o f  Small Cetaceans o f  Western Africa and Macaronesia, at 5.
51 In this respect, synergies are anticipated with the MOUs addressing Marine Turtles of the Atlantic Coast of 
Africa and the Eastern Atlantic Populations o f the Mediterranean Monk Seal: ibid.
52 Report o f the Thirty-Second Meeting o f the Standing Committee (Bonn: CMS, 2007), at 9. Moreover, at the 
WATCH I Meeting, the CMS representative observed that the parent convention’s “own resources were limited, 
both financially and in staff terms” although he remained hopeful that funds to implement the Action Plan 
would be sourced: Report o f the Government Negotiation Session, at 15.
53 Report o f the Thirty-Second Meeting, at 3; the WATCH I meeting was ultimately funded by contributions 
from Monaco, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain.
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also presents significant practical difficulties for the implementation of the MOU. In this 
respect, it appears that while the new MOU may offer conservation benefits for small 
cetaceans in these waters, as is the case with the Pacific Islands MOU, its success may prove 
to be ultimately contingent upon the ability of the existing CMS cetacean family to render 
meaningful and sustained assistance to this fledgling instrument.
7.4 Prospects for the conclusion of further regional instruments relevant to cetaceans 
under the CMS umbrella
As noted previously, one o f the key historical shortcomings of the CMS regime has been a 
comparative difficulty in generating comprehensive and binding subsidiary instruments in 
regions outside its traditional European power-base.54 Prior to the inauguration of the Pacific 
Islands MOU this position was especially true in the context of cetacean policies and projects 
advanced under the Bonn Convention. In the more recent past, however, a number of positive 
initiatives have been developed which affords some tentative optimism that further 
instruments pertaining to cetaceans may be ultimately elaborated and established under the 
aegis of the CMS. In this regard, it may be observed that there are emerging developments 
towards this end within South America, South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, with varying 
degrees of promise.
7.4.1 South America
The elaboration of regional policies to address the conservation needs of cetaceans within 
South America was first mooted at the CMS Scientific Council in 1995, where a Working 
Group was established to explore the possibilities to address threatened marine mammals in 
the South-West Atlantic.55 The Working Group duly recommended that an Agreement would 
represent a valuable contribution to conservation efforts within the region, which had been 
further stymied by a widespread dearth o f knowledge on the conservation status and 
population statistics of cetaceans.56 This initiative was followed by a further, more formal,
54 See R. Caddell, “International Law and the Protection of Migratory Wildlife: An Appraisal o f Twenty-Five 
Years of the Bonn Convention” (2005) 16 Colorado Journal o f  International Environmental Law and Policy 
113, at 152-55.
55 Report o f the Sixth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1995), at 3. In this regard, particular 
attention was focussed on the southern waters o f Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, as well as the 
Falklands/Malvinas Islands.
56 Report o f the Seventh Meeting o f  the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1997), at 11.
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review of the conservation status of cetaceans in the region, although few meaningful 
conservation measures have subsequently emerged under the CMS. While “the dolphins of
co
South America” were identified as a potential area of activity, the most tangible declaration 
of intent in relation to cetaceans in this region appears to have been confined to a 
recommendation advanced at a regional workshop convened in 2001.59 Here by-catch was 
identified as an acute problem and parties were recommended to pertinent international
commitments and adopt appropriate technical and administrative measures to conserve such
60species.
The development of regional activities regarding cetaceans has been undoubtedly impeded by 
an historical lack of coordination under the CMS in this region. This position was rectified to 
a considerable extent through the establishment of a Regional Working Group for South 
America in 2002.61 Nevertheless the development of a CMS instrument appears unlikely, 
with regional activities seemingly confined to a series of workshops aimed at increasing the 
parlous knowledge base on cetaceans in these waters. Tellingly, by the time of the Seventh 
COP to the CMS, at which point a formal list o f regions with the potential to develop 
subsidiary Agreements for marine mammals was advanced, the South-Western Atlantic was 
conspicuous by its absence.63
Conservation efforts under the CMS have instead focussed predominantly upon one 
particular species, namely the endangered Franciscana river dolphin. The present knowledge 
base on the Franciscana has been deemed especially poor,64 but it is considered to be 
confined to the waters of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina,65 where it faces particular threats
57 R. Hucke-Gaete (ed.), Review on the Conservation Status o f Small Cetaceans in Southern South America 
(Bonn: CMS, 2000).
58 Recommendation 6.2: Co-operative Actions for Appendix II Species, adopted at the Sixth COP in 1999.
59 Relatorla Taller Regional para America Latina de la CMS (Bonn: CMS, 2001), at 11.
60 Recommendation 2.
61 Report o f the Eleventh Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2002), at 2.
62 Most significantly a Workshop on the Conservation Status and Research Priorities of Aquatic Mammals in 
Latin America was convened in 2002, in the hope that further conservation proposals for dolphins and porpoises 
could be elaborated: Report o f the Eleventh Meeting, at 9.
63 Review o f Article IV Agreements under Development, Document UNEP/CMS/Conf.7.9.2, presented at the 
Seventh COP to the CMS in 2002.
64 E. A. Crespo, G. Harris and R. Gonzalez, “Group Size and Distributional Range of the Franciscana, 
Pontoporia Blainvillei” (1998) 14 Marine Mammal Science 845.
65 Ibid., at 845-6.
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f\f\ f i lfrom by-catches and the ingestion of harmful pollutants. The Franciscana was formally 
listed on Appendix I of the Bonn Convention at the Fifth COP in 1997, following which 
considerable attention began to be focussed on this species within the various CMS organs. In 
1998 the Scientific Council noted the “need for concerted action on the Franciscana dolphin” 
and recommended that the Secretariat be consulted on drafting a distinct MOU for this 
species. However, the MOU proposal has since been seemingly abandoned. Instead, since 
2001 regular provision has been made within the CMS budget to fund small scale research 
and conservation projects for the Franciscana. Nevertheless, it appears that such monies have 
proved rather easier to designate than disseminate, with the Scientific Council observing that 
conservation activities have been routinely stymied by the inability of research teams to 
physically access these funds.69
7.4.2 South-East Asia
One of the more promising regions for future regulatory activities towards cetaceans under 
the CMS would appear to be South-East Asia, for which -  together with the Indian Ocean -
• 70two distinct MOUs have already been established for aquatic species. Any future MOU 
would appear likely to address small cetaceans and dugongs, which have attracted the 
attention of the CMS institutions. In 1994 the parties were called upon to conduct 
investigations on the migratory patterns of small cetaceans in these waters, “giving priority to 
species and populations of threatened or uncertain status”.71 Familiar practical difficulties 
arose in this regard, with a working group noting that any such instrument would require a
66 M. Mendez, H. C. Rosenbaum and P. Bordino, “Conservation Genetics of the Franciscana Dolphin in 
Northern Argentina: Population Structure, Bycatch Impacts and Management Implications” (2008) 9 
Conservation Genetics 419, at 420-21.
67 T. G. Seixas et al., “Total Mercury, Organic Mercury and Selenium on Liver and Kidney of a South American 
Coastal Dolphin” (2008) 154 Environmental Pollution 98.
68 Report o f the Eighth Meeting o f  the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1998), at 14. At this juncture the 
Scientific Council observed somewhat cryptically that, with regard to conservation efforts for the Franciscana 
under the CMS umbrella, “[t]here had not been much work done in the past, but one could say that at least 
something was moving”: at 6.
69 Report o f the Tenth Meeting o f  the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2001), at 7; Report o f the Eleventh 
Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2002), at 7.
70 These instruments address turtles and dugongs respectively. The Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Conservation and Management o f Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia 
(IOSEA) was opened for signature and entered into effect on 1 September 2001. The text of the MOU is 
reproduced in full on the institutional website o f the IOSEA Secretariat at www.ioseaturtles.org (last visited 31 
August 2009). The Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Dugongs (Dugong 
dugon) and their Habitats Throughout their Range was opened for signature and entered into effect on 31 
October 2007. The text of the MOU is reproduced in full at www.cms.int (last visited 31 August 2009).
71 Recommendation 4.2: Research on Migration in Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Fourth COP to the CMS in 
1994.
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preceding revision of Appendix II of the parent convention to incorporate relevant 
populations of threatened cetaceans in these waters.72 Efforts to elaborate a distinct subsidiary 
instrument for small cetaceans subsequently stagnated, with extreme economic and political
73turmoil and dislocation blamed as the primary impediment to this objective, alongside the 
continued non-participation in the CMS of Indonesia, as a key Range State for small 
cetaceans.74 Conservation efforts were thereby largely restricted to underwriting the costs of 
workshops and small-scale research projects on an ad hoc basis.
The process was tentatively revised in 2002, with discussion of a draft CMS Agreement at a
nc
workshop on small cetaceans and dugongs convened in Dumaguete, Philippines. This was 
followed by a CMS Resolution at the Seventh COP, supporting the development of an 
appropriate instrument on small cetaceans and dugongs “if  the reaction from Range States is 
positive”.76 The Resolution was supported by a targeted Recommendation,77 noting that 
particular threats to these marine mammals were posed by both intentional and incidental 
capture and mortality, pollution and habitat destruction and modification, and called upon all 
relevant Range States and stakeholders to facilitate efforts towards the conclusion of an 
appropriate instrument, for which a coordinator for the preliminary development phase 
should be appointed “as soon as possible”. Support for this project was reiterated at the 
Eighth COP in 2005,78 although this endorsement was qualified by a note of alarm at the 
relatively slow progress demonstrated to date, with the parties requesting a lead country to 
sponsor the instrument’s preparatory phase “as a condition of the CMS’ continued support for 
the initiative”. Little progress had been made by the Ninth COP where the parties called again 
for a lead country and further financial and in-kind support for this initiative.79
7.4.3 The Indian Ocean
Allied to the various initiatives towards the eventual formulation of an Agreement in the 
South-East Asia region, work has also been on-going towards the conclusion under the
72 Report o f the Sixth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1995), at 8-9.
73 Report o f the Ninth Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1999), at 17.
74 Ibid.
75 Report o f the Eleventh Meeting o f the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 2002), at 27-8.
76 Resolution 7.7: Implementation o f Existing Agreements and Development o f Future Agreements, adopted at 
the Seventh COP in 2002.
77 Recommendation 7.4: Regional Cooperation for Small Cetaceans and Dugongs of Southeast Asia and 
Adjacent Waters.
78 Resolution 8.5: Implementation of Existing Agreements and Development o f Future Agreements.
79 Resolution 9.2: Priorities for CMS Agreements.
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umbrella of the CMS of a similar instrument for the Indian Ocean. As noted above, the 
initial CMS mandate at the Fourth COP to address the poor knowledge base on small 
cetaceans generally was inspired by the particular need to collate further data within the 
South-East Asia and Indo-Malay regions. Despite this, however, much of the subsequent 
attention in this respect has been directed at populations of small cetaceans in South-East 
Asia, while conservation activities within Indian Ocean have been centred on other marine 
mammals, evidenced by the recent progress towards the ultimate conclusion of an MOU 
concerning dugongs. Nevertheless, as far as small cetaceans are concerned, it has been 
strongly argued that the “rudiments of a mandate for an ... agreement already exist in the
O 1
political context of the region”, not least given the existence of the current IOSEA initiative 
pertinent to these waters under the CMS, as well as a series of other relevant fora such as the
o9
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. To this end, the conclusion of a CMS subsidiary 
Agreement, modelled upon ACCOBAMS and incorporating the establishment of a distinct 
management body and scientific committee, has been strongly advocated as the optimal 
institutional mechanism by which to address the conservation needs of small cetaceans in the
83region.
Current initiatives towards this objective may be most appropriately categorised as a “work in 
progress”. With little formal pressure from the CMS Scientific Council, the primary impetus 
towards such an instrument has been forthcoming from within the NGO community and, 
more explicitly, the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, which largely initiated and has 
continued to sponsor the project. At the Seventh COP to the CMS the parties noted a project 
by the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society to gauge the feasibility of the conclusion of 
a small cetacean instrument,84 and invited the Secretariat to “explore further options with
Q f
regard to the development of a CMS instrument”. Nevertheless, it appears that limited 
institutional support for this initiative has ultimately been forthcoming. A similar Resolution 
adopted at the Eighth COP omitted mention of cetaceans in the context of marine mammal 
conservation in the Indian Ocean, referring only to dugongs and noting the developments
80 For an overview of the conservation status o f cetaceans known to be located within the Indian Ocean 
sanctuary as established by the IWC see M. N. de Boer et al., Cetaceans in the Indian Ocean Sanctuary: A 
Review. A WDCS Science Report (Bath: Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, 2002).
81 M. Prideaux, “Discussion o f a Regional Agreement for Small Cetacean Conservation in the Indian Ocean” 
(2002) 32 California Western International Law Journal 101, at 127.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., at 130.
84 Document UNEP/CMS/Conf.7.9.2.
85 Resolution 7.7: Implementation of Existing Agreements and Development o f Future Agreements.
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towards the conclusion of a distinct MOU for sirenians in these waters. Following the Ninth 
COP, it appears that if  any such project is to ultimately come to fruition, it is likely to be 
directly linked to on-going efforts to generate an MOU for small cetaceans in South-East
on
Asia, in a manner analogous to the Dugong MOU.
Instead, as in the South American region, conservation efforts have instead been vested in 
individual species, especially the Gangetic sosu. The Gangetic sosu is a freshwater cetacean, 
indigenous to the various rivers and tributaries across the frontiers of India, Bangladesh and 
Nepal,88 and is threatened mainly by directed hunting activities.89 Migratory species of 
freshwater dolphins were “considered priorities” for the conclusion of Agreements for their 
conservation at a preliminary stage in the operation of the CMS;90 however, no such 
measures have as yet come close to fruition. The conservation plight of the Gangetic sosu 
was first formally noted by the Scientific Council in 1999, where it was advocated that this 
species should be listed on Appendix I.91 This species was so designated at the Seventh COP 
and subsequently identified as a species for which concerted actions should be adopted, as 
outlined in the following Section.
7.5 Emerging developments
The resource implications demonstrated by the Pacific Islands and the Western African 
MOUs illustrate that future regulatory activity for the ever-expanding list of species under the 
purview of the CMS may ultimately proceed upon an alternative basis to promoting regional 
subsidiary instruments. Indeed, the financial capacity of the CMS regime has failed to keep 
pace with the number both of its parties and its protected species. Consequently, the 
Executive Secretary has recently observed that “future MOUs would need to be more
86 Resolution 8.5: Implementation o f Existing Agreements and Development of Future Agreements.
87 Resolution 9.2: Priorities for CMS Agreements. Here, the parties observed that “extending the geographic 
scope of the [South-East Asia] instrument to cover the Indian Ocean would significantly increase the number of 
CMS Parties involved, thus facilitating the negotiation process for the instrument”.
88 B. D. Smith, “1990 Status and Conservation o f the Ganges River Dolphin Platanista gangetica in the Kamali 
River, Nepal” (1993) 66 Biological Conservation 159, at 159.
89 R. K. Sinha, “An Alternative to Dolphin Oil as a Fish Attractant in the Ganges River System: Conservation of 
the Ganges River Dolphin” (2002) 107 Biological Conservation 253. Although'the sosu has been designated a 
protected species under national law, this is considered to be “completely ineffective”: at 253.
90 Report o f the Third Meeting o f  the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1991), at 6.
91 Report o f the Ninth Meeting o f  the Scientific Council (Bonn: CMS, 1999), at 13. India was subsequently 
encouraged to take the lead in this regard within the COP: Report o f  the Tenth Meeting o f the Scientific Council 
(Bonn: CMS, 2001), at 15.
92 Resolution 9.1: Concerted and Cooperative Actions.
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financially independent as the parent Convention could not automatically provide secretariat 
services from its own resources”. It appears that as far as future subsidiary instruments are 
concerned, the CMS favours an approach pioneered by the Pacific Islands MOU, in which a 
“champion” party is sought that is prepared to exercise the necessary political will and 
financial capacity to meet the majority of the relevant expenses, both during and after the 
conclusion of the instrument in question.94 Accordingly, it appears that if the mooted 
cetacean instruments in respect of southern South America, South-East Asia and the Indian 
Ocean are to ultimately come to fruition, much will depend upon the ability of the CMS to 
identify and successfully court a lead partner from within these areas. Thus far, however, this 
has proved to be a challenging task in practice.
In addition to this emerging policy, the CMS has, in recent years, developed alternative 
approaches to the development of multilateral conservation initiatives for the species listed in 
the Appendices to the Convention. Particular species listed in Appendices I and II have been 
identified as requiring “concerted” and “cooperative” actions respectively. As far as 
Appendix I is concerned, certain individual species have been listed as candidates for 
“concerted actions to implement the provisions of the Convention, where possible through 
existing instruments of bilateral and multilateral co-operation”.95 To date, nine species of 
cetaceans have been so designated,96 with the parties encouraged to prepare reports for such 
species and to seek to address their conservation needs through other multilateral fora.
In relation to Appendix II species, it has been formally acknowledged that “not all such 
species are currently the object of an Agreement or can reasonably be expected in the short 
term, to become the object of an Agreement to assist with their conservation”.97 Accordingly, 
certain Appendix II species are to be subject to cooperative actions. These arrangements are 
rather more obscure and appear to be confined to ensuring that a regular update of the 
conservation status of these species is provided to the pertinent Councillor within the 
Scientific Council. This is presumably intended to inform debate concerning future 
conservation strategies for these species. Given the recent practice of the Scientific Council,
93 Report o f the Thirty-Second Meeting o f the Standing Committee (Bonn: CMS, 2007), at 17.
94 Ibid.
95 Resolution 3.2: Appendix I Species.
96 Namely the Franciscana, Ganges river dolphin, Black Sea harbour porpoise, fin whale, sei whale, sperm 
whale, Southern right whale, blue whale and humpback whale: Resolution 9.1: Concerted and Cooperative 
Actions.
97 Recommendation 8.28: Cooperative Actions for Appendix II Species.
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this appears to mainly concern funding of research projects and workshops, for which these 
species may ultimately receive priority. Some thirteen species of small cetaceans were
Q ftdesignated for cooperative actions during the 2006-08 triennium, and subsequently 
extended into the 2009-11 triennium."
7.6 Concluding remarks
The general development of the CMS regime appears to be following a broad trend away 
from the conclusion of legally-binding Agreements, along the models advanced by 
ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS, towards the elaboration of a more MOU-based approach. 
There is considerable merit in this policy, not least in generating multilateral synergies as 
well as political and public attention for such species. There has accordingly been a steady 
proliferation of such instruments in recent years, thereby expanding the geographical scope 
and species coverage of the CMS subsidiary instruments significantly. This has served to 
promote the profile of the Convention and secured the participation of states and institutions 
from areas not traditionally associated with sustained activity in the CMS regime. For 
cetaceans, like many other species subject to new MOUs, this has undoubtedly generated a 
positive platform upon which to develop further conservation measures.
In many respects, it is somewhat premature to advance clear conclusions in respect of the 
new MOUs, given their relatively brief tenure in comparison to ASCOBANS and 
ACCOBAMS. Nevertheless, a number of broad issues are worthy of comment. In the first 
instance, like ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS, the MOUs have demonstrated tangible 
progress in unifying and formalising previously disparate conservation policies that had been 
advanced on a previously ad hoc basis. This is especially true in the case of the Pacific 
Islands MOU, which has essentially created a series of further operational machinery for the 
SPREP programmes, providing a clear institutional framework, increased political visibility 
and further funding opportunities for pre-existing action plans for cetaceans in the region. 
The Western African MOU exhibits potential in this respect, given that no such action
98 Namely the Peale’s dolphin, dusky dolphin, Burmeister’s porpoise, spectacled porpoise, Commerson’s 
dolphin, Black/Chilean dolphin, finless porpoise, Chinese white dolphin, Indian Ocean bottlenose dolphin, pan- 
tropical spotted dolphin, Spinner dolphin, Fraser’s dolphin and Irrawaddy dolphin. To date, no large cetaceans 
have been so designated.
99 Resolution 9.1: Concerted and Cooperative Actions.
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programme had been instituted previously in this area, and has provided a much-needed 
forum for the coordination of conservation measures in these waters.
The MOU approach is nonetheless representative of a trend in which the legal strength of 
CMS subsidiary instruments has begun to recede in favour of an exclusively soft-law 
approach. Whether the lack of legally-binding obligations will make a discernible difference 
to the ultimate success of these instruments is unclear, not least since the implementation of 
commitments under ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS has proved rather mixed in many key 
respects. Nevertheless, MOUs offer little scope for the development of the institutional 
structure, especially on scientific and monitoring issues, that remains a considerable strength 
of the more binding subsidiary Agreements. While this is mitigated in the case of the Pacific 
Islands MOU by the important role envisaged for SPREP in this respect, the options for 
further institutional development for the Western African MOU -  operating in a region with 
considerable data deficiencies for cetaceans -  are rather less certain.
Finally, as with ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS, a recurring theme within the operation of 
the MOUs is likely to be problems in securing the necessary financial and staffing resources 
to pursue the policies and objectives o f these instruments effectively. Difficulties of this type 
have already been reported under both MOUs, while financial considerations have further 
impeded the development of additional initiatives in other regions. Accordingly, and perhaps 
more so than any of the other considerable challenges faced by the CMS in pursuing its 
ambitious agenda in respect of cetaceans, the need to secure adequate funding on a sustained 
and independent basis is central to the ultimate success of the Bonn Convention in regulating 
such species.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REGULATION OF
CETACEANS
8.1. Introduction
In recent years there has been an unprecedented level of regulatory interest in the 
conservation needs of cetaceans within the various EU institutions. In many respects, 
the impetus behind the emergence of such policies may be traced back to the adoption 
in 2002 of the Sixth Environmental Action Programme (EAP),1 which mandated inter 
alia the development of a stronger regulatory regime in respect of marine 
biodiversity. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the emergence of a distinct framework 
for the regulation of cetaceans is not an overnight phenomenon, with the EU 
institutions having expressed a supervisory interest in such species since the late 
1970s. Instead, as will be demonstrated below, the EC initially lacked a clear political 
mandate to regulate cetaceans, while its legislative competence in this regard may 
also be considered to have been rather underdeveloped in comparison to the present 
day. Accordingly, a clear framework to promote the conservation of cetaceans under 
EC law may now be identified, comprising a series of guiding policy objectives, 
general provisions of nature conservation law and specific Regulations designed to 
address particular conservation threats, especially in the context of incidental catches.
It may be suggested that the emergence of such a framework is essentially the product 
of a loose three-stage process, which has been on-going since the late 1970s, where 
the first outline proposals were made within the EEC towards a greater degree of 
influence over the national whaling policies of its constituent Member States. A first 
stage can be identified as the period between 1979 and 1992, which saw abortive 
attempts to attain membership of the IWC, as well as the adoption of a series of ad 
hoc legislative provisions to regulate trade in whale products and to address certain 
fishing practices that raised concerns over cetacean welfare, such as encirclement 
fishing.
1 Decision No. 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council o f 22 July 2002 laying 
down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme [2002] Official Journal L242/1.
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The second stage can be identified as the period between 1992 and 2002, which 
witnessed three key legislative and policy developments with a strong application to 
cetaceans. First, in 1992 the cornerstone provision of EU nature conservation law was 
adopted, the Habitats Directive,2 which prescribes the establishment of Special Areas 
of Conservation for two particular species o f cetaceans and requires the strict 
protection of “all species” o f cetaceans within EC waters. Second, throughout the 
1990s there was an incremental development of a strong legislative stance against 
driftnet fishing, with the incidental mortality of cetaceans playing a central role in the 
generating the political conditions to facilitate swingeing restrictions on such 
equipment. Thirdly, the elaboration o f a specific EC Biodiversity Strategy, in line 
with the EU’s commitments under the CBD, established a further basis for 
conservation measures in respect o f marine wildlife.
The third stage encompasses the period between 2002 and 2008, which has seen the 
adoption of a considerable volume o f cetacean-orientated legislation. This stage has 
been driven primarily by the demands o f the Sixth EAP, which mandated a greater 
emphasis on marine considerations within the Habitats Directive, which has presented 
conservation benefits for cetaceans. This important development has dovetailed with a 
root-and-branch reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which has, in turn, 
inspired the first clear fisheries-based Regulations on cetacean conservation. These 
processes have occurred in conjunction with the adoption of the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive3 concluded in 2008, which places a strong emphasis on the 
coordination of regional responses to marine environmental threats and mandates a 
closer working relationship with existing regional structures to address conservation 
concerns. Finally, this third stage has also witnessed a growing appreciation of the 
need to address other anthropogenic threats to marine biodiversity, such as the 
pervasive impacts o f ocean noise, ship- and land-source pollution and the 
encroachment of development projects upon the coastal environment.
2 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora [1992] Official Journal L206/7. The most recent consolidated version of the Directive 
was adopted on 1 January 2007, following the latest round of accession to the EU, incorporating 
Bulgaria and Romania into a further enlarged EU o f twenty-seven Member States.
3 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 17 June 2008 establishing a 
framework for community action in the field o f marine environmental policy [2008] Official Journal 
L164/19 [Hereinafter “MSFD”].
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Accordingly, this Chapter will analyse the current EC framework for cetacean 
regulation, first evaluating guiding principles establishing the basis for the on-going 
programme of legislative activity in relation to such species. There will then follow an 
examination of the impact of the Habitats Directive as the primary legislative 
mechanism for the protection of European species of cetaceans. Finally, this Chapter 
will offer an appraisal o f the recently developed -  and controversial -  fisheries-based 
policies towards the regulation of cetacean by-catches.
8.2. Guiding EC policies and the regulation of cetaceans
Before examining the role of the Habitats Directive and more specific by-catch 
mitigation provisions, it is first important to establish the guiding policy objectives of 
the EU in relation to marine biodiversity. As far as cetaceans are concerned, four key 
sources of EU policy may be identified. In the first instance, the European 
Community Biodiversity Strategy, elaborated in 1998, and latterly the Sixth EAP, 
adopted in 2002, established a programme o f regulatory activity for the EU 
institutions, which includes a series o f provisions with relevance to cetaceans. 
Nevertheless, in and of themselves, it may be observed that such documents offer 
little more than broad statements of legislative and policy-making intent, with the 
practical implementation of these objectives having been attained through the 
modification of existing legislative structures, as will be detailed in subsequent 
sections of this Chapter. In this respect, the Biodiversity Strategy and, more explicitly, 
the Sixth EAP have helped to develop a stronger marine focus to the Habitats 
Directive and to shape the reform o f the CFP.
In conjunction with these developments, a further two policy sources seek to facilitate 
inter alia the future of EC cetacean regulation. The emergence of the MSFD, adopted 
in 2008, will place a greater emphasis on regional governance as opposed to 
Community-wide solutions to marine environmental questions. Furthermore, the 
proposed aggregation of common Community policy on whaling seeks to facilitate a 
clear direction on large cetaceans, as well as bolstering the presence o f the EU as an 
actor in key multilateral fora such as the IWC.
8.2.1 The EC Biodiversity Strategy
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In 1998 the EC Biodiversity Strategy (ECBS) was elaborated to facilitate further 
management and conservation measures to address biodiversity loss throughout the 
Community.4 The ECBS offered little specific guidance in relation to cetaceans and 
related species, given that it contained “no reference in its text to the marine or 
aquatic environment”.5 Accordingly it was augmented in 2001 with the adoption of 
four Biodiversity Action Plans (BAPs).6 Each BAP addresses a key policy area, 
namely natural resources, agriculture, fisheries and development and economic 
cooperation. In this respect, the BAPs on Natural Resources and Fisheries have 
identified a number of significant areas o f future legislative and policy focus with
n
practical relevance to cetaceans.
Firstly, the BAP on Natural Resources raised three broad concerns that may be 
considered applicable to, inter alia, cetaceans: a failure to fully implement existing 
commitments under the Habitats Directive; a call to augment participation within 
pertinent international agreements; and a need to integrate environmental 
considerations more closely into fisheries and aquaculture policies. In this respect, the 
BAP targeted the full transposition o f the Habitats and Wild Birds Directives by 
2002,8 although as noted below this has proved somewhat overambitious in practice, 
especially in the context o f marine species and habitats.
With regard to improving participation within pertinent international organisations, 
the BAP noted that the EU is a party to a number of multilateral environmental 
agreements, emphasising the role o f the Barcelona, OSPAR and HELCOM 
Conventions.9 As noted below, these sentiments have since been translated into
4 COM (1998) 42.
5 C. Lasen Diaz, “The EC Habitats Directive Approaches its Tenth Anniversary: An Overview” (2001) 
10 Review o f European Community and International Environmental Law 287, at 294.
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Biodiversity 
Action Plans in the areas o f Conservation o f Natural Resources, Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Development and Economic Co-operation, COM (2001) 0162. The BAPs were introduced in 
conjunction with a pledge by the EU Heads o f State and Government in June 2001 at the EU Spring 
Summit in Goteborg to “halt the decline o f biodiversity by 2010”.
7 In addition, the BAP on Development and Economic Cooperation noted with concern the degradation 
of a number of key areas o f habitats, including coastal and marine regions. Accordingly, one of its 
main objectives was stated as supporting “sustainable use o f natural resources, particularly in relation 
to forests, grasslands and marine/coastal ecosystems”: at Para. 10.
8 Para. 1.
9 Para. 132. These commitments were further noted in the BAP on Fisheries: at paras. 37 and 38.
234
legislative action within the MSFD. Particular significance is also accorded to the 
opportunities raised by this framework to create regional networks of protected areas, 
both within and outside EC waters, with the Mediterranean, Persian and Gulf seas 
identified as key candidate locations.10 Furthermore, both the Council of Europe and 
CMS were explicitly identified as potential partners for the development of specific 
action plans “for the most endangered species other than birds”.11
The BAP on Natural Resources considered that “greening” fisheries provisions is best
pursued through the CFP.12 The BAP on Fisheries raised particular concerns over the
impact of commercial fishing on non-target species and marine and coastal
ecosystems, thereby establishing as a primary objective the need to facilitate the
1 ^sustainable exploitation o f aquatic biodiversity. Particular concern was raised over 
that “[pjersistent bio-accumulating contaminants can be a threat to the animals in the 
food chain, with impact on fish, sea birds, seals, cetaceans”.14 While fishing activities 
were considered “the most important” important pressure on such species, other 
important factors included contamination and habitat changes or losses.15 Possible 
mitigation strategies included the development o f technical conservation measures,16 
for which a series of EC strategies have since been elaborated, as are outlined below. 
The BAP further noted the development o f the Natura 2000 network under the
17Habitats Directive as a key conservation strategy.
Concerns have nonetheless been raised by the slow implementation of the Natura 
2000 network in marine areas. Targets have subsequently been set for the completion 
of the marine network by 2008, with management objectives agreed and instigated by 
2010.18 Furthermore, it was established by 2010 that “technical measures, including 
marine protected areas, [should be] effectively implemented to help ensure favourable
10 Para. 139. Likewise, commitments to marine biodiversity under OSPAR are also noted in para. 140 
of the BAP.
11 Para. 31.
12 Para. 64.
13 Para. 15.
14 Para. 29.
15 Ibid.
16 Para. 39.
17 Para. 44.
18“ Message from Malahide”, objective 1.1: reproduced on-line at 
www.ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/policy/pdf/malahide_message_fmal.pdf (last
visited 31 August 2009).
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conservation status o f marine habitats and species not commercially exploited”.19 This 
was reinforced in 2006 by a Communication on the further implementation of the
9 0relevant biodiversity provisions, with the restoration of “biodiversity and ecosystem 
services in the wider EU marine environment” considered a priority activity.21 In
99December 2008, a mid-term review o f these objectives was undertaken, with 
considerable faith placed in the MSFD to provide the operational basis for securing a 
good environmental status in the EC seas and fulfilling the aspirations of the ECBS by 
improving the general conservation status o f marine species in Community waters.23
8.2.2 The Sixth Community Environment Action Programme
Allied to these developments, the Sixth EAP provided an additional impetus towards 
the elaboration of conservation strategies to address marine biodiversity. As with its 
predecessors,24 the Sixth EAP advances a targeted programme of activity by 
establishing “priorities based on an assessment o f the state of the environment and of 
prevailing trends including emerging issues that require a lead from the 
Community”.25 To this end, four “key environmental priorities” are identified, 
including nature and biodiversity.26 Accordingly, a series of primary objectives has 
been advanced in relation to biodiversity that will have a practical impact upon the 
conservation of a host of marine species, including cetaceans.
First, noting the opportunity prescribed by the review of the CFP in 2002, the Sixth 
EAP advocates promoting the greater integration of environmental considerations 
within this sectoral policy. As discussed below, the CFP has undergone significant 
reform to meet this objective. Second, the EAP seeks to fiirther promote the 
protection of marine areas, especially under the Habitats Directive, as well as “by 
other feasible Community means”. The EAP has thereby provided a further impetus
19 Objective 7.3.
20 COM (2006)216.
21 Objective 3.
22 COM (2008) 864.
23 Ibid., at 5.
24 The first such instrument was adopted in 1973 as a substitute for express guidance within the EEC 
Treaty on environmental priorities. The EAPs have since become a key aspect o f EU environmental 
strategy-making.
25 Article 1(1).
26 Ibid. The other primary areas o f focus are climate change, environment and health and quality of life 
and natural resources and waste.
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to develop the marine application o f the directive. Indeed, a mid-term review of the 
EAP considered that the Habitats Directive presented a strong overall framework to 
achieve the stated goal of halting biodiversity loss, identifying “the full and effective 
implementation of existing legislation” as the priority action in this respect.27
Third, and in relation to land-use planning, the EAP noted the need to promote the 
integrated management of coastal zones, with a series of policies having been 
advanced in this respect in recent years. Finally, and of overarching importance to the 
future regulation of the marine environment within the Community, the EAP 
establishes a remit for the development o f a thematic strategy “taking into account, 
inter alia, the terms and implementation obligations of marine Conventions, and the 
need to reduce emissions and impacts o f sea transport and other sea and land-based 
activities”. The development o f such an initiative is of key significance for the 
regulation of the general cetacean environment, to which this Chapter now turns.
8.2.3 The Marine Strategy Framework Directive
Community policy for the coming decades in the marine sphere will be dominated by 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). The initial Commission proposals 
for a thematic marine strategy were unveiled in October 2005, which identified a 
series of deficiencies within the pre-existing regulatory framework. Particular 
concerns were raised by institutional limitations and a deficient knowledge base, 
identifying a need to proceed with a dual EU-regional approach, based on ecosystem 
consideration and Member State interaction in framing future marine policy. 
Following lengthy consultations,29 the MSFD was adopted in June 2008. The MSFD 
is intended to operate as an “environmental pillar” to a further Maritime Policy,30 for
31which a Green Paper was adopted in June 2006.
27 COM (2007) 225, at 7.
28 COM (2005) 504.
29 For a full account o f the development o f the Marine Strategy see L. Juda, “The European Union and 
Ocean Use Management: The Marine Strategy and the Maritime Policy” (2007) 38 Ocean 
Development and International Law  259.
30 Preamble to the MSFD, Third Recital.
31 SEC (2006) 689.
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The MSFD is a lengthy document addressing a broad range of concerns. The overall 
objective is to provide a legal framework “to achieve or maintain good environmental 
status within the marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest”.32 A “good 
environmental status” involves the provision o f “ecologically diverse and dynamic 
oceans and seas which are clean, healthy and productive within their intrinsic 
conditions, and the use o f the marine environment is at a level that is sustainable, this 
safeguarding the potential for uses and activities by current and future generations”.33 
This objective seeks to ensure that constituent marine ecosystems can withstand 
anthropogenic change and habitats and species are protected, while the anthropogenic 
impact of substances and energy upon the marine environment does not cause 
pollution effects.34 In ascertaining the environmental status of Community seas, a 
series of indicators and qualitative descriptors are established in the Annexes to the 
directive.
In pursuing this objective, the MSFD largely eschews a “top-down” Community-level 
approach and, in keeping with the principle o f subsidiarity, places responsibility for 
marine governance primarily at a national or regional level, subject to EU supervision. 
This approach constitutes an important recognition that generic responses to marine 
environmental problems are of limited value in addressing the four broad areas of 
Community seas, all of which face differing ecological pressures. Accordingly, in the 
first instance, each Member State is required to develop a marine strategy for its 
national waters, encompassing a clear assessment of their current environmental 
status and a targeted programme of measures to be introduced by 2016 at the latest.35 
Recognising that individual coastal states are components o f a wider marine region or 
sub-region, Member States are to take “due account” o f this position and cooperate 
to ensure that a good environmental status is attained in respect of the region or sub- 
region concerned.37 In implementing these commitments, national assessments should 
examine essential features and characteristics o f these areas, the predominant
*3 o
pressures upon them and their primary economic and social uses. From this
32 Article 1(1).
33 Article 3(5).
34 Ibid.
35 Article 5(1).
36 Article 4(1).
37 Article 5(2).
38 Article 8(1).
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appraisal a series of environmental targets shall be identified, as well as coordinated 
monitoring programmes for the ongoing assessment of these waters.40 A detailed 
programme of measures is then to be developed,41 including contributing to protected 
areas under the EU nature conservation directives.42
The MSFD cites its “ultimate aim” as “maintaining biodiversity and providing diverse 
and dynamic oceans and seas which ate clean, healthy and productive”.43 While it is 
not possible to state definitively the effect that the directive may have on cetaceans at 
this preliminary stage, four key conservation and management possibilities may 
nonetheless be identified. In the first instance, and somewhat self-evidently, 
presuming that the directive is swiftly and correctly implemented by the Member 
States, the cumulative effect of these general measures would have a considerable 
beneficial impact upon the quality of cetacean habitats and reduce the volume of 
pollutants and other anthropogenic sources faced by such species. This is, however, a 
considerable pre-supposition, especially given the EU criticism over previous actions 
to address marine environmental concerns. Moreover, a wholesale transformation of 
particularly degraded areas may ultimately prove to be a more long-term process than 
envisaged by the current MSFD targets.
Second, a particular strength of the directive is its emphasis upon the use of existing 
regional structures, focussing inter alia upon the potential application of the Regional 
Seas Agreements,44 which have demonstrated an application to cetaceans. A degree of 
opportunity may also exist for AS COBANS and ACCOBAMS to contribute to this 
overall framework. Some concern, however, may be raised that the CMS was rather 
marginalised throughout the consultation process,45 while MSFD commitments are 
indicated only with regard to the LOSC, CBD and Regional Seas Agreements,46 with 
no reference to the CMS and its cetacean subsidiaries. Despite this, it might be
39 Article 10.
40 Article 11. Under Article 12 this information is then to be communicated to the Commission for 
assessment.
41 Article 13(1).
42 Article 13(4).
43 Preamble to the MSFD, Third Recital.
44 Article 6(1).
45 As noted in Chapter V, the ASCOBANS Advisory Committee has criticised the lack of formal 
opportunities ultimately presented to it to participate in the preparation o f the directive: Report o f the 
Twelfth Meeting o f the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2005), at 25.
46 Ibid., Seventeneth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Recitals.
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considered that some introduction o f appropriate policies under ASCOBANS and 
ACCOBAMS will be forthcoming in future marine management strategies. Indeed, 
there appears to be little valid reason not to consider commitments under 
ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS in the development of national strategies, insofar as 
they do not conflict with relevant EC law.
Third, and of particular significance, the MSFD emphasises the problem of ocean 
noise in a manner unprecedented at Community level to date. Indeed, the MSFD may 
be considered the first clear translation o f political concerns on this issue into binding 
legislation and public policy. Concerns raised by anthropogenic ocean noise have 
occupied a small but significant aspect o f the EU political agenda, shortly after the 
identification of naval sonar as a potentially serious threat to cetacean welfare.47 
Following a series of official questions,48 in June 2003 the European Parliament was 
petitioned for a moratorium on the use o f active sonar devices and the introduction of 
further legal measures to prevent their unmonitored use in the ocean environment.49 
Simultaneously, the Commission had raised questions through the Habitats 
Committee which, in September 2003, requested advice from ICES. This was duly 
returned in February 2005 identifying gaps in the current knowledge base and 
suggesting possible mitigation measures to be considered.50
In October 2004, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution,51 considered 
“probably one of the strongest statements by an international body yet on the issue of 
military sonar and its impact on cetaceans”.52 The Resolution called for a moratorium 
on the deployment o f high-intensity active sonars “until a global assessment of their 
cumulative environmental impact on marine mammals, fish and other marine life is 
completed”. Moreover, Member States were to “urgently adopt” geographic
47 A. Frantzis, “Does Acoustic Testing Strand Whales?” (1998) 292 Nature 29. Concerns had 
nonetheless been ongoing for a number o f years prior to this: M. Simmonds and L. F. Lopez-Juado, 
“Whales and the Military” (1991) 337 Nature 448.
48 Written Questions E-2442/01 and E-2797/02 and Oral Question 0-0096/02.
49 European Parliament, Committee on Petitions, Document CM/536432EN.doc.
50 Answer to DG Environment Request on Scientific Information concerning Impact o f  Sonar Activities 
on Cetacean Populations.; reproduced on-line at
www.ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/conservation/species/whales_dolphins/index_en.htm (last
visited 31 August 2009).
51 European Parliament Resolution on the Environmental Effects o f High-Intensity Active Naval 
Sonars [B6-0089/2004].
52 E. C. M. Parsons et al., “Naval Sonar and Cetaceans: Just How Much Does the Gun Need to Smoke 
Before We Act?” (2008) 56 Marine Pollution Bulletin 1248, at 1253.
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restrictions on the use o f such sonar in sensitive marine habitats, and to initiate in 
conjunction with the Commission a Multilateral Task Force to develop international 
agreements regulating ocean noise.
The MSFD has thereby established a clear legal basis upon which a number of these 
particular aspirations may be realised. In the first instance, the concept of “pollution” 
is broadly defined in the directive to specifically include “human-induced marine 
underwater noise”.53 Moreover, the qualitative descriptors for demonstrating a “good 
environmental status” for the purposes o f the directive, listed in Annex I, further 
includes underwater noise. The indicative list of pressures upon the marine 
environment, listed in Annex III, also includes this source of disturbance, citing 
“shipping, underwater acoustic equipment” as particular examples. There is already 
some evidence to suggest that such sentiments are beginning to have a trickle-down 
effect upon Community policies. Indeed, shortly after the adoption of the directive, in 
a Communication relating to the Arctic region,54 the Commission identified as a key 
environmental policy the need to “[cjontribute to assessing the impact on marine 
mammals of increased noise generated by human activities”.55
Nevertheless, considerable problems remain in relation to military uses of sonar. 
Indeed, in response to the original petition, the Commission observed that “it is not 
possible to undertake further Community action to regulate the development of new 
military technologies, due to the lack o f EU community competences in this field”.56 
This position has also been reflected within the directive itself, which precludes an 
application to “activities the sole purpose o f which is defence or national security”.57 
This position is tentatively softened by a commitment for Member States to 
“endeavour” to ensure that such activities are conducted in a manner that is 
compatible “so far as reasonable and practicable” with the broad objectives of the
53 Article 3(8). This definition is itself partly derived from the LOSC where, despite there being no 
formal mention of acoustic pollution, it has nonetheless been convincingly argued that ocean noise is 
indeed caught by the LOSC definition: H. M. Dotinga, and A. G. Oude Elferink, “Acoustic Pollution in 
the Oceans: The Search for Legal Standards” (2000) 31 Ocean Development and International Law 
151.
54 COM (2008) 763.
55 Ibid., at 4.
56 Statement of Pedro Solbes Mira o f the Commission to the Parliament, 11 March 2004; Document 
CM/536432EN.doc.
57 Article 2(2).
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MSFD. Given that only Spain has to date introduced national restrictions on the use 
of military sonar,59 such a position does not bode well for the swift implementation of 
voluntary standards among the other Member States under the directive.
Finally, and allied to the regulation of anthropogenic noise sources, the MSFD is 
intended to act as the environmental basis o f shipping and maritime affairs within 
Community waters. Accordingly, the directive will ultimately advance a framework 
through which to regulate key aspects of shipping with the potential to cause marine 
environmental degradation. As far as cetaceans are concerned, this creates particular 
opportunities to address problems such as vessel-source pollution and shipping noise, 
given the emphasis accorded to these issues within the directive. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of such measures under the MSFD/Maritime Policy framework is also 
likely to constitute a longer-term project. Indeed, as Juda observes, the precise inter­
relationship between these two broad ocean frameworks remains a matter of some 
uncertainty,60 which will accordingly require substantive clarification at a relatively 
early stage if  the MSFD is to realise its full regulatory potential in this regard.
8.2.4 Towards an EC whaling policy
A policy of particular significance has been the ongoing development of a common 
EU position on whaling. Recent EU policy documents have reiterated a commitment 
towards “support of a continued international moratorium on commercial whaling”.61 
Strong criticism has also been voiced by the Commission of the resumption of 
commercial whaling under a reservation to the ICRW by Norway and Iceland -  
attacked as “a very negative step backwards”62 — while lethal scientific research
63conducted by Japan provoked an equally strident response. Such sentiments have 
been recently endorsed by the European Parliament, which has called for the 
maintenance of the global moratorium on commercial whaling and a cessation of
58 Ibid.
59 Parsons et al., “Naval Sonar and Cetaceans”, at 1253.
60 Juda, “Marine Strategy and the Maritime Policy”, at 274.
61 “Mid-Term Review of the Sixth EAP”: COM (2007) 225, at 8.
62 Press release IP/92/531 of 30 June 1992.
63 The Commission “emphasises that there is no need to use lethal means to obtain scientific 
information about whales, and that adequate data for management purposes can be obtained using non- 
lethal techniques”: Press release IP/07/1736 o f 20 November 2007. Furthermore, Commissioner Joe 
Borg has declared that “[scientific whaling must not be used as a cover for continued whaling”: Press 
release IP/08/200 of 8 February 2008.
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lethal research.64 The EU nonetheless retains broad support for aboriginal subsistence 
whaling conducted through the IWC, provided that “conservation is not compromised, 
whaling operations are properly regulated and catches remain with the scope of 
documented and recognised sustainable needs”.65
Of particular significance to the EU stance on commercial whaling has been the 
introduction of strict measures under rules concerning the common market to restrict 
the import of cetacean products into the Community.66 These provisions established
that from 1 January 1982 the introduction of cetacean products into the Community
£%1shall be subject to an import license, with no such license to be issued in respect of 
products to be used for commercial purposes.68 The primary aim of Regulation 348/81 
is to conserve cetaceans by restricting international trade, to truncate the market for 
such products and accordingly diminish the continued economic feasibility of 
commercial hunting. This position is further bolstered by legislation enshrining 
CITES commitments on the trade in protected species,69 as well as relevant provisions 
of the Habitats Directive.
Despite these initiatives, however, internal divisions between the constituent 
institutions have meant that the EU has not ultimately played as forceful a role on the
• 70world stage in relation to whaling as the Commission has advocated. In 1979 and 
199271 the Commission proposed the initiation of negotiations towards full 
membership of the IWC, within which the EU current holds observer status. Both 
proposals failed to find favour within the Council, primarily due to doubts over 
whether the EU ultimately possessed the legal status to do so. However, given the 
application to cetaceans of a number o f provisions of EU law, as well as participation
64 Press release IPR/46694 o f 20 January 2009; the Fisheries Committee o f the European Parliament 
endorsed a report calling for the elimination o f lethal hunting for scientific and commercial purposes.
65 COM (2008) 763.
66 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 348/81 o f 20 January 1981 on common rules for imports of whales or 
other cetacean products [1981] Official Journal L39/1.
67 A series of conditions for the practical operation o f import licenses was established in Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No. 3786/81 o f 22 December 1981 laying down provisions for the implementation of 
the common rules for imports o f whale or other cetacean products [1981] Official Journal L377/42. 
Under Article 2(1) of Regulation 348/81 a Committee on Cetacean Products was established to 
examine “any question relating to the application o f this Regulation, including the question of control”.
68 Article 1(1).
69 Council Regulation 338/97/EC of 3 March 1997 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora 
by regulating trade therein [1997] Official Journal L61/1.
70 COM (79) 364.
71 COM (92)316.
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within similar international fora, there would seem little obvious juridical impediment 
in this regard. Accordingly, as Churchill observes, “[wjhile in strict law it is difficult 
to argue that the Commission is wrong, in this area (as in others) questions of 
competence are in practice determined as much by political as legal considerations”.72
In December 2007, the Commission adopted a further proposal to the Council to 
advance a common EU position in respect o f the various Member States party to the 
ICRW to pursue at IWC Meetings.73 To this end, the Commission argued that “EC 
policy on whales will not be effective in Community waters if  it is not backed by 
coherent worldwide action”.74 Moreover, it was considered that the EU parties should 
advocate at the IWC the continuation o f the moratorium on commercial hunting; the 
creation of further whale sanctuaries; the further regulation o f scientific whaling and 
the continuation of aboriginal subsistence hunting; to support the activities of the 
Conservation Committee and other relevant fora such as CITES; and to encourage 
further transparency within the IWC by opposing the increased use of secret ballots.75
The current terms of the ICRW preclude accession to the treaty by a Regional 
Economic Integration Organisation,76 hence formal membership of the IWC would 
require an amendment o f the Convention as advocated by the European Commission 
in 1992. This is not an unprecedented arrangement, and corresponds to the position of 
the EU within CITES.77 Thus far, and following the CITES model, the most effective 
substitute for official EU membership is for the Commission to secure the aggregation 
of a common position prior to IWC Meetings and to establish a series of common 
goals to be supported by the Member States party, combined with practical 
supervision from Commission representatives acting as Observers. To date, with the
72 R. Churchill, “Sustaining Small Cetaceans: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Ascobans and 
Accobams Agreements” in A. Boyle and D. Freestone, International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 
234.
73 COM (2007) 871.
74 Ibid., at 6.
75 Ibid., at 9.
76 Article III of the Convention refers to the Membership o f “Contracting Governments” within the 
IWC.
77 In 1983 an extraordinary meeting o f CITES resulted in the amendment o f Article XXI, which now 
permits Regional Economic Integration Organisations to accede, under what is popularly referred to as 
the “Gabarone Amendment” to the Convention. Nevertheless, the EU currently remains outside the 
official umbrella o f CITES, as the amendment has to date failed to meet the requirements for entry into 
force as prescribed under Article XVII(3), namely the acquiescence o f two-thirds o f the states that were 
parties to the Convention at the material time.
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recent membership o f Lithuania,78 Estonia,79 Poland80 and Bulgaria,81 some twenty- 
five EU Member States have become parties to the ICRW.82 While the national 
position of most Member States corresponds broadly with that of the Commission, 
complications are nonetheless raised in relation to Denmark in respect of its overseas 
territories. The first formal example o f the EU parties acting as a bloc occurred at the 
Sixtieth Annual Meeting in 2008, which raised strong concerns from other delegations 
concerning the implications o f an aggregated approach to negotiations.83 
Nevertheless, however unpopular this tactic may ultimately transpire to be, it appears 
that a joint EU approach to IWC issues is likely to constitute a new and regular 
pattern of voting within the Commission, pursuant to the Commission’s policy of 
environmental diplomacy in multilateral organisations.
8.3. The Conservation of Cetaceans under the Habitats Directive
Ultimately, the overarching policies outlined above are largely facilitative, providing 
guidance for the future direction o f marine environmental policies or, in the case of 
the MSFD, conferring a greater degree o f impetus towards the development of 
national and regional initiatives. To date, however, the primary legislative provisions 
that directly impact upon the practical conservation o f European species of cetaceans 
remain those adopted under the Habitats Directive and, latterly, pursuant to the 
development of the reformed CFP.
The Habitats Directive is perhaps the best-known provision o f EU environmental law 
and certainly the most pertinent in prescribing clear obligations to advance the 
conservation of cetaceans. In many respects it continues to form the primary basis for 
regulatory action for such species, both at a Community level and within the 
individual Member States. The primary aims and objectives of the Habitats Directive
78 Instrument of ratification formally accepted on 25 November 2008.
79 Instrument o f ratification formally accepted on 7 January 2009.
80 Instrument o f ratification formally accepted on 17 April 2009.
81 Instrument o f ratification formally accepted on 10 August 2009.
82 Latvia and Malta currently remain outside the ICRW umbrella, although landlocked Austria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovakia are parties to the Convention.
83 Indeed, the Republic o f Korea suggested that such an approach may be illegal and considered this 
stance as “interfering with the legitimate process o f IWC”: Chair’s Report o f  the Sixtieth Annual 
Meeting o f the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 2008), at 21. Russia voiced 
similar concerns that the position o f the EU had been pre-ordained and rendered debate essentially 
meaningless in practice: ibid.
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are stated in Article 2(1) as being to “contribute towards ensuring bio-diversity 
through the conservation o f natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora in the 
European territory of the Member States”. Measures taken under the Directive are 
accordingly designed to maintain or restore natural habitats and species of 
“Community interest” at favourable conservation status.84
In the pursuit of these objectives, the Habitats Directive advances a two-pronged 
approach to the conservation o f European fauna and flora. Firstly, the directive 
provides for the creation o f a network o f Special Areas of Conservation (SACs), 
known collectively as “Natura 2000”. The Natura 2000 network consists of sites 
identified by the Member States as comprising particular habitat types (listed in 
Annex I of the directive), as well as the habitats o f particular species (listed in Annex 
II). To date, two species o f cetaceans have been listed on Annex II, namely the 
harbour porpoise and the bottlenose dolphin. Secondly, Member States are required to 
establish a system for the strict protection, within their natural range, of animal 
species that are listed in Annex IV(a) o f the directive. In this respect, “all species” of 
cetaceans have been listed in Annex IV(a), thereby all Member States are required to 
ensure that the distinct conservation and management requirements established for
or
such species are observed throughout their territory.
Despite the fundamental importance o f this legislation to European biodiversity 
generally, the Habitats Directive itself has, until relatively recently, encountered a 
number of obstacles in seeking to address marine species, which has accordingly had 
adverse implications for the protection o f cetaceans. Two primary inhibiting factors 
may be identified as having posed particular difficulties for the advancement of 
conservation efforts for cetaceans under the directive. Firstly, the tone and wording of 
the Habitats Directive has, since its inception, exhibited a strong emphasis on
84 Article 2(2). A favourable conservation status in respect o f natural habitat is defined in Article 1(e) 
as being where its natural range and areas covered within that range are stable or increasing; the 
specific structure and functions which are necessary for its long-term maintenance exist and are likely 
to continue to exist for the foreseeable future; and the conservation status o f its typical species is also 
“favourable”. A favourable conservation status in respect o f species is defined in Article l(i) as being 
where population dynamics data on the species concerned indicate that it is maintaining itself on a 
long-term basis as a viable component o f its natural habitats; that its natural range is neither being 
reduced nor likely to become reduced for the foreseeable future; and there is, and will probably 
continue to be, a sufficiently large habitat to maintain its populations on a long-term basis.
85 Article 2(1).
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terrestrial species and habitats. Although a marine remit is clearly established within
86the directive, there are nevertheless consistent references throughout this instrument 
to “land-use planning” and “landscape”87 with no corresponding identification of 
marine spatial planning or seascapes. Likewise, the various Annexes of the directive 
have long been dominated by terrestrial species and habitats, while the designation of 
offshore areas -  which comprise the main areas of critical habitat for cetaceans -  as 
SACs remains embryonic at present. Moreover, as discussed below, the EU 
authorities have been relatively slow in developing clear guidelines for the marine 
application o f the directive, which has further served to hinder the development of 
SACs in comparison with terrestrial protected areas.
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, the precise jurisdictional reach of the 
Habitats Directive in marine terms initially lacked clarity. Under Article 2(1), the 
directive is merely stated to apply within the “European territory” of the Member 
States. Since the inception o f the directive it has been somewhat questionable whether 
the concept o f “territory” is essentially analogous to the “territorial sea”, or whether it 
applies to the full range of jurisdictional waters claimed by the Member States. Initial 
drafts of the directive originally defined “territory” as “including maritime areas 
under the sovereignty or jurisdiction o f the Member States”, a clarification that was 
ultimately omitted from the final version o f the text. Consequently, an interpretation 
that the directive applied solely to coastal waters might not be considered entirely 
misguided. From an ecological standpoint, however, such a narrow view of the 
directive is essentially self-defeating in the context of species with an extended range, 
including many species o f cetaceans, as opposed to those exhibiting more coastal 
tendencies.88 Accordingly, the EU institutions have broadly considered the Habitats 
Directive to apply to national EEZs,89 even if  this viewpoint may not have been 
consistently endorsed within the practice o f the Member States.90
86 Article 1(b) o f the Habitats Directive states that “natural habitats means terrestrial or aquatic areas” 
(emphasis added).
87 See, for instance, the preamble to the directive, as well as Article 3(3).
88 Similar sentiments have been expressed in relation to the maritime application o f the Wild Birds 
Directive: D. Owen, “The Application o f the Wild Birds Directive beyond the Territorial Sea of 
European Community Member States” (2001) 13 Journal o f  Environmental Law 38.
89 In 2001, for instance, the Council Conclusions on the Strategy for the Integration o f Environmental 
Concerns and Sustainable Development into the Common Fisheries Policy encouraged the Member 
States, in cooperation with the Commission, to “continue their work towards the lull implementation of 
these directives in their exclusive economic zones”: Point 15; reproduced on-line at
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Somewhat surprisingly, the first judicial consideration of this issue was advanced only 
in 2000, in response to an application for judicial review brought in the UK.91 The 
Greenpeace action was raised in response to the adoption by the UK government of a
Q9series of Regulations to license future oil and gas exploration on the continental 
shelf, which expressly confined the application of the Habitats Directive to the 
territorial sea. The applicants considered that the restrictive approach taken by the 
UK authorities constituted a failure to correctly transpose obligations under the 
Habitats Directive into national law, given that a number of marine species 
(specifically including cetaceans) could be adversely affected by such activities. In 
granting the application, it was duly observed by the trial judge that “a Directive 
which includes in its aims the protection o f inter alia ... cetaceans will only achieve 
those aims, on a purposive construction, if  it extends beyond territorial waters”.94
The ECJ subsequently confirmed in a later case, Commission v. UK,95 that an unduly 
narrow view of the jurisdictional purview o f the Habitats Directive would essentially 
defeat the key aspirations of the legislation.96 Indeed, in the Opinion of Advocate- 
General Kokott, “[w]hile the Habitats Directive admittedly contains no express rule 
concerning its territorial scope, it is consonant with its objectives to apply it beyond 
coastal waters ... the directive protects habitats such as reefs and species such as sea 
mammals which are frequently, in part even predominantly, to be found outside
www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/agricult/ACF20DE.html (last visited 31 August 
2009).
90 For instance, the German Bundesnaturschutzgesetz (Federal Nature Conservation Act) initially 
stipulated that the Habitats Directive was to be applied solely within the territorial sea. In 2002 this 
provision was amended to specifically extend the application o f the Natura 2000 programme to the 
EEZ: Article 38.
91 R v. Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd [No. 2] (2000) 2 CMLR 94 
(QBD).
92 Conservation (Natural Habitats etc.) Regulations 1994.
93 Regulation 2(1). Somewhat curiously, however, the UK government had previously officially 
considered that the Habitats Directive operates in a manner so as to preclude commercial whaling 
activities within the EEZ: P. G. G. Davies, “The Legality o f Norwegian Commercial Whaling under the 
Whaling Convention and its Compatibility with European Community Law” (1994) 43 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 270, at 281. It is therefore somewhat difficult to reconcile the 
distinction between the operation o f the directive in these waters in relation to hunting with a non­
application to other potentially harmful activities.
94 (2000) 2 CMLR 94, at 114 (per Maurice Kay J.).
95 Case C-6/04; [2005] ECR1-9017.
96 At para. 117.
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onterritorial waters”. Accordingly, it has become settled law that the Habitats Directive 
applies to and must be enforced within the EEZs and non-extended continental 
shelves claimed by the Member States.
In order to evaluate the application of the Habitats Directive to cetaceans, it is 
necessary to examine both aspects of the conservation regime prescribed by the 
directive, namely the scope and operation of Special Areas of Conservation for Annex 
II species and the strict protection measures applicable to “all species” of cetaceans.
8.3.1 Special Areas o f  Conservation
As noted above, although the Habitats Directive is considered the cornerstone of EU 
nature conservation law, the various biodiversity Communications have consistently 
lamented the slow rate of progress towards advancing the Natura 2000 network. This 
has proved to be particularly challenging within the marine environment, where the 
establishment of SACs for cetaceans has, to date, been minimal. The comparative lack 
of protected areas for cetaceans -  especially given their high political visibility within 
the EU institutions -  is symptomatic of a general failure to designate a coordinated 
network of offshore SACs generally within Community waters. Accordingly, 
rectifying the sparse coverage of the Habitats Directive in these waters should be 
considered a significant area of activity for the Member States if  the directive is to 
realise its full conservation potential in a marine context.
In the light of these concerns, and in line with the sentiments of the Sixth EAP, a 
series of initiatives has been launched in recent years to address the various 
shortcomings in the marine application o f the Habitats Directive. In October 2002, at 
a meeting of Nature Directors of the Member States, it was agreed that further work 
was necessary in order to designate and manage sea-based Natura 2000 sites. In 
March 2003, a Marine Expert Group was established to outline a common 
understanding of the provisions of Natura 2000 within the marine environment, which 
culminated in the adoption by the Commission in May 2007 of a series of indicative,
97 At para. 132 of the Opinion o f the Advocate-General.
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yet non-binding, Guidelines for the designation and operation of marine SACs. Such 
a development must be considered especially timely, given the Commission’s 
observation that “to date there have been relatively few Natura 2000 sites identified 
for the offshore marine environment and this represents the most significant gap in the 
Natura network”.99 Nevertheless, as observed below, the Natura 2000 programme can 
be seen to be subject to particular difficulties in the specific context of cetaceans -  
both in the designation of SACs in the first instance and in the subsequent 
management of such areas by the Member States.
8.3.1.(i) The designation o f  cetacean SACs
As a preliminary point, it should be observed that the designation process for marine 
SACs is no different to that in relation to terrestrial sites, with the identification of the 
Natura 2000 network predicated solely on relevant scientific criteria.100 Accordingly, 
it is incumbent upon the Member States to propose a list of appropriate native sites, 
containing the natural habitat types listed in Annex I, as well as those that host species 
listed in Annex II.101 Criteria for the designation of SACs are provided in Annex III of 
the directive. For Annex II species, Annex III lays down the following considerations 
as site assessment criteria:
• Size and density of the population o f the species present on the site in relation 
to the populations present within national territory.
• The degree of conservation o f the features o f the habitat which are important 
for the species concerned and restoration possibilities.
• The degree of isolation of the population present on the site in relation to the 
natural range of the species.
• The global assessment of the value o f the site for the conservation of the 
species concerned.
98 Guidelines for the Establishment o f  the Natura 2000 Network in the Marine Environment: 
Application o f the Habitats and Birds Directives', reproduced on-line at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/marine/docs/marine_guidelines.pdf (last visited 31 
August 2009). [Hereinafter “Marine Guidelines”].
99 Ibid., at 6.
100 Commission v. France, Case C-166/97 [1999] ECR 1-1719; this point is reinforced in the Marine 
Guidelines: ibid., at 27.
101 Article 4(1).
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On the basis of this information, the indicative list of such areas produced by the
Member State is subsequently transmitted to the Commission, together with
documentation concerning the name, location and extent of the site, a map of the area,
1
as well as data generated in the application o f the Annex III criteria. Based on this 
information, the Commission is responsible for producing a draft list of Sites of 
Community Importance (SCIs) in consultation with the Member State, which will 
then be formally adopted.103 The Member State is then required to officially designate 
any such site within its jurisdiction as a SAC “as soon as possible and within six years 
at most”.104
Despite the operation of an administrative system that -  on the surface, at least -  
appears relatively uncomplicated, the establishment o f the Natura 2000 network has 
ultimately proved a protracted process in practice, both in relation to terrestrial and 
marine SACs. That the demanding deadlines105 for the completion of the network 
have not been met may be explained by the fact the relatively straightforward wording 
of the directive masks what is often a complex, expensive and labour-intensive series 
of research activities on the part of national nature conservation agencies. Moreover, 
the data required under Annex III to identify SCIs is often highly challenging to 
swiftly obtain in the distinct case of cetaceans -  especially in offshore waters -  given 
the practical and financial difficulties posed in conducting concerted studies on these 
species in the wild.
In conjunction with these practical limitations, a further challenge to the establishment 
of cetacean SACs has historically been the lack o f direct guidance afforded to marine 
species under the directive. The only specific provision addressing the designation of 
marine SACs is Article 4(1), which provides that “[f]or aquatic species which range 
over wide areas, such sites will be proposed only where there is a clearly identifiable 
area representing the physical and biological factors essential to their life and
102 Article 4(2).
103 Under Article 20 this will be evaluated by a specialist Committee, which will then submit its 
recommendations to the Commission under Article 21 for adoption.
104 Article 4(4).
105 The Member States that were under the EU umbrella at the time o f the conclusion of the Habitats 
Directive were originally scheduled to have furnished the European Commission with the requisite 
national lists by June 1995, with a list of sites o f Community importance due to have been finalised by 
June 1998.
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reproduction”. It may be considered that the legislative intent of this provision is to 
prevent the designation of excessive expanses of the sea as protected areas and 
thereby permit the coexistence o f vital economic activities with nature 
conservation.106 Nevertheless, there is some suggestion from current practice that this 
formulation is rather counter-productive. Indeed, the stringency of these requirements, 
and concomitant difficulties in demonstrating unequivocally that areas of high species 
density are also in fact “essential to life and reproduction”, is cited as a primary 
reason for truncating the parameters o f a key SAC for harbour porpoises within the 
German EEZ.107
Some uniform principles were tentatively developed in respect of Natura 200 sites for 
cetaceans by an ad hoc working group o f the EC Habitats Committee in December 
2000.108 The working group considered potential designation criteria for protected 
areas for migratory marine species, with particular reference to harbour porpoises. 
Areas representing the crucial factors for the life-cycle of the species were deemed 
identifiable, especially where:
• There is a continuous or regular presence of the species, subject to seasonal 
variations.
• There is a good population density in relation to other areas.
• There is a high ratio of young to adults during certain periods of the year.
Such considerations are not considered to be exhaustive and “other biological 
elements are characteristic of these areas, such as very developed social and sexual 
life”109 may also prove informative. Recent Danish practice has considered site 
fidelity in a reproductive context as the key aspect in ascertaining potential SACs, 
since “designating protected areas for harbour porpoises implies identifying areas of 
high porpoise density with a particular focus on distribution during the breeding
106 Article 4(1) operates in conjunction with Article 11, requiring the surveillance o f such sites and 
allows for the national list o f SCIs to be amended in the light o f further data.
107 S. A. Pedersen et al., “Natura 2000 Sites and Fisheries in German Offshore Waters” (2009) 66 ICES 
Journal o f Marine Science 155, at 160.
108 EC (2001) Habitats Committee, Hab. 01/05.
109 Marine Guidelines, at 47.
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season”.110 Although there is little definitive practice in respect of “other biological 
elements” that may be considered in identifying areas of importance for cetaceans, a 
“high proportion of sensitive behaviour, i.e. resting” was deemed to be of additional 
significance in establishing German SACs for harbour porpoises.111
While the guidelines were elaborated with the harbour porpoise specifically in mind,
119they have been also successfully applied to bottlenose dolphins in terrestrial waters. 
Likewise, recent practice has seen a tentative emergence of the Natura 2000 network 
into offshore waters, with designations for SCIs pending in a number of Member 
States. The first concerted programme of activity to establish SACs within the EEZ of 
a Member State was undertaken by Germany in the light of the amendment of the 
Bundesnaturschutzgesetz to confer formal powers upon the pertinent authorities to do 
so. Accordingly, in 2004 a list o f ten new SCIs -  the first in offshore waters within the
• 113 •Community -  were proposed to the Commission, with the western area of the 
island of Sylt ultimately designated as a SAC for harbour porpoises.114
There is some scope for optimism that, in the mid-term future, an increasing number 
of critical areas of habitat for Annex II cetaceans may be identified and proposed as 
SCIs by the Member States, as the offshore and inshore coverage of the Natura 2000 
programme continues to develop.115 In this regard, an ambitious target has been set 
for the completion of the Natura 2000 network, both in a terrestrial and marine 
context, by 2012. However, notwithstanding the instructive corpus of practice that has 
begun to emerge in recent years on the establishment of marine SACs, the prospects 
of the Member States ultimately meeting this demanding deadline will depend
110 J. Teilmann et al., High Density Areas fo r  Harbour Porpoises in Danish Waters: NERI Technical 
Report No. 657 (Aarhus: National Environmental Research Institute, 2008), at 9.
111 J. C. Krause et al., “Rationale Behind Site Selection for the NATURA 2000 Network in the German 
EEZ” in H. von Nordheim, D. Boedeker and J. C. Krause (eds.), Progress in Marine Conservation in 
Europe: Natura 2000 Sites in German Offshore Waters (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2006), at 72.
112 For instance, the UK has designated two SACs in inshore waters for bottlenose dolphins in the 
Moray Firth, Scotland, and Bae Ceredigion, Wales, respectively: for full details o f these SACs see the 
website of the Joint Nature Conservation Commission at www.jncc.gov.uk (last visited 31 August 
2009).
113 Krause et al., “Rationale Behind Site Selection”, at 66-7.
114 Pedersen et al., “Natura 2000 Sites and Fisheries”, at 160.
115 For instance, in August 2008 the UK submitted its first five proposals for offshore SACs to the 
Commission, although none o f these specifically addressed cetaceans. On this process generally see E. 
M. De Santo and P. J. S. Jones, “The Darwin Mounds -  From Undiscovered Coral to the Development 
of an Offshore Marine Protected Area Regime” (2007) 81 Bulletin o f Marine Science 147 and E. M. De 
Santo and P. J. S. Jones, “Offshore Marine Conservation Policies in the North East Atlantic: Emerging 
Tensions and Opportunities” (2007) 31 Marine Policy 336.
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primarily on the ability o f national authorities to allocate substantial funds to identify 
key areas for marine species. In the particular context of cetaceans, it may also be 
noted that data collection on this magnitude has been very much a long-term project, 
with the two SCANS initiatives -  cited by the Marine Guidelines as a key example of 
good practice116 -  having been on-going since 1994. Moreover, recent Danish 
initiatives also utilised data gathered over a ten-year period from 1997 as an important
117source. Where there is a considerable body of pre-existing historical data on 
cetaceans and their habitats in the waters o f a particular Member States, such a task is 
rendered somewhat easier. However, many such areas are still considered data
1 1 o
deficient, which may suggest that acquiring the necessary information to develop a 
coherent network o f marine SACs for cetaceans is likely to extend beyond the 
confines of the current Commission targets.
8.3.1.(ii) The management o f  cetacean SACs
The designation o f  SACs for cetaceans under the Habitats Directive, like that of any
marine protected area, is essentially meaningless unless accompanied by a clear set of
management targets and enforcement provisions. Indeed, the establishment of a SAC
entails a long-term commitment to the maintenance of such sites, given that protected
areas in a marine context “require effective governance and well-functioning
management institutions if  they are to be ecologically and socially successful”.119
Moreover, a leading review of best practice for protected areas for cetaceans
considers that such sites, as a basic necessity, require inter alia an ecosystem-based
and socio-economic management plan, legal recognition and a clear enforcement
programme.120 The Habitats Directive establishes obligations upon the Member States
in relation to SACs, most notably under Article 6, which provides the broad
121 •framework of protective measures to be taken and the coexistence of conservation
116 Marine Guidelines, at 47.
117 Teilmann et al., “High Density Areas”, at 10-11.
118 Indeed, data availability on the distribution o f Annex II species generally is considered “very 
sparse”: Marine Guidelines, at 47.
119 A. Charles and L. Wilson, “Human Dimensions o f Marine Protected Areas” (2009) 66 ICES Journal 
of Marine Science 6, at 9.
120 E. Hoyt, Marine Protected Areas fo r  Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises (London: Earthscan, 2005), at 
75.
121 Articles 6(1) and (2).
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1strategies and economic activities within these sites. Nevertheless, some concerns 
may be raised as to how effective such commitments may be in practice for cetacean 
SACs.
Under Article 6(1), the national authorities “shall establish the necessary conservation 
measures involving, i f  need be, appropriate management plans specifically designed 
for the sites or integrated into other development plans, and appropriate statutory, 
administrative or contractual measures which correspond to the ecological 
requirements” of the habitats or species in question. There is no express obligation 
to ultimately develop a targeted management plan of the type identified by Hoyt as 
crucial to the basic success o f a protected area for cetaceans. In practice, however, 
national conservation agencies have developed management plans for the cetacean 
SACs established to date.124 Likewise, the Marine Guidelines strongly recommend the 
establishment of conservation plans for marine SACs, citing the OSPAR model as a
125particular example of good practice.
The second limb of Article 6(1), however, is clear and unequivocal: Member States 
must establish appropriate measures to safeguard the ecological requirements of the 
site. Given the extreme variability in the conservation needs of habitats and species 
addressed under Annexes I and II, the Commission has sought to avoid undue 
prescription in the discharge o f this obligation. Nevertheless, it is clear that such 
measures must correspond to the particular needs of the species throughout its life 
cycle.126 In the context of Annex II cetaceans, such measures might, for instance, be 
envisaged to take particular account o f migratory behaviour and provide for enhanced 
protection during breeding and calving seasons.
122 Articles 6(3) and (4).
123 Emphasis added.
124 For instance, species action plans have been adopted by the UK for its two bottlenose dolphin 
SACs, while national action plans are also considered to be a key aspect of present and future Danish 
conservation initiatives: Teilmann, “High Density Areas”, at 8. As noted by Krause et al., “sound site 
selection must be followed by effective management if  the overall conservation intent of marine 
NATURA 2000 sites is to be achieved”, hence this is a key aspect o f the German strategy: “Rationale 
Behind Site Selection” at 94.
125 Marine Guidelines, at 81-2. The OSPAR Guidelines are themselves modelled upon those advanced 
by the IUCN.
126 Managing NATURA 2000 Sites: The Provisions o f  Article 6 o f  the “Habitats” Directive 92/43/EEC 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2000), at 18.
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Particular obligations apply to the habitats o f Annex II cetaceans under Article 6(2),
177 _ . ,which become operational as soon as a site is designated a SCI. This provision 
prescribes a two-pronged approach to habitat protection, with Member States to “take 
appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas o f conservation, the deterioration of 
natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as disturbance of the species for 
which the areas have been designated, in so fa r  as such disturbance could be
178 ♦significant in relation to the objectives o f  this Directive”. However, while the
requirements pertaining to habitat deterioration are clear, interpretive difficulties are 
raised by the “disturbance” of cetacean SACs. The point at which this obligation will 
be triggered for Annex II cetaceans is difficult to quantify objectively; the directive 
offers no definition of “significant” disturbance. Likewise, whether a disturbance will 
affect the conservation status of a protected species is dependent upon multiple factors 
such as the nature of the disturbing activity, the point at which it occurs within the life 
cycle of the species, the projected adverse impact upon individual animals, as well as 
stock numbers and dynamics to ascertain whether unsustainable material losses are 
likely to occur.
This lack of a generic “tipping point” demonstrates the practical utility of a clear 
management plan for Annex II cetaceans where a SAC is created. Indeed, good 
practice would appear to involve the development of indicative guidelines within the 
management plan on proposed responses to disturbing activities likely to be faced 
within the SAC. Although the conditions within each SAC are highly individual in
170nature, the Marine Guidelines have cited oil and gas exploration and ecotourism
110activities as examples of typical sources of disturbance in the cetacean 
environment. Accordingly, the development o f localised guidelines to address such 
activities may be considered an increasingly important aspect of SAC management on 
the part of the Member States. For instance, Irish practice in relation to dolphin-
127 Article 4(5). The same is true of Articles 6(3) and (4), while the requirements o f Article 6(1) do not 
apply until the site is formally established as a SAC.
128 Emphasis added. The objectives of the directive in this regard are considered to be the maintenance 
of Annex II cetaceans at a favourable conservation status.
129 Marine Guidelines, at 96.
130 The Marine Guidelines note that whale- and dolphin-watching “needs to be carefully managed” and 
cites the ACCOBAMS Guidelines as an instructive model: ibid., at 103.
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watching operations in the Shannon Estuary SAC is to require written government 
consent, with permission contingent upon adherence to specific Codes of Practice.131
Despite the establishment o f SACs for Annex II cetaceans under the directive, “the 
inclusion of a site into the network Natura 2000 does not, a priori, exclude its future 
use”.132 Accordingly, Articles 6(3) and (4) establish the conditions under which such 
activities may be conducted within protected areas. These provisions are not 
uncontroversial, nor indeed may they be considered to be especially clear. Moreover, 
they are likely to be invoked with increasing frequency given the major economic and 
social interests at stake in a number o f areas of critical habitat for cetaceans.
Article 6(3) provides that “[a]ny plan or project not directly connected with or
necessary to the management o f the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon,
either individually or in combination with other plans or projects shall be subject to
appropriate assessment o f its implications for the site in view of the site’s
conservation objectives” . However, the directive is silent on what constitutes a “plan
or project” caught under the purview o f this provision. A preliminary ruling by the
ECJ has clarified this issue somewhat,133 viewing the definition as broadly following
a related directive134 and suggesting that “the terms ‘plan’ or ‘project’ should be
1 4
interpreted broadly, not restrictively”. Likewise, the concept of a “significant” 
effect is undefined and a substantial negative impact of such activities could be 
experienced within the SAC, without necessarily triggering a significant impact for 
the purposes of the conservation status o f the animals concerned. Much of the current 
litigation to date on this provision has concerned the necessity for an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) in individual circumstances,136 for which there is a
131 Personal communication with Dr. Simon Berrow, Irish Whale and Dolphin Group, 7 September 
2006 (on file); see also Hoyt, note 132 supra, at 186-7.
132 Marine Guidelines, at 96.
133 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee, Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van 
Vogels v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Case C-127/02.
134 Council Directive 85/337/EEC o f 27 June 1985 on the assessment o f the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment [1985] Official Journal L175/40. This provision defines a 
“project” (but not a “plan”) as “the execution o f construction works or o f other installations or 
schemes” and “other interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape including those involving 
the extraction o f mineral resources”: Article 1(2). The present case considered cockle fishing to 
constitute a project for the purposes o f Directive 85/337/EEC and, by extension, the Habitats Directive.
135 Opinion o f Advocate-General Kokott, at para. 30.
136 See, for instance, Commission v. France, Case C-256/98 [2000] ECR1-2487.
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substantial array o f EU legislation on this issue,137 which is of considerable practical 
utility in identifying key implications for cetaceans in proposed marine activities.
More significantly, Article 6(4) provides that “[i]f, in spite of a negative assessment 
of this implications for the site and in the absence of alternative solutions, a plan or 
project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest, including those o f a social or economic nature, the Member State shall take 
all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 
2000 is protected”. Article 6(4) thereby seeks to reconcile the demands of economic 
and industrial activity o f fundamental importance to the Member State with the 
practical demands of Community biodiversity commitments.
Nevertheless, Article 6(4) suffers from a marked lack of clarity concerning the 
threshold by which economic activities may be conducted within a SAC. Indeed, the 
notion of “imperative reasons o f overriding public interest” is among the most 
contentious -  and certainly one of the most opaque -  clauses of the Habitats 
Directive, for which the Commission readily admits that the ECJ “has not given clear 
indications for the interpretation o f this specific concept”. De Sadeleer considers 
this phrase “as referring to a general interest superior to the ecological objective of the 
Directive”.139 A further interpretation o f considerable influence mandates a balance of 
interests approach, whereby “[a] project that is of great public interest but involves 
only minor adverse effects to the protected area in question should be treated 
differently than a project with marginal economic public interest but important 
detrimental effects on ecological values”.140 It is accordingly evident that the concept 
remains highly subjective and is dependent entirely on the particular conditions 
present within each individual SAC.
137 For an overview o f these provisions see P. G. G. Davies, European Union Environmental Law: An 
Introduction to Key Selected Issues (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2002), at 156-185.
138 Guidance Document on Article 6(4) o f  the “Habitats Directive ” 92/43/EEC (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2007), at 7.
139 N. de Sadeleer, “Habitats Conservation in EC Law -  From Nature Sanctuaries to Ecological 
Networks” (2005) 5 Yearbook o f  European Environmental Law 215, at 249.
140 A. Nollkaemper, “Habitat Protection in European Community Law: Evolving Conceptions of a 
Balance of Interests” (1997) 9 Journal o f  Environmental Law 271, at 280.
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The obligations incumbent upon the Member States under Article 6(4) are also 
uncertain. There is little precise indication o f the “compensatory measures” required 
of the national authorities, aside from a vague intimation that nesting or resting sites 
should be moved to an appropriate safer point along migratory pathways or that so- 
called “habitat banking” may be considered.141 While this is more feasible for certain 
terrestrial or avian species, such policies represent a substantial challenge in the case 
of cetaceans. Instead, mitigation measures in cetacean SACs are likely to involve, for 
instance, temporal and spatial restrictions on fishing activities and the introduction of 
guidelines on seismic activities in areas of critical habitat.142
A Member State may only invoke this exemption on three broad grounds, namely 
considerations of human health or public safety, beneficial consequences of primary 
importance for the environment or “further to an opinion from the Commission, to 
other reasons of overriding public interest”. The first two criteria are likely to be of 
limited relevance to cetaceans, although it should be observed that the current EU 
aspirations towards the further development o f alternative energy sources143 may 
involve an increasing volume of tidal barrages and offshore windfarms.144 With 
potential adverse effects on cetaceans of such projects having been raised in certain 
fora,145 subject to an appropriate EIA, the environment clause may be considered 
likely to override such concerns, while military activities may be justified under the 
“public safety” exemption. The clearest area o f conflict, however, is likely to occur in 
the context of the expansively worded sweep-up clause, “other imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest”.
To date, some ten Opinions have been delivered by the Commission regarding Article 
6(4) projects,146 although they may not necessarily represent a precise template for the
141 Guidance Document on Article 6(4), at 13.
142 On this issue generally see R. Compton et al., “A Critical Examination of Worldwide Guidelines for 
Minimising Disturbance to Marine Mammals During Seismic Surveys” (2008) 32 Marine Policy 255.
143 COM (2006) 848.
144 Indeed, while it is extremely difficult to study the reactions of cetaceans to such noise sources, 
concerns have been raised about the implications o f projects within harbour porpoise SACs: A. 
Kellermann, K. Eskildsen and B. Frank, “The MINOS Project: Ecological Assessments of Possible 
Impacts of Offshore Wind Energy Projects” in von Nordheim, Boedeker and Krause, “Progress in 
Marine Conservation”, at 245-6.
145 For instance, under the auspices of the CMS and the Bern Convention.
146 Reproduced on-line at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/guidance_en.htm (last visited 30
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application of this provision in a marine context. Insofar as broad principles may be 
distilled from these Opinions, it appears that such a project will be permitted where 
the Member State demonstrates that it is essential to alleviate substantial 
unemployment or social hardship,147 to secure the competitiveness of a Member State 
or Community industry on an international level,148 to create vital infrastructure 
links149 or to service fundamental human needs.150
Given the highly limited practice to date, the degree of toleration for development 
activities in cetacean SACs remains largely an exercise in conjecture. Nevertheless, 
certain key industrial activities have been identified within the Marine Guidelines for 
which supervision will be required when carried out in proximity to or within SACs. 
In addition to ecotourism activities,151 particular concern has been reserved for oil and 
gas exploitation, active sonar use, vessel-based noise and acoustic by-catch mitigation 
devices, all of which “need to be regulated in accordance with the provisions of article 
6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive if  they are likely to have a significant effects
1 M
[sic] on protected features at a Natura 2000 site”. Likewise, fisheries activities may 
also require management measures within these areas, for which the Commission has
1 ^ 3recently produced concise outline guidance. In this respect, additional 
complications are created by the demarcation of competence over fisheries 
management in particular areas, as noted below. Accordingly, with potential SACs for 
cetaceans encompassing locations o f significant economic activity, it is likely that the 
parameters o f Articles 6(3) and (4) in a marine context will become areas of 
considerable controversy and conflict in future years as the Natura 2000 network 
develops further in both inshore and offshore waters.
August 2009). On this issue generally see L. Kramer, “The European Commission’s Opinions under 
Article 6(4) o f the Habitats Directive” (2009) 21 Journal o f  Environmental Law 59.
147 Prosper Haniel Colliery Development Plan, Opinion o f 24 April 2003.
148 Project Mainport Rotterdam Development Plan, Opinion of 23 April 2003; Muhlenberger Loch 
Development Plan, Opinion o f 19 April 2000.
149 Grenadilla Port Development Plan', Karlsruhe/Baden-Baden Airport Development Plan, Opinion of 
6 June 2005; TGV Est Development Plan, Opinion o f 16 September 2004; Peene Valley Development 
Plan, Opinion o f 18 December 1995.
150 La Breha II Dam Development Plan, Opinion o f 14 May 2004.
151 As noted above, conditions have been imposed by the Irish authorities in respect o f such activities in 
the Shannon Estuary SAC, which may represent an attractive model for other Member States to follow.
152 Marine Guidelines, at 94-5.
153 Fisheries Measures fo r  Marine Natura 2000 Sites: A Consistent Approach to Requests for Fisheries 
Management Measures under the Common Fisheries Policy (Brussels: European Commission, 2008).
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8.3.2 Strict protection measures
The second key conservation objective pursued by the Habitats Directive mandates 
that Member States “shall take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict 
protection for the animal species listed in Annex IV(a) in their natural range”.154 As 
far as cetaceans are concerned Article 12(1) prescribes, inter alia, the prohibition of 
all forms of deliberate capture or killing of specimens155 in the wild, of deliberate 
disturbance of these species, particularly during the period of breeding, rearing, 
hibernation and migration156 and the deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or 
resting places. Likewise, Article 12(2) prohibits the keeping, transport, sale or 
exchange or offering for sale or exchange of such species. Furthermore, Article 12(4) 
requires the Member States to establish a system to monitor the incidental capture and 
killing of Annex IV(a) species, a source of substantial anthropogenic pressure upon 
stocks of many European species o f cetaceans.
Despite the protection measures mandated under Article 12, as with the provisions in 
respect of SACs, it is possible for a Member State to derogate from these obligations, 
provided that “there is no satisfactory alternative and the derogation is not detrimental 
to the maintenance of the populations concerned at a favourable conservation status in 
their natural range”.157 A number o f grounds are specified for derogations, of which 
one may cause particular controversy in the case of cetaceans. Article 16(l)(e) allows 
for the taking or keeping of Annex IV(a) species “under strictly supervised 
conditions, on a selective basis and to a limited ex tent... in limited numbers specified 
by the competent national authorities”. Accordingly, the construction of this provision 
suggests that the directive may in principle support some limited degree of directed 
hunting. Under Article 16(2), a Member State seeking to pursue whaling activities on 
this basis would be required to submit a reasoned report to the Commission. The
154 Article 12(1). As noted above, “all species” o f cetaceans are listed in Annex IV(a).
155 “Specimens” are defined in Article l(m) as “any animal or plan, whether alive or dead, o f the 
species listed in Annex IV and Annex V, any part or derivative thereof, as well as any other goods 
which appear, from an accompanying document, the packaging or a mark or label, or from any other 
circumstances, to be parts or derivatives o f animals or plans of those species”. Davies observes that this 
definition prevents the import o f whale products into the Community, removing any potential 
economic benefit and “thereby diminishes a potential loophole, namely that the prohibition on the 
killing of animals outside Community waters is not provided for in the Habitats Directive”: “Legality 
of Norwegian Whaling”, at 281.
156 By virtue of Article 12(3), these two obligations “shall apply to all stages o f life of the animals”, as 
indeed does the obligation concerning sale and trade of the species in Article 12(2).
157 Article 16(1).
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Commission is then to return an Opinion on the compatibility of such activities with 
the Habitats Directive within twelve months of receipt. Given the clear Commission 
position on commercial whaling, however, it must be considered highly unlikely to 
acquiesce meekly to such requests.
There is some uncertainty as to whether prohibition of the lethal exploitation of
cetaceans is a fundamental component of the environmental acquis. The limited
degree of state practice to date is somewhat inconclusive. On the one hand, it is
interesting to note that Portuguese accession to the EEC in 1985 was accompanied by
1 ^ 8the immediate cessation of national whaling activities; indeed, a number of former 
whaling grounds have been subsequently identified as potential cetacean SACs.159 
Likewise, little obvious guidance is forthcoming from the position of Denmark -  
which acts as the primary representative within the IWC for the whaling activities of 
its overseas territories of Greenland and the Faeroe Islands -  and is recognised by the 
European Commission as a unique and special case. The EU position has not been 
definitively tested in the context o f a state with a politically and economically 
significant whaling industry. Commercial whaling was earmarked to receive “very 
careful consideration”160 by the Commission during accession negotiations with 
Norway. However, Norwegian candidacy was ultimately rejected by a national 
referendum in 1994, hence there is little clear indication of the level of consideration 
-  and, indeed, toleration -  for commercial whaling within the accession process. This 
issue will nonetheless receive attention in the context of Iceland; the Icelandic 
application for membership, lodged in July 2009, is currently undergoing preliminary 
EU review.
Perhaps of more immediate practical concern, Article 16(l)(c) permits derogations “in 
the interests of public health and public safety, or for other imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature and 
beneficial consequences o f primary importance to the environment”. As in the case of 
SACs, there is considerable elasticity in the wording of this provision to license 
important economic and industrial activities within the cetacean environment, which
158 Davies, “Legality o f Norwegian Whaling”, at 292.
159 Hoyt, “Marine Protected Areas”, at 194-9 and 202-5.
160 COM (93) 142, at 12.
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may ultimately result in a growing number o f challenges to such derogations in future 
years. There is little decided authority in relation to these requirements specifically 
addressing the “strict protection” of cetaceans, with only one case seemingly brought 
to date. Nevertheless, insofar as this decision may be considered an instructive guide, 
the tone o f the judgment suggests that the ECJ will not lightly tolerate a failure to 
facilitate such a system. In this respect, subsequent complaints are likely to involve 
close scrutiny o f the procedural aspects of derogation practice, as well as the 
resources allocated to facilitating the enforcement and monitoring obligations towards 
Annex IV(a) cetaceans.
In Commission v. Ireland,161 infringement proceedings were brought for a series of 
alleged breaches of the Habitats Directive concerning an eclectic group of species, 
including cetaceans. Two central complaints pertaining to cetaceans were raised by 
the Commission. Firstly it was alleged that the Irish authorities had failed to establish 
a system o f strict protection due to an absence o f a national action plan for cetaceans 
and a failure to fulfil surveillance and monitoring obligations. Secondly, concerns 
were raised that a project to lay a gas pipeline in Broadhaven Bay involved the use of 
explosives which, despite acknowledging that the sound created would have an 
adverse impact on cetaceans, was nonetheless authorised by the government without 
entering a derogation under Article 16. The Irish authorities responded that a species 
action plan was “underway” and that monitoring projects were being conducted by 
conservation volunteers with more in-depth government studies in certain areas. 
Moreover, a national records database had since been established together with full 
adherence to the by-catch monitoring obligations prescribed under relevant fisheries 
legislation, while permission for seismic blasting had been granted in accordance with 
national rules.
The ECJ found Ireland to be in breach of its commitments in relation to Annex IV(a) 
cetaceans on both counts. The failure to establish species action plans, considered “an 
effective means o f meeting the strict protection requirement under Article 12(1)”,162 
could not be defended by demonstrating that initiatives to comply with this 
requirement were concluded after the expiry of the Reasoned Opinion issued by the
161 Case C -l83/05.
162 Opinion o f Advocate-General Leger, at para. 39.
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1Commission. Particular criticism was reserved for surveillance activities, 
considered “ad hoc and confined to certain geographical areas”,164 while resources for 
marine conservation were “especially meagre” and wildlife rangers “focussed on 
terrestrial duties and do not have any meaningful seagoing capacity”.165 Accordingly, 
the Court ruled that a system of strict protection had not been demonstrated.166 
Furthermore, it was held that the national authorisation process for seismic blasting 
was too permissive, rendering breeding and resting sites for cetaceans “subject to 
disturbances and threats which the Irish rules do not make it possible to prevent”.167
8.3.3 Appraisal
The Habitats Directive is clearly a vital instrument for the conservation of European 
species of cetaceans, both in its provisions for the establishment of protected areas 
and its facilitative role in ensuring the strict protection of these species throughout 
Community waters. Unlike many MPA-based approaches, the directive provides a 
strong prescriptive impetus for the creation of such areas, as well as a clear system for 
the review of decisions affecting the ecological integrity of SACs. While some 
reservations may be raised concerning the permissive nature of Article 6, the SAC 
regime demonstrates clear potential to transcend the “paper sanctuaries” often created 
for cetaceans, which are commonly starved of resources and devoid of meaningful 
enforcement powers. Moreover, the ECJ has demonstrated a strong approach to 
deficiencies in the establishment o f a Community-wide system of strict protection. 
The high political visibility o f cetaceans within the EU institutions will also ensure a 
proactive review of national policies that have the propensity to adversely affect the 
conservation status of such species.
Nevertheless, these clear strengths obscure a series of underlying structural 
deficiencies within the Habitats Directive that undermine its overall effectiveness as a 
conservatory regime for cetaceans. Firstly, the designation of SACs is restricted to 
harbour porpoises and bottlenose dolphins. As Hoyt observes, the reasons for this are
163 At para. 16 of the judgment. This position had been established in earlier (unrelated) litigation: 
Commission v. Ireland, Case C-282/02 ECR1-4653, at para. 40.
164 Opinion of Advocate-General Leger, at para. 84.
165 Ibid., at 69.
166 At para. 31 of the judgment.
167 Ibid., at 36.
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contemporary to the drafting of the directive, with such species considered at the time 
to be the only cetaceans resident in inshore waters.168 Subsequently, a case may be 
made to expand the range species of species listed on Annex II, as “[cjetacean 
distribution and habitat needs are becoming increasingly well known and certainly 
well enough known that species such as short-beaked, common, Atlantic white-sided 
and Risso’s dolphins, among others, should be able to have their habitats protected as 
well”.169
Secondly, the designation criteria for SACs are not presently conducive to the swift 
establishment of an extensive network of protected areas for cetaceans. The 
stringency of Article 4(1) means that while a particular site may be identifiable as 
being high in cetacean density, demonstrating definitively that it qualifies as 
representing physical and biological factors essential to life and reproduction is often 
rather more complicated. Allied to this, “[mjany important features of the feeding and 
reproduction biology o f harbour porpoises are still not fully understood”,170 thereby 
creating further challenges in identifying appropriate locations as potential SACs. 
Moreover, existing data deficiencies are also “understandably regarded as hindrances 
in the establishment o f offshore NATURA 2000 sites”.171 While the German 
experience demonstrates that such challenges are not insurmountable, practical 
difficulties may be experienced in other Member States. Indeed, the UK authorities 
consider that such sites take “several years for an area to progress from being an Area 
of Search to being submitted as a cSAC”,172 while some of the more recent EU 
entrants may lack the research facilities to gather such information as swiftly and 
efficiently as Germany.
Finally, concerns must also be raised by the often vague and permissive nature of the 
obligations imposed upon the Member States concerning SACs under Article 6, which 
is considered “a poor piece o f legislation that, unless strictly interpreted, contains big 
loopholes for major infrastructure projects in vulnerable areas”.173 These loopholes 
are likely to be explored with increasing frequency given the major economic interests
168 Hoyt, “Marine Protected Areas”, at 183.
169 Ibid.
170 Kraus et al., “Rationale Behind Site Selection”, at 74.
171 Ibid., at 93.
172 Cited by the JNCC website.
173 Nollkaemper, “Evolving Conceptions”, at 286.
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at stake in key areas o f cetacean habitats throughout the Community. Given the 
practical difficulties associated in developing alternative habitat sites and lingering 
concerns over mitigation obligations for seismic testing,174 cetacean habitats will 
prove a considerable test to the Commission’s ability to balance the interests of nature 
conservation and economic development in these areas.
8.4. The conservation of cetaceans under the Common Fisheries Policy
As noted above, the protection of cetaceans under EU law has been primarily guided 
by obligations established under the Habitats Directive. The implementation of the 
Natura 2000 network and securing the strict protection of particular in EC waters have 
been clearly identified as ongoing priorities for the Member States in addressing the 
conservation needs of marine biodiversity.175 Such endeavours will therefore form the 
primary focus of initiatives to protect cetaceans in the mid- and long-term future. 
Despite this stated focus, an unintentional impediment to the EU framework has 
become increasingly pronounced in recent years, as a result o f the strong emphasis 
upon the marine application of the Habitats Directive. Indeed, as further measures 
have been developed to address cetaceans, it has become apparent that 
implementation difficulties will arise due to the division of competences between the 
EU institutions and the Member States in the field of fisheries.
Competence to address biodiversity concerns has developed incrementally under the 
constituent EU treaties.176 The original 1957 EEC Treaty was not originally endowed 
with competence to regulate environmental concerns. This position was altered in the 
aftermath of the 1972 Stockholm Conference with the establishment in 1973 of the 
Environment and Consumer Protection Service and the first Programme of Action of 
the European Communities on the Environment.177 From these preliminary initiatives, 
certain provisions of the EEC Treaty addressing the common market were used as a
174 C. R. Weir and S. J. Dolman, “Comparative Review o f the Regional Marine Mammal Mitigation 
Guidelines Implemented during Industrial Seismic Surveys, and Guidance towards a Worldwide 
Standard” (2007) 10 Journal o f  International Wildlife Law and Policy 1.
175 “Mid-Term Review of the Sixth EAP”, at 3.
176 On the graduated emergence o f competence o f the EEC over biodiversity concerns see L. Kramer, 
“The Interdependency o f Community and Member State Activity on Nature Protection within the 
European Community” (1993) 20 Ecology Law Quarterly 25.
177 [1973] Official Journal Cl 12/1.
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basis for legislative activity.178 Subsequent reforms of the EC Treaty have established 
clear supervisory competence over ecological concerns. A key development in this 
regard was the adoption o f the Single European Act in 1986, designed primarily to 
further develop the common market. The SEA elaborated a distinct “Environmental 
Title”,179 which prescribed competence, inter alia, to “protect, preserve and improve 
the quality of the environment”. These powers were subsequently consolidated within 
successive revisions o f the EC Treaty.
Particular difficulties have arisen in the context of cetaceans due to conflicts between 
sectoral competences. This has been especially pronounced in the context of marine 
biodiversity, as opposed to terrestrial species, due to the need to address fisheries 
interactions. As noted previously, by-catches are considered to pose a severe 
conservation threat to cetaceans, with the risks posed by European fisheries deemed 
especially acute.180 There is accordingly an urgent need to address this issue as part of 
a wider policy to ensure the strict protection o f cetaceans by the Member States and to 
ensure the ecological integrity o f SACs.
The specialist technical measures required to address cetacean by-catches would 
ordinarily be introduced and applied by a coastal state through its fisheries legislation. 
This has proved challenging in the EU context due to the nature of competences over 
fisheries concerns. The EC Treaty explicitly claimed competence over fisheries in 
1992 by virtue of the Treaty on European Union.181 Prior to this, fisheries measures 
were introduced as part of the Community’s remit to regulate agricultural products, 
which included aspects o f fisheries concerns. In 1981 the ECJ confirmed that the
10-5
EC exercised exclusive competence over fisheries. Subject to powers delegated to 
the Member States, the European Council is therefore charged with establishing the 
conditions regulating fishing activities pursued by Community fleets. This includes
178 Namely Ex-Article 100 (now Article 94) and Ex-Article 235 (now Article 308).
179 See also L. Kramer, “Thirty Years o f European Environmental Law: Perspectives and Prospectives” 
(2002) 2 Yearbook o f  European Environmental Law 155.
180 R. R. Reeves, B. D. Smith, E. A. Crespo and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and 
Porpoises: 2002-2010 Conservation Action Plan for the World’s Cetaceans (Gland: IUCN, 2003), at 
14-15.
181 Article 3.
182 For a comprehensive appraisal o f the early operation of the CFP, see R. R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries 
Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
183 Case C-804/79; Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045.
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the development of technical measures in respect of fishing and the conservation and 
exploitation of fisheries resources. In the context of the CFP, this is addressed by the 
Council through a “Basic Regulation”, with the current version adopted in 2002 
following a root-and-branch reform of Community fisheries objectives. As noted 
below, such powers have spawned a series of protective measures to address the 
particular problem o f cetacean by-catches in Community fisheries. However, these 
arrangements have also created considerable difficulties for Member States to pursue 
individual policies to address particular concerns over the incidental mortality of 
cetaceans within their jurisdictional waters.
Chronologically, the first major legislative acknowledgement by the EU of the threat 
posed to marine wildlife from incidental capture came in 1992 -  through the Habitats 
Directive as opposed to specific fisheries legislation. In line with commitments 
towards individual protected species, incidental catches are addressed under Article 
12(4) which establishes an obligation to address, inter alia, by-catches:
“Member States shall establish a system to monitor the incidental capture and 
killing of the animal species listed in Annex IV(a). In the light of the 
information gathered, Member States shall take further research or 
conservation measures as required to ensure that incidental capture and killing 
does not have a significant impact on the species concerned”.
This requirement is further bolstered in Article 15 of the directive, which requires 
Member States to prohibit “the use o f all indiscriminate means capable of causing 
local disappearance of, or serious disturbance to, populations of such species”.
For terrestrial species, there is little obvious impediment to the development of 
policies by the individual Member States to implement this obligation. However, for 
marine species, discharging commitments under Article 12(4) will inevitably require 
the introduction of restrictions on fishing activities. So, while Article 12(4) may
184 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002 o f 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable 
development o f fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy [2002] Official Journal 
L358/59.
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technically mandate further by-catch mitigation measures, in practice Member States 
are not freely able to swiftly adopt such policies in the manner envisaged by this 
provision.
Instead, having transferred legislative competence over fisheries to the EC, a Member 
State wishing to introduce protection measures in the context of by-catches must 
instead rely on powers delegated by the Council. In this respect, the Basic Regulation 
prescribes a highly limited scope for the unilateral imposition of emergency 
environmental measures. Where a particularly pressing situation arises, a Member 
State must, in the first instance, request that the Commission introduces temporary
1 Of
emergency measures. Member States retain a power under Article 8 to introduce 
measures for a period o f up to three months in duration, but the development of 
mitigation strategies on a more sustained basis remains the responsibility of the EU. 
This position offers considerably less flexibility to Member States to mitigate 
individualised by-catch concerns in national waters that may not be replicated on a 
Community-wide basis and may be therefore less likely to command EU attention.
Indeed, this has been strikingly illustrated in the attempts by the UK to significant 
cetacean by-catches from pair-trawling within its territorial sea, eventually leading to
1 fiA • • •a judicial review of national policies. With the UK having previously registered
1 87concerns over cetacean by-catches in this fishery in 2003, the Commission rejected 
an application under Article 7 o f Regulation 2371 for emergency measures.188 The 
UK authorities responded with temporary emergency measures under Article 8,189 but 
have since been restricted in attempts to develop a more permanent national solution 
in this particular location, despite the demands of Article 12(4) of the Habitats 
Directive. The dichotomy between environmental and fisheries competences therefore
185 Article 7 of Regulation 2371/2002. A refusal may be overruled by the Council by a qualified 
majority vote.
186 Greenpeace Ltd v. Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2005] EWHC 
2144 (High Court judgment); [2005] EWCA Civ 1656 (Court of Appeal judgment).
187 Written Question E-0482/03 [2003] Official Journal 243E/135. In response, remedial measures 
were “not considered a high priority”.
188 [2005] EWHC 2144, at para. 22.
189 South-West Territorial Waters (Prohibition o f Pair Trawling) Order 2004 (SI 2004/3397), amended 
by South-West Territorial Waters (Prohibition of Pair Trawling) (Amendment) Order 2005 (SI 
2005/49).
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has clear and negative implications for the development of effective by-catch policies 
and the ability of individual Member States to respond swiftly to emerging threats to 
stocks through fisheries interactions.
Despite this position, on a Community level, cetacean by-catches have occupied 
significant legislative attention in recent years. In 2004, following a series of reforms 
of the CFP, a specific Regulation was adopted to address incidental cetacean mortality 
in EC fisheries. It is to this measure, which raises a number of intriguing implications 
for by-catch mitigation, which this thesis now turns.
8.4.1 The reform o f  the CFP and the development o f  Regulation 812/2004
The original CFP, inaugurated in 1970 was not initially well-placed to address marine 
environmental concerns, focussing instead on developing “equal access” to fishing 
grounds and in promoting harmonious relations between the Member States in this 
sector. Accordingly, until the CFP was comprehensively reformed in 2002, by-catches 
o f cetaceans were addressed on a piecemeal basis, with the adoption of ad hoc 
technical measures to promote enhanced selectivity o f fishing gear and techniques. In 
October 1992, a Regulation was adopted prohibiting the practice of encirclement 
fishing,190 identified as a technique that “may result in the pointless catching and 
killing o f marine mammals”.191 Regulation 3034/92 is no longer in force, and the use 
o f purse-seine nets is now governed by a subsequent measure192 that prohibits the 
practice o f encirclement fishing and the use o f shore-seines (towed nets operated from 
the shore) from 1 January 2002, unless the Council, by a qualified majority vote, 
“decides otherwise in the light o f scientific data proving that their use does not have a
190 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3034/92 o f 19 October 1992 amending, for the fourteenth time, 
Regulation (EEC) No. 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery 
resources [1992] Official Journal L307/1. Encirclement fishing involves the setting o f purse-seine nets 
around groups o f marine mammals to catch fish, such as tuna, that are found in close association with 
these mammals.
191 Preamble to the Regulation.
192 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1626/94 o f 27 June 1994 laying down certain technical measures for 
the conservation o f fishery resources in the Mediterranean [1994] Official Journal LI 71/1.
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negative impact on resources”.193 Further restrictions on dolphin-associated fishing 
were introduced by Resolution 894/97,194 which prohibits the encirclement of schools 
or groups of marine mammals with purse-seine nets195 and restricts the use of trawl 
nets in specified geographical areas at certain points in the fishing season.196
In 2002, the CFP was comprehensively revised in order to mitigate the adverse effects 
of the Community fishing effort on the marine environment. In March 2001, the
107 •Commission issued a Green Paper on the future of the CFP, which was highly 
critical of the previous environmental regulation of the EC fishing industry. The 
Commission considered that the CFP had failed to “sufficiently integrate the
• • • 1QOenvironmental problems into management considerations in a proactive manner”, 
while environmental issues affecting the marine ecosystem as a whole were not 
addressed in a coherent and co-ordinated fashion.199 Consequently, Regulation 
2371/2002 was introduced to fundamentally readjust the aims and objectives of the 
CFP. Mindful of the need to integrate environmental management concerns into the 
broad areas of Community policy, the main objectives of the CFP were redefined 
under Article 2(1) of the Regulation, which introduced an ecosystem-based approach 
to the management of fisheries resources. Article 4 lists the types of measures to be 
taken by the Council in order to pursue these new objectives including, inter alia, 
adopting recovery plans, adopting management plans, limiting catches and limiting 
fishing efforts. From the perspective of by-catch mitigation, Article 4 also allows for 
the adoption of technical measures, including the introduction of “specific measures
193 Article 2(3). In addition to these technical restrictions, Regulation 1626/94 requires Member States 
to “pay attention” to the conservation o f “fragile or endangered species” listed in its Annexes. This 
includes “all marine species o f mammals” listed in the Annexes to the CMS and the Bern Convention, 
which in practice encompasses all species o f cetaceans ordinarily and occasionally resident in 
Community waters.
194 Council Regulation (EC) No. 894/97 o f 29 April 1997 laying down certain technical measures for 
the conservation o f fishery resources [19971 Official Journal LI 32/1.
195 Article 10(17).
196 Article 10(15).
197 COM (2001) 135. For an appraisal o f these developments see R. Caddell, “By-Catch Mitigation and 
the Protection of Cetaceans: Recent Developments in EC Law” (2005) 8 Journal o f International 
Wildlife Law and Policy 241, at 249-51.
198 Ibid. at 9.
199 ru : J  ,  A
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to reduce the impact o f fishing activities on marine ecosystems and non-target
Shortly after issuing the Green Paper, the Commission began to consider the effective
901integration of environmental concerns into the CFP. Here, a number of policy 
objectives were listed as requiring “the highest priority”, including the improvement 
of fishing methods to reduce discards and incidental catches, and to mitigate adverse
• 909impacts on a variety o f marine species, including cetaceans. Work began in earnest 
on pursuing these priority objectives and, by mid-2002, the Commission started to 
address the issue o f incidental catches and the protection of cetaceans. In December 
2001 and June 2002, the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries 
(STECF) examined the issue o f cetacean mortality in European waters, concluding 
that while the precise number o f by-catches was difficult to quantify, harbour 
porpoises were especially vulnerable to incidental capture, particularly in the Baltic 
Sea.203 The STECF recommended that sweeping measures, including the prohibition 
of driftnet fishing in the Baltic Sea and the use of acoustic deterrent devices, should 
be introduced as a matter o f priority. In 2003, the Commission published a proposal 
for a new Regulation to address the incidental capture of cetaceans in Community 
fisheries.204 Three key policies were identified to mitigate cetacean by-catches:
• The restriction and eventual phase-out of driftnet fishing in the Baltic Sea.
• The mandatory use o f acoustic deterrent devices in certain fisheries.
• The implementation o f a co-ordinated monitoring scheme for cetacean by- 
catches.
These draft proposals were adopted by the Council and Regulation 812/2004 formally 
entered into force on 1 July 2004.
200 Article 4(g)(iv). In addition to this, Article 4(h) allows for measures to be taken to mitigate the 
environmental impact o f fishing activities by “establishing incentives, including those of an economic 
nature, to promote more selective or low impact fishing”.
201 COM (2002) 186.
202 Other priority actions were to be taken in respect of sharks and seabirds, as well as reducing 
pressure on fishing grounds and eliminating public aid for modernising fishing fleets.
203 Caddell, “By-Catch Mitigation”, at 250-1.
204 COM (2003) 451.
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8.4.2 The regulation o f  driftnet fishing
Large-scale pelagic driftnets are perhaps the m ost controversial type of fishing gear 
deployed in modem fisheries, having been roundly condemned for their acute lack of 
selectivity.205 Driftnets have been subject to particularly stringent international 
restrictions due to their significant adverse impacts within the marine environment. 
The EC has incrementally introduced a full prohibition on driftnet fishing in most 
Community fisheries, which forms a central aspect o f Regulation 812/2004, and has 
generated particular controversy within a number o f the individual Member States.206
Driftnetting may be broadly described as a process whereby “the surface layer of the 
ocean is fished with nets allowed to drift with winds and currents ... held open in a 
vertical position by the tension exerted between numerous floats on the floatline and a 
weighted deadline”.207 Traditional driftnets, primarily constructed from hemp and 
other organic materials, were initially considered highly selective and ecologically 
efficient.208 However, since the 1950s, such netting began to be manufactured on a 
vast scale using synthetic filament with smaller mesh sizes. Between the 1960s and 
mid-1980s few discernible restrictions were placed on the size of driftnets by 
international fisheries bodies, with the enormous expanses of netting routinely 
deployed in many fisheries eventually generating considerable disquiet over the long­
term sustainability o f such practices,209 especially in the context of marine mammals.
205 A. Wright and D. J. Doulman, “Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific: From Controversy to 
Management” (1991) 15 Marine Policy 303, at 313-4.
206 See R. Caddell, “The Prohibition o f Driftnet Fishing in European Community Waters: Problems, 
Progress and Prospects” (2007) 13 Journal o f  International Maritime Law 265.
207 A. H. Richards, “Problems o f Drift-Net Fisheries in the South Pacific” (1994) 29 Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 106, at 106.
208 S. P. Northridge, Driftnet Fisheries and their Impacts on Non-Target Species: A Worldwide Review. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 320 (Rome: FAO, 1991), at 1.2.1.
209 Indeed, by the late 1980s, commercial driftnets used in certain fisheries could extend to dimensions 
of up to 60km in length: M.R. Islam, “The Proposed ‘Driftnet-Free Zone’ in the South Pacific and the 
Law of the Sea Convention” (1991) 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 184, at 184.
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Concerns were first raised in the 1960s over the incidental mortality of porpoises by
Japanese salmon driftnetters in the North Pacific.210 By the 1980s, wholesale by-
catches of cetaceans had been observed within the South Pacific211 and, especially, the
Mediterranean region.212 During this period, driftnetting attracted opprobrium from
environmental campaigners, with such equipment condemned as “walls of death”
responsible for “strip-mining the oceans”.213 The emerging political visibility of the
impact of driftnet fisheries led to the introduction o f national restrictions by a number
of coastal states. In this regard, Australia instituted a series of fisheries closures in
1986 to protect depleted stocks o f dolphins,214 while in 1987 the US government
enacted the Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act, restricting the
use of such equipment to a maximum of 1.5 nautical miles within American 
01 ^jurisdictional waters.
From these individual initiatives, the ecological problems associated with driftnet 
fishing began to receive considerable attention within regional fora. In 1989, the first 
regional denunciation o f  driftnets as an unsustainable fishing practice was made 
through the Tarawa Declaration,216 issued by the South Pacific Forum Fishing 
Agency, in response to distant-water driftnetting by Japan and Taiwan.217 In 
November 1989 a regional convention was adopted by the South Pacific states,218 
instituting a ban on the use o f driftnets o f  over 2.5 km in length within a vast expanse
210 R. R. Reeves, B. D. Smith, E. A. Crespo and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and 
Porpoises: 2002-2010 Conservation Action Plan fo r  the World's Cetaceans (Gland: IUCN, 2003), at 
14.
211 M. B. Harwood and D. Hembree, “Incidental Catch o f Small Cetaceans in the Offshore Gillnet 
Fishery in Northern Australian Waters: 1981-1985” in Thirty-Seventh Report o f  the International 
Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1987), at 363.
212 G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, “A Note on the Cetacean Incidental Catch in the Italian Driftnet 
Swordfish Fishery, 1986-1988” in Fortieth Report o f  the International Whaling Commission 
(Cambridge: IWC, 1990), at 459.
213 A. Wright and D. J. Doulman, “Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific: From Controversy to 
Management” (1991) 15 Marine Policy 303 at 313-314.
214 Richards, “Problems o f Driftnet Fisheries”, at 108
215 See J. Bautista Otero, “The 1987 Driftnet Act: A  Step Toward Responsible Marine Resources 
Management” (1991) 2 Colorado Journal o f  International Environmental Law and Policy 129.
216 Reprinted at (1990) 14 Law o f  the Sea Bulletin 29. On the political developments towards the 
adoption o f the Tarawa Declaration see G. J. Hewison, “High Seas Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific 
and the Law of the Sea” (1993) 5 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 313.
217 On Japanese driftnet fishing efforts and policies in the South Pacific Region see I. Miyaoka, 
Legitimacy in International Society: Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation (London: 
Palgrave, 2004), at 50-54.
218 Convention for the Prohibition o f Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific; 1899 UNTS 3.
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of the region.219 Following this, the concerns over driftnet fishing in the South Pacific 
were soon extended to the North Pacific Region,220 as well as the Caribbean221 and, by 
the early 1990s, had attained global attention within the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA). In 1989 and 1990 a series o f Resolutions were adopted by the UNGA, 
calling for the increasingly stringent regulation of this equipment within areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.222 In 1991 a further Resolution was adopted by the UNGA 
calling for “a moratorium on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing ... notwithstanding 
that it will create adverse socio-economic effects on the communities involved”.223 
Resolution 46/215 thereby purported to prohibit the use o f large driftnets -  initially 
undefined, but subsequently widely interpreted in line with the 2.5km limit imposed 
under the Wellington Convention -  upon the high seas.
Although UNGA Resolutions do not ordinarily create binding legal obligations, the 
driftnet moratorium prescribed under Resolution 46/215 has subsequently become a 
striking anomaly to this general rule. Indeed, a considerable number of coastal states 
have enacted domestic legislation to give effect to these international restrictions,224 
while a significant volume o f bilateral enforcement activity (especially in conjunction 
with the US authorities) has also emerged.225 Moreover, an array o f regional fisheries 
management organisations (RFMOs), intergovernmental organisations and
219 For a full appraisal o f  the Wellington Convention see G. J. Hewison, “The Convention for the 
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific” (1993) 25 Case Western Reserve 
Journal o f International Law  449; see also B. Miller, “Combating Drift-Net Fishing in the Pacific” in J. 
Crawford and D. R. Rothwell (eds.), The Law o f  the Sea in the Asian-Pacific Region: Developments 
and Prospects (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 161.
220 L. A. Davis, “North Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the High Seas Controversy” (1991) 64 
Southern California Law Review 1057.
221 On the same day that the Wellington Convention was adopted, the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States issued the Castries Declaration, calling for a similar management regime to address 
driftnet fishing activities in this region. Nevertheless, the strong rhetoric was never matched by clear 
regulatory action, as no specific regional measures were subsequently adopted by this particular body 
against driftnet fishing. The Castries Declaration is reproduced at (1990) 14 Law o f  the Sea Bulletin 28.
222 A/Res/44/225 o f 22 December 1989 and A/Res/45/197 o f 21 December 1990. On this process 
generally see D. R. Rothwell, “The General Assembly Ban on Driftnet Fishing” in D. Shelton (ed.), 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role o f Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 140.
223 A/Res/46/215 o f 20 December 1991. For a comprehensive (and largely critical) analysis o f  this 
measure see W. T. Burke, M. Freeberg and E. L. Miles, “United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet 
F ishing* An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management” (1994) 25 
Ocean Development and International Law  127.
224 See, for instance, J. S. Davidson, “New Zealand Driftnet Prohibition Act 1991” (199*1) 6 
International Journal o f  Estuarine and Coastal Law  264.
225 For a comprehensive appraisal o f bilateral monitoring and enforcement arrangements sete D. 
Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law o f  the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), at 117-124.
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multilateral environmental treaty bodies have also endorsed and applied the ban on 
large-scale pelagic driftnets, thereby raising convincing claims that the UNGA 
moratorium may have ultimately passed from the hortatory confines of political
99 AResolutions and into customary international law.
The use of driftnets in European fisheries dates back over 2000 years.227 However, 
until the mid-1980s, with the exception of the Italian swordfish fleet, few vessels
' J ' J Q
routinely used driftnets in European fisheries. This position changed in 1986, when 
the French expanded its albacore driftnet fleet significantly, alongside Ireland and the
99QUK. Such activities “grew until 1992 without the Commission and the European 
Fisheries Ministers passing any kind o f regulation on the use of nets up to 6 or 7 
kilometres long”.230 However, the expansion o f these activities in the Bay of Biscay 
soon generated strong resentment within the staunchly nationalistic coastal regions of 
the autonomous Basque Country in Spain, culminating in the development of an 
unlikely alliance between Basque nationalists and environmental NGOs to lobby for
9^ 1EU-wide restrictions on the use o f driftnets, which was soon officially supported 
within the European Parliament by Spain and Portugal.
In 1992 the first Community restrictions were introduced,232 mirroring the UNGA 
moratorium, to control the use o f driftnets in a number of key European maritime 
regions. Driftnets of over 2.5km in length were prohibited in Community fisheries,
226 G. J. Hewison, “The Legally Binding Nature o f the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet 
Fishing” (1994) 25 Journal o f  Maritime Law and Commerce 557.
227 Rothwell, “General Assembly Ban”, at 142.
228 At this time, there were approximately 3500 driftnet fishermen employed in the Italian swordfish 
fleet in the Mediterranean Sea: see R. J. Long and P. A. Curran, Enforcing the Common Fisheries 
Policy (Oxford: Fishing News Books, 2000), at 289.
229 Fishermen from Ireland and Cornwall began to use driftnets in the Bay of Biscay in the 1990 fishing 
season. By 1994, 18 Irish vessels and 12 UK vessels were regularly deploying driftnets in this region: 
M. Findlay and A. E. Searle, “The North East Atlantic Albacore Fishery: A Cornish Crisis o f 
Confidence” (1998) 22 Marine Policy 95, at 98-9.
230 Lequesne, “Politics o f Fisheries”, at 117.
231 However, few commentators suggest that this alliance had any basis in environmental altruism, and 
was instead largely a marriage o f convenience designed to intimidate foreign fleets into abandoning 
local fishing grounds that had provided a steady income for coastal communities in the Basque region 
for centuries. Indeed, as noted somewhat acidly by Lequesne, the Basque anti-driftnet bloc “could 
appreciate the tactical advantage o f espousing the cause of dolphins, although in fact it had no 
compassion for the fate o f these marine mammals”: ibid, at 122.
232 Council Regulation (EEC) No 345/92 of 27 January 1992 amending for the eleventh time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery 
resources [1992] Official Journal L042/15.
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subject to two broad exceptions in that the restrictions did not apply to the Baltic Sea, 
Belts and Sound, 233 and that France was allocated a short-term derogation in respect 
of the national albacore tuna fleet. In 1997, further restrictions on driftnet fishing 
were introduced, including the repeal of the French albacore exemption although 
leaving the Baltic Sea area exemption undisturbed. Most significantly, the Regulation 
recognised the problems posed to fisheries and the marine environment by the 
wholesale catches of non-target species, emphasising the potential scope for 
incidental catches involved in the use of both driftnets and purse-seine nets. 
Community vessels were therefore precluded from keeping on board or using for 
fishing one or more driftnets whose individual or total length is greater than 2.5km.236
More controversially, in June 1998, Regulation 894/97 was amended to further
9 “X1strengthen the Community’s anti-driftnet legislation. Article 11 was amended to 
prohibit the use of driftnets completely -  irrespective of individual or collective length 
-  within certain listed fisheries in EC waters from 1 January 2002 onwards. This 
move, which was unprecedented under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP),238 
prevented the keeping on board or use for fishing of driftnets on particular species 
listed in Annex VIII of Regulation 894/97,239 including albacore tuna and swordfish, 
traditional staples of the French and Italian driftnet fishing fleets respectively.
In 2004 the driftnet fishing restrictions were, for the first time, extended to the Baltic 
Sea areas under Community control following the accession of Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania to the EU. Regulation 812/2004 represented the first coordinated 
measures to restrict driftnetting in Baltic waters, which had remained exempt from the
233 Driftnet fishing in this area was at this time regulated solely by the International Baltic Sea Fisheries 
Commission (IBSFC). As a result o f the accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to the EU 
in 2004, these countries were required to formally withdraw from the IBSFC, which exists nominally. 
Prior to the 2004 EU enlargement, the IBSFC which, in tandem with the European Council, had 
sanctioned the use of driftnets of up to 21km in length: Long and Curran, “Enforcing the Common 
Fisheries Policy”, at 283.
234 Article 9a.
235 Council Regulation (EC) No 894/97 o f 29 April 1997 laying down certain technical measures for 
the conservation o f fishery resources [1997] Official Journal LI 32/1.
236 Article 11.
237 Council Regulation 1239/98 of 8 June 1998 amending Regulation 894/97 laying down certain 
technical measures for the conservation o f fishery resources [1998] Official Journal LI 71/1.
238 Lequesne, “Politics of Fisheries”, at 124.
239 Article 11a. This provision also prohibited the landing of any Annex VIII species caught with a 
driftnet by Community vessels.
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UNGA moratorium due to the absence of any areas of high seas within the region. 
The Regulation provided for the introduction of incremental restrictions on driftnets 
within the Baltic Sea area, culminating in a complete prohibition on the use of this 
equipment from 1 January 2008.240 Complications with the timetable for the 
eradication of driftnet fishing meant that some adjustments were made to individual 
deadlines for certain areas within the Baltic Sea,241 but the ultimate deadline for the 
cessation of driftnetting activities remained undisturbed.
The prohibition of driftnet fishing has proved to be highly controversial, with 
concerted opposition to these provisions having been raised by coastal communities in 
a number of Member States. Indeed, the original Regulations introducing the first 
operative restrictions were both subject to ultimately unsuccessful challenges on 
various points of EU law,242 while a third challenge is currently on-going.243 
Moreover, in February 2006 a collective of Polish fishing interests petitioned the 
European Parliament seeking an exemption for national waters on the grounds that the 
ban would be likely to cause severe economic hardship.244 Polish grievances against 
the restrictions have also been raised within the ASCOBANS Jastamia Group.245
240 The incremental phase-out o f this equipment commenced from the 2005 fishing season onwards. 
The original deadline set by the Commission in its draft version o f Regulation was one year earlier than 
this, with a proposed moratorium to begin on 1 January 2007.
241 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2187/2005 o f 21 December 2005 for the conservation of fishery 
resources through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound, amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 1434/98 and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 88/98.
242 Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, Case C-405/92 [1993] ECR 1-6133, 
unsuccessfully challenged Regulation 345/92 alleging that it had been adopted on an erroneous legal 
basis, given that the measure was essentially motivated by ecological considerations and should 
therefore have been elaborated under the (then) Articles 130r and 130s o f the EC Treaty. An action to 
annul Regulation 1239/98, brought by France and Ireland on behalf o f the national fishing industries, 
was later rejected by the Court o f First Instance: Armaments Cooperatif Artesinal Vendeen v. Council, 
Case T-138/98. For full commentary on these cases see Caddell, “Prohibition of Driftnet Fishing”, at 
274-76.
243 In February 2007 a further challenge to Regulation 1239/98 was submitted to the ECJ as a 
preliminary reference under Article 234 o f the EC Treaty from the Prud’homie de peche de Martigues: 
Jonathan Pilato v. Jean-Claude Bourgault, Case C-109/07.
244 European Parliament, Committee on Petitions, Document CM/601531EN.doc; 3 February 2006. 
This petition was ultimately unsuccessful, although as noted above, Regulation 2187/2005 did adjust 
the timescale for the eventual entry into force o f these restrictions in certain areas o f the Baltic region.
245 At the inaugural meeting o f the Jastamia Group, it was observed that “Polish fishermen could not 
replace drift-nets by other gear because o f the nature o f the country’s coastline ... The ban on drift-nets 
would lead to the death o f the salmon fishery in Poland and to strong opposition from Polish fishermen, 
who feared for their future”: Report o f  the First Meeting o f the UNEP/ASCOBANS Jastamia Group 
(ASCOBANS, 2006), at 2.
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With legal challenges proving fruitless, astute operators have instead exploited 
significant drafting weaknesses within Regulation 812/2004, which proffered a vague 
and ambiguous definition o f a driftnet. This loophole has been controversially utilised 
by French and Italian fishermen, whereby the authorities have sanctioned the use of 
the thonaille and ferrettara respectively -  netting that is effectively the same type as 
that proscribed under EC law but the modification of which renders it technically 
distinct and thereby outside the scope o f the current provisions. In France, the 
decision by the relevant fisheries authorities to permit the use of this equipment was 
successfully challenged and annulled in 2005 by the Conseil d ’Etat,246 and in July 
2008 a similar action was initiated in Italy by WWF Italia against the use of the 
ferrettara. Additionally, the recent development of so-called “semi-driftnets” by 
Polish salmon fishermen has created similar problems of quasi-compliance with the 
relevant provisions, which has raised further concerns within ASCOBANS over
9 4 7cetacean mortality in the Baltic Sea.
In the light of concerns about the potential lacunae in the EC driftnet provisions, a 
new Regulation was adopted in June 2007 to amend Regulations 894/97, 812/204 and 
2187/2005.248 At the proposal stage, the diplomatically-worded intention of this 
legislation was stated by the European Commission as being to “clarify certain 
existing provisions to avoid counterproductive misunderstandings as well as facilitate 
uniformity in the practice o f monitoring between Member States”.249 Accordingly, the 
new definition of a driftnet, as established in Regulation 809/2007, is stated to be:
“[A]ny gillnet held on the sea surface or at a certain distance below it by floating 
devices, drifting with the current, either independently or with the boat to which it 
may be attached. It may be equipped with devices aiming to stabilise the net or to 
limit its drifting”.
246 Contentieux No. 265034; 3 August 2005; see Caddell, “Prohibition o f Driftnet Fishing”, at 281.
247 Report o f the Second Meeting o f  the Jastamia Group (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2006), at 8.
248 Council Regulation (EC) No. 809/2007 o f 28 June 2007 amending Regulations (EC) No. 894/97, 
(EC) No. 812/2004 and (EC) No. 218/2005 as concerns drift nets [2007] Official Journal L182/1.
249 COM (2006)511.
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This Regulation entered into force officially in mid-July 2007 and applies in all 
waters under the jurisdiction o f the EC. Nevertheless, it is true that a certain amount 
of technical creativity may be exercised with respect to virtually any official 
definition of a “driftnet” to create gear that will operate at the outermost parameters of 
the law. In this respect, monitoring activities by the recently inaugurated Community 
Fisheries Control Agency250 -  as well as by vigilant NGOs and other interested parties 
-  will be required to reduce the current opportunities to circumvent both the letter and 
the spirit of the relevant provisions in EC waters.
8.4.3 The use o f  “pingers ”
Perhaps the most ambitious provisions of the new Regulation involve the mandatory 
use of acoustic deterrent devices by EU fishing vessels. Given the importance of 
sound to cetaceans,252 it has been long considered that the development of some form 
of acoustic emission from fishing nets may prove to be the most effective method of 
reducing incidental catches. This has led to the development of appliances, known as 
Acoustic Deterrent Devices (ADDs) or “pingers”, which may be attached to fishing 
gear to emit a high-frequency sound to discourage cetaceans from approaching 
netting. Limited trials o f these devices to date have demonstrated that these appliances 
have the potential to be highly effective in mitigating cetacean by-catches and
253reducing incidental mortality to negligible levels.
Despite these successes, the use o f pingers does raise management concerns. 
Commentators have observed that the levels of success achieved in early experiments
250 The Community Fisheries Control Agency was established in 2005: Council Regulation (EC) No. 
768/2005 of 26 April 2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy 
[2005] Official Journal L128/1.
251 Article 2.
252 See W. J. Richardson, C. R. Greene, Jr., C. I. Malme and D. H. Thomson, Marine Mammals and 
Noise (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995).
253 S. D. Kraus et al., “Acoustic Alarms Reduce Incidental Mortality of Porpoises in Gill Nets” (1997) 
388 Nature 525; see also E. A. Trippel, M. B. Strong, J. M. Terhune and J. D. Conway, “Mitigation of 
Harbour Porpoise (Phocoena Phocoena) By-catch in the Gillnet Fishery in the Lower Bay of Fundy” 
(1999) 56 Canadian Journal o f  Fisheries and Aquatic Science 113; P. J. Gearin et al., “Experimental 
Testing of Acoustic Alarm s (Pingers) to Reduce Bycatch o f Harbor Porpoise, Phocoena phocoena, in 
the State of Washington” (2000) 2 Journal o f  Cetacean Research and Management 1; and J. Barlow 
and G. A. Cameron, “Field Experiments Show That Acoustic Pingers Reduce Marine Mammal 
Bycatches in the California Drift Gill Net Fishery” (2003) 19 Marine Mammal Science 265.
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have not been widely replicated, and have counselled against the viewing these 
devices as a panacea to eliminate by-catches of cetaceans entirely.254 Furthermore, it 
has been advocated that “the use o f acoustic alarms on gillnets should not substitute, 
but complement other measures, such as localized fishery closures”.255 Indeed, 
concerns have been raised over the reaction of certain species to the use of pingers, 
especially since evidence suggests that bottlenose dolphins and harbour porpoises in 
particular may be displaced from important areas of habitat by this equipment,256 and 
that accordingly pingers may ultimately prove detrimental to conservation efforts. 
Conversely, concerns have also been raised that cetaceans may ultimately become 
habituated to the sound of pingers in the marine environment -  as has occurred in the 
case of certain species o f pinnipeds -  thereby compromising the practical efficacy of 
these appliances.257 The response o f cetaceans to such devices varies markedly from
o r o
species to species -  and, indeed, from pinger to pinger -  ranging from strong
aversive reactions to little discernible change in behaviour. Accordingly, as noted
by Kraus, “rigorous experimental work on their effectiveness in the particular fishery 
and on a particular cetacean species should be done before pingers are implemented in 
a fishery”.260
Thus far, the development o f such a regulatory framework for pinger use has been 
largely conspicuous by its absence. Indeed, to date the deployment of pingers has 
occurred on a predominantly localised basis, primarily in North America in gillnet 
fisheries within the Bay of Fundy, and until the adoption by the EC of Regulation
254 See S. M. Dawson, A. Reid and E. Slooten, “Pingers, Porpoises and Power: Uncertainties With 
Using Pingers to Reduce Bycatch o f Small Cetaceans” (1998) 84 Biological Conservation 141, at 142- 
45.
255 B. M. Culik, S. Koschinski, N. Treganza and G. M. Ellis, “Reactions of Harbor Porpoises Phocoena 
phocoena and Herring Clupea Harengus to Acoustic Alarms” (2001) 211 Marine Ecology Progress 
Series 255, at 259.
256 T. M. Cox, A. J. Reid, D. Swanner, K. Urian and D. Waples, “Behavioral Responses of Bottlenose 
Dolphins, Tursiops Truncatus, to Gillnets and Acoustic Alarms” (2003) 115 Biological Conservation 
203, at 208-9.
257 Cox et al., “Behavioral Responses”, at 209. Estimates suggest that harbour porpoises may habituate 
to pingers in as little as 10-11 days: T. M. Cox, A. J. Reid, A. Solow and N. Tregenza, “Will Harbour 
Porpoises Habituate to Pingers?” (2001) 3 Journal o f  Cetacean Research and Management 81, at 84.
258 R. A. Kastelein, D. de Haan, N. Vaughan, C. Staal and N. M. Schooneman, “The Influence of Three 
Acoustic Alarms on the Behaviour o f Harbour Porpoises (Phocoena phocoena) in a Floating Pen”
(2001) 52 Marine Environmental Research 351.
259 R. A. Kastelein, N. Jennings, W. C. Verbroom, D. de Haan and N. M. Schooneman, “Differences in 
the Response of a Striped Dolphin (Stenella coeruleoalba) and a Harbour Porpoise (Phocoena 
phocoena) to an Acoustic Alarm” (2006) 61 Marine Environmental Research 363.
260 S. D. Kraus, “The Once and Future Ping: Challenges for the Use o f Acoustic Deterrents in 
Fisheries” (1999) 33 Marine Technology Society Journal 90, at 93.
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812/2004 had not been sanctioned on a wider scale. Regulation 812/2004 therefore 
entails the first major legislative instance in which the use of pingers has been made 
compulsory within a series o f major fisheries. However, it is accompanied by a vague 
and rather untested regulatory “framework” that is likely to require prompt 
reconsideration if  the EC pinger policy is to prove successful, both as a mitigation 
strategy in the specific European context as well as a desirable model to be exported 
to similar passive gear fisheries.
The rationale behind the introduction o f this policy on the part of the EC is listed in 
Regulation 812/2004, in which it is observed that “[s]ome acoustic devices have been 
developed to deter cetaceans from fishing gear, and have proven successful in 
reducing by-catch o f cetacean species in static net fisheries”.261 Article 2(1) of the 
Regulation requires the mandatory use o f in fishing activities by all vessels of 12m or 
over in length in certain fisheries within EC waters at certain points within the 
season, subject to a graduated phase-in period commencing from 1 June 2005. That 
pinger use has been made mandatory as opposed to having been incentivised in the 
form of grants or other material benefits is explained predominantly by the fact that to 
date voluntary acceptance o f such devices by the fishing industry has been minimal. 
Pingers are “expensive, require periodic maintenance, are prone to failure, may 
interfere with the setting and hauling o f the net, can reduce fishing performance and, 
in general, are unpopular with fishermen”. It is further incumbent upon the Member 
States to take necessary steps to monitor and assess, by means of scientific studies or 
pilot projects, the effects o f pinger use over time and in the fisheries and areas 
concerned.264
The current EC position in relation to the use of these appliances has drawn 
considerable unease, both within the fishing industry in a number of Member States, 
as well as other key multilateral bodies exercising regulatory competence over
261 Fourth recital o f the Preamble to Regulation 812/2004; emphasis added.
262 These are detailed in full in Annex I to the Regulation. In practice, with the exception o f bottom-set 
gillnets under 400 metres within ICES Sub-Area IV and division Ilia, the use of pingers is required all 
year. Under Article 2(2), it is the responsibility o f the master o f the vessel to ensure that all devices are 
fully operational when setting the fishing gear.
263 A. J. Reid, Potential Mitigation Measures fo r  Reducing the By-Catches o f Small Cetaceans in 
ASCOBANS Waters: Report to ASCOBANS (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2000), at 14.
264 Article 2(4).
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cetaceans. Indeed, to this end, four key deficiencies may be identified within the EC 
legislation as it currently stands. Firstly, as noted above, the mandatory pinger 
requirements apply only to vessels o f 12m or more in length; however, the majority of 
EC gillnet fishing activities are performed on vessels that do not fulfil this criterion, 
hence Article 2(1) is relatively meaningless in practice. Secondly, the monitoring and 
enforcement of these provisions is also likely to pose a significant challenge in 
practice. Due to essential safety reasons, it is neither feasible nor desirable to place 
observers upon vessels less than 12m in length and alternative monitoring schemes, 
such as the use of closed-circuit television cameras aboard such vessels are still at a 
very preliminary stage. Moreover, the experience o f  the US coastguard has proved 
instructive of the difficulties posed by the monitoring of pinger use, with the 
authorities generally lacking the facilities to haul nets for inspection, and remaining 
wary of tortious liability for damaging the nets and the catch even if  they had this 
technical capacity.
Thirdly, the use of pingers has been sanctioned on an apparently open-ended basis, 
with the Regulation designating specific phase-in periods, while remaining silent on 
the discontinuation o f these devices. In this respect, it appears that this policy 
represents a misapplication o f the scientific advice received by the STECF, which 
suggested that pinger use should remain a temporary policy due predominantly to 
concerns over the potential habituation o f cetaceans to these appliances. Fourthly, and 
perhaps most significantly, the environmental impacts o f pinger use on such a 
dramatic scale remain largely uncertain, notwithstanding localised information to 
suggest that the temporary use o f such appliances m ay reduce cetacean by-catches. 
Indeed, an understanding o f the precise operative basis o f pingers still eludes fisheries 
managers, with investigations currently on-going into whether by-catch mitigation is 
achieved either by warning marine mammals from nets or by displacing their prey 
from areas in which fishing activities are occurring.
This knowledge deficiency is seemingly replicated within the relevant provisions of 
Regulation 812/2004 itself, with Article 2(4) acknowledging that the experimental
265 Reid, “Potential Mitigation Measures”, at 16. Consequently, coastguard officers were required to 
formally board a shipping vessel, and the fishing crew obliged to haul nets in the presence of the 
authorities, which not only disrupted fishing activities but also created the safety problems noted above 
of an excessive number o f individuals upon a small vessel: ibid.
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nature of this mitigation technique requires considerable monitoring activities on the 
part of the Member States, while the preamble calls for further scientific research and 
for technical specifications o f pingers to be updated in line with additional data.266 
Given the tentative support for the theoretical application of pingers in fisheries, as 
well as the wealth o f research calling for a substantial degree of further investigation 
into the potential adverse effects of pinger use upon cetaceans, the widespread 
deployment of these appliances throughout EC waters on this basis appears to be a 
misapplication o f the precautionary principle/approach that is so centrally mandated 
within the framework o f the revised CFP.
8.4.4 Monitoring obligations
To ensure compliance with these provisions, Article 5 of Regulation 812/2004 
requires Member States to design and implement monitoring schemes for incidental 
catches of cetaceans and to appoint an observer for every fishing vessel with an 
overall length of 15 metres or more flying the national flag. Observers must be 
“independent and properly qualified and experienced personnel”,267 whose task is to 
“monitor incidental catches o f cetaceans and to collect the data necessary to 
extrapolate the by-catch observed to the whole fishery concerned”, with a particular 
emphasis on the monitoring o f fishery observations and by-catches of cetaceans.268 
Observers are required to complete a report compiling all the data collected on the 
fishing effort as well as observations on incidental catches of cetaceans to the 
competent authorities of the flag Member State, which in turn must report to the 
Commission.
As far as smaller vessels are concerned, considerable practical problems are raised by 
the possibility of an observer programme, with legitimate concerns raised as to the 
safety implications o f such a project, although other technical possibilities exist for 
these vessels involving mechanical, as opposed to human, observation. The 
development of monitoring possibilities of smaller vessels and recreational fisheries is 
an on-going project under EC fisheries law, as evidenced by the recent adoption of a
266 Fifth recital of the Preamble to Regulation 812/2004.
267 Article 5(1).
268 Article 5(2).
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new Regulation mandating both a Community-wide and nationally-based programme 
o f data collection from fishing vessels, with no qualifications based on vessel size.269
8.4.5 Appraisal
The adoption of Regulation 812/2004 has proved to be a highly controversial measure 
by the EC. Regulation 812/2004 remains essentially the sole legislative provision to 
explicitly identify the eradication of driftnets as the key mitigation strategy of a 
fisheries regulator against cetacean by-catches. Given the unsustainable rates of 
m arine mammal by-catches in many European driftnet fisheries, Regulation 812/2004 
has been warmly welcomed by conservationists. However, the success of these 
measures to date has been decidedly mixed, both in terms of providing an effective 
solution to cetacean by-catches in EC fisheries, as well as regulating driftnetting in 
these waters. Indeed, the current application o f Regulation 812/2004 suggests that this 
provision will require substantive amendment if  is to achieve either of these twin 
objectives.
Firstly, there has been substantial non-compliance with the various anti-driftnet 
provisions introduced to date by the EC, including Regulation 812/2004.270 Indeed, 
there have been particular compliance problems in the Mediterranean region, with 
some evidence to suggest that infringements were either officially sanctioned or, at
971 . . .the least, tacitly supported by certain governments. This raises the ironic position 
that EC waters, despite being subject to the heaviest restrictions, have remained a 
hotspot for driftnet fishing. Moreover, as noted above, loose drafting of the 
definitional aspects o f the EC driftnet legislation has created considerable loopholes,
269 Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 o f 25 February 2008 concerning the establishment of a 
Community Framework for the collection, management and use o f data in the fisheries sector and 
support for scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy [2008] Official Journal L60/1.
270 Due to its clandestine nature, the scale o f illegal driftnet fishing by EU Member States is near 
impossible to quantify accurately, although there have been some ad hoc studies. For instance, in the 
Mediterranean Sea, a study o f the effects o f illegal driftnet fishing for swordfish by Spanish vessels in 
the Straits o f  Gibraltar estimated that some 366 dolphins were taken as by-catch in the 1993 fishing 
season, with 289 individuals taken in the 1994 season, concluding that the incidental mortality of 
dolphins in the Mediterranean was not sustainable: see L. Silvani, M. Gazo and A. Aguilar, “Spanish 
Driftnet Fishing and Incidental Catches in the Western Mediterranean” (1999) 90 Biological 
Conservation 79.
271 T. Scovazzi, “The Enforcement in the Mediterranean o f United Nations Resolutions on Large-Scale 
Driftnet Fishing” (1998) 2 Max Planck Yearbook o f  United Nations Law 365, at 372.
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through which individual vessels have been effectively able to continue fishing with 
derivative gear, contravening the clear spirit of these provisions.
More insidiously, there is evidence to suggest that a number of EC driftnet fishing 
vessels were swiftly re-flagged in order to circumvent these restrictions.272 
Furthermore, despite the generous grants and subsidies paid by the EU institutions to 
underwrite the costs o f decommissioning driftnet vessels and promoting alternative
273gear, evidence suggests such vessels continued to routinely use driftnets and took 
considerable volumes o f cetaceans and other marine mammals as by-catches.274 In 
addition, and of overriding concern, the various infringement procedures operated 
under EU law have, in the context of illegal driftnet fishing, proven highly 
cumbersome and excessively protracted. Indeed, by an unfortunate irony, the greater 
the volume of evidence o f non-compliance received by the European Commission, the 
longer a substantive judgment is effectively postponed, since such evidence must be 
presented to the Member State in question for an official response before the matter 
may proceed further, thereby facilitating a vicious circle of regulatory stagnation. 
Indeed, this situation raised the possibility of external enforcement through the 
unilateral application o f US fisheries laws, which prescribes considerable scope to 
sanction foreign vessels using illegal driftnets.275 Perhaps rather fortunately for the 
Italian government, as is the case with whaling sanctions, the US government
272 R. R. Churchill, “The EU as an International Fisheries Actor -  Shark or Minnow?” (1999) 4 
European Foreign Affairs Review 463, at 480-1.
273 Council Decision 97/292/EC o f 28 April 1997 on a specific measure to encourage Italian fishermen 
to diversify out o f certain fishing activities [1997] Official Journal L121/20. The EU’s contribution 
increases to up to seventy-five percent o f the costs in the most economically deprived “Objective One” 
regions. Similar “bribes” o f this nature to have also been conferred on Spain, France, Ireland and the 
UK in order to eradicate driftnet fishing in the North Atlantic: Council Decision 1999/27/EC of 17 
December 1998 on a specific measure to encourage diversification out of certain activities and 
amending Decision 97/292/EC [1999] Official Journal L008/22.
274 M. J. Comax, X. Pastor and R. Aguilar, Italian Driftnetters 2006: The Oceana Report (Oceana, 
2006), at 13-14. Indeed, in practice NGOs have proved most adept at monitoring illegal driftnet fishing 
in the Mediterranean Sea.
275 The Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act 1987 was passed, requires the 
Secretary of State to enter into negotiations with foreign governments whose nationals and vessels 
conduct high seas driftnet fishing to assess the impact o f such activities on US marine resources: Public 
Law 100-200; codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1822. This was followed by the Driftnet Act Amendments of 
1990, which provided sweeping powers o f vessel inspection and sanction: Public Law 101-627; 
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1826. The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act 1992 extended these 
powers further still: Public Law 102-582. This operates alongside the High Seas Driftnet Fishing 
Moratorium Protection Act 1995: Public Law 104-43; codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1826g.
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ultimately managed to avoid imposing formal trade sanctions following some shrewd 
political manoeuvring by the Clinton administration.
Secondly, and of significant concern to researchers and conservation actors, the 
alignment of EC cetacean by-catch policy so ostentatiously with its controversial 
stance against driftnets has created a substantial rift between the legislators and the 
fishing industry. This has had a significant -  and, to date, largely unheralded -  impact 
on the willingness of fishermen to cooperate with and assist in voluntary by-catch 
monitoring operations with independent researchers. Likewise other conservation 
bodies, such as ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS, have often been erroneously blamed 
for these restrictions. Indeed, a large section of the fishing industry has considered 
itself marginalised, with the unintended and unhelpful consequence that cooperation
7 7 8from this constituency has largely evaporated. This has serious implications for the 
long-term effectiveness of these measures, given that the support and cooperation of 
the fishing industry will be instrumental in the ultimate success -  or otherwise -  of 
these provisions.
Thirdly, it appears that notwithstanding the introduction of these measures, there has 
been little net reduction in the volume o f driftnet fishing in EC waters and, by 
extension, the rates of marine mammal by-catches in these fisheries. Indeed, a 
significant number of non-EU driftnet fishing vessels, predominantly drawn from 
northern Africa, have subsequently moved into the fishing grounds vacated by the 
various Member States.279 There is very little available data on the scale of these 
fishing activities, but the statistics that do exist have revealed alarming rates of
276 See C. Espinosa, “The Humane Society o f  the U.S. v Clinton: Executive Officers Have Broad 
Discretion in Determining Sanctions against Nations Conducting Illegal Driftnet Fishing in the High 
Seas” (2001) 8 University o f  Baltimore Journal o f  Environmental Law 214.
277 E. Rogan and M. Mackey, “Megafauna Bycatch in Drift Nets for Albacore Tuna (Thunnus alalunga) 
in the NE Atlantic” (2007) 86 Fisheries Research 6, at 7.
278 Indeed, this issue has been regularly raised within ASCOBANS, especially the Jastamia Group, 
with cooperation from Polish fishermen towards researchers deemed “excellent” prior to the adoption 
of Regulation 812/2004 but has “ceased altogether since”: Report o f  the Second Meeting o f the 
ASCOBANS Jastamia Group (Bonn: ASCOBANS, 2006) at 8.
279 This point was not lost on opponents o f the anti-driftnet legislation among the EU Member States. 
As noted by Long and Curran, “Italy, in common with the other Member States which border the 
Mediterranean, has no EEZ/EFZ. Thus there is the belief in Italy that an indiscriminate prohibition of 
driftnets would immediately cause Italian fishermen to be replaced by foreign fishermen, free from any 
obligation whatsoever”: “Enforcing the Common Fisheries Policy”, at 289.
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cetacean by-catches that are widely believed to be unsustainable.280 Although the 
provision of funding to develop alternative fishing gear has constituted a key element 
of fisheries relations between the EC and various north African states to date,281 such 
a policy remains very much a long-term initiative and, given the considerable volume 
of areas of high seas within the Mediterranean region, the current EC rules remain 
jurisdictionally difficult to fully enforce.
Finally, and of overarching concern, although Regulation 812/2004 purports to 
provide an holistic approach to the mitigation o f cetacean by-catches, the measure 
itself is dominated by considerations o f driftnet fishing. Although driftnets have 
undoubtedly accounted for substantial by-catches of cetaceans in EC waters, 
Regulation 812/2004 seemingly views the prohibition of this equipment as a panacea 
against incidental mortality and is largely silent regarding other types of gillnets -  as 
well as artesinal and recreational fisheries -  that also have a considerable propensity 
for incidental catch. Moreover, the observer programme envisaged under the 
Regulation -  which, in conjunction with considerable practical challenges in relation 
to the introduction of pingers -  is also o f limited value, given that it applies only to 
vessels of 15m in length. The majority o f fishing activities in EC waters, especially in 
the Baltic Sea, takes place on vessels under this limit and the provisions are therefore 
rather meaningless in practice.282 Accordingly, it is clear that Regulation 812/2004, 
with its emphasis on a one-gear approach and largely untried and experimental 
technical fixes, as opposed to a clear commitment to the long-term phase-in of 
alternative equipment and a collaborative approach to the fishing industry, will 
require significant reform in the short- to mid-term in order to develop the full 
potential of these measures to address cetacean by-catches in these waters.
8.5. Concluding remarks
280 See S. Tudela et al., “Driftnet Fishing and Biodiversity Conservation: The Case Study of the Large- 
Scale Moroccan Driftnet Fleet Operating in the Alboran Sea (SW Mediterranean)” (2005) 121 
Biological Conservation 65.
281 Indeed, since May 2006 the EC has ring-fenced some €1.25 million to specifically underwrite 
programmes to abolish driftnet fishing in Morocco: Council Regulation (EC) No. 764/2006 on the 
conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the 
Kingdom of Morocco [2006] Official Journal L141/1.
282 Likewise, such vessels will not be caught by the relevant pinger provisions of Regulation 812/2004.
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It is clear that the EU has a highly significant role to play within the current legal 
framework addressing the conservation of cetaceans. This is indeed true at three 
levels of governance. At the international level the EU has become an increasingly 
important figure through active participation at various international fora. More 
subtly, the alignment o f a general Community policy is becoming an increasing 
feature within the various COPs, MOPs and Annual Meetings of a host of 
organisations, ranging from CITES to the CMS subsidiaries, with recent 
developments towards a similar position at the IWC. As a regional actor it is of even 
greater significance, exercising substantial competence over activities that have the 
potential to adversely impact upon cetaceans, such as fishing and, latterly, shipping 
and maritime affairs. Finally, at the domestic level, the transposition of EU 
commitments under the Habitats Directive and MSFD will frame national 
conservation responses in respect o f marine biodiversity for the coming decades.
In many respects, the EU is especially well-placed to regulate cetaceans, with strong 
legislative powers, structural funding and enforcement mechanisms that are largely 
absent from many of the institutions reviewed in preceding Chapters. Despite the 
initially slow rate of progress, the Habitats Directive regime is seemingly better 
placed to deliver a network o f MPAs with clear powers of designation, monitoring 
and review that are not generally replicated in other key marine regions. Likewise, the 
strong emphasis on cetacean conservation within the various political organs of the 
EU also present opportunities for the development of further regional legislation to 
protect such species, underpinned by a clear system of judicial enforcement. 
Moreover, there is considerable scope for financial assistance for research activities 
through schemes such as EU LIFE to contribute towards addressing the deficient 
knowledge base on species by funding long-term projects, such as SCANS.
Despite these clear advantages, the legal framework pertaining to cetaceans is subject 
to certain key shortcomings that will require further supervision by the EU institutions 
in order to ensure that the legislation is properly and effectively transposed. While the 
Habitats Directive presents strong conservation possibilities for cetaceans, the 
Commission must nonetheless continue to apply pressure upon the Member States to 
designate further SACs for marine mammals. Moreover, considerable assistance may
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be required within the new Member S tates in order to ensure a relatively swift 
establishment of cetacean SACs in the B altic  and Black Sea regions. Ultimately, 
however, conservation efforts under the Habitats Directive are to an extent 
undermined by the very high scientific thresholds for the identification of potential 
Natura 2000 sites in the first instance and, m o re  importantly, by the permissive nature 
of Article 6 that allows considerable leew ay for the continuation of major industrial 
activities within SACs. As Verschuuren no tes, “ [s]o far, many of the SPAs and SACs 
are small islands where large-scale econom ic activities are dominant”. Given the 
major industrial importance o f key areas o f  cetacean habitats, it is likely that this fate 
will be replicated in many emerging marine m am m al SACs.
In addition, while the current fisheries-based initiatives also raise strong conservation 
possibilities, not least in the “zero tolerance”  approach to destructive fishing practices, 
these provisions are subject to considerable flaws and will require further 
modification in the short- to mid-term fu tu re  in order to close substantial loopholes 
and improve their operational capacity. T h e  ban on driftnet fishing has become a 
highly significant aspect of the EU political agenda towards the marine environment. 
However, while the use o f driftnets in C om m unity  waters raises serious concerns for 
both fisheries and the wider ecosystem, the legislation has largely failed to date in its 
aim of eradicating such equipment in E uropean  seas. Moreover, the prospective 
pinger programme, which remains som ew hat theoretical at present due to continuing 
technical limitations, has raised concerns o v e r  the adverse impacts of sanctioning such 
a project on this scale with limited know ledge concerning its prospective impact upon 
the marine environment. With the R egulations having also impacted adversely upon 
the goodwill of the fishing industry in m an y  k ey  coastal areas, it is clear that further 
revisions are necessary in order for the leg isla tion  to realise its full conservation 
potential. Most significantly, a degree o f  accommodation will need to be found 
between environmental and fisheries com petences, as the transfer of fisheries powers 
by the Member States has created im portant practical difficulties in addressing by- 
catch concerns in national waters.
283 J. Verschuuren, “Effectiveness o f Nature Protection Legislation in the EU and the US: The Birds 
and Habitats Directive and the Endangered S p e c ies  Act” (2003) 3 Yearbook o f European 
Environmental Law 303, at 328.
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As far as the further development of EU cetacean policy is concerned, it may be 
considered that future regulatory initiatives are likely to be based around one key 
issue: anthropogenic ocean noise. More specifically, such policies are likely to 
address the impacts o f seismic testing and oil exploration activities, as well as vessel- 
source noise. Indeed, given that the EU is currently precluded from developing 
binding standards in relation to the use o f military sonar, consideration of this issue is 
likely to remain confined to the realms of ad hoc pronouncements and political 
lamentation concerning the effect o f this equipment upon the marine environment. 
Instead, initiatives through NATO will be instrumental in developing safer standards 
for military sonar, which may then be incorporated into national legislation on a 
voluntary basis by the Member States. In the meantime, the Commission considers -  
somewhat optimistically, perhaps -  that “Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive 
provides a balanced framework to solve possible conflicts of interest between military 
activities and nature protection issues”.
Indeed, as far as civilian sources o f noise and disturbance are concerned, Article 6 of 
the Habitats Directive will continue to play a primary -  and not uncontroversial -  
role. Some concerns may be expressed that this provision, on its current construction, 
will offer a less than optimal degree o f protection to marine species, while the balance 
of interests envisaged under Article 6 may be increasingly tipped in favour of 
economic interests. Given the importance o f industrial and resource extraction 
activities in areas of critical habitats for marine mammals, it is likely that the public 
interest exemption will be increasingly invoked in a marine context. Moreover, there 
are a number of examples o f national legislation within the Member States that, 
although in conformity with Article 6, nonetheless prescribe considerable preference 
to mineral extraction and the development of offshore windfarms over the 
conservation of protected areas.285 Such legislation will continue to run the gauntlet of 
the permissive provisions o f the Habitats Directive in this respect, for which there is a 
pressing need for clear guidance both from the Commission on operational
284 Marine Guidelines, at 101.
285 A particular example is the current Bundesnaturschutzgesetz in Germany, in which “[tjhe preference 
given to mining and wind power is rather astonishing”: D. Czybulka and T. Bosecke, “Marine 
Protected Areas in the EEZ in Light o f International and European Community Law -  Legal Basis and 
Aspects of Implementation” in von Nordheim, Boedeker and Krause, “Progress in Marine 
Conservation”, at 43.
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requirements within and around marine SACs, as well as the ECJ in adjudicating what 
is likely to be an increasing volume of litigation on these issues.
Ultimately, and despite these deficiencies within the current framework, the EU offers 
significant regulatory opportunities to address the conservation needs of cetaceans 
and, moreover, has consistently exercised a strong political and legislative will to do 
so. The priority activities for the coming years should therefore be focussed on 
increasing the Natura 2000 capacity, possibly involving the amendment of Annex II 
of the Habitats Directive to include a greater number o f species. Attention will also 
need to be focussed on developing an effective balance with key economic interests, 
such as oil and gas exploration and extraction, in current and future SACs. Such 
activities should also be complemented by addressing current deficiencies within the 
fisheries-based legislation and in continuing to advance influential conservation 
policies within key international fora.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
The primary aim of this thesis has been to establish the extent to which the various global and 
regional instruments and actors with a regulatory interest in cetaceans constitute a coherent 
and effective framework for the conservation of these species. Given the extensive 
conservation threats to cetaceans -  outlined in Chapter II of this work -  the concept o f the 
international “whaling regime” may be considered vast and open-ended.1 The full range of 
instruments and institutions applicable to these conservation threats includes an array of 
pollution control bodies, fisheries management organisations and shipping regulators, 
alongside treaties addressing climate change, atmospheric concerns and other environmental 
pressures. Accordingly, this thesis has examined the practices of what may be considered the 
core international structure addressing cetaceans: the leading biodiversity-related treaties, as 
well as overarching global frameworks such as the ICRW and LOSC. At the outset, this work 
identified three key research questions for evaluation. These research questions have 
accordingly led to a series of conclusions concerning the challenges facing both the 
individual actors within the system, as well as the regulatory framework as the wider sum of 
its parts.
The first key question examined the extent to which the IWC, recognised as the leading 
global regulator for many species of cetaceans, may be considered to promote the effective 
conservation and management of such species. In this respect, it must be considered that the 
experience of the IWC has been extremely mixed. While the Scientific Committee has 
attracted near-universal admiration for its essential work on the conservation needs of 
cetaceans, the management of cetacean stocks by the IWC has nonetheless drawn 
considerable criticism.
The ICRW regime is subject to a series of deficiencies that undermine its capacity to provide 
clear conservation leadership for cetaceans on a global basis. A number of clear problems 
may be identified. Firstly, and of primary importance, the heavy politicisation o f the whaling
1 P. Bimie, “The Framework for Conservation of Whales and Other Cetaceans as Components o f Marine 
Biodiversity” in W. C. G. Bums and A. Gillespie (eds.), The Future o f Cetaceans in a Changing World (New 
York: Transnational Publishers, 2003), at 111-14.
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debate has created a climate in which the IWC has struggled to operate in an optimal manner. 
External factors have played a key role in the transformation of whales, which were viewed 
in largely unsentimental terms at the conclusion of the ICRW, into a primary metaphor for 
global environmental concerns.2 Nevertheless, as the plight of whales was to a considerable 
extent driven by the ecologically deficient stewardship of the IWC, the roots of this 
politicisation lie predominantly within the Commission. Despite inheriting heavily depleted 
stocks of whales, the perpetuation o f management failures further damaged the conservation 
status of great whales. This subsequently generated the conservation concerns that facilitated 
the totemisation of the whaling debate within wider ecological consciousness. The political 
problems generated by these events have had a clear practical impact within the IWC. As 
public opinion has developed in many jurisdictions into a strong anti-whaling position, this 
has heavily influenced the policies o f national delegations at the Commission. This has 
created an impasse between pro- and anti-whaling constituents, introducing considerable 
circularity to the IWC debate that has often inhibited attempts to develop a more holistic 
approach to the “proper conservation o f whale stocks and . . . the orderly development of the 
whaling industry”.
Beyond these difficulties, it is argued that two central limitations work against the notion that 
the current IWC is appropriately placed to address the conservation of cetaceans. In the first 
instance, there is no clear agreement over the range of species ultimately governed under the 
auspices of the ICRW. Two schools o f thought have arisen. One takes a narrow view, that the 
Nomenclature of Whales originally appended to the draft convention during the negotiations 
constitutes an exhaustive list o f target species, mainly comprising the great whales and other 
commonly exploited species. Such a view considers that other species of cetaceans should be 
regulated via other bodies and must accordingly retain a peripheral focus within the IWC. 
This thesis favours a wider interpretation, based on a review of IWC practice — evidenced by 
a plethora of regulatory initiatives and pronouncements -  alongside the stated policy of the 
Scientific Committee to examine the conservation status of all stocks of cetaceans. Legal 
argument may be made for a wider recognition of competence, based on this subsequent 
practice of the Commission. However, a recurring theme within the IWC remains that its 
regulatory direction ebbs and flows with that o f its constituent parties. While the Commission
2 C. Epstein, The Power o f  Words in International Relations: Birth o f an Anti-Whaling Discourse (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2008), at 248.
3 Preamble to the ICRW.
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has given attention to a wide range of species, it is clear that it lacks the critical mass of 
internal support for a wide remit in this respect. The debate on “small” cetaceans has 
therefore been increasingly diverted to other fora which may -  or may not -  be better placed 
to address these species.
The second particular limitation has been recognised explicitly by the IWC in that the 
conservation of whales (however such a species is interpreted), is more nuanced than the 
simple levy of catch quotas.4 The pressures incumbent on the survival of whale stocks now 
considerably transcend the debate over directed hunting. It is clear that, in order to implement 
effective catch quotas for any future hunting operations, the IWC will need to consider 
cetaceans in more holistic terms than it has previously undertaken. However, in so doing, two 
key difficulties have become apparent in IWC practice. In the first instance, the Commission 
suffers from self-inflicted problems, with the political constraints having undermined policies 
of particular importance -  most notably the establishment of a distinct Conservation 
Committee and the elaboration of whale sanctuaries. Secondly, these concerns are problems 
of wider consideration, with global solutions requiring clear and targeted measures to reduce 
by-catches, address the degraded states o f many areas of the seas and mitigate the impacts of 
climate change. It is therefore questionable whether a treaty body primarily concerned with 
quota-setting is well-placed to address these issues accordingly.
The precise mandate for the IWC in the Twenty-First Century therefore remains an issue of 
key significance, both for the actual regime itself, as well as the wider structure of the 
“whaling regime”. This raises a third problem -  the inherent lack of a strategic direction -  
given that the composition and practices of the IWC leave it vulnerable to changes of 
direction. This has been strikingly illustrated in recent years with the adoption of two major 
“constitutional” Resolutions in 2003 and 2006 respectively, which fundamentally altered the 
ethos of the Commission. The Berlin Initiative appeared to consolidate a general policy 
direction towards a more holistic view of whales and other cetaceans and the need to strongly 
reinforce the IWC mandate in this regard. A short while later, the St. Kitts Declaration sought 
to limit this approach towards an increasingly commercial objective with more limited 
conservation obligations. The development of a new direction for the IWC -  whether it is
4 Resolution 2007-3: Resolution on the Non-Lethal Use of Cetaceans.
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considered “normalisation” or “modernisation” -  is likely to prove a protracted and hard- 
fought exercise.
This ultimately begs the question as to how the IWC should operate in the coming decades. 
There are a number of inter-related issues that need to be addressed within the Commission, 
primarily the position on directed hunting. It is clear that the moratorium on commercial 
whaling has largely proved illusory, given that a series of possibilities exist within the ICRW 
to continue harvesting on alternative bases. O f these, reservations and scientific whaling have 
proved the most contentious, and perceived abuses of these have led to a further souring of 
relations within the Commission, which further inhibits a negotiated solution. At present, a 
series of initiatives are underway within the IWC to develop a common strategic direction -  
or, at a minimum, a “least worst” option that can prove relatively acceptable to the greatest 
number of parties.
This is, in essence, the first major attempt to foster a negotiated direction for the IWC. These 
ongoing attempts to develop a package deal o f reforms represent a strong opportunity for the 
IWC’s constituents to re-engage with each other in a positive manner and develop pragmatic 
solutions to the current impasse. Nevertheless, this process is fraught with political 
difficulties, which may ultimately prove insurmountable. For this initiative to bear fruit, it is 
clear that difficult compromises will need to be made on both sides of the ideological divide. 
Anti-whaling states are likely to be asked to tolerate a degree of commercial hunting in future 
years. Pro-whaling states are likely to have to accept considerable limitations on their 
freedom to enter reservations, alongside substantial restrictions upon — if  not the complete 
abolition of -  lethal scientific research, in conjunction with a greater emphasis on wider 
anthropogenic concerns. If such a political bargain can be brokered in the coming years, a 
unified IWC has much to offer the global regulatory system -  both in terms of an improved 
stewardship of whale stocks, as well as influential political contributions in other important 
environmental fora.
However the IWC proceeds from this juncture, it is nonetheless clear that it cannot work in 
isolation from other multilateral bodies. Accordingly, the second key area of research posed 
by this thesis involved an analysis o f the practices of other components of the regulatory 
framework, alongside a review o f collaborative initiatives. Perhaps mirroring a wider trend in 
general international law, the multilateral regime for the regulation of cetaceans has proved
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susceptible to a considerable degree o f fragmentation, a process facilitated by the pertinent 
provisions of the LOSC. Article 65 has long raised difficult questions over the precise 
position of the ICRW in the regulation o f cetaceans, given that it provides for a clear plurality 
of institutions for the conservation, management and study of such species. The spectre of a 
host of alternative whaling bodies has accordingly haunted IWC meetings since the 
conclusion of the LOSC and, especially, since the inauguration of NAMMCO.
The years immediately following the establishment of NAMMCO have proved to have been 
some of the most politically fraught in the history o f the IWC, as developments in the High 
North have threatened to render the Commission largely redundant in the regulation of key 
stocks of harvested whales. To date, the institutional plurality provided for under Article 65 
has not facilitated the break-up o f the IWC and the establishment of regional whaling bodies 
as a realistic prospect -  although this may re-emerge as a live option if  the on-going 
negotiations within the Commission ultimately degenerate into acrimony.
Instead, this thesis argues that Article 65 has been used in a less divisive manner than may 
have been initially feared. Although the IWC has been keen to stress its primacy among 
alternative regulators,5 and has often directed strongly-worded Resolutions to bodies such as 
CITES in the past to this effect, there appears to be a more collaborative ethos at present. 
This is evidenced by the growing numbers o f Memoranda of Understanding concluded 
between the various conventions and a considerable softening of the rhetoric in IWC 
pronouncements. This thesis considers that a collaborative approach between the conventions 
is essential to the effective functioning o f the overall framework, given that a number of 
biodiversity-related treaties have developed significant policies in respect of cetaceans, which 
supplement rather than supplant those o f the IWC.
The CBD, as the leading biodiversity-related convention in terms o f global scope and 
application, has exercised a very limited degree o f attention to cetaceans. This is not entirely 
surprising given that it operates in a different manner to other leading bodies such as CITES 
and the CMS, which take a more individualised approach to threatened species -  from which 
cetaceans have been particular beneficiaries. Instead, the CBD has proved to be a useful
5 A. Gillespie, “Forum Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC, CITES and the Management of 
Cetaceans” (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law  17.
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forum to develop principles for the elaboration of Marine Protected Areas and other potential 
ocean policies that may have a residual benefit for cetaceans.
CITES has proved a somewhat reluctant component within the overall regulatory framework, 
with fears that the profound political disquiet generated within the IWC may be displaced to 
the trade convention having eventually proved to be well founded. An accommodation with 
the IWC has been reached, whereby CITES will retain full protection for species of whales as 
long as the commercial moratorium remains in place, based on a collaborative relationship 
with the IWC’s Scientific Committee. CITES will not entirely escape the political 
implications of the whaling debate, however, and proposals to delist cetaceans appear likely 
to continue for the foreseeable future irrespective of this position, which will continue to 
generate a considerable degree o f controversy.
Instead, the most pressing challenges faced by CITES in a cetacean context will remain the 
trade in live specimens o f small cetaceans. To this end, this thesis has demonstrated 
considerable problems concerning the grant o f import and export permits, especially in 
relation to no-detriment findings. Given the widespread uncertainty over stock numbers, in 
many instances a meaningful no-detriment declaration is near impossible to provide. 
Combined with minimal institutional consideration o f these requirements on a national level, 
a series of hotspots for trade have emerged -  largely among small island states -  which 
CITES will need to address as a matter o f some urgency.
Particular attention has been paid by this thesis to the role of the CMS, which must be 
considered a key component o f the multilateral framework addressing cetaceans. The position 
of the CMS is significant in two respects -  it plays a key role both as a wider framework 
treaty, while its subsidiary instruments further comprise important aspects of the overall 
cetacean regime. Taken on its own terms, there are a number of clear advantages to the CMS 
as a regulatory body for cetaceans. Firstly, it has unquestioned competence over a substantial 
array of both large and small cetaceans. Given the limitations consistently experienced by the 
IWC in its attempts to regulate a wide range o f species, this should not be underestimated. 
The CMS has therefore been able to develop conservation initiatives for a host of species that 
have been otherwise rather neglected on an international level. Secondly, the CMS has 
demonstrated a proven political will to exercise these competences, with cetaceans having 
constituted some of the Convention’s major conservation projects to date. Thirdly, and
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notwithstanding the emergence o f the EU as a distinct cetacean regulator, the CMS has for 
three decades remained the leading avenue through which to develop regional policies. This 
is starkly illustrated by the formation of ACCOBAMS, whereby initiatives by a variety of 
regional bodies to develop a distinct agreement were eventually aggregated under the CMS 
structure.
The CMS does face a number o f problems, however, that will impact upon its future ability to 
effectively address cetaceans. Firstly, the Bonn Convention is not concerned specifically with 
the regulation of such species. It has a vast remit and cannot necessarily concentrate on 
cetaceans. Likewise, despite initial criticisms as a “sleeping treaty”,6 the CMS regime has 
attracted a growing range o f parties over the past decade, which has brought a changing focus 
to species conservation initiatives. Secondly, the strength and structure of its subsidiaries has 
receded significantly in recent years. The priorities of the CMS regime have shifted from the 
formation of substantial and binding Agreements creating autonomous regional institutions, 
towards a more diverse approach focussing on the development of Memoranda of 
Understanding.7 Although there are advantages to this approach -  not least in that initiatives 
m ay be developed for a wider range o f species -  it remains questionable as to whether 
effective conservation policies will be developed out of the MOU framework. Thirdly, and of 
greatest significance, the CMS regime faces enormous financial and resource pressures, 
which affect its ability to generate and maintain effective regional subsidiaries for cetaceans 
and, indeed, many other species under its regulatory purview.
The CMS has, however, provided a series o f insights into the prospects and challenges for the 
regulation of small cetaceans as a specific concern, as well as regional approaches to cetacean 
conservation. As noted above, it appears likely that the current political situation within the 
IWC will continue to inhibit a clear regulatory direction for small cetaceans, beyond the 
endeavours of the Scientific Committee. To date, ASCOBANS represents the lone institution 
that seeks exclusively to regulate small cetaceans: ACCOBAMS has a broad ranging remit 
applicable to all cetaceans, as does the Pacific Islands MOU, while the Western African 
MOU applies also to sirenians. Beyond the CMS umbrella, NAMMCO applies to all marine
6 S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis o f  International Treaties Concerned with the Conservation 
o f Wildlife (Cambridge: Grotius, 1985), at 297-98.
7 Resolution 9.2: Priorities for CMS Agreements, adopted at the Ninth COP in 2008.
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mammals and, notwithstanding ongoing political concerns from within the IWC, has largely 
focussed on sirenians.
Despite the unique status o f ASCOBANS, it remains difficult to draw definitive conclusions 
from the practice o f this organisation on either the value of the CMS subsidiary approach to 
small cetaceans, or the scope for establishing further regional bodies for the conservation of 
such species. ASCOBANS is instructive up to a point, but it must also be seen as a product of 
its distinct regulatory environment. ASCOBANS has demonstrated some promise in 
addressing the specific problems affecting small cetaceans in northern Europe and has 
developed a number o f novel solutions that have been emulated in other CMS subsidiaries. 
Particular attention has been given to noise concerns and the generation of conservation and 
recovery plans, while there is some evidence that these measures have begun to inform 
national practices, especially in relation to licensing requirements and environmental impact 
assessments. Nevertheless, ASCOBANS has also suffered from a series o f key problems for 
which few easy solutions are apparent. The dominance of EC concerns has had a negative 
impact on the Agreement, and its ability to address by-catch concerns -  a key problem in 
these waters -  is heavily compromised by the transfer of fisheries competence of its 
constituent parties to Brussels. Likewise, a number o f institutional difficulties exist that 
recent reforms have failed to address and, arguably, in fact aggravated.
ACCOBAMS has been widely lauded as a superior instrument to ASCOBANS and it clearly 
enjoys a greater volume o f structural funding, a lesser impact from EC concerns and a wider 
number of participants. A series o f clear successes are also identifiable, with a number of 
novel approaches to by-catch concerns and ocean noise also notable. Its innovative 
institutional structure has also managed to unite two disparate regions in generating 
conservation leadership for cetaceans. However, in a number o f respects, difficulties 
experienced in ASCOBANS are also replicated in ACCOBAMS.
Indeed, although a considerable degree o f subjectivity exists in assessing the potential of the 
various CMS subsidiaries to regulate cetaceans, three cross-cutting deficiencies may be 
observed within the overall regime. Firstly, they all lack binding commitments. The two 
MOUs were specifically created as non-binding regimes. Moreover, ASCOBANS has been
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criticised for its predominantly soft-law and research intensive approaches,8 while the 
strength of obligations under ACCOBAMS -  despite being widely considered the most 
powerful of the CMS cetacean bodies -  are also rather uncertain. Secondly, they have each 
experienced practical difficulties in implementing key polices. ASCOBANS and 
ACCOBAMS have developed a series of potentially valuable conservation and recovery 
plans for particular species, but they have tended to be overlong, unduly technical and not 
conducive to swift implementation by stakeholders. Thirdly, and of primary concern, the 
CMS subsidiaries — like the parent convention -  have been clearly affected by financial 
constraints. O f the four bodies, ACCOBAMS appears to have been the most insulated 
through the additional financial commitments of Monaco to underwrite its institutional 
structure, but has experienced resource constraints in the development of further policies. 
Likewise, ASCOBANS has undertaken a variety of cost-cutting measures, but these have 
seemingly failed to deliver considerable additional funds for conservation measures while 
arguably weakening its institutional framework. The Pacific Islands MOU has struggled to 
source funding to support the employment o f key operational personnel, which will continue 
to impact upon its ability to coordinate conservation measures within the region. 
Considerable financial pressures have also been apparent within the Western African MOU 
since the earliest stages o f the negotiation process.
The final theme explored in this work concerns the role of the European Union in the 
regulation of cetaceans. In recent years the EU has become an increasingly prominent 
component within the global framework for the conservation o f marine mammals. The EU, 
which acts both on a global and a specifically regional context, may be considered to have 
exerted a broadly positive influence, albeit with some scope for controversy and conflict.
On a global level, the EU has been an increasingly influential element within the institutions 
established by the major treaties analysed in this thesis. This has considerable implications 
for the regulatory direction o f these institutions, as well as for the national biodiversity 
policies of the Member States. A common whaling position by the Member States party to 
the ICRW will clearly bolster the anti-whaling constituency in the IWC, both strategically 
and through the recruitment o f European countries that had previously demonstrated little
8 H. Nijkamp and A. Nollkaemper, “The Protection o f Small Cetaceans in the Face of Uncertainty: An Analysis 
of the ASCOBANS Agreement” (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 281, at 290; 
see also R. R. Churchill, “The Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas” 
in Bums and Gillespie, “Future o f Cetaceans”, at 310.
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interest in the whaling convention. The EU is committed to a continuation of the commercial 
moratorium, the cessation of lethal research and the on-going protection o f cetaceans from 
anthropogenic pressures and is likely to exert considerable influence -  both vocally and 
through the weight of votes -  towards these broad objectives. The official bloc EU presence 
within the IWC is a very recent development, and it is somewhat premature to draw clear 
conclusions as to the precise impact that this may have within the Commission. Nevertheless, 
EU participation has had an intriguing effect upon the behaviour of IWC members. The 
advancement of a distinct EU agenda has drawn a disgruntled response from a number of 
parties, but it has also led to the tentative emergence o f common regional positions. Indeed, 
during the on-going discussion on the “normalisation” of the IWC, the South American 
parties were keen to formulate a common position on whaling and the future direction of the 
Commission. It remains too early to tell whether this will constitute a definitive responsive 
trend, but there at least appears to be a degree o f interest for bloc negotiations among like- 
minded states.
On a regional level, the EU must be considered to have had a mixed record as an exponent of 
particular policies towards cetaceans. There have been a number o f positive developments 
under EU law, not least an emerging network o f protected areas, a clear acknowledgement of 
the problems of fisheries by-catches -  accompanied by bold and ambitious mitigation policies 
-  and a strong impetus to address the marine environment through the MSFD. However, 
particular difficulties have also become apparent, both in framing and in implementing the 
various EU policies to date.
The Habitats Directive exhibits particular promise through its dual approach to conservation, 
generating the establishment of protected areas and mandating the “strict protection” of all 
species of cetaceans. This regime is supported by significant enforcement powers, which may 
in turn be considered likely to be deployed due to the high political visibility of cetaceans 
within the EU institutions. However, this thesis has demonstrated that the Habitats Directive 
has not always fully realised its regulatory potential in respect of cetaceans. This is due to 
problems that are both historical and contemporary in nature.
On an historical basis, implementation efforts have suffered due to the initial uncertainty over 
the precise jurisdictional reach o f the Directive. Although its application to an extended area
303
of maritime territory had long been advocated,9 and was subsequently judicially endorsed as 
self-evident,10 clear policies for implementation in coastal and, especially, offshore waters 
have only emerged in recent years. With jurisdictional issues now clearly resolved, it is 
equally evident that the implementation o f the Habitats Directive is subject to ongoing 
difficulties in the case o f cetaceans and other marine species.
While the requirements o f the Directive appear prosaic, they nonetheless present considerable 
practical difficulties to nature conservation agencies. The data required to identify potential 
SACs for cetaceans is often highly challenging to swiftly obtain, given the practical and 
financial difficulties posed in conducting concerted studies on these species in the wild. 
Large-scale survey projects, conducted over substantial maritime areas, are often cost- and 
time-intensive, given that they are generally less accessible than those on land. In addition to 
funding considerations, studies may also be adversely affected by survey conditions, 
especially in unpredictable offshore areas, which may further inhibit the ability o f researchers 
to access such species and gather the necessary data.11 Moreover, the evidential threshold 
within the Directive for areas o f importance is deceptively high and potentially counter­
productive. Indeed, the stringency o f these requirements is cited as a primary reason for 
truncating the parameters o f a key SAC for harbour porpoises within the German EEZ.12 A 
similarly staccato approach to the identification of cetacean SACs has also been experienced 
in Dutch waters.13
Beyond the designation o f SACs, considerable challenges arise in relation to the management 
of these sites. The strategic importance o f many such areas -  which may be sited in areas 
with considerable oil and gas deposits, or key fishing grounds -  will undoubtedly provoke 
difficult questions in the balance o f interests between environmental conservation and
9 D. Owen, “The Application o f the Wild Birds Directive beyond the Territorial Sea of European Community 
Member States” (2001) 13 Journal o f  Environmental Law 38.
10 Commission v. UK, Case C-6/04 [2005] ECR1-9017; at para. 117.
11 Such considerations have impacted on the progress o f studies by German researchers, for instance, given that 
“[g]ood survey conditions are rare for the German Exclusive Economic Zones in the Baltic and North Sea”: U. 
Siebert et al., “A Decade o f Harbour Porpoise Occurrence in German Waters -  Analyses of Aerial Surveys, 
Incidental Sightings and Strandings” (2006) 56 Journal o f  Sea Research 65, at 78.
12 S. A. Pedersen et al., “Natura 2000 Sites and Fisheries in German Offshore Waters” (2009) 66 ICES Journal 
of Marine Science 155, at 160.
13 H. Dotinga and A. Trouwborst, “The Netherlands and the Designation of Marine Protected Areas in the North 
Sea: Implementing International and European Law” (2009) 5 Utrecht Law Review 21, at 35-38.
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economic development.14 The Directive provides considerable scope for derogations to 
nature conservation concerns which may correspondingly erode the protection accorded for 
important areas of cetacean habitat. Little indicative guidance has been provided on the 
coexistence of important marine projects and habitat concerns. It therefore appears likely that 
such issues will generate considerable litigation in the mid-term future in the context of 
cetaceans.
A further limitation of critical concern relates to the inter-relationship between environmental 
and fisheries competences and the residual powers o f the Member States to introduce 
particular conservation policies swiftly and effectively. The fault-lines between the two 
sectoral competences have been increasingly exposed by attempts to address by-catches, 
acknowledged as indisputably the most pressing threat to all species of cetaceans on a global
i c
level. Nevertheless, the conditions o f the CFP have had unexpected practical consequences 
in dramatically inhibiting the scope for Member States to introduce by-catch mitigation 
policies on an individualised basis. It is increasingly clear that a balance will have to be 
struck in this respect as part o f the ongoing reform o f the CFP, otherwise the framework for 
cetacean conservation in Community waters will be heavily undermined. The most likely 
avenue to rectify this position would appear to be through the delegation of more generous 
emergency powers to the Member States under the Basic Regulation to address by-catches 
within national waters. It is to be hoped that some accommodation between the competences 
can be reached swiftly to mitigate this legislative cul-de-sac.
Beyond the difficulties experienced with fisheries competences, a series of bold policies have 
been pursued under the CFP to address by-catches. In principle these are commendable in 
many respects, introducing a stronger series o f controls over driftnet fishing in a region long 
notorious for incidental cetacean mortality in this equipment,16 as well as demonstrating a 
clear commitment to enforcement, monitoring and mitigation. However, this thesis identifies 
a number of deficiencies within this legislation, which will also require reform in order to 
realise their conservationist potential as well as, crucially, fully engaging the cooperation of 
the fishing industry. O f primary concern is the fundamental lack o f application of Regulation
14 A. Nollkaemper, “Habitat Protection in European Community Law: Evolving Conceptions o f a Balance of 
Interests” (1997) 9 Journal o f  Environmental Law  271.
15 R. R. Reeves, B. D. Smith, E. A. Crespo and G. Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and Porpoises: 
2002-2010 Conservation Action Plan fo r  the World’s Cetaceans (Gland: IUCN, 2003), at 14-15.
16 P. Berggren, et a l , “Potential Limits to Anthropogenic Mortality o f Harbour Porpoises in the Baltic Region”
(2002) 103 Biological Conservation 313.
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812/2004 in the areas in which it is arguably most needed. Additional reconsideration should 
be given to the qualification requirements for fishing vessels, with a substantial proportion of 
the EC fleet currently lying outside the scope of the Regulation. Some degree of 
consideration should also be applied to the permanent use of pingers in the cetacean 
environment, given the significant conservation concerns exhibited over the deployment of 
these appliances. Combined with concerns over competences, it is clear that these well- 
meaning policies will require considerable attention in the short-term future if  the substantial 
by-catch problems in Community fisheries are to be effectively addressed.
Ultimately, two overriding problems have become apparent from this study of the 
international framework for the regulation o f cetaceans, for which there appear to be few easy 
solutions. The framework is undermined primarily by funding problems. Furthermore, and in 
many respects related to financial constraints, additional problems have been raised in 
coordinating the precise remits o f  the various actors. Funding constraints clearly remain the 
key problem, and one that is experienced across virtually all multilateral bodies. There is a 
constant shortage of finance within the treaty bodies examined in this thesis, with particular 
concerns arising within the IWC and CMS. This is thrown into sharp focus by the significant 
costs inherent in the conservation, management and study o f cetaceans. Likewise, the ability 
of these bodies to generate funding beyond the contribution of their constituent parties has
1 7proved highly challenging.
Some innovative solutions are being developed under the auspices of the Bonn Convention, 
notably the impending recruitment o f a designated Funding Officer to secure a greater 
volume of private sector investment in the work o f the treaty. Elsewhere, the generosity of 
individual parties has proved highly influential, with Monaco largely underwriting the 
operational costs of ACCOBAMS, and the United Arab Emirates sponsoring a CMS 
Regional Office, which will have a strong influence over marine mammal conservation in 
these waters. The CMS has also sought the emergence of what may be termed “champion 
parties” in other locations, although the reticence o f its parties does not bode well for the 
ongoing development o f cetacean subsidiaries in the South Pacific and Western Africa.
17 W. C. G. Bums, “The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International 
Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans?” (2004) 13 Review o f European Community and 
International Environmental Law  72, at 80-82.
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Allied to these shortcomings is a lack of clear boundaries between the various regimes, with 
the historical dearth o f coordination having led to duplication and conflict. A series of 
Memoranda of Understanding signed between key institutions has proved helpful to a degree. 
In recent years, the various Recommendations and Resolutions of major treaty bodies have 
helped to demarcate precise areas o f activity. Again, the practice of the CMS has proved 
influential and its ongoing commitment to articulating institutional responsibilities in respect 
of cetaceans -  combined with a clear programme o f collaborative activity -  represents an 
admirable model for other bodies to emulate.
In closing, it is clear that the period 2009-2012 will be of great significance to the 
international framework addressing cetaceans. During this period, if  political developments 
within the IWC remain conducive to progress, the Commission’s reform process may have 
generated a degree o f compromise and treaty adjustment that could allow this body to 
designate a clear and unified series o f future objectives. These objectives will inform the 
IWC’s inter-relationship with the other components o f the multilateral framework and 
therefore the precise degree o f supplementation necessary from other treaty bodies to further 
advance the effective conservation, management and study of cetaceans in future years.
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